Security In Iraq Research Articles

ئاسایشى یاسایی لە عێراق یاساى بازرگانى و کارگێڕى بە نموونە

This research deals with legal security, which is one of the most important elements of a legal state based on the rule of law. This leads the public authorities to commit themselves to ensuring some degree of stability in legal relations and a minimum level of stability for the legal centers, so that individuals can act with confidence in the guidance of the legal rules and regulations that are in place and arrange their conditions without being subjected to sudden actions that undermine their legitimate expectations and destabilize their legal status; as an individual can only obtain his or her legitimate rights under established and stable legal system in all areas. The existence of some kind of relative stability in legal relations reinforces the stability of legal centers and promotes peace and tranquility and achieves human security in its broad dimensions. In contrast, the instability and disorder of laws create chaos, sedition and the disruption of the normal lives of individuals, thereby compromising the sovereignty and prestige of the state. To this end, it is necessary to look for the elements that stabilize legal rules in a manner that guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals under state sovereignty and law. The appropriateness of the law to society is measured by the extent to which the law responds to the requirements and needs of the society. The more the rule of law is accepted by the addressees, the more realistic it is and the better it will be in practice. However, reaching that aim cannot be achieved in the absence of a clear and predictable legislative vision. Respect for the legal rule is the result of respect for a sound and stable legal and judicial environment. The quality of the drafting and the legal text must be clear, easy to understand and precise in determining the requirements. In view of the forgoing, the research entitled Legal Security in Iraq - Commercial andAdministrative Law is a serious scientific effort to present the concept of legal security and the dimensions of its relationship with justice, the rule of law, stability and tranquility in society, and to indicate the gaps, shortcomings, shortcomings and legal contradictions in which the Iraqi legislators of commercial and administrative law have made, in order to address them and to identify appropriate suggestions and proposals to reduce them.

Partisan Armed Forces of Kurdistan Regional Government

Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 41, No. 2, Winter 2018 Partisan Armed Forces of Kurdistan Regional Government Hawre Hasan Hama* Introduction The Kurdistan Region of Iraq emerged as a quasi-state thanks to the establishment of the no-fly zone in northern Iraq by the United States— along with the United Kingdom and France—which put an end to Saddam Hussein’s attacks on the Kurds. Once the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) appeared as a quasi-state in 1992, the Kurdish guerrilla forces remain divided between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Mustafa Barzani, established the former in 1946 while Jalal Talabani had founded PUK in 1975 when he split from Barzani’s KDP. The Kurdish armed forces known as the Peshmerga and the security forces known as Asayish1 have been politicized by both the KDP and the PUK. This is not new. Since the rise of the KRG, the Kurdish military and security forces have been divided between the two ruling parties, and the elites within the two sides also have their private forces. For example, Kosrat Rasul, PUK’s deputy secretary general, has his protection unit called Hezekani Kosrat Rasul, while Talabani’s son, Bafel Talabani, commands the counter-terrorism unit, which is not controlled by any 38 *Hawre Hasan Hama obtained his MA in International Studies at Sheffield University in the UK. Hawre is currently a lecturer at University of Sulaimani, faculty of law, politics, and department of politics. He is the author of “Politicization of Kurdish Security in Iraq since 2003.” He has published policy papers in the Washington Institute’s Fikra Forum, Open Democracy, Center for Security Studies, Modern Diplomacy, The Kurdish Policy Foundation and Masher Politics & Culture Journal. He is a security expert on Kurdistan security affairs at Kurdish Policy Foundation. 1 The Asayish forces were formally set up in October 1992, five months before they were legally established under the Law of the Ministry of Interior. They were said to have started functioning effectively in January 1993 following the appointment of Karim Sinjari, a civilian, as head of the General Security Directorate. (see Refworld, “Human Rights Abuses in Iraqi Kurdistan Since 1991,” Amnesty International, Feb 28, 1995, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9e94.html 39 ministry. The same applies to the KDP; Nechirvan Barzani, prime minister of the KRG, has his own battalion. Although all the Kurdish forces are officially subordinated to the KRG Presidency Council and its Peshmerga Ministry, (and the Iraqi Constitution2 and Kurdistan Region’s laws allow only one single and unified armed force as the regional guard force3 ) the armed forces remain subordinate to separate PUK and KDP commands.4 Despite many efforts for the unification of the Kurdish forces, these forces are still divided along partisan lines. This article explores the problems facing the Kurdistan Region of Iraq because of the lack of unification or coordination between the divided forces, including intelligence sharing, equipment sharingarming , political-personal loyalties are more important than the democratic procedures, the lack of judiciary system, and revenue appropriationcorruption . The article finally discusses the impact of the partisan forces on human security inside Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The rise of KRG and the formation of military and security forces The Iraqi state, since its inception and until the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, was ruled by a Sunni-Arab minority that systematically oppressed the Kurdish minority in the north.5 Gunter and Yavuz argue that between 1991 and 2003 the Kurds were actively engaged in a de facto statebuilding process with the assistance of a US-led alliance in northern Iraq.6 This resulted in the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government in 1992 following the withdrawal of Iraqi government forces and adminis2 The fifth section of the article 121 states that: “The regional government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the region, particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the region such as police, security forces, and guards of the region.” Iraq’s constitution 2005, available at: https://www.constituteproject .org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en 3 The Kurdistan National Assembly (now the...

Complexity Theory, Democratic Transition and Public Policy Choices in Iraq

This article adopts Complexity Theory to improve understanding of Iraq's future patterns ofdemocratic stabilization and consolidation. It emphasizes the importance of soft technologies, aswell as hard technologies for making better public policy choices. The article also sheds light onIraq's institutional evolution, on its processes and mechanisms of variation and replication. Itemphasizes the importance of new culturally-sensitive public policies and political economies. Thefirst part of the article briefly describes the main political, economic, social and cultural changes inIraq since the fall of the Saddam regime. The second part discusses the system of social security inIraq and in formerly ISIS controlled territories. The final section deals with important challenges ofde-radicalization necessary that are necessary for the democratization, liberalization,institutionalization and consolidation of new institutions. A new spatial politics of public policymaking in formerly ISIS-occupied territories is also discussed in the concluding section.

Fragile State in Iraq and Women Security

After the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the term “fragile states” has gained increasing prominence in security debates and the international community turned its attention to how to deal with such countries. These security concerns originate from several factors: emphasis on building peace and security, spread of this idea that development and security are related, and the principle that the stability of state plays an influential role in its development. The term “fragile state” refers to weak states that are vulnerable to internal and external threats and have a poor government that is incapable of managing internal affairs and external policy. In this regard, Iraq was considered as a fragile state after 2003, and its stability has been evaluated poor since ever. The present study employed indices of fragile state and human security in order to investigate the effect of Iraq’s fragile state on development of threats to women security. Violation of human security in Iraq after 2003 was caused by failure in nation state-building process and weakness of Iraqi government in maintaining societal order and unity. Therefore, the main question that the present study aims to address is: “How has women security been threatened by Iraq’s crisis and its fragile state?”

العراق والمحيط الإقليمي دراسة في العلاقات التركية – العراقية

Iraq's relationship with Turkey out of the historical context has a different equation. By means of which, it is manifested that Iraq is the least influential country in determining the affairs of Turkey, but the latter , on the other hand, has an intensive impact on the affairs of Iraq. This is owing back in some of its causes to the large number of radical changes taking place in Iraq which are weakening the political, social and economic infrastructures compared to the stability of Turkey. This has been reflected on the growing abilities of the influence of some of the governments that have followed in terms of the country administration. Also, if we exclude the period from 1979 until now we will find that the link between the US and Western Europe and Turkey had the greatest impact on such influence, especially in the Republican stages after the fall of the monarchy in Iraq. Today, it seems that the political equation has changed because Iraqi relationship with the United States of America and other Western European countries has changed. On this basis, this change can be invested to make Iraq more influential in determining the orientations of American and European policy as well. Which may correct the imbalance In the equation of relations, and achieve some of the interests that were overlooked in the previous stages. Especially those that were as severe constraints on Iraqi politics in light of the frequency of wars waged in multiple fronts and their subsequent such as sanction and the international isolation empowering the regional countries to cause interests' damages. The new variable that can be invested to improve the Iraqi environment and to increase its effectiveness on the political, economic and security levels. This change has to be invested to rectify Iraqi environment's policies that can be expected to happen in the coming stages, especially when the Iraq's security, political, social and economic situations be stabilized.

Food security in Iraq: results from quantitative and qualitative surveys

Iraq’s food security has been profoundly affected by its oil-based economy, over three decades of conflict and its politics that have been shaped by authoritarian rentierism. The article outlines the political economy of food security in Iraq and how it has been shaped historically. It identifies various conditioning factors such as oil, conflict, environment, agricultural development strategies and institutional setups, such as the Public Distribution System (PDS), the world’s largest public food program. It then disentangles these factors in an analysis of data from Gallup, Iraq Body Count and various international organizations to give an appreciation of the Iraqi food security situation since the end of the Saddam regime. Finally, it takes a look at views of Iraqi experts on current food security issues in Iraq, using the results of an online survey that was conducted from May–October 2015 among 152 Iraqi experts from academia, ministries and NGOs. Iraqis overwhelmingly identify political instability and bad governance as major challenges to food security; it is unlikely that mere technocratic policy prescriptions can improve food security in the absence of political stability and improved governance.

Operational Success, Strategic Failure: Assessing the 2007 Iraq Troop Surge

ABSTRACT: This article outlines contemporary history of sectarian conflict and identifies consequences of US surge strategy perpetuating region's violence and strengthening Islamic State. By 2006, security had declined dramatically Iraq. The February bombing of al-Askari mosque, a major Shia holy site, sparked a rapid increase sectarian conflict. Violence Baghdad increased 43 percent over summer; by October, civilian deaths had risen to more than three thousand per month. (1) Thus, January 2007 United States radically shifted course of War by executing Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, commonly known as the surge. Under General David Petraeus, surge attempted to reverse course of war and stabilize using counterinsurgency tactics, which included 30,000 additional soldiers '[living] with people' order to secure them. (2) Operationally, effort appeared to have been a success. By January 2009, casualties declined from 2,693 to 372 civilians and from 101 to 14 US troops; violent incidents declined from 908 to 195. (3) In recent years, however, increasing sectarian conflict is again jeopardizing Iraq's stability. (4) At this point it seems surge has failed to achieve strategic objectives--daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence their leaders, and government will... make progress--stated by President George W. Bush January 2007. (5) Why? Most scholarship on this issue falls into two camps. The first group claims operation would have succeeded if President Barack Obama had kept US forces past 2011. The second camp argues mission could not have succeeded because it failed to address underlying sectarian conflict and political instability fueling civil war. Due to complexity of issue, determining correct cause with complete certainty is challenging. The debate centers around such evidence as contemporary history of sectarian conflict Iraq, sectarian tension and institutional mismanagement during surge, immediate consequences of surge, and implications of strategy. After carefully accounting for such evidence, this article not only posits military solution to political and sectarian problems was misguided but also illustrates lessons from this operation for use future conflicts. The Debate The optimists surge efficacy debate argue Iraq's increasing instability is due to troop withdrawal under Obama administration. This view claims reduced violence and improved relations with local communities were squandered absence of US troops enforcing rule of law. (6) David Kilcullen, Petraeus' senior counterinsurgency adviser, notes in a conflict like Iraq, if violence drops when you apply counterinsurgency techniques, then returns when you stop ... it suggests [the tactics] do work ... and you shouldn't have stopped before figuring out a way to maintain progress. Kilcullen also criticizes Obama's desire to end war rather than to fight for a status of forces agreement (SOFA) to extend troops past 2011. (7) Similarly, Peter Mansoor, Petraeus's executive US Army officer, argues surge was a successful strategy shift: Al-Qaeda was allowed off ropes ... due to our inability to remain sufficiently engaged ... not to failure of surge as a strategic concept. (8) According to optimists, two assumptions explain Iraq's security decline. First, reduced violence during 2007 and 2008 increased Iraq's stability and positioned government to manage sectarian tension successfully. For example, former Sunni insurgents, known as Sons of Iraq (SOI), willingly began working with coalition forces and Shia police. Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr also stood down Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) Shia militia. (9) Second, by end of 2011, trend lines indicated efforts to stabilize were on target; therefore, 20,000 troops recommended by General Lloyd J. …

The Impact Of International Terrorism On The Right To Personal Security In Iraq After 2003

Hardly a day passes by without news of a terrorist bombing, kidnapping, or assassination somewhere in the world especially in Iraq. Terrorism has become a cancer and it is not in the interest of the nations, because it takes away their right to personal security. Following the event of September 11, there have been violations of international conventions and usages, human rights, which prompted countries globally to come up with laws to protect civil freedoms. In the context of Iraq, the Government came up with the Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Act No.13 of 2005 and the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 to address the issue of terrorism. The aim of this paper is to address the impact of international terrorism on the right to personal security in Iraq after 2003. The methodology adopted in this paper is a doctrinal legal research, focusing namely on primary and secondary data. This paper concludes that international terrorism has indeed affected the Iraqis right to personal security after 2003. Hence, there is a need to protect this fundamental right by re-looking into the Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Act No.13 of 2005. For instance, under the Act there is no clear definition of the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist act”. This has led to serious problems in the enforcement of the Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Act No. 13 of 2005 such as the abuse of the right to personal security where innocent Iraqis are deprived to enjoy this fundamental right at the disguise of fighting terrorism by the state, which is not even clearly defined under the Act. Key words: International terrorism, Iraqi Constitution of 2005, Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Act No.13 of 2005, right to personal security.

Politicization of Kurdish Security in Iraq Since 2003

This article focuses on Kurdish security question in Iraq from 2003 to the present. Its central argument is that the security of the Kurdish region of Iraq has only constitutionally de-securitised since 2003. However, the Kurdish security demands in Iraq have been politicized by the different Iraqi governments since 2005, and therefore, security relations between the Iraqi state and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have been fraught with distrust, tensions, and chaos since that time. The concepts derived from the Copenhagen School (CS) provide the framework for discussing security relations and the inherent security struggles between the Iraqi state and the KRG.

The Best Laid Plans: How the Failure to Effectively Implement DDR and Transitional Justice Fueled Iraq's Instability

A decade after the US invasion, Iraq's security situation remains fragile. The failure to enact a DDR program resulted in large numbers of armed individuals idle around the country. Fearful of reprisals and disgruntled over losing their privileged positions, many Sunnis joined the insurgency. Combined with easy access to weapons, Iraq's history of interethnic tension was exacerbated by the pursuit of transitional justice. Trials and vetting processes were politicized by Shias, which reinforced many Sunnis' belief that the new political order held no benefit for them. Violence and instability have hampered reconstruction and de-Ba'athification robbed the country of professional and technical expertise that was sorely needed for the effort. The author argues that, while transitional justice may still have value in Iraq, current circumstances are not propitious.

Water Security in Iraq - Problems and Solutions (Basra Governorate as a Model)

Water security is one of the main requirements for achieving food security, as it directly affects the nature and quantity of agricultural production, as well as its impact on agricultural development plans used on the economic development of the country as a whole. (1)The reason for the emergence of ancient Iraqi civilizations is mainly due to the abundance of water that Iraq enjoyed. The two immortal rivers played a major role in the successive Iraqi civilizational renaissances, and any serious imbalance in the role of these two rivers may be reflected in a large and massive way on all aspects of life in Iraq. Therefore, the water problem must be considered not on the basis of the current stage and an attempt to reach temporary solutions, but rather work must be done for the long term in an attempt to provide water and food security for the Iraqi society.

With (Great) Power Comes (Great) Responsibility: A Move Toward Greater Responsibility for States Exercising Power Abroad (Al-Jedda v the United Kingdom)

This case note addresses the recent European Court of Human Rights case Al-Jedda v the United Kingdom. In this case, the Court decided that the act of detaining and interning the applicant in Iraq was attributable to the United Kingdom, and not the United Nations, and that the applicant fell under the UK's jurisdiction. Having established jurisdiction, the Court addressed whether Al-Jedda's internment violated Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. In order to answer this, the Court had to decide whether Article 103 of the UN Charter, together with a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the UK (among other States) to secure and maintain security in Iraq, entailed a conflict of norms that resulted in the inapplicability of the ECHR's right to liberty. The Court concluded that no such conflict was present and, thus, that the UK had violated the right to liberty.

The Heroes of COIN

The conventional wisdom holds that security in Iraq only improved after Gen. David Petraeus implemented a new counterinsurgency doctrine that stressed population security instead of aggressive operations against insurgent forces. This interpretation is strikingly similar to the historiography of the Huk Rebellion, the Malayan Emergency, and the Vietnam War. In each case observers criticized initial efforts as brutal and counterproductive, only to be rescued when enlightened new leaders arrived on the scene. This article challenges the familiar hero narrative, arguing that critics routinely exaggerate the importance of leadership changes because they view conflicts as experiments in counterinsurgency rather than exercises in state-building. Whereas counterinsurgency (COIN) theory emphasizes issues like public security and government legitimacy, theorists of state-building describe a bloody and protracted competition for power under conditions approaching anarchy. The upshot is that the “heroes” of late-stage COIN might actually depend on the earlier “villains” who did the dirty work of establishing political order and coercing the population into obedience.

Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?

Efforts to understand Saddam Hussein's strategic thought have long been hampered by the opacity and secrecy of the Baathist regime. Newly available, high-level Iraqi archival documentation demonstrates that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Saddam viewed nuclear weapons through a fundamentally coercive, revisionist lens. He had long hoped to wage a grinding war of attrition against the Israeli state, and he believed that Iraqi acquisition of the bomb would neutralize Israeli nuclear threats, force the Jewish state to fight at the conventional level, and thereby allow Iraq and its Arab allies (with their larger economic and population base) to prosecute a prolonged war that would displace Israel from the territories occupied in 1967. These findings have implications for the existing theoretical literature on the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation, as well as for the growing body of work on “nuclear alarmism.” The Iraqi case undermines the thesis that states proliferate primarily because of defensive concerns. Saddam certainly viewed possession of the bomb as a means of enhancing Iraq's security, but his attraction to nuclear weapons revolved around offensive objectives. Saddam hoped to exploit the deterrent balance with Israel to initiate a bloody conventional war that would have likely been immensely destructive and destabilizing for the Middle East as a whole. In other words, though Saddam never obtained nuclear weapons, his views on their potential utility give good cause for both pessimism and alarm.

The political parameters of post-withdrawal Iraq

The withdrawal of US combat forces presents new challenges and opportunities for Iraqis over the coming months and years. This special issue of International Affairs seeks to provide an assessment and analysis of many of these challenges and opportunities from the perspective of Iraqi actors, while also considering the interests of the wider regional and international community. Iraq remains important, fundamentally so. The main challenges that now face Iraqi leaders are not of recent origin but have never been fully confronted—to some degree the US presence has acted to ameliorate tensions at difficult times and helped to find compromise solutions that have left situations calm but also put on hold. The articles in this special issue focus on a range of these challenges, questioning orthodox views on Iraqi political development and considering the possibilities that lie ahead. They present not only ‘post-American Iraq’ but also ‘post-Iraq America’. By facing these challenges successfully, political, economic and social opportunities clearly unfold. These opportunities, if exploited to the full, would see Iraq's security become normalized, its economy and social structures repaired, and the prominence of the country in international affairs as a constructive rather than destructive force increased. However, the reverse of this is also starkly apparent. The failure of Iraqi leaders to meet the challenges may present very serious problems in the near future—problems possibly made all the more severe due to the lack of a US military presence and the perceived weakening of US will to impose itself on the political direction of the country.

Comments: Progress in Iraq?

Editor's column This month, exports are scheduled to begin flowing from the first new fields to be developed in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein 6 years ago. This could mark a major milestone in Iraq's return to major producer/exporter status on the world stage. Exports totaling 100,000 BOPD will come from two fields—the Twake field developed by Norway's DNO and the Taq Taq field produced by Addax Petroleum, a Swiss-Canadian company. The Kurdish government in northern Iraq signed the contracts and, after some contentious wrangling, finally received approval from the country's Oil Ministry to begin exports. Iraq has the second-largest oil reserves in the world, behind Saudi Arabia, but production and exports have languished for years and have continued to fall since US military action in the country earlier this decade. Iraq exports reached 3.5 million BOPD in the 1980s but currently are at 1.8 million BOPD. Production has fallen to 2.2 million BOPD from 2.5 million BOPD just 2 years ago. Output at the country's largest fields in the south continues to decline, which is encouraging the government to move forward with development in the northern part of the country. The new Iraqi government also needs the oil revenue. News of the export breakthrough was a hot topic of discussion at last month's Iraqi Oil and Gas Summit in Houston, the latest major oil-city stop by Iraqi government officials designed to encourage oil investor interest in the country. About 200 attended the event, which drew participation from several large operators. Clearly many companies want to do business in Iraq given its attractive resource potential. But a sticking point appears to be the absence of a national hydrocarbons law, which could be months away. Development and security in Iraq cannot be met without more revenue, former Iraqi Oil Minister Ibrahim al-Oloum told the gathering. He said the government's goal is to eventually increase production to 4 million BOPD by 2014 and to 6 million BOPD by 2019. Al-Oloum said much the same thing 3 years ago when he was a keynote speaker at the first International Petroleum Technology Conference in Doha, a conference sponsored by SPE and other major oil industry associations. He was oil minister then and expressed skepticism that the Iraqi oil industry could recover quickly without major funding for infrastructure and security. Another hurdle for potential private investors is the contracts being offered by the government. The Kurdish government contract model, which attracted bids from more than two dozen companies, allows production sharing, giving firms an ownership stake. The Iraqi Oil Ministry contracts, currently up for bidding, would pay companies for work they perform on various oil fields but gives them no ownership. Without some ownership, companies cannot book any reserves and may lack incentive for increasing production. Several speakers at the Iraqi government road show predicted that the new fields in the Kurdish region would soon be producing up to 250,000 BOPD of high-quality crude, and urged the government to adopt contracts similar to those used in the northern part of the country.

The US ‘Surge’ as a Collaborative Corrective for Iraq

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Said in June 2005. BBC News, ‘The state of Iraq's security forces’, 11 December 2006. 2. Dan Murphy, ‘New commander, new plan in Iraq’, Christian Science Monitor Online, 11 February 2007. 3. Yahoo News and AP, ‘Report finds Iraqi government precarious’, 23 August 2007. 4. Mark Kukis, ‘At Baghdad's ground zero’, Time Online, 19 January 2007. 5. BBC News ‘Iraqi forces “ready by mid-2007”’, 3 December 2006. 6. Scott Johnson, ‘Ministers of death’, Newsweek International, 13 November 2006, pp. 38–40. 7. Hamza Hendawi, ‘Brittle bond: Iraqi sheikh joins US fight’, Yahoo News, 13 October 2007. For instance, tension has resulted from US soldiers shooting CLC militiamen unknowingly. One militiaman commented, ‘Such acts will create a gap between us and the Americans. We are trying to restore security in the area while they are killing us.’ Katarina Kratovac, ‘Knowing the enemy difficult in Iraq’, Yahoo News, 8 October 2007. 8. For instance, one former Sunni insurgent belonging to the Fursan Al-Rafidain (Knights of Mesopotamia) presently allied with Americans commented, ‘At the beginning, people saw it as an occupation which had to be resisted. But then they saw that the Americans were working in the interests of the people.’ BBC News, ‘Sunni militia brings calm to Baghdad area’, 18 December 2007. The ‘interests of the people’ can be taken to mean using the US as leverage to strengthen Sunni positions against Shia parties and militias. 9. Petraeus thus argued: ‘There is no military solution to a problem like that in Iraq, to the insurgency in Iraq. Military action is necessary … but it is not sufficient.’ Haaretz, ‘US general: Force alone won't end the violence in Iraq’, 8 March 2007. 10. Gates thus argued: ‘The issue that we're all trying to figure out is how best do you get the Iraqis to reconcile their differences … this is not going to be solved by the military. It has to involve political reconciliation in Iraq, among Iraqis. We're basically buying them time.’ Steven R. Hurst, ‘US troop deaths show Sunni resilience’, Yahoo News, 18 March 2007. 11. Diaa Hadid, ‘Iraqi gov't pledges to disband Sunnis’, Yahoo News, 23 December 2007. 12. For instance, retired Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez commented that the US effort in Iraq is presently a ‘nightmare with no end in sight’ because of US political misjudgements rather than its military policies. Steven Komarow, ‘Ex-general: “No end in sight” in Iraq’, Yahoo News, 13 October 2007. 13. Joe Klein, ‘Operation Last Chance’, Time, 9 July 2007, pp. 19–23. See p 22. 14. Iraqi Defense Minister Abdul-Qader Al-Obeidi summed this up well regarding the Sunni communities vis-à-vis Al-Qa'ida: ‘The awakening movement was a response to Al-Qa'ida in Iraq trying to prevent Sunnis from entering the political process … The Sunni's response was an uprising, represented by the awakening group. Now that Al-Qa'ida has largely been marginalised in certain areas, Sunnis are entering the political arena. We will see a definite change soon because there is nobody now standing between them and the rest of the Iraq people.’ Bradley Brooks, ‘Sunni fighters need political role’, Yahoo News, 23 December 2007. 15. Larry Diamond, James Dobbins, Chaim Kaufmann, Leslie H Gelb and Stephen Biddle, ‘What to do in Iraq: A Roundtable’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006. 16. Larry Diamond, James Dobbins, Chaim Kaufmann, Leslie H Gelb and Stephen Biddle, ‘What to do in Iraq: A Roundtable’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006. 17. Darrin Mortenson, ‘America's new Shia Allies’, Time Online, 11 October 2007. 18. Robinson, op. cit., p. 147. Note that these summary points largely mirror those of Robinson's except for his fifth point. 19. Mark Urban, ‘Fragile success for US Iraq surge’, BBC News, 10 December 2007. Additional informationNotes on contributorsMatthew B. ArnoldMatthew B Arnold is a postgraduate research student in the Department of International Relations, London School of Economics.

Dilemmas of Security in Iraq

This article suggests that much of the violence that has ravaged Iraq since the country's occupation by the US-led coalition in 2003 can be explained by focusing on the interplay between domestic and external factors that pushed Iraq's major communities (Shi'is, Sunnis, and Kurds) into conflict. The domestic factors include an intercommunal `security dilemma' that was engendered by the US-led invasion; the role of belligerent `ethnic entrepreneurs' within these communities; and the long-term animosities, apprehensions, and fears among their members. External factors include the disbandment of Iraq's ruling elite, regime, and security sector by the USA, along with the role of the Arab and Muslim volunteers who came to fight Iraq's foreign occupation. The article concludes by discussing the possible ramifications of the conflict in Iraq for domestic, regional, and international security, and mentions several steps that can help ameliorate it.

Operationalizing Iraqi freedom

Purpose – To understand practices of inscription and description used by the US Government in the production of discourse concerning the war in Iraq as part of the post 9/11 War on Terror and as part of a neo‐liberal project of governance.Design/methodology/approach – Using an analytics of governmentality, this paper interrogates US government discourse on the war in Iraq, focusing on a series of Department of Defense documents entitled Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (MSSI).Findings – Through the use of New Public Management techniques, the MSSI reports render the war in Iraq in depoliticized, decontextualized, apolitical and amoral terms. Such a rendering does an unacceptable violence to the experiences of those living in the war zone and to the complex context of US military involvement in Iraq.Originality/value – Neo‐liberal regimes of knowledge and practice are ubiquitous, perhaps even hegemonic. This analysis disturbs the neat logic of neo‐liberalism and seeks to reinsert the troubling bodi...

Food Security and Food Sovereignty in Iraq

This paper examines the impact of war and sanctions on food security in Iraq from 1990 to 2006. Iraq provides an important example of a country that went through an almost complete “exclusion” from the global economy under sanctions (in 1990–2003) and is now undergoing coercive “integration” into the global economy by force, a process that began with the US-led invasion in 2003. It is argued here that both war and sanctions have negative impacts on food security and have contributed to a dramatic decline in the nutritional and health status of vulnerable segments of the Iraqi population. While sanctions (exclusion) were intended to marginalize the Iraqi regime and weaken its political support, they instead increased civilians' dependence on the state and impeded recovery from the 1990–91 Gulf War. The 2003 invasion (coercive inclusion) also worsened living conditions. This paper demonstrates that the total collapse of a state can create major political turmoil and lead to increasing violence, in turn triggering a decline in food security and allowing major changes in food sovereignty that may continue to shape Iraq for years to come.