Affirmative action generates so much controversy that very often proponents and opponents both fail to understand the other’s position. A recent work by Michel Rosenfeld convincingly argues that the incommensurability of the opposing sides is based on fundamental disagreements about the meaning of such concepts as equality and justice: “the affirmative action debate is not between persons who are ‘pro-equality’ and others who are ‘anti-equality’. Both the most ardent advocates of affirmative action and its most vehement foes loudly proclaim their allegiance to the ideal of equality.” Within a liberal framework, two conceptions of equality are commonly defended—formal and substantive equality of opportunity. Both conceptions assume background conditions of the scarcity of goods, a need to compete for educational, social and economic benefits, and the value of rewards for fair competition as a means to individual self-development and self-realization. In the first section, I outline each conception briefly, summarize the sorts of affirmative action each defends, and show that the irreconcilability of the opposing sides is ultimately grounded in different conceptions of the self. I then go on to argue that both conceptions limit our understanding of selves and ultimately constrain attempts to achieve equality in a context in which individuals are also members of groups with identities formed in historical contexts of discrimination.