The Evolutionary Game of Cooperative Air Pollution Management under Complex Networks

Abstract

In this paper, based on complex networks and evolutionary game theory, we use Text Mining and Analytics, MATLAB Simulation, and other technical means to study the decision-making process of each subject in the collaborative air pollution management network, taking the “limited rational” local government as the decision-making subject of the evolutionary game. The study finds that the cooperative network of small-scale air pollution management is a very important element in the evolutionary process. The small-scale air pollution collaborative governance network has the effect of significantly improving the evolution speed of local government collaborative governance decisions in the network. It can better mobilize local governments to participate in collaborative air pollution governance and realize the cooperative emergence with the ratio interval of income heterogeneity in [0.6, 1], preference heterogeneity in [1.2, 1.4], and allocation heterogeneity in [0.6, 1]. The results of the study are consistent with the actual situation, which verifies the validity and operability of the model. Finally, the article also proposes countermeasures to improve the dilemma of air pollution synergy caused by regional heterogeneity.