Seeking Reelection Research Articles

Juge ou oracle? L’influence d’un chroniqueur politique sur la vie parlementaire au Québec

Background: Michel David has been publishing columns evaluating the performance of Québec parliamentarians since 1995. Analysis: This unique case, providing evaluations for 50 parliamentary sessions, allows us to quantitatively examine whether certain biases influence the evaluation of political actors by the media. Our results do not indicate any gender bias, but favourable biases toward senior ministers, the Parti Québécois, Québec Solidaire, and opposition members are observed. Moreover, the magnitude of the assigned ratings is positively associated with the likelihood of a legislator seeking re-election in subsequent elections. Conclusions and implications: We conclude that evaluations by the media elite can serve as effective predictors of parliamentary career trajectories.

Preventative Polarization: Republican Senators’ Positional Adaptation in the Tea Party Era

Republicans in Congress have, by almost any measure, become significantly more conservative over the last 25 years. We propose that the changing pressures they face when seeking reelection helps explain this trend. Rather than moderating towards the general election median voter as they had previously done, Republican senators became more conservative when seeking reelection to avoid the emergence of, or mitigate the threat from, a primary opponent after the Tea Party emerged. We also show that at the height of the Tea Party era—the 111th to 113th congresses—retiring senators moderated their voting behavior, suggesting that their personal preferences were more moderate than their expressed preferences. During the Trump era, we report mixed results, suggesting that the threat posed by primary challengers was not solely ideological, though the new dynamics and behaviors that emerged in the Tea Party era have continued to shape the Republican Party in the Senate.

Choosing legislative candidates via primaries: The pivotal role of executive incumbency

How much influence does incumbency have on the way parties nominate candidates? I address this question in the context of Argentina, examining how political parties decide on candidate nomination methods for National Deputies. I argue that holding the governorship creates an imbalanced distribution of resources within a party, leading party factions to lean toward consensus in candidate selection and reducing the likelihood of choosing a primary election. Conversely, when a party lacks the governorship, its provincial party leader may have a weaker influence in deterring primary elections. I also theorize the various situations and resources governors can employ to discourage primary elections, including potential coattail effects, the option of seeking reelection, control over the primaries’ selectorate, and control of the electoral calendar. To test my expectations, I employ a regression discontinuity design, focusing on governors and those who finished as runners-up in lower chamber elections from 1985 to 2023. My findings reveal that governor incumbency decreases the probability of holding a primary election. I conduct further analyses by examining subgroups, considering the governor’s circumstances and the resources I previously theorized as factors influencing primary deterrence. I find that incumbency only deters primaries when the governor and National Deputies elections are concurrent, when the governor is not term-limited, and when they have control over the electorate and the electoral calendar.

Informacja czy agitacja? Wizerunek Andrzeja Dudy w portalu Tvp.info przed I turą wyborów prezydenckich

The text analyzes the image of Andrzej Duda on the Tvp.info portal before the first round of the presidential elections in 2020. The author referred to the theory of social influence formulated by Robert Cialdini, which states that in some situations people act in a simplified manner and automatically react to specific stimulus. In the texts analyzed was found one example of the rule of involvement and consistency. Not once did the analyzed texts contain the principles of liking and inaccessibility. In seven of the studied publications was found none of the rules of exerting social influence. In the vast majority of texts which stated the existence of rules of exerting social influence, was observed agitation in favor of the president seeking re-election.

Sledgehammer: How Breaking with the Past Brought Peace to the Middle East

Sledgehammer: How Breaking with the Past Brought Peace to the Middle East

Pathways to the Chancellorship

Olaf Scholz emerged as the Federal Republic’s ninth chancellor from a context marked by several “firsts,” including in particular the absence of an incumbent chancellor seeking re-election and a competition between three chancellor candidates. While few, if any, individual elements of Scholz’s profile were exceptional, the combination of elements was as unique as the wider political context. Echoing similar experiences from the Merkel years, the 2021 campaign and results suggest that in the German political context, advanced levels of personalization in the electoral arena are not dependent on any particular charisma of the competing lead candidates. In the end, Scholz, who managed to portray himself as a de facto incumbent seeking re-election, profited strongly from the perceived limitations and deficiencies of his contenders. A historical assessment of competitions for the chancellorship also reveals that the stakes for unsuccessful chancellor candidates have risen dramatically.

Briefly Noted

On June 2, 2021, the Intern-American Court of Human Rights was referred a case from the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights concerning Fabio Gadea Mantilla, a former candidate in the 2011 Nicaraguan presidential race. According to a press release from the OAS, it was contested that the country possessed the primary responsibility of securing and upholding Gadea Mantilla's right to become an electoral candidate, which it failed to accomplish. This is in reference to his past participation in 2011, where he was listed as a prime candidate for the presidency. In March of 2011, the presidential seat was occupied by Daniel Ortega, and despite the illegality of Ortega seeking re-election, he won by a majority vote of over 62%. This was addressed and argued before the Supreme Electoral Council by both Gadea Mantilla and other competing parties, which was dismissed, and the decision finalized. According to constitutional precedent, the Council has the last word on these matters and appeals are simply not possible. The main issue to be determined was whether executive power was being overextended, impeding on democratic processes as outlined in Article 147 of the Constitution, which limits presidential candidates to two terms. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice failed to see any validity in referencing this, but the IACHR asserted its stance on this practice being a direct contradiction to foundational principles of inter-American democracy.

Party Strategy, Candidate Selection, and Legislative Behavior in Mexico

What explains party unity in legislatures? Prior research suggests when candidate selection and electoral rules create incentives for legislators to cultivate a personal vote, party unity should decline. However, previous theories often treat candidate selection rules as exogenous institutions that have independent effects on legislative behavior despite the fact the choice of nomination rules are often an intraparty issue and a key component of partisan electoral strategies. Here, we develop a theory linking candidate selection rules to party unity through the strategic behavior of party leaders. Our main finding is that, under personalized electoral rules, the effects of nomination rules on legislative behavior are conditional on parties' electoral incentives. We test our theory using data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, a case where our results are unlikely to be explained by personal vote‐seeking incentives since legislators are banned from seeking reelection.

Chasing votes with the public budget

This paper examines the distribution of public resources by an incumbent seeking re-election. I present a model to explain the behavior of an incumbent redistributing public goods and cash transfers. According to the model, politicians use the government budget as a portfolio for electoral investment and diversify expenditure in order to target different groups of voters at the same time. I construct a unique data set of the promises made by the president of Colombia from 2002 to 2010 to municipalities throughout the country's various regions. The empirical results show some evidence that promises of cash transfers targeted swing voters, promises of public goods simultaneously targeted both core and swing municipalities, while opposition municipalities received few promises of cash transfers and public goods, which is consistent with the prediction of the model.

Is it the economic policy, stupid? Economic policy, political parties & the gubernatorial incumbent advantage

Incumbent politicians have a well-known advantage in seeking re-election. Using the Economic Freedom of North America dataset, we examine how changes in economic policy during an incumbent governor's tenure influence the probability of losing their re-election bid. Put simply, does economic policy matter for the incumbent advantage? The results suggest that a decrease in economic freedom increases the probability of an incumbent loss, regardless of the governor's party. A decomposition analysis indicates that these results are primarily driven by the government spending sub-index. Furthermore, a more granular analysis suggests that: (1) increases in government consumption spending and government employment are associated with a lower probability of re-election among Democratic incumbent governors, but a higher probability among Republicans; (2) increases in transfer payments relative to personal income reduce the likelihood of re-election, regardless of party; and (3) among Republican incumbents, increases of income taxation and of top marginal tax rates are associated with a higher and lower, respectively, probability of losing re-election. Finally, controlling for a variety of demographic, political and socioeconomic factors, we find that high unemployment increases the probability that an incumbent loses re-election, while increasing net population migration reduces it.

Is it the Economic Policy, Stupid? Economic Policy, Political Parties & the Gubernatorial Incumbent Advantage

Incumbent politicians have a well-known advantage in seeking re-election. Using the Economic Freedom of North America dataset, we examine how changes in economic policy during an incumbent governor’s tenure influence the probability of losing their re-election bid. In other words, does economic policy matter for the incumbent advantage? The results suggest that decreases in economic freedom increase the probability of incumbent loss, regardless of the governor's party. A decomposition analysis indicates that these results are primarily driven by the government spending sub-index. A more granular analysis suggests that: (1) increases in government consumption spending and government employment are associated with a lower probability of re-election among Democratic governors, but a lower probability among Republicans; (2) Increases in transfer payments relative to personal income reduce the likelihood of re-election, regardless of party; (3) increases in income taxation relative to personal income and top marginal tax rates are associated with a higher and lower, respectively, probability of losing re-election, but only among Republican incumbents. We also control for a variety of demographic, political and socio-economic factors and find that high unemployment increases the probability that an incumbent loses re-election and net migration reduces it.

WHOSE ISSUE IS IT ANYWAY… AND DOES IT REALLY MATTER? Issue Ownership and Negative Campaigning

Although academic research has yielded mixed results, candidates and consultants are rational people whose experience persuades them that “going negative” can be an effective campaign strategy under the right circumstances. And they are almost certainly right, even if their evidence is more anecdotal than systematic. This article considers whether the impact of negative ads is moderated by perceptions of issue ownership, a factor that is known to affect the candidate preferences of some voters. Focusing on the attitudes of those who identify with the party of the targeted candidate, we examine the changes in support and favorability induced by four policy‐based attacks against a hypothetical congressional incumbent seeking reelection. Results from an Internet survey experiment suggest that attacks are somewhat more effective among target co‐partisans who do not believe that their party is more competent to handle the issue in question, especially when that issue is salient to the individual.

Gerrymandering in Electoral Autocracies: Evidence from Hong Kong

To authoritarian rulers, holding somewhat competitive elections enhances legitimacy, but entails political risks. Committing electoral fraud can secure victory, but may jeopardize regime legitimacy. However, there is a tool of electoral manipulation that allows authoritarian rulers to reduce electoral risk while preserving legitimacy: gerrymandering. This article undertakes a systematic study of gerrymandering in Hong Kong, using a dataset that documents boundary changes at the level of residential buildings. The empirical findings show a significant partisan bias in electoral redistricting: opposition constituencies are more likely to be redistricted. Redistricting, however, fails to deter opposition incumbents from seeking re-election. No significant negative relationship is found between redistricting and opposition incumbents’ vote share, although redistrictingdoesreduce their overall chances of re-election. The results suggest that gerrymandering, which involves the use of packing and cracking strategies in different districts, can be employed to undermine the aggregate electoral performance of the opposition parties.

Pre-Primary News Coverage of the 2016 Presidential Race: Trump's Rise, Sanderss Emergence, Clinton's Struggle

What’s the best predictor of which candidate will win the presidential nomination? The winner of the Iowa caucus? The winner of the New Hampshire primary? Actually neither is as good an indicator as the winner of what political scientists call “the invisible primary” — the period before a single primary or caucus vote is cast. A fast start in Iowa or New Hampshire is important. A candidate with a poor showing in both states is in trouble. Voters aren’t interested, donors aren’t interested, and reporters aren’t interested in a candidate who finishes at the back of the pack. Yet, more often than not, the winner in Iowa has lost in New Hampshire. Since 1980, of the twelve open nominating races — those without an incumbent president seeking reelection — only Al Gore in 2000 and John Kerry in 2004 won both contests. In 1992, the eventual Democratic nominee, Bill Clinton, lost both, though he ran well enough in the two states to be seen as a viable candidate.

Ecuador: La democracia después de nueve años de la "Revolución Ciudadana" de Rafael Correa

Several problems converged in 2015 to generate uncertainty about the future of Correa’s “Citizen’s Revolution”. The drop in oil prices severely hit the Ecuadorian economy based on the exportation of raw materials and dependent on public spending. Public dissatisfaction was channeled through massive protests against the legislative reforms proposed by the governing forces. Moreover, Correa’s sudden decline in the popularity, in addition to his decision to abstain from seeking reelection in 2017, have created a difficult scenario for correismo. The fortune of the governing forces in the forthcoming elections will depend on how they resolve these tensions during 2016.

California's 2014-15 Budget: Political Corruption Distracts the State

Author(s): DiSarro, Brian; Hussey, Wesley | Abstract: Governor Jerry Brown used the relatively easy budget negotiations during this budget cycle to set himself up to run as the elder statesman seeking reelection for an unprecedented fourth term as governor. But it was not budget politics or even elections that occupied Sacramento’s attention this fiscal year, but rather a series of three separate political corruption investigations and convictions in the State Senate that tarnished the Golden State. These cases not only generated a great deal of negative media attention, but they cost the Democrats three seats, as the caucus was forced to suspend all three senators. This denied the Democrats their supermajority in the Senate, and therefore the legislature as a whole.

Similarities and Differences in Support of Minority and White Republican Candidates

AbstractHistory has shown that voters tend to support candidates of their own race. This reality has proven particularly challenging for black candidates who have often had difficulty running for office in majority white electorates. However, the vast majority of research on this topic has focused on minority Democrats, not minority Republicans. In this study, we take advantage of a unique set of circumstances in South Carolina's (SC's) 2014 elections where voters had the opportunity to cast ballots for an Indian-American Republican Governor and an African-American Republican Senator. Additionally, the presence of a white Republican Senator seeking reelection provides an important comparison case for determining if there is significant variation in support of these candidates given their different racial profiles, but shared party affiliation. Using unique data from The Winthrop Poll, we find that the determinants of approving of, and voting for, minority Republican candidates, are quite similar to support for the white Republican candidate. It appears that party and ideology are foremost in guiding approval and vote choice decisions among voters in contemporary American politics. Hence, even in SC, support for minority Republicans approximates that given to a white Republican.

Indian Gaming: The Declining Democratic Advantage in State Legislative Elections

As policy making for Indian gaming and other tribal issues has shifted from the federal government to state politics and state legislatures over the past several decades, the role of American Indians in the electoral process in state legislative elections deserves greater scholarly attention. We examine changes in voting patterns among state legislative elections over a 40‐year period for districts with and without casinos. In the past, Democrats held a large advantage in casino districts both in terms of the two‐party vote share and in terms of incumbents running unopposed when seeking reelection. Since the 1990s, this traditional Democratic advantage has largely disappeared to a point where the two parties compete at rough parity in these districts. In several states, American Indians represent a sizeable and potentially influential voting bloc.Related Articles Pearson‐Merkowitz, Shanna. 2012. “.” Politics & Policy 40 (): 258–295. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00349.x/abstract Adams, Brian E. 2012. “.” Politics & Policy 40 (): 43–68. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00336.x/abstract Sullivan, Jas M., Lesa Hatley Major, Kirby Goidel, and David Kurpius. 2009. “.” Politics & Policy 37 (): 289–308. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2009.00173.x/abstract Related Media Bogardus, Kevin. 2013. The Hill. http://thehill.com/policy/technology/327241-casino-lobbyist-time-to-go-on-offense Parti, Tarini. 2015. “Tribal Casino Fight Tests Lobbying Clout.” Politico.com. http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/tribal-casino-fight-lobbying-117992 Jones, Harriet. 2015. “Tribes Lobby Hartford‐Area Businesses on Expanding Gaming.” WNPR.org. http://wnpr.org/post/tribes-lobby-hartford-area-businesses-expanded-gaming#stream/0

A Functional Analysis of 2013 Australian Member of Parliament and Prime Minister Debates

Kevin Rudd (Labor) engaged in two election debates in 2013: first for his seat in Parliament (Griffith) and then for Prime Minister. In seeking re-election to his Griffith seat he was challenged by Bill Glasson (Liberal), Geoff Ebbs (Green), and Karen Hunter (Palmer United). He faced Tony Abbott (Liberal) in the PM Debate. This study content analyses these two debates: an August 6, 2013 Member of Parliament debate and an August 11, 2013 Prime Minister debate. Acclaims were more common in these two debates than attacks; defenses were the least common function. Statements about policy outnumbered those on policy. In each debate, when the candidates discussed record in office (past deeds), the incumbent acclaimed more and attacked less than the challenger. More acclaims and fewer attacks addressed general goals and ideals.

Paramilitaries and Electoral Support

AbstractThis paper examines the tactical redistribution of public resources by an incumbent seeking reelection in a country in the midst of an armed conflict. The illegal armed groups in Colombia are known to have extreme ideological beliefs; the guerrillas lean far to the Left, and the paramilitaries, far to the Right. The model and the empirical results show that regions with powerful groups who have a defined political ideology are less strategically attractive when it comes to the distribution of government resources. Nevertheless, when an illegal group can coerce voters to support a candidate and decide between candidates, as in the case of paramilitaries, redistribution is targeted to the illegal group. As a natural experiment, this paper empirically tests the effect of a policy to demobilize and reintegrate the members of paramilitary groups into society, so as to show the decisions on redistribution change when paramilitary forces do not exercise control in the municipalities.