This article is a comprehensive study of the category of obligation in the philosophical and legal thought of Ancient China. The authors conclude that the most ancient sources of the history of ancient Chinese philosophy are dominated by a theocratic perception of the category of obligation, culminating in the emergence of classical Chinese philosophy, which offers a more rational understanding of this category.
 The first philosophical treatise to address the category of obligation is Shu Jing, but it does not reveal the nature of obligation, but lists the specific responsibilities of the state and officials in the organization of society. In this context, "obligation" serves as a principle, a maxim of moral and legal conduct.
 The article states that in Confucius, obligation is a component of morality and is determined by one's social status. According to Confucius, if the social elite does not have a sense of obligation, they can revolt, while the lower classes, if they do not have a sense of obligation, can commit robbery. Thus, the authors come to the conclusion that the observance of responsibilities is the key to public peace, according to Confucius.
 The study noted that the doctrine of responsibilities was gradually transformed from a general philosophical understanding into a political and legal one in order to effectively implement the latter in the practice of public administration. Followers of Confucius advocate a symbiosis of ritual and obligation, believing that they establish social order, and without them, human society could not exist. At the same time, the authors dwell on the philosophy of legism, whose representatives tried to form the institution of responsibilities as a legal category.
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