The early 21st century will be remembered for its shift in global economic power dynamics. In the past two decades, the Chinese government has fostered the growth of many of the world’s most valuable firms, advanced complete integration of Chinese companies in global supply chains, and positioned its firms as key players in cross-border infrastructure and investment transactions. Perhaps even more striking is the speed of China’s capital market growth. It took merely three decades for China’s capital market to advance as the world’s second most meaningful market. Chinese firms—many of which are subject to an illiberal, political governance—are increasingly integrated with global financial markets, attracting domestic and foreign public investors. Neither state ownership and control, political influence, or weakly functioning legal institutions stand in the way of these firms’ access to capital. Such reality challenges law and development theories and notions of corporate governance best practices. This Article discusses the puzzling allure of Chinese public firms to external suppliers of capital while illuminating the functions of illiberal governance through the Chinese state’s and Communist Party capacities within firms. It argues that Chinese public firms were able to grow and expand, attracting external finance, not despite the function of “bad” corporate governance institutions but because of them. The Article shows how alongside its many obstructions, China’s illiberal governance system plays an important role in promoting market regularity, providing investors with the assurances necessary to secure the flow of external finance. Against the backdrop of the U.S.-China trade war and calls for economic decoupling, policymakers are trying to comprehend the various implications of China’s rising powers while considering appropriate regulatory and policy responses. Yet while aspects of trade, national security, and labor carry the headlines, corporate governance is largely missing from the discussion. Only now, as a result of escalating geopolitical wariness, Congress and the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) have extended efforts to grapple with corporate governance aspects as well. This Article supports such recent intentions. It examines the implications of China’s illiberal corporate governance for global investors and assesses recent policy developments while pointing to the potential fallacies of adhering to conventional notions of corporate ownership and control. * Please refer to the published Article for the final version.