Abstract
We consider private-value auctions in the presence of exogenous participation costs and secret reserve prices endogenously set by sellers whose valuation of the item equals zero. We show that in first-price auctions there is an equilibrium for any arbitrary reserve price level. In second-price auctions, the only equilibrium with truthful bidding is a situation where no buyer enters and the seller chooses a reserve price that deters entry.
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