Governance by Perpetual Conflict: How Early Colonial Political Practices Undermine Democracy in Post-Civil War Sri Lanka

Abstract

Abstract The 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka established a semi-presidential system within the country with constitutional provisions for a powerful executive presidency. Three decades later, practices of the presidents in the post-war period show commonalities with the Sinhala monarchy that prevailed in early colonial Sri Lanka. To substantiate this argument, this paper focuses on four kings from the Sithavaka and Kandyan kingdoms who reigned in Sri Lanka during the Portuguese colonization and the early years of Dutch colonization, i.e. from 1521 to 1687. These kings governed by feeding off perpetual conflict, using such as a political tool to retain their dictatorial authority and political relevance. Despite being formally constrained by the 1978 Constitution, presidents in the post-war period engage in a similar form of governance. However, this local conceptualization of the executive as a monarch clashes with the substantive democratic rationality of the office of president, which requires constitutional and political checks that apply beyond elections. Due to this clash between governance by perpetual conflict, which gains legitimacy from and has been instituted since Sri Lanka’s early colonial past, and democratic governance, the establishment of democratic constitutional norms within the country has been unstable.