Predicament and Elimination of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Cooperative Air Pollution Control

Abstract

The Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei air pollution collaborative governance still has difficulties such as insufficient willingness to participate actively, opportunistic behavior, and lack of stable and coordinated cooperation. By comparing the theoretical implications of collaborative governance and the reality of air pollution control in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei, the causes of the dilemma are explained from three levels: relationship networks, action strategies, and governance structures: stress-type relationships between central and local governments, and “strong-Chinese” “Weak” development pattern and asymmetric resource dependence between government and enterprises lead to insufficient participation of local governments and enterprises; it is difficult for the actors to reach consensus on action strategies based on the “benefit-risk” analysis, making it easier for local governments and enterprises Opportunistic behaviors and inability to participate effectively in governance; the “pyramid” governance structure between central and local governments, the governance structure with insufficient communication and coordination between local governments, and the lack of incentives between government and enterprises affect the stability and cooperation of collaborative governance Coordination. In the future, it is necessary to eliminate the predicament of coordinated governance of air pollution in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, and promote air pollution through clear division of authority between central and local governments, effective communication and coordination of collaboration groups, improvement of income distribution and risk sharing mechanisms, and construction of selective incentive mechanisms. Effective problem solving.