Secret Reserve Price Research Articles

Semi-nonparametric estimation of secret reserve prices in auctions

This letter proposes an estimation method for the distribution of unobservable secret seller reserve prices in auctions. Within the symmetric affiliated private values model, I construct a density estimator using the semi-nonparametric quasi maximum likelihood approach developed by Gallant and Nychka (1987). I then use Monte Carlo experiments to demonstrate its performance in relatively small samples. A discussion on applying this method to structurally similar identification problems is provided. • This letter offers an approach to identify the distribution of secret reserve prices. • The model allows for affiliated private values among buyers and sellers. • Input data include the auction’s paying bid and whether the item sold at said bid. • A semi-nonparametric estimator identifies the distribution of secret reserve prices. • This method works well in relatively small samples ( ∼ 100 ).

Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers

If bidders are better informed than the seller about a common component of auction heterogeneity, the seller can allocate more efficiently by keeping her reserve price secret and revising it using submitted bids. We build a model of a first‐price auction under unobserved auction heterogeneity—imperfectly observed by the seller—that captures this rationale and derive conditions for identification. An application to French timber auctions, where such revisions are widely used, shows that having perfect information about unobserved auction heterogeneity would increase surplus by 5.22%. Combining a secret reserve price with learning from submitted bids reduces this surplus gap by up to 84%.

Analysis of Buyer and Seller's Decision under New Online Auction

Online transactions have become increasingly crucial in worldwide social and commercial activities as the Internet has risen in popularity. The online auction has gradually developed into a major trade mode as an effective technique of online trading. This paper mainly studies the factors that influence the decision of buyers and sellers in the new online auction of the group-buying auction, reverse auction, and buy-it-now auction. It is found that psychological factors often affect consumers' entry time in online group-buying auctions, and sellers' use of static public reserve prices or secret reserve prices will lead to different results. In an online reverse auction, buyers can improve their own interests by colluding, while sellers' expectations of buyers and information processing ability have certain effects on the present and future decision-making. In an online buy-it-now auction, consumers' risk sensitivity will affect buyers' strategy, while sellers' price-setting strategy will affect their own earnings. This paper aims to comprehensively analyze and summarize the strategies of buyers and sellers in each online auction, hoping to provide useful information for participants in the online auction.

Reserve Price Signaling with Public Information: Evidence from Online Auto Auctions

This paper studies the problem of information provision in auctions. The linkage principle indicates that credibly revealing private information would benefit the seller, which implies that a seller should prefer a public reserve price to a secret one if the reserve price could reveal her private information. However, information revelation may backfire if the seller's information is not verifiable, and the reserve price works as a signaling device. In this paper, we consider an auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We show that such a signaling incentive could decrease the seller's profit and probability of sale in equilibrium, with a larger impact when the seller's private information is more precise relative to the public information announced by a third party. We estimate the reserve price signaling model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. We find that the signaling incentive could cost the seller 4% of her profit, and decrease the probability of sale by 15 percentage points. Counterfactual simulations suggest that a secret reserve price can improve both the seller's profit and probability of sale, especially when the signaling incentive is strong. Our findings support the prevalent use of secret reserve prices in practice, contrary to the predictions of linkage principle.

Semi-Nonparametric Estimation of Secret Reserve Prices in Auctions

Semi-Nonparametric Estimation of Secret Reserve Prices in Auctions

적격심사제도에서 예정가격 공개 여부에 따른 입찰가격 균형에 대한 이론적 고찰

본 연구는 우리나라 공공조달시장의 낙찰자 선정 기준으로 활용되는 적격심사제도에서 예정가격을 공개할 때와 복수의 예정가격 중 임의로 예정가격을 선정할 때의 입찰균형을 이론적으로 살펴보고 구매자와 입찰자 측면에서의 성과를 비교한다. 분석 결과, 복수의 예정가격이 활용되는 경우 발생하는 예정가격과 낙찰하한율의 불확실성은 모두 발주자의 기대비용이 낮아지는 방향으로 작용하게 되며, 이에 따라 발주자의 기대비용 관점에서 복수의 예정가격 중 임의로 예정가격을 선정하는 것이 예정가격을 공개하는 경우에 비하여 우월한 성과를 갖는 것으로 분석되었다. 한편, 낙찰자가 받는 최저비용의 관점에서는 입찰자들이 높은 낙찰하한율 이상으로 입찰하므로 이때 받게 되는 비용의 최저가는 공개된 예정가격에서의 균형과 같게 된다. 따라서 발주자의 기대비용과 낙찰자가 받는 최저비용의 관점을 모두 고려할 때 적격심사제의 성과는 복수의 예정가격 중 임의로 선정되는 것이 예정가격이 공개되는 경우에서 보다 우월하게 된다. 본 연구의 이론적 분석 결과는 현행의 적격심사제도에서 예정가격을 선정하는 방식이 타당함을 이론적으로 뒷받침한다.

Secret Reserve Prices by Uninformed Sellers

Secret Reserve Prices by Uninformed Sellers

Supporting private data on Hyperledger Fabric with secure multiparty computation

Hyperledger Fabric is a “permissioned” blockchain architecture, providing a consistent distributed ledger, shared by a set of “peers” that must all have the same view of its state. For many applications, it is desirable to keep private data on the ledger, but the same-view principle makes it challenging to implement. In this paper, we explore supporting private data on Fabric using secure multiparty computation (MPC). In our solution, peers encrypt their private data before storing it on the chain and use secure MPC whenever such private data are needed in a transaction. We created a demo of our solution, implementing a bidding system where sellers list assets on the ledger with a secret reserve price, and bidders publish their bids on the ledger but keep secret the bidding price. We implemented a smart contract that runs the auction on this secret data, using a simple secure-MPC protocol that was built using the EMP-toolkit library. We identified two basic services that should be added to Hyperledger Fabric to support our solution, inspiring follow-up work to implement and add these services to the Hyperledger Fabric architecture.

The effects of competitive reserve prices in online auctions

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate how competition among online auction sellers influences the setting of both open and secret reserve prices, thereby affecting auction outcome.Design/methodology/approachUsing a data set collected from eBay consisting of 787 identical product auctions, three empirical models have been proposed. Model 1 simultaneously estimates the effects of auction competition on a seller’s own open and secret reserve price strategies; Model 2 estimates the effects of auction competition on bidder participation; and Model 3 estimates the direct and indirect effects of auction competition on selling price.FindingsCompetition among sellers is central to shaping sellers’ reserve price strategies. When there are more concurrent auctions for identical items, sellers tend to specify a low open reserve and are less likely to set a secret reserve. Sellers are strongly influenced by competitors’ reserve price strategies, and tend to follow competition. Finally, auction competition and competitive reserve price strategies influence both bidder entry and selling prices.Practical implicationsThis study has important implications for both sellers and bidders. It highlights the importance for sellers to adapt their reserve price strategies in light of their competitors’ reserve price strategies and offers implications for bidders regarding auction selection. An auction with low starting bid does not necessarily lead to a lower selling price as it attracts more bidders.Originality/valueThis paper focuses on competition among auction sellers, whereas previous literature has focused on competition among bidders. This paper is the first to study the impact of competing reserve prices in auctions.

No-Trade in Second-Price Auctions with Entry Costs and Secret Reserve Prices

We consider private-value auctions in the presence of exogenous participation costs and secret reserve prices endogenously set by sellers whose valuation of the item equals zero. We show that in first-price auctions there is an equilibrium for any arbitrary reserve price level. In second-price auctions, the only equilibrium with truthful bidding is a situation where no buyer enters and the seller chooses a reserve price that deters entry.

No-trade in second-price auctions with entry costs and secret reserve prices

We consider a second-price private-value auction in the presence of an exogenous participation cost and a secret reserve price endogenously set by the seller. We show that, if the entry cost is strictly positive, the only equilibrium outcome is that the seller chooses a reserve price that deters entry and no buyer enters.

Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse

We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rP above the seller’s cost c, but lowers the secret reserve price rS below the revenue maximizing reserve price r0. Further, rP<rS. Hence, for a risk averse seller, public and secret reserve prices are ordered: c<rP<rS<r0.

Public vs. Secret Reserve Prices in Auctions: Evidence from Combining Field and Lab Experiments

In this paper, we report both field and laboratory experimental results on the effects of setting public versus private reserve prices in ascending auctions. The field experiments were performed with a large online used automobile seller. In addition to providing a check on the results of the field experiment, we use laboratory experiments to implement an important treatment that we could not use in our field experiments.We find no evidence in the field or in the lab of an effect of reserve price presentation on auction revenues.

Goethe's secret reserve price

AbstractThe story in which Goethe sold a manuscript through a secret reserve price is revisited. Goethe's choice of secrecy can be explained as an attempt to mitigate the lemons problem through concealing his private information about the manuscript. The standard mechanisms that make the price public are unsafe for the seller as the buyer may adopt non‐trusting posterior beliefs. A safe inscrutable mechanism is constructed here that generates more expected profits for some seller types than any such standard mechanism. A contrast between this mechanism and the one devised by Goethe explains why his mechanism was corrupted during its execution.

Secret versus public reserve price in an “outcry” English procurement auction: Experimental results

In a set of human experiments, we analyze the impact of the buyer׳s reserve price policy in an online open outcry reverse auction. We measure the impact of revealing or not the reserve price on the buyer׳s expected cost when suppliers may be risk-averse. Results confirm that the optimal public reserve price policy dominates for the buyer when the lowest cost supplier is weakly risk-averse but in contrast with theory, the secret reserve price policy does not dominate when he becomes very risk-averse. Analysis of strategic suppliers׳ bidding behavior shows, in conformity with theory, that they react to the secret reserve price and are more aggressive when they are more risk-averse. This explains why the optimal public reserve price does not perform better in this context but is equivalent to the secret one. However, strongly risk-averse bidders are less aggressive than predicted by theory. That is why the secret reserve price policy does not strictly dominate.

On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices

From a theory viewpoint, the use of auctions with zero public reserve prices, also called absolute auctions, or of auctions with secret reserve prices, is somewhat puzzling despite being common. By allowing that buyers differ in their processing of past data regarding how the participation rate varies with the auction format and how reserve prices are distributed when secret, we show in a competitive environment that these auction formats may endogenously emerge. We also analyze how buyers with various sophistications and sellers with various costs sort into the different formats, thereby offering a range of testable predictions. Alternative approaches are reviewed.

Secret reserve prices in first-price auctions

This article offers a theoretical explanation for the use of secret reserve prices in auctions. I study first-price auctions with and without secret reserve price in an independent private values environment with risk-neutral buyers and a seller who cares at least minimally about risk. The seller can fix the auction rules either before or after she learns her reservation value. Fixing the rules early and keeping the right to set a secret reserve price can be strictly optimal. Moreover, I describe the relation of using a secret reserve price to phantom bidding and non-commitment to sell.

The Efficiency of Dynamic, Post-Auction Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions

This study quantifies the eciency of a real-world bargaining game with two-sided incomplete information. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987) derived the theoretical ecient frontier for bilateral trade under two-sided uncertainty, but little is known about how well real-world bargaining performs relative to the frontier. The setting is wholesale used-auto auctions, an 80 billion industry where buyers and sellers participate in alternating-oer bargaining when the auction price fails to reach a secret reserve price. Using 300,000 auction/bargaining sequences, this study nonparametrically estimates bounds on the distributions of buyer and seller valuations and then estimates where bargaining outcomes lie relative to the ecient frontier. Findings indicate that the observed auction-followed-by-bargaining mechanism is quite ecient, achieving 88‐96% of the surplus and 92‐99% of the trade volume which can be achieved on the ecient frontier.

Search and Choice in Online Consumer Auctions

Price dispersion in simultaneous online auctions is a puzzle in light of the relatively low search costs required to find the lower price. Much of this price dispersion appears to be due to a lack of switching by bidders between auctions, which in turn could be due to inertia related to search costs. We identify some of the influencing factors through a controlled field experiment involving pairs of simultaneous auctions. Keeping the sellers and the goods sold identical between two auctions, we vary auction design features between and within pairs including shipping cost, open reserve, secret reserve price, and duration, and we provide bidders with incentives to search. We use a choice model that examines individual choice between pairs of simultaneous auctions. We find that within-pair price dispersion is substantial and that prices and auction choice by bidders are indeed related to search costs. We find strong inertia in auction choice and find that this effect significantly interacts with time left in the auction. Although individuals do not always choose a lower-priced auction, they are more likely to do so when search costs are low or search incentives are high.

Managing information diffusion in Name-Your-Own-Price auctions

In Name-Your-Own-Price auctions (NYOP) prospective buyers bid against a secret reserve price set by the seller and only win the auction at the price of their bid if it is equal or higher than the seller's reserve price. Thus, bidders who want to win the auction without too much overbidding have a strong incentive to learn more about the seller's secret reserve price, possibly via their own network of friends, digital networks or online communities. Information sharing and information diffusion in digital networks can change bidding behavior and thus have important implications for sellers in NYOP markets. We develop a decision support system that enables sellers to assess the impact of information diffusion and to analyze the profitability of different seller strategies. We build the system from the bottom up by developing and testing a model of agents' bidding behavior which constitutes the basis for analyzing the effects of different network structures and seller strategies on profit. Sellers can react to information diffusion by setting the secret reserve price optimally, taking into account this strategic element by the provision of a forum and by decreasing the quality of information through forum intervention. Our results show that information diffusion can either decrease or increase seller profit depending on the buyers' initial beliefs about the seller's costs. We also show that the structure of the underlying social network is an important driver for information diffusion and that data about social networks might hence be of value to decision makers.