Selecting Agent Research Articles

Prey Size Decline as a Unifying Ecological Selecting Agent in Pleistocene Human Evolution

We hypothesize that megafauna extinctions throughout the Pleistocene, that led to a progressive decline in large prey availability, were a primary selecting agent in key evolutionary and cultural changes in human prehistory. The Pleistocene human past is characterized by a series of transformations that include the evolution of new physiological traits and the adoption, assimilation, and replacement of cultural and behavioral patterns. Some changes, such as brain expansion, use of fire, developments in stone-tool technologies, or the scale of resource intensification, were uncharacteristically progressive. We previously hypothesized that humans specialized in acquiring large prey because of their higher foraging efficiency, high biomass density, higher fat content, and the use of less complex tools for their acquisition. Here, we argue that the need to mitigate the additional energetic cost of acquiring progressively smaller prey may have been an ecological selecting agent in fundamental adaptive modes demonstrated in the Paleolithic archaeological record. We describe several potential associations between prey size decline and specific evolutionary and cultural changes that might have been driven by the need to adapt to increased energetic demands while hunting and processing smaller and smaller game.

A hypothesis to explain accuracy of wasp resemblances.

Mimicry is one of the oldest concepts in biology, but it still presents many puzzles and continues to be widely debated. Simulation of wasps with a yellow‐black abdominal pattern by other insects (commonly called “wasp mimicry”) is traditionally considered a case of resemblance of unprofitable by profitable prey causing educated predators to avoid models and mimics to the advantage of both (Figure 1a). However, as wasps themselves are predators of insects, wasp mimicry can also be seen as a case of resemblance to one's own potential antagonist. We here propose an additional hypothesis to Batesian and Müllerian mimicry (both typically involving selection by learning vertebrate predators; cf. Table 1) that reflects another possible scenario for the evolution of multifold and in particular very accurate resemblances to wasps: an innate, visual inhibition of aggression among look‐alike wasps, based on their social organization and high abundance. We argue that wasp species resembling each other need not only be Müllerian mutualists and that other insects resembling wasps need not only be Batesian mimics, but an innate ability of wasps to recognize each other during hunting is the driver in the evolution of a distinct kind of masquerade, in which model, mimic, and selecting agent belong to one or several species (Figure 1b). Wasp mimics resemble wasps not (only) to be mistaken by educated predators but rather, or in addition, to escape attack from their wasp models. Within a given ecosystem, there will be selection pressures leading to masquerade driven by wasps and/or to mimicry driven by other predators that have to learn to avoid them. Different pressures by guilds of these two types of selective agents could explain the widely differing fidelity with respect to the models in assemblages of yellow jackets and yellow jacket look‐alikes.

Perspectives and Debates: Mimicry, Signalling and Co‐Evolution (Commentary on Wolfgang Wickler – Understanding Mimicry – With special reference to vocal mimicry)

AbstractIn his stimulating discussion, Wolfgang Wickler criticizes fuzzy usage of term mimicry by drawing attention to its original definition by H. Bates. Mimicry refers to functional ‘model–mimic–selecting agent’ trinity (with varying number of species involved) when the selecting agent (i.e. signal receiver) responds similarly to mimic and model to the advantage of the mimic. Concurring with Wickler I argue that convergence is neither necessary nor sufficient to support similarity as evidence for mimicry and that it is artificial and unproductive to classify mimicry with respect to ontogeny (innate vs. learned similarity) or model species identity (learning from conspecifics vs. heterospecifics). Using butterfly ‘eye’‐spots, I argue that just identifying each of the supposed model, the mimic and the selective agent, and even demonstrating that mimic‐model similarity affects the agent's behaviour, provides no conclusive evidence for mimicry. Even a demonstration that the mimic benefits from receiver response may not provide conclusive evidence for mimicry. Using avian brood parasite–host egg and nestling mimicry, I emphasize that without experimental manipulation of the hypothesized mimetic traits, it is impossible to test the mimicry hypothesis robustly. Due to fundamental constraints on human perception, some cases of mimicry may in fact be just a by‐product of human inability to perceive relevant differences between animal phenotypes (what is similar for human eye, nose or ear may not be viewed, smelled or heard as similar for relevant animal observers), whereas many cases of real mimicry may escape our attention from the same reason (‘hidden’ mimicry). Surprisingly, the same mimetic phenotype may show completely different effects on selective agents under different ecological circumstances. Finally, relatively dissimilar species may be more mimetic than highly similar model–mimic pairs because mimicry may be more fruitfully understood as a co‐evolutionary process rather than a similarity.

An Iterated Four-Player Prisoner's Dilemma Game with an External Selecting Agent: A Metacontingency Experiment

In these series of experiments we used an iterated prisoners' dilemma game (IPDG) to examine the effect of metacontingencies on aggregate products of the interrelated behavior of four players. Results of the first experiment showed that cultural level consequences in the form of points delivered to all players) contingent on aggregate products XXXX or YYYY increased the frequency of those productions. In subsequent experiments we added a baseline condition where the players experienced only the individual behavioral contingencies embedded in the game. Then we imposed the metacontingency on the XXXX aggregate product or, alternatively, on YYYY. After several reversals, we discontinued the metacontingency and the players again experienced only the individual contingencies of the game. In one experiment we used a yoked control to assess the effect of market feedback independent from the metacontingency relation. Results indicate that the cultural consequence (market feedback) controlled production of aggregate products even when its magnitude was minimal, that the metacontingency relation was necessary, and that it maintained relations among the behavior of individuals which resulted in the worst individual outcomes for all players.