Semi-presidential Research Articles

Shaping Presidential Powers in Hungary: Convention, Tradition and Informal Constitutional Amendments

Abstract There was no tradition of a republican president in Hungary before the fall of communism, and the transitory constitution of 1989 was unclear about the exact role the President should play in the constitutional system of Hungary. Some provisions even resembled those of presidential or semi-presidential systems; some ambiguities were clarified during the first two decades after the transition. Conventions, however, were established to some extent and sometimes very quickly. This period gave rise to guidelines as to how the powers of the President should be exercised. Some other powers were concretized and interpreted foremost by the Constitutional Court. These conventions and judicial interpretations formed the character of the Presidency to the extent of informal constitutional change. Some of these elements have even been incorporated into and formalized by the new Fundamental Law of Hungary. The present contribution will point out how the originally broad competencies of the President have been narrowed in the practice, and what role the Constitutional Court and political actors played in this process.

PREDSEDNIK REPUBLIKE NA RAZMEĐU PARLAMENTARNOG I POLUPREDSEDNIČKOG SISTEMA

The position and role of the head of state are crucial for determining whether a system of government can be determined as a parliamentary or semi-presidential one. In the five states of the former Yugoslavia, the established systems of government, although in principle parliamentary, contain a mixture of elements of these two systems. In addition to direct election, which is common to all these five states, proximity to one or the other system is determined by the scope and content of the powers of the head of state, and his position in relation to parliament and government. In that respect, analyzed systems postion themselfs in different places between those two systems. However, constitutional solutions in countries that go beyond the parliamentary system, yet do not reach the semi-presidential system, do not always correspond to the real role of the head of state, which is especially contributed by his (non) party character, numerous political factors, and areas of shared competencies and powers.

Legislative direction of regulatory bureaucracies: evidence from a semi-presidential system

ABSTRACT Independent regulatory agency has become the standard institutional choice in Western Europe. Little is known, however, about the involvement of legislators in their design and in their monitoring. In this paper, we analyse ex-ante and ex-post legislative involvement for 48 regulatory agencies enacted in France. We show that legislators debate and design more substantially agencies for which the government bill has already granted them more powers to appoint members to their board, or to be appointed as board members themselves. Once enacted, agencies that allow greater participation by legislators in their decision-making are subject to greater scrutiny, and this even after controlling for routine oversight activities. Regulatory domains matter, though only for ex-post legislative oversight. These results suggest that legislative involvement is selective and driven by strategic considerations. More fundamentally, they imply that legislative involvement could be more important in regulatory agency activities than usually assumed.

Governance by Perpetual Conflict: How Early Colonial Political Practices Undermine Democracy in Post-Civil War Sri Lanka

Abstract The 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka established a semi-presidential system within the country with constitutional provisions for a powerful executive presidency. Three decades later, practices of the presidents in the post-war period show commonalities with the Sinhala monarchy that prevailed in early colonial Sri Lanka. To substantiate this argument, this paper focuses on four kings from the Sithavaka and Kandyan kingdoms who reigned in Sri Lanka during the Portuguese colonization and the early years of Dutch colonization, i.e. from 1521 to 1687. These kings governed by feeding off perpetual conflict, using such as a political tool to retain their dictatorial authority and political relevance. Despite being formally constrained by the 1978 Constitution, presidents in the post-war period engage in a similar form of governance. However, this local conceptualization of the executive as a monarch clashes with the substantive democratic rationality of the office of president, which requires constitutional and political checks that apply beyond elections. Due to this clash between governance by perpetual conflict, which gains legitimacy from and has been instituted since Sri Lanka’s early colonial past, and democratic governance, the establishment of democratic constitutional norms within the country has been unstable.

Prime ministers, presidents and ministerial selection in Lithuania

ABSTRACT In the semi-presidential system of Lithuania, a tradition to elect non-partisan presidents coexists with re-occurring conflicts between prime ministers and presidents over cabinet composition. We investigate what factors increase the probability of presidential activism in this field, i.e. when the president attempts to affect ministerial selection. We explain the outcomes of such activism by the electoral cycles and the political weakness of prime ministers and their party governments. More specifically, we argue that prime ministers are most vulnerable to presidential activism right after presidential elections and when they do not enjoy strong support in parliament. We test these hypotheses with a data set chronicling all instances of competition between the prime ministers and presidents over ministerial selection. The quantitative analysis is supplemented with qualitative insights from interviews with former cabinet members and high-level officials.

Prime ministers and party governments in Central and Eastern Europe

ABSTRACT This article is the introduction to a special issue on Prime Ministers (PMs) and party governments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It argues that the political survival of PMs in post-communist democracies depends on their interrelationships with other actors in three different arenas. The first arena encompasses the linkages between PMs and their parties. In this respect, being a party leader is a major power resource for PMs to retain their office even under critical circumstances. At the heart of the second arena is the PMs’ relationship to other parliamentary parties. In this regard, the high fragmentation and fluidity of many post-communist party systems pose enormous challenges for PMs to secure constant parliamentary support. In the third arena, PMs are confronted with state presidents. Relatively strong CEE presidents, especially in semi-presidential systems, may use their constitutional powers to interfere in the political domain of PMs and thus jeopardise the stability of party governments. For each of these interrelationships, the article provides systematic evidence for eleven CEE democracies from 1990 to 2019 and situates the findings of the volume’s contributions within a broader comparative perspective.

몰도바의 준-대통령제 : 준-대통령제의 의전적 대통령과 의회제의 강력한 대통령

몰도바의 준-대통령제 : 준-대통령제의 의전적 대통령과 의회제의 강력한 대통령

Puppets of the president? Prime ministers in post-communist Romania

ABSTRACT With sixteen Prime Ministers (PMs) in thirty years, Romania seems to fit well in the Central and Eastern European pattern of countries with “weak” heads of party governments. This article aims at contributing to the extant literature by focusing on the relationship between presidents and PMs in the Romanian context. In doing so, it challenges the general assumption that in semi-presidential systems heads of state predominate over heads of government. The empirical analysis of all Romanian chief executives since 1989 reveals that the actual power of presidents over PMs largely depends on their political convergence with the parliamentary majority.

Relações Executivo-Legislativo na Perspectiva da Medida Provisória no Brasil e do Decreto-Lei em Portugal | Executive-Legislative Relations from the Perspective of the Provisional Measure in Brazil and the Decree-Law in Portugal

The purpose of the paper is to analyze the relationship between the executive and legislative branches from the comparison between the presidential system adopted in Brazil and the semi-presidential system in force in Portugal. The research seeks to identify whether different systems of government produce different results in the capacity of the executive branch to intervene and direct legislative production. To produce a comparison between the two countries, the prerogative of the Brazilian president to produce Provisional Measures was used as an analysis variable and in the Portuguese case the production of Decree-Laws initiated by the Prime Minister. The research comprised the post-democratic period in the two countries, covering 26 years in Brazil and 37 years in Portugal. The results found demonstrate the high capacity that the Portuguese Prime Minister finds to direct legislative production, but this has not remained stable over time. In Brazil, the President’s ability to obtain legislative support for his initiative projects is quite precarious, but this resource has remained stable throughout the analyzed period.

Ustavnopravni položaj predsednika Republike Srpske u svetlu uporednog prava

Although the Constitution of the Republic of Srpska was created in extremely complex circumstances, exposed to multiple, often violent changes, the underlined constitutional concept of the organization of power and the position of the President of the Republic remained unchanged. Thanks to that fact, the Constitution of the Republic of Srpska confirmed its vitality, and enabled the stable functioning of the state government. Although the semi-presidential system (of power) implies certain elements common to all variants, there are numerous specifics of its different manifestations. In this regard, one can observe the position of the President of the Republic of Srpska, who, in addition to immediate legitimacy, has vast and independent powers, which make him the true head of the executive branch. In light of these characteristics of the position of the President of the Republic, one can speak of a stronger semi-presidential form of government. Having in mind determinism of existing solutions, the similarity with comparative models, and bearing in mind certain specifics, the author is of the opinion that established solution should not be changed.

Predsednici baltičkih država - uporedni pregled

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are three countries that encompass diverse and creative constitutional solutions when it comes to the system of separation of powers and the constitutional engineering of the role of the president of the republic. Sharing the same Soviet history, these sovereign states continue to maintain high level of cooperation, but also develop their constitutional systems in different directions. While Lithuania adopted one form of the semi-presidential system, Estonia and Latvia on the other hand opted for parliamentary ones. Differences are especially prominent when it comes to particular presidential powers, e.g. presidential veto power, where constitutional solutions of these countries manifest attributes that are not only significantly different from one another, but also unique in a general comparative perspective and from the theoretical standpoint. Some of these powers also enable (or have the potential to do so) the presidents of Estonia, and especially Latvia to achieve much more prominent role in comparison to the one that is to be expected from the president in a parliamentary system. In this paper the author analyses key elements regarding presidential power in all three of the Baltic States, their constitutional foundation and framework, as well as real manifestation in political life, especially highlighting the sui generis constitutional solutions that the Baltic States exhibit in this matter.

Uzroci, razvoj i ishodište polupredsedničkog sistema vlasti u Litvaniji

In 1992, Lithuania, similar to many European post-communist countries, and differently from its Baltic neighbours, Estonia and Latvia, chose a typical semi-presidential system of government. A logical question arises, why did Lithuania take a different path in relation to Latvia and Estonia? In other words, it is necessary to investigate the causes of this decision of the Lithuanian constitution-maker, which can help us to realize why and when such solutions are being pursued. Secondly, when that path was already chosen, almost thirty years ago, it is scientifically justified to investigate how this system of government works in practice. The answer to these questions shows us the origin of this choice, and the degree of its justification, as well as the elements on which its positive and negative sides depend.

Problems of foreign service and diplomacy in the post-Soviet context: the case of Armenia

The institutional development of many post-Communist countries remains a daunting task. Since the early 1990s, some of them have managed to achieve visible results in eradicating corruption and enhancing the effectiveness and accountability of public institutions, while others still struggle with several systemic problems. Since regaining its independence Armenia has managed to transform some of its public institutions by carrying out large-scale reforms; however, much remains to be done. The present research examines the institutional features of Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) before the 2015 constitutional amendments, which changed the semi-presidential system of government to parliamentary democracy. It particularly looks at the MFA’s effectiveness in policy planning and formulation, its relation to the presidential administration, its recruitment strategies and the promotional prospects of the diplomatic staff. The study argues that for the past decade or so the impact of the MFA on foreign policy decisions has been limited, whereas the evaluation of recruitment and career promotion policies reveals several significant systemic deficiencies. Existing research on post-Soviet states concentrates mainly on diverse foreign policy and geopolitical problems and rarely pays attention to institutional considerations. The present research aims to address this gap.

Stability and conflict of inter-institutional relations within the framework of polish semi-presidentialism of the period of the “small constitution” (1992–1997)

The article is dedicated to studying the parameters of stability and conflict of inter-institutional relations within the framework of Polish semi-presidentialism of the period of the “Small Constitution” (1992–1997). The study is based on the fact that this period of the development of the Polish political system was the first stage in the development of Polish semi-presidentialism in the recent political history of this country. It is argued that the early stage of the development of Polish semi-presidentialism was characterized by quite significant conflicts in inter-institutional relations. The author argued that Poland chose a rather complex scenario of political and inter-institutional relations during the period of 1992–1997, since the formalized attributes of Polish semi-presidentialism at that time were significantly modified by the lack of political traditions and personal characteristics of Polish politicians, especially presidents. In general, the Polish semi-presidential system of 1992–1997 often provided incentives for power and inter-institutional conflicts and political/constitutional destabilization, especially if certain constitutional conditions, including the powers of political institutions, were ambiguous. Thus, it is established that both formally and politically, the Polish early case of semi-presidentialism not only foresaw, but even dictated the possibility and probability of inter-institutional conflicts, even when different political institutions and their personalities represented the same electoral majority or even a parliamentary majority.

Semi-Presidential Reform and Referendums in France and Romania

Abstract This paper seeks to examine how direct democracy was used as a means to achieve or to strengthen semi-presidentialism in France and Romania. Whereas the Fifth Republic is widely seen as the archetypal semi-presidential regime, Romania relied heavily on this particular model for its post-communist constitution but opted to drastically reduce the powers of an otherwise directly-elected head of state. Nevertheless, the Gaullist reforms of postwar France echoed through the turn of the century. Traian Băsescu used referendums in an uncanny resemblance to Charles de Gaulle’s own pursuit of constitutional reform. Both aimed to increase the president’s role and decrease parliamentary involvement in the dual executive. However, only de Gaulle achieved partial success in shaping the political system.

Problems of foreign service and diplomacy in the post-Soviet context: the case of Armenia

The institutional development of many post-Communist countries remains a daunting task. Since the early 1990s, some of them have managed to achieve visible results in eradicating corruption and enhancing the effectiveness and accountability of public institutions, while others still struggle with several systemic problems. Since regaining its independence Armenia has managed to transform some of its public institutions by carrying out large-scale reforms; however, much remains to be done. The present research examines the institutional features of Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) before the 2015 constitutional amendments, which changed the semi-presidential system of government to parliamentary democracy. It particularly looks at the MFA’s effectiveness in policy planning and formulation, its relation to the presidential administration, its recruitment strategies and the promotional prospects of the diplomatic staff. The study argues that for the past decade or so the impact of the MFA on foreign policy decisions has been limited, whereas the evaluation of recruitment and career promotion policies reveals several significant systemic deficiencies. Existing research on post-Soviet states concentrates mainly on diverse foreign policy and geopolitical problems and rarely pays attention to institutional considerations. The present research aims to address this gap.

Power in office: presidents, governments, and parliaments in the institutional design of contemporary democracies

The institutional design of democratic regimes has attracted much attention from a legal and political perspective, because it affects the actual distribution of power among political actors and the effectiveness of their decisions. The article advances a classification of the democratic institutional design, with particular reference to the triangular interactions among Presidents, Governments, and Parliaments. Moving from the assumption that the arrangements among these three top political institutions identify the main patterns of the democratic government, the distinction among Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential systems set by the constitutional law is rejected and a new classification schema is advanced. In this new perspective, the institutional design of democracy consists of the institutional roles of authority, procedural resources attached to them and arenas of confrontation among the roles.

Constitutional monarchies and semi-constitutional monarchies: a global historical study, 1800–2017

ABSTRACT The issue of executive power sharing in democratic countries with a monarch as head of state has received little scholarly attention. In many ways this make perfect sense; since there is no place for a powerful hereditary monarch in a democratic system, one could argue that systems with powerful monarchs do not qualify as democracies. Nevertheless, there are many examples of political systems, classified as democracies by most reputable categorizations or indices, where the monarch has, or has had, more or less the same position as a president in semi-presidential systems. The aim of the present study is to study to what extent the occurrence of semi-constitutional monarchies, i.e. democratic regimes in which power is shared between a prime minister and a monarch, can be explained by reference to Huntington’s notion of the King’s dilemma and the size of countries. The study is global and encompasses the time period 1800–2017.

Does the constitution matter? Semi-presidentialism and the origin of hegemonic personalist regimes:

This study examines hegemonic personalist regimes (HPRs) and argues that semi-presidential dictatorships are more likely to evolve into HPRs than parliamentary systems or presidential autocracies. ...

The Influence of Political Culture on Democracy in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Systems. Case Study: Albania vs France

The Influence of Political Culture on Democracy in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Systems. Case Study: Albania vs France