Operational Success, Strategic Failure: Assessing the 2007 Iraq Troop Surge

Abstract

ABSTRACT: This article outlines contemporary history of sectarian conflict and identifies consequences of US surge strategy perpetuating region's violence and strengthening Islamic State. By 2006, security had declined dramatically Iraq. The February bombing of al-Askari mosque, a major Shia holy site, sparked a rapid increase sectarian conflict. Violence Baghdad increased 43 percent over summer; by October, civilian deaths had risen to more than three thousand per month. (1) Thus, January 2007 United States radically shifted course of War by executing Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, commonly known as the surge. Under General David Petraeus, surge attempted to reverse course of war and stabilize using counterinsurgency tactics, which included 30,000 additional soldiers '[living] with people' order to secure them. (2) Operationally, effort appeared to have been a success. By January 2009, casualties declined from 2,693 to 372 civilians and from 101 to 14 US troops; violent incidents declined from 908 to 195. (3) In recent years, however, increasing sectarian conflict is again jeopardizing Iraq's stability. (4) At this point it seems surge has failed to achieve strategic objectives--daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence their leaders, and government will... make progress--stated by President George W. Bush January 2007. (5) Why? Most scholarship on this issue falls into two camps. The first group claims operation would have succeeded if President Barack Obama had kept US forces past 2011. The second camp argues mission could not have succeeded because it failed to address underlying sectarian conflict and political instability fueling civil war. Due to complexity of issue, determining correct cause with complete certainty is challenging. The debate centers around such evidence as contemporary history of sectarian conflict Iraq, sectarian tension and institutional mismanagement during surge, immediate consequences of surge, and implications of strategy. After carefully accounting for such evidence, this article not only posits military solution to political and sectarian problems was misguided but also illustrates lessons from this operation for use future conflicts. The Debate The optimists surge efficacy debate argue Iraq's increasing instability is due to troop withdrawal under Obama administration. This view claims reduced violence and improved relations with local communities were squandered absence of US troops enforcing rule of law. (6) David Kilcullen, Petraeus' senior counterinsurgency adviser, notes in a conflict like Iraq, if violence drops when you apply counterinsurgency techniques, then returns when you stop ... it suggests [the tactics] do work ... and you shouldn't have stopped before figuring out a way to maintain progress. Kilcullen also criticizes Obama's desire to end war rather than to fight for a status of forces agreement (SOFA) to extend troops past 2011. (7) Similarly, Peter Mansoor, Petraeus's executive US Army officer, argues surge was a successful strategy shift: Al-Qaeda was allowed off ropes ... due to our inability to remain sufficiently engaged ... not to failure of surge as a strategic concept. (8) According to optimists, two assumptions explain Iraq's security decline. First, reduced violence during 2007 and 2008 increased Iraq's stability and positioned government to manage sectarian tension successfully. For example, former Sunni insurgents, known as Sons of Iraq (SOI), willingly began working with coalition forces and Shia police. Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr also stood down Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) Shia militia. (9) Second, by end of 2011, trend lines indicated efforts to stabilize were on target; therefore, 20,000 troops recommended by General Lloyd J. …