Secularism In Turkey Research Articles

Islam, Nation-State, and the Military: A Discussion of Secularism in Turkey

In comparative and theoretical discussions, Turkey—where secularism is imposed from above as one of the irrevocable founding principles of the constitution—is criticized for being religiously hostile, aiming to repress religion in the public sphere in a coercive manner. This view is faulty on two grounds. First, it essentializes religion by assuming that religion is an objectively identifiable concept and that as such it can be separated from the realm of the secular and become an object of state power. The separation between the secular and the religious, as this article argues, is premised on particular definitions of religion, the roots of which are historically contingent and intimately linked to the rise of the modern nation-state. As the article argues, a particular conception of Islam is integrated into the nation-state's projects of rationalization, homogenization, and disciplinization, and as such it is turned into a disciplinary tool through which new citizens are created. Second, the claim that the state represses “religion” relies exclusively on legal and constitutional machinery that restricts the use of religion for political purposes and consequently misses how a particular conception of religion is disseminated by state institutions in the private realms of culture and education in order to form new Islamic selves that agree to put the nation's “sacred” interests above all “particular” interests. The article problematizes the way military service is normalized in defending the secular constitution through an appeal to the Islamic conception of martyrdom, wherein “good” citizens are promised to be rewarded not in the secular time but in the hereafter.

The Islamic Work Ethic and the Emergence of Turkish SME Owner-Managers

The aim of this study is to explore the influence of religious beliefs on the work-related attitudes of Turkish SME (small and medium-sized enterprise) owner-managers. In this research, the emergence of pious or devout business people is considered as a phenomenon, and special attention is paid to religious transformation and secularism in Turkey. Both concepts, religion and secularism, are considered within the Turkish context. For the research, in-depth interviews were conducted with 32 Turkish business people from religious and secular backgrounds, respectively. The study investigates the so-called “Islamic work ethic” values and Islamic business principles from a critical perspective and argues that they do not seem to be as significant factors as predicted in the emergence of pious or devout business people in Turkey.

The Essence of Islamist Resistance: A Different View of Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas

The Iranian revolution—the political realization of the “Great Refusal” of Western modernization—was a direct consequence a half century later of the forced secularization of the Ottoman Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk. With the superstructure of the Muslim ummah dismantled and replaced by the Turkish nation state, insurgent religious movements, from the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the Shiite imams of Qum and Najaf, moved into the vacuum to reclaim Islam from the shadow of Western dominance.Now, history is turning again. Iran has been seized by violent turmoil as it seeks to reconcile democracy and religious rule. Secular Turkey is governed by an Islamist‐rooted party. As they struggle to regain their balance, the global economic meltdown threatens a convergence against globalization that joins the Islamist resistance with populist backlashes elsewhere.Two legendary intelligence agents, a Hezbollah leader, an Iranian dissident philosopher and Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate, examine this historical turn.

Iran's Crisis of Legitimacy

The Iranian revolution—the political realization of the “Great Refusal” of Western modernization—was a direct consequence a half century later of the forced secularization of the Ottoman Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk. With the superstructure of the Muslim ummah dismantled and replaced by the Turkish nation state, insurgent religious movements, from the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the Shiite imams of Qum and Najaf, moved into the vacuum to reclaim Islam from the shadow of Western dominance.Now, history is turning again. Iran has been seized by violent turmoil as it seeks to reconcile democracy and religious rule. Secular Turkey is governed by an Islamist‐rooted party. As they struggle to regain their balance, the global economic meltdown threatens a convergence against globalization that joins the Islamist resistance with populist backlashes elsewhere.Two legendary intelligence agents, a Hezbollah leader, an Iranian dissident philosopher and Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate, examine this historical turn.

A Global Convergence Against Globalization?

The Iranian revolution—the political realization of the “Great Refusal” of Western modernization—was a direct consequence a half century later of the forced secularization of the Ottoman Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk. With the superstructure of the Muslim ummah dismantled and replaced by the Turkish nation state, insurgent religious movements, from the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the Shiite imams of Qum and Najaf, moved into the vacuum to reclaim Islam from the shadow of Western dominance.Now, history is turning again. Iran has been seized by violent turmoil as it seeks to reconcile democracy and religious rule. Secular Turkey is governed by an Islamist‐rooted party. As they struggle to regain their balance, the global economic meltdown threatens a convergence against globalization that joins the Islamist resistance with populist backlashes elsewhere.Two legendary intelligence agents, a Hezbollah leader, an Iranian dissident philosopher and Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate, examine this historical turn.

Democratic Refusal in Iran

The Iranian revolution—the political realization of the “Great Refusal” of Western modernization—was a direct consequence a half century later of the forced secularization of the Ottoman Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk. With the superstructure of the Muslim ummah dismantled and replaced by the Turkish nation state, insurgent religious movements, from the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the Shiite imams of Qum and Najaf, moved into the vacuum to reclaim Islam from the shadow of Western dominance.Now, history is turning again. Iran has been seized by violent turmoil as it seeks to reconcile democracy and religious rule. Secular Turkey is governed by an Islamist‐rooted party. As they struggle to regain their balance, the global economic meltdown threatens a convergence against globalization that joins the Islamist resistance with populist backlashes elsewhere.Two legendary intelligence agents, a Hezbollah leader, an Iranian dissident philosopher and Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate, examine this historical turn.

Hezbollah: Islamist Resistance Comes of Age

The Iranian revolution—the political realization of the “Great Refusal” of Western modernization—was a direct consequence a half century later of the forced secularization of the Ottoman Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk. With the superstructure of the Muslim ummah dismantled and replaced by the Turkish nation state, insurgent religious movements, from the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the Shiite imams of Qum and Najaf, moved into the vacuum to reclaim Islam from the shadow of Western dominance.Now, history is turning again. Iran has been seized by violent turmoil as it seeks to reconcile democracy and religious rule. Secular Turkey is governed by an Islamist‐rooted party. As they struggle to regain their balance, the global economic meltdown threatens a convergence against globalization that joins the Islamist resistance with populist backlashes elsewhere.Two legendary intelligence agents, a Hezbollah leader, an Iranian dissident philosopher and Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate, examine this historical turn.

The Establishment of Kemalist Secularism in Turkey

AbstractThree mechanisms (exit, sincere voice and self-subversion) mediated the establishment of Turkish secularism. Exit means purging opponents out of decision-making. Sincere voice is public expression of dissent against the secularist reforms. Self-subversion refers to concealment of underlying opposition to Kemalist project in the face of perceived pressures. Exit ensured the absence of the opposition leaders in the Assembly, allowing the Kemalists to intimidate the opposing deputies to self-subvert themselves, clogging sincere voice, to such a degree that all the secularizing reforms were unanimously approved without a single vote of dissent in the parliament. Thus, the Kemalist secularism was established as a result of the dominance of exit and self-subversion over sincere voice. The very same interplay of these three mechanisms later led to the rise of a secular public sphere in Turkey during the early republican era (1923-1938). The article ends with discussing the social ramifications of this intense secularization in contemporary Turkey.

The Securityness of Secularism? The Case of Turkey

Secularism is frequently portrayed as a security referent in present-day Turkey. But, what is it that makes secularism a security issue? Where are we to locate the `securityness' of secularism? Against prevailing accounts that privilege the domestic dimension, this article argues that the securityness of secularism in Turkey should be located in both the domestic and the international . This is not to suggest that secularism can be reduced to security, but it is to suggest that efforts to portray Turkey's secularism merely as a constitutive principle and an outcome of the project of Republican transformation, or as a means of safeguarding a particular vision of transformation through controlling religion, or as an instrument of national economic development, while rewarding in themselves, nevertheless miss an important set of dynamics that help to explain secularism's centrality to Turkey's politics. The article locates this latter set of dynamics in the international realm and ultimately proffers the argument that secularism was in part a response to European/international society's ambivalence towards Turkey's `difference' and the insecurities this entailed. The conclusion suggests that the present-day centrality of secularism in Turkey's politics and the apparent securityness of such centrality could be considered as a response to particular remembrances of the past and interpretations of the present vis-à-vis such ambivalence.

Turkey's Europeanization

Turkey's presidential and parliamentary election processes in 2007 caused a debate over the nature of the country's Europeanization - its gradual adaptation to the EU's norms in domestic and foreign policy realms, as well as its secular modernization - in the course of the EU accession process. The debate revolves around the question of whether the Justice and Development party- led liberal-democratic reforms at home will result in Turkey's eventual membership in the EU - suggesting that Turkey's European identity would no longer be disputed at home or abroad - or whether Turkey will transform into a moderate Islamic country, where the increasing public salience of Islam will in the end erode the secular, unitary, and European character of the regime. This debate is currently unfolding at two levels, domestic and external. Domestically, the Justice and Development party (JDP) and its intellectual supporters have been confronting the traditional secular elites.1 Externally, contending blocks of politicians and intellectuals in the European Union have been trying to assess the degree of Turkey's commitment to, as well as its readiness for, EU membership.Recently, this debate intensified when Turkey's constitutional court agreed to hear the case filed against the JDP by the chief state judge. The judge wanted to ban the party, as well as its influential political members, on the grounds that they represented increasing threats to Turkey's secular character. High-level representatives ofthe European Union, including the head ofthe EU Commission and the commissioner in charge of enlargement process, have expressed their discomfort with this particular development and made it clear that European public opinion would find the idea of Turkey's governing party being closed down by the constitutional court odd (and indeed in the final verdict, the court argued it was the focal point of antisecular activity, but did not ban it). On numerous occasions they have emphasized that secularism in Turkey should never justify the banning of political parties or the suspension ofthe democratization process.2That said, this article argues that Turkey's decades -long Europeanization process might not be sustainable in the years to come, for two main reasons. First, the traditional supporters of this process in Turkey, mainly the secular elites, have recently adopted Euro- skeptic attitudes and become the champions of anti-EU sentiment. To the secular elites, JDP's support of Turkey's EU membership appears to be more tactical than strategic, in the sense that the continuation ofthe EU accession process has been considered by the JDP leadership to be vital for the party's ability to secure external and internal legitimacy in the eyes of its critics. This article underlines the point that absent the support ofthe secular elites for the Europeanization process, it is going to be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve Ataturk's goal to have Turkey become a part of contemporary civilization via inclusion in the EU. Second, the ongoing internal debate in Turkey seems to have weakened the hands of those in the EU who have thus far tried to justify Turkey's membership on the basis of normative grounds. Turkey's internal debate has been mirrored inside the EU in that a group of normative supporters of Turkey's accession, the so-called liberal cosmopolitanists, applauds Turkey's liberal democratization under the leadership of the JDP government, whereas the other group of normative supporters, the so-called traditionalists, shares the worries of Turkey's secular elites, yet at the same time fears the negative consequences of militarization in the name of protecting secularism.Against such a background, we first analyze the dynamics of the ongoing debate in Turkey by paying particular attention to the concerns of the traditional secular elites about the intentions of the JDP, particularly with regard to Turkey's Islamization. Then an attempt will be made to highlight the growing schism between Turkey's normative supporters inside the EU. …

Secularism in Turkey as a Nationalist Search for Vernacular Islam

Cet article analyse une réforme du régime kémaliste qui, dans les années 1933-1950, a imposé la récitation de l’appel à la prière en turc et a interdit la version arabe originelle. Cette réforme reflétait la pression nationaliste visant à créer un islam national non affecté par la langue et les traditions culturelles arabes. L’interdiction de l’appel à la prière en arabe faisait partie d’un programme nationaliste plus vaste qui visait à turquifier tous les domaines culturels y compris la religion, et à promouvoir un islam vernaculaire purifié de tout élément étranger. Cette intervention allait dans le sens de la laïcité officielle, car cette dernière ne signifiait pas l’exclusion totale de l’islam de la sphère publique, mais plutôt son contrôle et son soutien tant qu’il demeurait loyal vis-à-vis de l’État moderniste.

Modernity, Islam, and secularism in Turkey: bodies, places, and time

Modernity, Islam, and secularism in Turkey: bodies, places, and time

Suleiman Minor At Contemporary Turkey

Sufism played an important rote in preserving Islamic identity of the Turkish state. It also had a great role in the political activities and had influence on parliament elections. Among the approaches was Al- Sulaymanya which was established by Suleimain Hulmi Tonahan. Al- Sulaymanya was one of the opposition elements for Secularism in Turkey. AL– Sulaymanya, during its first period, was characterized by its unknown identity and aimed at establishing educational and cultural system which is parallel to all secular measurements through establishing many small school (Katatib) for teaching and memorizing the Holy Quran, spreading Arabic Language and reviving Islamic science: Fiqih, traditions (Hadith) and interpretation. The aim of AL– Sulaymanya was to establish an Islamic state. At first it was characterized by extremely as it declared Al-Jihad against Secularism in Turkey. But after allowing political parties to work after the 2nd world War; and despite Tonahan's attitude towards parties activity, he and his followers after his death, were participating in Parliamentary whom they think the best in serving Islam and Muslims. This made political Turkish parties admire and like Al-Sulaymanya.

Taming Islam: Studying Religion in Secular Turkey

Taming Islam: Studying Religion in Secular Turkey Kim Shively It is hard to overemphasize how politically sensitive religious education is in Turkish society. The debate over religious education, along with a few other touchstone issues, reveals much about how official conceptions of religion clash with the beliefs and practices of many religiously observant Turkish citizens. This clash became particularly clear to me as I became involved in an independent and unauthorized women’s Koran course in Sincan, a suburb of Ankara. I participated in this course in order to understand conservative religious lifestyles in Turkey, and to gain insight into the view of secularism that many pious Muslims held in Turkish society soon after the collapse of the Islamist-leaning government in 1997. The involvement in the Koran course certainly allowed me to carry out this research, but also gave me an interesting perspective from which to examine the politicization of religious knowledge and education at a rather turbulent time in Turkey’s economic and political history. To appreciate the political importance and sensitivity of religious instruction, it is necessary to understand the nature of secularism in Turkey and most especially the relationship between the Turkish state and religion. The Turkish population is overwhelmingly Muslim, but especially since the [End Page 683] fall of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the modern Turkish republic in 1923, Turkey’s government and major social institutions have been staunchly secular. The early Republican government, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, saw secularization as essential to the creation of a truly modern nation-state. Indeed, Kemalism (the ideology based on the doctrines of Mustafa Kemal) promotes what it considers to be secularism, along with nationalism, economic development and Westernization, as the ideological basis of the modern Turkish Republic. Many aspects of Turkish society —from education and governance to the organization of daily life— were officially secularized over a relatively short period of time. However, Turkish secularism more closely resembles French laicité than American-style secularism. Where secularism in the United States strives for a complete separation of church and state, laicism (laiklik) in Turkey strives to bring religion under the control of the state. The idea is that religion should not be in the hands of a powerful and independent cleric elite (ulema) that can rival government power, but should be brought under the control of the non-religious state, where it no longer poses a potential threat to government hegemony (Davison 2003:341; White 2002:4). As such, Turkish secularism—or laicism—does not make assumptions of religious neutrality or objectivity in the public sphere, but instead religion is tightly defined and legally subordinated to the political establishment. Religion is controlled by a branch of government, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, whose main task, according to the 1982 Turkish constitution, is to regulate Islam, especially its public expressions, such that it guarantees that these expressions accord with the needs of the state (Yavuz 2000:29; Yılmaz 2005:388). Controlling religious education is, of course, an essential method of “domesticating” religion and guaranteeing that it remains relatively harmless. Over the course of the Westernizing reforms in the 19th-century Ottoman Empire, education became more and more secular (Mardin 1993:350–353). Since the founding of the modern Turkish republic in 1923, compulsory general education has been secular, ending once and for all the influences of the traditional Ottoman medreses, or religious schools. The new Republican government put all education under the control of the Ministry of Education, developing a unified curriculum and educational system that would articulate a particular cultural and moral identity—a Turkish identity—to be shared by the (Turkish) citizens of the new nation (Kaplan 2006:39). This identity included a very particular [End Page 684] interpretation of Islam that was encoded in official religious educational practices and institutions, while alternative interpretations were condemned and often declared illegal by the Turkish government. Yet many members of Turkish society have found the government treatment of religion in education to be problematic for many reasons that I will explore in this paper, and they have attempted to establish alternative forms of religious education outside the official channels. The Sincan Koran course...

The Presidency of Religious Affairs and the Principle of Secularism in Turkey

The Muslim WorldVolume 98, Issue 2-3 p. 228-241 The Presidency of Religious Affairs and the Principle of Secularism in Turkey Ahmet Hadi Adanali, Ahmet Hadi Adanali Ankara University Ankara, TurkeySearch for more papers by this author Ahmet Hadi Adanali, Ahmet Hadi Adanali Ankara University Ankara, TurkeySearch for more papers by this author First published: 11 April 2008 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.2008.00221.xCitations: 10Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Citing Literature Volume98, Issue2-3April 2008Pages 228-241 RelatedInformation

Headscarves Are Secular Turkey's Waterloo

The drama between the secularist legacy of Ataturk and the popular surge of Islamist‐rooted politics continues in Turkey, centered on the debate over the headscarf. Is it a sign of religious reaction, or a sign of non‐Western modernization that will ensure higher education for Muslim women? We represent here all sides of the debate.Elsewhere in the Muslim world are the reformers and critics listening to each other, or impeding progress with a blame game? Europe's most controversial figures in this debate—Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Tariq Ramadan—engage here.

The tension between secularism and democracy in Turkey: Early origins, current legacy

The author presents an in-depth examination of Turkey's development. This essay briefly covers the history of secularism in Turkey, the secular revolution of the early 1920s and today's multi-party system. The Turkish model has both strengths and weaknesses: while the system succeeds in setting limits on authoritarian regimes, it has failed to implement a full liberal democracy.

Review: Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time, on the Political

Review: Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time, on the Political

The Origins of Secularism in Turkey

This paper aims to offer some remarks on the relationship between Ottoman reforms and Atatürk's revolutionary laws – a relationship that is generally minimised or misperceived. The first part focuses upon the Ottoman system of relations between state and religious denominations. It challenges the theory of the theocratic character of the Ottoman Empire, which constitutes one of the traditional arguments strengthening the case against the importance of the Ottoman secularising reforms. The second part of the paper deals with the Ottoman reforms concerning dress, education and administration of justice. It stresses the secular character of such measures, and maintains that there is no historically grounding to the view that the secularisation of institutions is always accompanied by the secularisation of society. The third part takes into account the two elements that most distinguish Mustafa Kemal's reforms from the Ottoman ones: that is, the ideological nature of the principle of secularism, and the method of preparation and implementation of the revolutionary laws.

A Religious Administration to Secure Secularism: The Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey

This article is primarily concerned with an agency, the Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, which was instituted to regulate Islamic services, but in actuality was used as a means of 'securing' secularism in Turkey for over a period of 80 years. This apparent paradox in terms was the muse which led me reflect on the representation of the construction (and deconstruction) of 'modernity' and of 'state and religion' in Turkey. In order to develop my argument I focus on the legal and bureaucratic structure of the Presidency of Religious Affairs.