Selective Incentives Research Articles

Juvenile mortality and sibling replacement: a kin selection approach

Abstract Mortality generally is higher around birth and then progressively declines through the juvenile stage. In species where offspring depend upon their parents during maturation, a factor behind this mortality decline could be sibling replacement: offspring sacrifice their survival to benefit future or present siblings as early as possible in order to minimize losses in parental investment. Here, we propose a kin-selection model of sibling replacement. Theoretical analysis of the model and its application to demographic data of mammals suggest that sibling replacement consistently generates a selective incentive for increasing juvenile mortality at early ages when this mortality increment is the result of positive selection for juvenile altruism within the nuclear family. The model highlights how sibling replacement goes beyond optimal allocation of parental resources into dependents and can provoke greater mortality closer to birth also in response to a more favorable ratio of actors to recipients of altruism among siblings.

Women, political violence and economics

The participation of women in armed insurgencies calls into question a widespread belief that women are inherently more peace loving than men on account of their hard-wired caring disposition. To explain why women engage in political violence, existing research either ignores the fundamental collective action problem involved because of motivations focused on the value of the cause, or looks for selective incentives in the form of loot and appropriation, which often cannot be found. This paper offers a simple gendered model of the supply of violence that can account for both peaceful and violent choices and make sense of the apparent extremism of some choices as rational, not fanatical behaviour. Crucially, it regards the individual reward for violence as not material gain, but the possibility of women of breaking out of the cage of traditional gender roles and making a statement by their deeds, thereby joining a cult of heroes and martyrs. For evidence, we turn to the extraordinary involvement of women in the Russian revolutionary movement leading up to the 1917 revolution.

Free riding in NATO after the Rise of Russia: cost sharing, free riding and selective incentives in NATO from 2009 to 2019

After a period of relative overperformance due to the focus on output indicators in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) burden-sharing debate, we ask whether the shift back to input indicators prior to the Ukraine War meant that the smaller NATO allies have returned to their fringe position as NATO underperformers. According to the deterrence model, smaller allies are induced to free ride to a higher degree than mid-sized allies. Utilizing insights from public choice theory, our analysis demonstrates, first, that there is no support to the claim that the size of NATO member state GDP determines the percentage of GDP spent on defence. Second, selective incentives tend to reduce the incentive for small allies to free ride. The relationship between GDP and the percentage of GDP spent on defence capabilities is therefore conditional upon the net gain of the individual member state. Defence capabilities that are characterized as a public good when we control for exposed borders indicate a higher percentage of GDP spent on defence. Our conclusions show that even though small allies continue to free ride, they do so less than expected due to the existence of selective incentives in the period from 2009-2019.

All about power after all? A multi‐level analysis of employers’ organization membership in Europe

AbstractEmployers’ organizations (EOs) are the voice of business interests in social partnership and socio‐economic policy making. Their legitimacy depends on the willingness of employers to join them as members. We examine the role of two types of power that EOs confer onto their members as drivers of EO membership: countervailing power against labour and organizational power. By analysing large‐scale micro‐level data on more than 30,000 business establishments across 27 EU countries in 2013 and 2019, we find that at the micro‐level, company size, workplace unionization and the presence of trade unions and works councils are positively associated with membership, as is union density at the macro‐level. These findings suggest that, in contrast to contemporary arguments in the EO literature, countering the collective power of labour remains an important motivation for EO membership. The positive impact of company size also suggests that organizational power, that is the ability to influence public policies and collective agreements through EOs, dominates the services provided by EOs to their members as a selective incentive for EO membership. Further tests of this argument, however, yield inconclusive results.

Understanding Change in International Organizations Across Time and Spaces: The Rise of UN Country Teams

AbstractThis article analyses the progress of the agenda committed to tackle the fragmentation of the UN system to better understand the process of institutional change in International Organizations. Focusing on changes undergone by the UN's country‐level presence, the case study of the voluntary implementation of Delivering as One initiative (DaO) in Mozambique and Vietnam demonstrates how common plans, joint programs and pooled funds have promoted better divisions of labor and settled divergences among UN entities. This has fostered the national ownership of UN country‐level activities and developed the nexus of humanitarian‐development agendas. Pilot countries and donors resorted to selective incentives for the engagement of UN bureaucracies, who, especially at headquarters, remained resistant to reforms. Reform was subject to incentives and constraints that were introduced and manifested unevenly across spaces and over time. It lost momentum both in Mozambique and Vietnam following the pilot phase, when donors’ engagement faltered, but had more enduring effects in the latter, where the government’s greater capacity to engage in favor of reforms supported the compliance of UN country offices. This indicates the United Nations Country Teams (UNCT) consolidation amid institutional changes based on layering institutional innovations alongside extant structures, overcoming conflicts of loyalties.

Migrate, Cooperate, or Resist: The Civilians’ Dilemma in the Colombian Civil War, 1988–2010

By using innovative microlevel data from Colombia’s civil war, this article examines protests, one of many actions that civilians employ to resists peacefully armed actors during civil war. By using a cost-benefit analysis, the author argues that inhabitants can mobilize and solve their collective action problem when the costs of migrating or supporting one side in a war are too expensive. By examining the civil conflict on Colombia between 1988 and 2010, the author finds that civilians are likely to protest armed actors under three conditions. First, autonomous communities, which enjoy benefits associated with their territory, are likely to protest because migration would be costly; moreover, the institutional strength of these communities can decrease the costs of mobilization against armed actors. Second, foreign aid distributed through nongovernmental associations can empower individuals to take action by providing selective incentives for mobilization, thus decreasing costs. Last, high levels of violence, up to a certain threshold, increase the costs of nonparticipation and induce civilian action.

Why Rebels Stop Fighting: Organizational Decline and Desertion in Colombia's Insurgency

Abstract Desertion, or the unauthorized exit from an armed group, has major implications for counterinsurgency, war termination, and recruitment dynamics. While existing research stresses the importance of individual motivations for desertion, organizational decline, in the form of military and financial adversity, can also condition desertion. Organizational decline undermines a group's instruments to channel individual preferences into collective action. These instruments include selective incentives, ideological appeal, and coercion. When the binding power of these instruments diminishes, individual desires start to dominate behavior, making desertion more likely. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) insurgency is used to examine this argument with a multimethod approach. First, a quantitative analysis employs unique data on more than 19,000 reported FARC deserters from 2002 to 2017, provided by the Colombian Ministry of Defense. Guarding against threats to causal inference, statistical analysis indicates that organizational decline drives desertion. Second, a qualitative analysis uses a large body of detailed reports on interviews with deserters conducted by Colombian military personnel. The reports demonstrate that organizational decline weakens selective incentives, group ideology, and a credible coercive regime, and fosters desertion through these mechanisms. These findings provide key insights for policymakers, given that desertion can both contribute to ending conflict and accelerate the recruitment of new combatants.

NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ON SOCIAL NETWORKS WITH INDIRECT CONNECTIONS AND SOCIAL CONTROL

This study aims to investigate how various forms of social control, namely selective incentive and behavioral conformity, collectively rationalize participation in collective action, through indirect network connections. To address it, we use a public game model and analyze the equilibrium conditions of the emergence of collective action on centralized, star-shaped networks and on decentralized, loop-shaped networks. The results show that social control is effective in motivating contribution towards a public good; however, the effect is highly dependent on the ratio of the benefits derived from selective incentive versus behavioral conformity as well as on the structure of social networks. Moreover, we find that indirect network connections can be an important route through which social control can improve the emergence of collective action. These findings have important implications for collective action theory and for intervention in collective actions.

Analysis of participation in collective action initiatives for addressing unilateral agri-environmental externalities

The fact that agriculture is associated with negative external effects on ecosystems is of great concern. Most of these agri-environmental externalities are public goods in nature and therefore solving them through conventional market and regulation tools is challenging. Collective action has been identified as an option in dealing with externalities emanating from activities touching on agriculture and the environment especially in circumstances where markets and government regulation are not effective. In this paper, we assess the potential for collective action in addressing agri-environmental externalities. The study achieves this objective using cross-sectional household survey data collected from 307 households in the Lake Naivasha basin, Kenya. Results indicate that non-participation in collective action initiatives is a dominant strategy in the Lake Naivasha basin. The study also identifies factors that influence the probability of participating and therefore could be catalysts to encourage participation. Such factors include expected private incentives, labour endowments and agricultural commercialization. Positive perceptions and attitudes, the presence of social sanctions and norms of trust were also found to significantly influence participation. To deal with agri-environmental challenges through collective action, policy needs to focus on facilitating selective incentives, awareness creation and embracing local participation in resource management.

The micro-politics of corporate responsibility: How companies shape protest in communities affected by mining

Abstract This article analyzes how corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects individual incentives to engage in protest against mining companies. The study finds that CSR practices provide selective incentives to individuals that increase the perceived costs and reduce the benefits of engaging in collective action against the firm. This individual cost-benefit calculation is affected through discursive, institutional and distributive mechanisms. When CSR practices function to reduce perceptions of uncertainty and risk associated with the mining project, channel public participation through legitimate institutional forums, and distribute material benefits broadly, they increase individual perceptions of the costs of protest against companies. The study is based on a comparative analysis of eight cases of firm-community relationships in Argentina and Chile, and provides strong empirical evidence for the role of CSR in the everyday depression of incentives to protest in mining communities. The article offers a novel framework for understanding corporate social responsibility that theorizes the social practices of companies in terms of their effects on individual incentives to engage in collective action, which is fully compatible with the contentious politics approach, and adds analytical power and nuance to existing efforts to understand social conflicts.

Autonomização do campo judicial e redefinição das elites judiciais locais

O que o presente trabalho buscou identificar foi o tipo de processo de transformação do campo político da administração judicial brasileira e seus efeitos a partir da institucionalização da Carta de 1988 e da EC n. 45/2004 que produziram incentivos seletivos para a formação de um novo campo político da administração judicial no Brasil. A partir da investigação pode-se constatar: 1. O acentuado e significativo grau da autonomia do campo judicial brasileiro em relação às demais instituições democrático-representativas; 2. O insulamento burocrático do campo judicial e a nova articulação desse campo com os executivos estaduais; 3. Como esse processo de autonomização se fundou em uma retórica autoritária de profissionalização do campo que legitima o próprio insulamento burocrático e se expressa em um novo tipo de elite judicial dentro do campo de administração política nas Justiças estaduais; 4. O surgimento de uma nova elite judicial que se auto representa como portadora da modernização e da profissionalização do campo judicial e incorpora o habitus dessa auto representação e 5. A nova articulação do Executivo e do Judiciário locais que estabelecem um modo de articulação com vistas a garantir o insulamento dessa elite judicial em relação aos outros partícipes do campo político-burocrático.

A Tragic Solution to the Collective Action Problem: Implications for Corruption, Conflict and Inequality

We study the role of an enforcer in the effectiveness of selective incentives in solving the collective action problem when groups take part in a contest. Cost functions exhibit constant elasticity of marginal effort costs. If prize valuations are homogeneous, our source of heterogeneity induces full cost-sharing and the first-best individual contributions; further, the group probability of winning goes up. With heterogeneity in prize valuations, an increase in the effectiveness of the enforcer in conflict increases the group probability of winning only if the prize valuation of the enforcer is lower than de Lehmer mean of those of the other players; however, the induced partial cost sharing is not group efficient. If effectiveness tends to infinity, the collective action problem is solved with partial cost-sharing if that prize valuation is not too low. Tragically, if productivity is low (if the prize is private in our set up) this occurs with corrupt coalitions which have been shown to form together with conflict and inequality endogenously; otherwise, this occurs with non corrupt coalitions. Further, even if such valuation is too low the group winning probability goes up. In this latter case, over cost-sharing yields group efficiency.

Predicament and Elimination of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Cooperative Air Pollution Control

The Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei air pollution collaborative governance still has difficulties such as insufficient willingness to participate actively, opportunistic behavior, and lack of stable and coordinated cooperation. By comparing the theoretical implications of collaborative governance and the reality of air pollution control in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei, the causes of the dilemma are explained from three levels: relationship networks, action strategies, and governance structures: stress-type relationships between central and local governments, and “strong-Chinese” “Weak” development pattern and asymmetric resource dependence between government and enterprises lead to insufficient participation of local governments and enterprises; it is difficult for the actors to reach consensus on action strategies based on the “benefit-risk” analysis, making it easier for local governments and enterprises Opportunistic behaviors and inability to participate effectively in governance; the “pyramid” governance structure between central and local governments, the governance structure with insufficient communication and coordination between local governments, and the lack of incentives between government and enterprises affect the stability and cooperation of collaborative governance Coordination. In the future, it is necessary to eliminate the predicament of coordinated governance of air pollution in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, and promote air pollution through clear division of authority between central and local governments, effective communication and coordination of collaboration groups, improvement of income distribution and risk sharing mechanisms, and construction of selective incentive mechanisms. Effective problem solving.

Farmers in Singapore? Collective Action under Adverse Circumstances

ABSTRACT How can individuals with contrasting interests in a declining industry, at odds with the country’s identity, and facing an illiberal and sceptical government, band together to promote collective goals? This article addresses this question by examining Singapore’s Kranji Countryside Association, one of Singapore’s few civil society organisations to focus on community organising. To Association members, the material and time costs of organising were high, the odds of success were low and the material rewards of success were modest. The article evaluates two views that purport to explain collective action: the rational choice approach that focuses on selective incentives and the social-psychological approach that emphasises non-excludable collective incentives and collective identity. It is concluded that while selective incentives were necessary for attracting several non-active members to fill out the ranks of the organisation, the rational choice approach cannot explain the group’s initial establishment or why some members have been especially active. For this, social-psychological factors were vital to both building and sustaining the organisation. The results illuminate collective action in Singapore’s illiberal context and enhance our understanding of the state’s dilemmas in managing civil society.

The Economics of a Targeted Economic Development Subsidy

In an effort to spur economic growth and to burnish their job-creation bona fides, policymakers at the federal, state, and local levels often dispense targeted economic development subsidies. These selective incentives include targeted tax relief, targeted regulatory relief, cash subsidies, and in-kind donations of land and other valuable goods and services. The weight of economic theory suggests that these subsidies do not work and may even depress economic activity. In this paper, we review the economic case for and against targeted economic development subsidies, using Wisconsin’s $1.2 billion to $3.6 billion subsidy to Foxconn to illustrate these points. We show that under realistic scenarios the subsidy may depress state economic activity by tens of billions of dollars over the next 15 years.

Теоретичні погляди на поняття «набуття членства» в соціології організацій

The article reveals the theoretical basis for the development of the concept of «membership in organizations». In sociology, the term "membership" is used in a broad (member of society) and narrow (member of a formal organization) sense. At the level of professional, totalitarian and bureaucratic organizations as social segments, membership is modified as «belonging status», organizational identity, subordination and involvement. Certain value principles are revealed, the formal implementation of which is guarded by the statute and the oath. Organizations decide, on the one hand, on the acquisition and termination of membership, and on the other on the transfer of members to various positions in the organization. Acquisition of membership turns the individual into a component of staff, which becomes the object of organizational decisions. The macro-sociological concepts of F.Tönnies, M.Duverger, T.Parsons, M.Olson present membership as a formal-bureaucratic procedure with limited and open access. Admission to the group, the organization is a preliminary investigation and establishment of the ethical value of the applicant and receipt after testing and testing of the approbation as a «full». Joining the organization or gaining membership in it is a complex procedure of social cooperation, mutual consent. You can join a closed organization only after a long probationary period and serious recommendations from the responsible guarantors, even passing an examination and filtration commission, providing evidence of sincerity and firmness of intention. There are groups with limited and open access, but the process of joining and leaving the group is determined by the nature of the goal that the group wants to achieve, not by some characteristics of membership. Thus, pressure groups (lobbying organizations) attract participants partly through subtle forms of coercion, and partly through the provision of selective incentives (legal and financial advice, advocacy of members of associations before the judiciary and law enforcement agencies). With the acquisition of membership in one organization, the individual receives formal isolation from a member of another organization. Members of a particular organization can be recognized by symbols (flag, emblem, slogan, etc.). Any organization can set its own restrictions or qualifications: age, availability of written recommendations, entrance fees. Active participation in membership not only deepens the experience of the individual and expands the potential of the organization, but expands its influence within the community, involving a wider segment of the community in organizational activities.

A Tragic Solution to the Collective Action Problem: Implications for Corruption, Conflict and Inequality

We study the role of an enforcer in the effectiveness of selective incentives in solving the collective action problem when groups take part in a contest. Cost functions exhibit constant elasticity of marginal effort costs. If prize valuations are homogeneous, our source of heterogeneity induces full cost-sharing and the first-best individual contributions; further, the group probability of winning goes up. With heterogeneity in prize valuations, an increase in the effectiveness of the enforcer in conflict increases the group probability of winning only if the prize valuation of the enforcer is lower than de Lehmer mean of those of the other players; however, the induced partial cost sharing is not group efficient. If effectiveness tends to infinity, the collective action problem is solved with partial cost-sharing if that prize valuation is not too low. Tragically, if productivity is low (if the prize is private in our set up) this occurs with corrupt coalitions which have been shown to form together with conflict and inequality endogenously; otherwise, this occurs with non corrupt coalitions. Further, even if such valuation is too low the group winning probability goes up. In this latter case, over cost-sharing yields group efficiency.

Joining the party: Incentives and motivations of members and registered sympathizers in contemporary multi-speed membership parties

Many parties have updated their recruitment strategies and offer softer routes for joining their ranks. In some parties, registered sympathizers are given virtually the same rights as traditional members with substantially lower costs. This begs the question, why would somebody take the further step of joining such parties as full members rather than sympathizers? This article analyzes this question by using membership surveys from three left-wing Spanish parties. As such, it explores the usefulness of the general incentives model (GIM) for explaining the decisions of these two groups of affiliates. We find that full members and sympathizers differ in the motives they have to join the party and in their evaluations of the diverse types of incentives included in the GIM. Candidate selection incentives seem particularly important for sympathizers, whereas selective outcome incentives, selective process benefits, collective outcome benefits and altruistic motivations play a more significant role for members.

Intra-party conflict at grassroots: Party-councillor ideological congruence in Croatia

Party-councillor ideological congruence reinforces party linkages with local voters and credibility of councillors as future party elites. This contribution examines the role of career motivations and selective incentives, as well as party branch characteristics in forming party-councillor congruence. The empirical analysis draws on the original survey of Croatian local councillors. The results find councillors with progressive ambition and those exposed to intra-branch competition reporting higher levels of ideological congruence with their parties, while no effect was found for holders of upper level party positions. Branch power has the opposite effect from expected. Party grassroots shape ideologically congruent professional politicians, but this function is challenged by shrinking supply of candidates.

Linkage Based on the Kandori Norm Successfully Sustains Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Since social dilemmas among n-persons are often embedded in other types of social exchanges, the exclusion of defectors in social dilemmas from other exchanges functions as a costless selective incentive. Recently, such “linkage” has been considered as a promising solution to resolve the social dilemma problem. However, previous research showed that cooperation sustained by linkage is fragile when subjective perception errors exist. The purpose of this study is to find linkage strategies that are robust against subjective perception errors. Based on the strategies presented in previous studies on indirect reciprocity, we devised several linkage strategies and examined their evolutionary stability by agent-based simulation. The simulation results showed that the linkage strategy based on kandori was evolutionarily stable even when perception errors existed. Our study provides substantial support for the argument that linkage is a plausible solution to the social dilemma problem.