Abstract
This article investigates the extent to which the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and Donald Davidson’s semantic holism (DSH) harmonize. We first characterize CSR, philosophical semantics (and more specifically DSH). We then note a prima facie tension between CSR and DSH’s view of First-Person Authority (that we know what is meant when we speak in a way that we do not when others speak). If CSR is correct that the causes of religious belief are located in cognitive processes in the mind/brain, then religious insiders might have no idea what they are talking about: only the scholar of CSR would have a chance of knowing what they ‘really’ mean. The article argues that the resolution to this problem is to take seriously DSH’s rejection of semantic bifurcation, specifically rejecting the idea that religious and non-religious language can be sharply distinguished. We conclude by supporting the following claims: (i) common cognitive neural/psychological processes are explanatorily relevant in proposed meaning-theories for any discourse, and (ii) those processes need semantic supplementation with reference to external and naturalistic factors (biological, cultural, environmental etc.).Keywords: cognitive science of religion, cognitive theory, holism, semantics, philosophy of language, religious studies, theory of religion.
Highlights
The aim of this paper is to explore some of the connections between one particular influential position in philosophical semantics – Donald Davidson’s semantic holism – and a relatively sub-area of the study of religion/s, the cognitive science/study of religion (CSR)
This section of the paper offers an ideal-typical account of cognitive science of religion (CSR), concentrating e ecia ly on those elements which impinge on Davidson’s semantic holism (DSH).7
Scholars in the area claim several distinct names for their field: “cognitive science of religion” (Lawson, 2000; Pyysiäinen, 2001; Bar ett, 2007a); “cognitive theory of religion” (Boyer, 1994; Anttonen, 2000; Whitehouse, 2004); “cognitive study of religion” (Kamp inen, 2001); “cognitive ap roaches to religion” (Boyer, 1990; Geertz, 2004), “cognitive per ectives on religion” (Whitehouse, 1998; Andresen, 2001), or “cognitive foundations of religion” (Whitehouse and McCauley, 2005)
Summary
In order to consider the interplay between DSH and CSR, we need to chara erize both. We begin here with the latter. Scholars in the area claim several distinct names for their field: “cognitive science of religion” (Lawson, 2000; Pyysiäinen, 2001; Bar ett, 2007a); “cognitive theory of religion” (Boyer, 1994; Anttonen, 2000; Whitehouse, 2004); “cognitive study of religion” (Kamp inen, 2001); “cognitive ap roaches to religion” (Boyer, 1990; Geertz, 2004), “cognitive per ectives on religion” (Whitehouse, 1998; Andresen, 2001), or “cognitive foundations of religion” (Whitehouse and McCauley, 2005) As this range of descriptions su gests, there is no broad consensus regarding the status, or the theoretical presup ositions, of CSR. We’ l dub the first position “pro-belief ” and the second “anti-belief.” one of the central tenets we assign to CSR is the centrality of the category of (religious) belief. A third common tenet, though not one central to our discussion, has been the idea that there is a definitive element to religious belief involving purported a lusion, at some level, to “supernatural agents.”
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