Semi-presidential Research Articles

The psychological effect of electoral systems in founding elections

In this research note, I revisit the conventional wisdom about when the psychological effect of electoral systems is observed. I rely on data from the first presidential and legislative elections in 45 third- and fourth-wave presidential and semi-presidential regimes to show that the psychological effect of electoral systems manifests itself in the first election. The effective number of legislative parties is significantly higher than the effective number of presidential candidates in the first election when the electoral system in legislative elections is more permissive than in presidential elections.

Cabinet ministers under competing pressures: Presidents, prime ministers, and political parties in semi-presidential systems

Although Prime Ministers (PMs) often have the constitutional right to fire ministers, their ability to exercise this power is contingent on institutional rules and party politics. This article focuses on the relative powers of Presidents, PMs and political parties over cabinet composition in semi-presidential systems. Several expectations regarding their ability to fire ministers are tested on an original dataset on the tenure of French ministers under conditions of unified government and cohabitation. The analysis shows that presidential influence over cabinet composition strengthens during unified government. Although the influence of both PMs and parties increases during cohabitation, their bearing on cabinet composition varies less than expected across the two executive scenarios. Moreover, ministerial durability is shown to increase during cohabitation. These results highlight the impact of intraparty constraints on prime ministerial influence and the asymmetrical relation between executive format and the ability of the President and the PM to control executive decision making.

La función parlamentaria de control a caballo de parlamentarismo y presidencialismo

Es posible comparar presidencialismo y parlamentarismo en los controles parlamentarios. Sin control parlamentario, no puede existir democracia representativa, tampoco en el presidencialismo. Las normas constitucionales y de los Reglamentos ya reflejan esa tendencia en Iberoamérica. Esta conclusión lleva a que el clásico debate sobre ambos sistemas de gobierno deba contemplarse de una manera distinta. Hay una pluralidad de tipos presidenciales y semipresidenciales de confusa diferenciación en la realidad. El presidencialismo originario estadounidense es antiguo y difícilmente exportable. El presidencialismo iberoamericano contemporáneo se ha ido parlamentarizando. Existe actualmente un continuum en el binomio presidencialismo/parlamentarismo con diferencias de grado más que cualitativas. Se advierten tres tendencias: la presidencialización del parlamentarismo europeo, la parlamentarización del presidencialismo iberoamericano, e influencias recíprocas entre los Reglamentos parlamentarios. Pluripartidismo extremado, representación proporcional, y un entendimiento absolutista de la separación de poderes presidencial, que impida los controles parlamentarios, son rasgos incompatibles. La solución más fácil está en abandonar ese entendimiento absolutista que no garantiza bien constitucional alguno. La duración fija del mandato presidencial y la idea de que el Presidente debe responder de forma diferida y directa ante el electorado hacen imposible mecanismos de control-responsabilidad política de su figura, pero puede bastar con reforzar los de control-fiscalización para construir checks and balances y representación política en el Parlamento.*

Legislative Cycles in a Semipresidential System

The political-legislation-cycle theory predicts a peak of legislative production in the pre-electoral period, when the legislator focuses on voters' welfare in order to be reelected. This paper tests the theory on the French semipresidential system, characterized by direct election of both the executive and the legislative branch. We use a data set that encompasses all the legislation passed in France from 1959 to 2012 at a monthly rate, and find a dual cycle of the production of laws, connected to both the presidential and the legislative elections.

The Essential Features of Electoral Process of Armenia in the Context of Current Changes in the Electoral Code

A constitutional referendum was held in Armenia on 6 December 2015. The amendments to the constitution changed the country from having a semi-presidential system to a parliamentary republic, with the changes planned to take place during the 2017–18 electoral cycle. The results of the referendum determine not only the current changes in the electoral code, but also the necessity and effectiveness of the new electoral system.
 Particularly, by replacing the majoritarian system to the proportional system and by increasing the representativeness of the parliament for some groups, we can create basis for the further development of the country. Above all in the article we discussed the main factors that have a big impact on the voting behavior of the citizens.

Essential Features of Electoral Process of Armenia in the Context of Current Changes in the Electoral Code

A constitutional referendum was held in Armenia on 6 December 2015. The amendments to the constitution changed the country from having a semi-presidential system to a parliamentary republic, with the changes planned to take place during the 2017–18 electoral cycle. The results of the referendum determine not only the current changes in the electoral code, but also the necessity and effectiveness of the new electoral system.
 Particularly, by replacing the majoritarian system to the proportional system and by increasing the representativeness of the parliament for some groups, we can create basis for the further development of the country. Above all in the article we discussed the main factors that have a big impact on the voting behavior of the citizens.

Descartes, Rousseau, de Gaulle: France’s Constitutional Waltz of Plebiscitarian Caesarism

Abstract Since 1789, France has had 21 constitutional regimes. This paper explains French constitutional instability through the optic of “constitutional culture” – the norms, attitudes, and beliefs, conscious and unconscious, held by a dominant portion of the French people about the nature, scope and function of constitutional constraints. French constitutional culture has historically been torn between a desire for a strong and effective state, and an obsessive veneration of democracy. This paper argues that France’s constitutional instability between 1789 and the constitution of 1958 was a series of swings between plebiscitarianism and caesarism, caused by the influences of Rousseau and Descartes. Problems remain, especially the risks of an unconstrained “hyperpresidentialism” and undue power to the street’s ability to bully the rule of law into continued rents. But the Fifth Republic has been successful because it balanced the tensions through a semi-presidential system: the plebiscitarianism of parliamentary democracy, along with the caesarism of a strong presidency.

Kosovo - An Atypical Parliamentary Republic

The topic of this comparative study is the republican character of the system of governance in Kosovo. In the public discourse and political communication, as well as in academic discourse Kosovo is considered a Parliamentary Republic, based on the principle “of the separation of powers and checks and balances between them.” Although the constitutional definition of the relationship between the executive and legislative favors parliamentary republicanism, the constitutional powers of the president, the government and especially the constitutional and political power of the prime minister, significantly weaken the parliamentary character, in favor of a semi-presidential system. However, neither the current theories of government, nor constitutional provisions can rank Kosovo among semi-presidential systems, or pure parliamentary systems. Comparisons of competence powers relations in Kosovo, with similar relations and competences of the countries of the region and beyond, testify to the specific nature of parliamentary democracy in Kosovo. It is precisely the comparison of the Kosovo constitutional-legal system of governance with similar systems and theoretical analysis of parliamentary models facing Kosovo model which will be the basis of support of the hypothesis that Kosovo is not a typical parliamentary republic.

Varieties of Presidentialism & of Leadership Outcomes

This essay explores aspects of the relationship between political leadership and institutional power, comparing the different forms that presidential institutions have taken across the world and identifying the relationship between these structures and social, political, and economic outcomes. Semipresidential systems are distinguished from presidential systems, and within the former, a distinction is made between president-parliamentary and premier-presidential regimes. Some scholars have argued that presidential regimes are less conducive to the successful transition from authoritarian rule to democracy than are parliamentary governments, but the empirical evidence is contradictory. Recent research has, however, drawn attention to finer distinctions within the various broad categories of presidentialism, focusing on more precise institutional arrangements and trying to identify which are more, and which are less, consonant with the consolidation of democracy.

President of the Republic

The starting point for studying the Croatian constitutional democracy is the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia on 22 December 1990. The said Constitution defines the system of government as semi-presidential and its authors state as their model the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. However, the importing, in 1990, of French constitutional provisions was not neutral since the original French constitutional text was stripped of institutional obstacles, constitutional institutions for opposing the will of the President of the Republic, constitutional-law conditions for the Prime Minister's primacy in the political system in case of co-habitation and discrepancies between the parliamentary and the presidential majority. The text was complemented by constitutional norms unknown to the original. French constitutional norms had to be put to good use, interpreted in line with and legally adapted to the desired political goal, i.e., the establishment of an effective state government in which the primacy of the President of the Republic would assert itself over both the Government and the legislature. The myth on the semi-presidential system was drawn on for both the adoption of the provisions regulating the organisation of government in the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and their amendment in 2000.

Recent debates and advances in the scholarly examination of presidential institutions

Research on presidents and presidential institutions has never been out of date. However, presidents in semi-presidential and parliamentary systems have attracted even more attention from scholars in the last decade. Furthermore, presidential institutions, executive-legislative relations and inner-executive relationships between president and government are important topics in most countries’ constitutional discourses. Their importance and thus their popularity make presidential institutions and relating questions no less disputed among scholars. Nevertheless, its importance stems largely from the role presidential institutions play in countries’ democratic development, the efficiency of governance, but also the simple fascination for presidential leadership. In this article, I will show that, despite the variety of approaches and topics, a common pattern emerges – namely, the shared emphasis by scholars of presidential institutions on the importance of the variety of constitutional design. The aim of this contribution is to review recent scholarship on presidential institutions in semi-presidential and parliamentary democracies, map existing trends, in particular present the common topic of constitutional design, and propose further research directions for a field where the standards are already immensely high.

Intra-Democracy Regime Change. Transitions Between Presidential, Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Systems

This article examines transitions between presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems in democracies. Using two major datasets, it identifies nine such transitions in eight different countries: Brazil 1961, France 1962, Sri Lanka 1977, Slovakia 1999, Moldova 2000, Turkey 2007, Kenya 2008, Kenya 2010, and the Czech Republic 2012. Findings from a close examination of these cases include the following: most transitions involve the semi-presidential regime type; serious crises precede the transitions in nearly all the cases and change is often used as a means of solving these crises; electoral volatility and turnover in government precede most transitions; change serves different functions in different political contexts, ranging from facilitating acceptance of anti-establishment executives to implementing power-sharing deals; and once achieved, regime change becomes an almost permanent fixture on the political agenda, with debates escalating rather than dying down.

Bicameral parliaments: Then and now

Today's scientific consensus has well passed the view that only 3 branches of power can be conceived. As a summary we can state that of functions of power, there are 3. These are: legislature, executive, and judiciary. These functions can be enforced by different power factors, the relationship of which can be different by forms of government. It is vastly different between the parliamentary, presidential and the semi-presidential systems, the last one being a middle ground. In the estate-representative state models the two chambers were intended to represent the different social classes. With the embourgeoisement, and thus with the spread of parliamentarism the 'second chambers' had long remained the depositary of the old ruling strata. In the democratic systems however - along with the former ones - we can notice the new functions of the senates, while generally their composition underwent changes as well. The dual adoption of laws can be the guarantor of a more measured legislation, and can prevent the necessity of constant modifications. In the case of the parliamentary systems where the parliament and the government are interlocked, it can create real separation of power, it 'hampers' the downgrading of the functioning of the representative body of the people into a voting machine, especially as the more different the methods of election of the two chambers are. The second chamber, created based not on the people's representation, at least not on the party system, could reflect the society along different ruptures, as the citizens have interests and opinions independent of their party affiliation, but which at the same time can still be articulable to political ones. It could create a representative system for the apolitical persons jaded with the party system; with regard to exercising both the active and passive suffrage. It could overrule the decisions of the people's representative chamber on a professional principle, and not on the binary code of government/opposition (especially with the involvement of professionals who keep their distance from the parties). Well, at today's state of party politics, the people's representative parliament by far cannot be viewed as unified as a result of the powers having fairly different opinions.

<b> The Semi-Presidential System of Cape Verde: the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative Powers </b> 10.5102/uri.v13i2.3533

O artigo procura analisar a relacao que se estabelece entre o poder executivo e legislativo no sistema de governo cabo-verdiano, onde Investigadores buscam compreende-lo, tendo em conta a sua configuracao pratica, teorica e constitucional. Ha que realcar a proeminencia do debate e dos estudos realizados no sentido de compreender como e que a academia cientifica procura debelar esta problematica. Duas questoes sao pertinentes neste debate: a primeira refere-se a configuracao teorico-constitucional do sistema de governo cabo-verdiano e a outra a pratica politica e legislativa.

El Presidencialismo: Análisis y diseños institucionales en su contexto

This paper studies the presidential system of government-the US model being its prototype-and its extension in Latin America. It breaks down the criticism that this system has received from the perspective of the parliamentary system, stressing the methodological myths incurred by this academic approach to Latin American presi-dentialisms. It systematizes the types of presidential systems, mainly the cases of Chile and Argentina, and the importance of considering presidential systems in their political and institutional contexts. It finishes with a reference to the semi-presidentialism, which considera a reasonable alternative for Latin America.

INTERACTION OF PARLIAMENTS WITH EXECUTIVE BRANCHES IN POST-SOCIALIST ROMANIA AND KAZAKHSTAN: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Studies on legislature-executive relations have gained a crucial place in the field of comparative politics. However, the most intriguing challenge for comparative political studies has been investigating the collapse of socialist regimes and development of new institutions in post-communist and post-Soviet countries. Accordingly, this article compares legislative-executive relations in Kazakhstan and Romania, in a longitudinal perspective, from the time of communism’s collapse. These relationships have evolved somewhat differently in Romania compared to Kazakhstan, despite both countries having semi-presidential systems. A comparative analysis helps us to better understand the role and place of the parliament in each of the respective countries. The authors identify similarities and differences of legislature-executive relations in post-communist Romania and post-Soviet Kazakhstan, while making some inference about the strength of legislatures. The article concludes with a summation that the frequent cases of no-confidence votes in Romania has resulted in an unstable government and, often, governmental crises, but at the same time, this indicates a relatively powerful parliament, whereas the non-existence of such practices in Kazakhstan has contributed to a strong, stable, and unanimous cabinet, but with a weak and subservient parliament.

A law-political Review of the Dual Executive System in Germany

A law-political Review of the Dual Executive System in Germany

Governments, Parliaments and Legislative Activity

Various strands of literature in comparative politics suggest that there is a differential impact of the type of government and their supporting legislative coalitions in parliamentary democracies, for example, in terms of their size and ideological heterogeneity, and on their potential to induce policy change. Most studies in this area focus on governments as agenda-setters, possibly neglecting the role of parliaments as a further key actor in policy making. In this article, we address the broader question as to how patterns of conflict within parliament effect legislative activity of governments and parliamentary actors. Through a simultaneous analysis of the success and event history of over 12,000 legislative bills in three parliamentary systems and one semi-presidential system from 1986 until 2003, we show how the interplay of actor motivations and institutional settings has a discriminating impact on the potential of both the government and parliament to induce policy change.

Democracy, development and the executive presidency in Sri Lanka

This paper examines the developmental causes and consequences of the shift from a parliamentary to a semi-presidential system in Sri Lanka in 1978, examining its provenance, rationale and unfolding trajectory. Drawing on a wide range of sources, it sets out an argument that the executive presidency was born out of an elite impulse to create a more stable, centralised political structure to resist the welfarist electoral pressures that had taken hold in the post-independence period, and to pursue a market-driven model of economic growth. This strategy succeeded in its early years, 1978–93, when presidents retained legislative control, maintained a strong personal commitment to market reforms and cultivated alternative sources of legitimacy. In the absence of these factors, the presidency slipped into crisis from 1994–2004 as resistance to elite-led projects of state reform mounted and as the president lost control of the legislature. Between 2005–14, the presidency regained its power, but at the cost of abandoning its original rationale and function as a means to recalibrate the elite–mass power relationship to facilitate elite-led reform agendas.

Vertical Accountability in the Semi-Presidential Regimes: A Micro-Level Prospective

This manuscript sets out to examine whether the complicated structure of semipresidentialism hinders the identifiability of government accountability. By analyzing the Global Barometer Survey data, we find that citizens can observe the distribution of political powers between the president and the prime minister and hold the actual executive head liable for government policy by identifying whether the president is capable of controlling a majority in the legislative branch.