One of the main objectives of Donald Davidson’s theory of language and content is to leave unfounded the skepticism which proposes the possibility that we are massively wrong about how the world is. It can be identified, in Davidson, two ways to argue against this kind of skepticism whose ultimate goal is to show the ‘true nature of belief ’. Our goal is to show that both argumentative strategies suffer some problems, so those don’t let unfounded skepticism. On the one hand, the omniscient interpreter argument is problematic because, or assume what it wants to show, that is, assume that we are not massively wrong, or it’s possible to think of a interpreter mistaken that, by maximizing the agreement with us, it would interpret us as massively wrong. On the other hand, for the argument of externalism and semantic holism, we show that the difference between getting a concept, doesn’t get it and to get it erred is not sufficiently clear and that this lack of clarity re-opens the possibility of skepticism about how conceive the world. However, we propose an argument to solve the problems that have these two ways of arguing against the skeptic. Our argument is to construct a flexible approach to the possession of concepts, using Putnam’s notion of ‘social division of linguistic labor’, from which it is not necessary to have all general true beliefs about a concept in order to say that it is owned. We believe that this reflection is important as it constitutes a response to radical skepticism about how we conceive the world.