Second-person Account Research Articles

Are There Any Conventional Obligations?

AbstractThere are reasons to believe that conventional obligations are impossible. Thus, it could be argued that for me to have an obligation to Φ in virtue of the fact that a convention so requires, it must be the case that I have a convention-independent obligation to do something else such that, given the existence of the convention, Φing is a way of doing just that. But, then, my obligation to Φ would not really be conventional at all. On closer inspection, so-called conventional obligations turn out to be no more than a specification of what our nonconventional obligations require given the circumstances. In this paper, I shall argue that contra to what this argument suggests, there can be genuinely conventional obligations. To do so, I develop a second-personal account of conventional obligations, according to which obligations are grounded by conventions in virtue of an explanation that does not follow the indicated pattern.

Relationships, Authority, and Reasons: A Second-Personal Account of Corporate Moral Agency

We present asecond-personalaccount of corporate moral agency. This approach is in contrast to thefirst-personalapproach adopted in much of the existing literature, which concentrates on the corporation’s ability to identify moral reasons for itself. Our account treats relationships and communications as the fundamental building blocks of moral agency. The second-personal account rests on a framework developed by Darwall. Its central requirement is that corporations be capable of recognizing the authority relations that they have with other moral agents. We discuss the relevance of corporate affect, corporate communications, and corporate culture to the second-personal account. The second-personal account yields a new way to specify first-personal criteria for moral agency, and it generates fresh insights into the reasons those criteria matter. In addition, a second-personal analysis implies that moral agency is partly a matter of policy, and it provides a fresh perspective on corporate punishment.

Respect for persons and the allocation of lifesaving healthcare resources.

Many ethicists argue that we should respect persons when we distribute resources. Yet it is unclear what this means in practice. For some, the idea of respect for persons is synonymous with the idea of respect for autonomy. Yet a principle of respect for autonomy provides limited guidance for how we should distribute scarce medical interventions. In this article, however, I sketch an alternative conception of respect for persons-one that is based on an ethic of mutual accountability. I draw in particular upon Stephen Darwall's writings on respect and the second-person standpoint. I consider the implications of this conception of respect for the distribution of scarce, lifesaving healthcare resources. A second-personal account of respect rules out aggregative approaches to distribution, and instead requires that we give individual consideration to the claims that persons in need make on the resources in our control. The principles that we use to govern our allocation of resources, furthermore, should be principles that are acceptable to all reasonable agents. Building on this insight, the final section of this paper considers how a principle of need can be used as a means to make decisions about the allocation of lifesaving resources.

Kant and the Second Person

AbstractAccording to Stephen Darwall's second-personal account, moral obligations constitutively involve relations of authority and accountability between persons. Darwall takes this account to lend support to Immanuel Kant's moral theory. Critics object that the second-personal account abandons central tenets of Kant's system. I respond to the three main challenges that critics offer by showing that they rest on misunderstandings of the second-personal account. Properly understood, this account is not only congenial to Kant's moral theory, but also illuminates aspects of that theory which have hitherto received scant attention. In particular, it motivates a fresh perspective on the relationship between respect, persons, and the law.

Temperance and the Second-Person Perspective

The virtue of temperance with respect to food and drink is often assumed to be relatively straightforward, a matter of steering a mean between excess and deficiency. Given also that humans share the need to eat and drink with non-human animals, this topic might therefore seem promising to explore for possible connections between evolutionary research on morality and theological ethics. In this paper, however, I argue that many aspects of temperance go far beyond the Aristotelian account and can be understood principally as reflecting the fact that human beings are embodied relational persons. This second-person account can indeed be connected to theological ethics, but it is also one that draws principally from the discontinuities of human and non-human behaviour.

Commitment and the Second-Person Standpoint

On Chang's voluntarist account of commitments, when we commit to φ, we employ the 'normative powers' of our will to give ourselves a reason to φ that we would otherwise not have had. I argue that Chang's account, by itself, does not have sufficient conceptual resources to reconcile the normative significance of commitments with their alleged fundamentally volitional character. I suggest an alternative, second-personal account of commitment, which avoids this problem. On this account, the volitional act involved in committing is one of holding ourselves accountable, thus putting us under to a pro tanto obligation to ourselves. The second-personal account implies that there is an interesting link between commitment and morality.

Social Impairments in Mental Disorders: Recent Developments in Studying the Mechanisms of Interactive Behavior

Most mental disorders are associated with impairments in social functioning. Paradigms developed to study social functioning in laboratory settings mostly put participants in a detached observer point of view. However, some phenomena are inherently interactive and studying full-blown reciprocal interactions may be indispensable to understand social deficits in psychopathology. We conducted a narrative review on recent developments in the field of experimental clinical psychology and clinical social neuroscience that employs a second-person approach to studying social impairments in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), Personality Disorder, Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD), and Schizophrenia. Recent developments in methodological, analytical, and technical approaches, such as dual eye-tracking, mobile eye-tracking, live video-feed, hyperscanning, or motion capture allow for a more ecologically valid assessment of social functioning. In individuals with ASD, these methods revealed reduced sensitivity to the presence of a real interaction partner as well as diminished behavioral and neural synchronicity with interaction partners. Initial evidence suggests that interactive paradigms might be a powerful tool to reveal reduced interpersonal sensitivity in Personality Disorders and increased interpersonal sensitivity in individuals with SAD. A shift towards adapting a second-person account has clearly benefitted research on social interaction in psychopathology. Several studies showed profound differences in behavioral and neural measures during actual social interactions, as compared to engaging participants as mere observers. While research using truly interactive paradigms is still in its infancy, it holds great potential for clinical research on social interaction. We review studies adopting a second-person account of social interaction in clinical psychology. Studies show profound differences between actual social interactions and mere observations. The full extent of impairments in social functioning unfolds only in complex social interactions. New methodological developments hold great potential for research on social interaction deficits. We review studies adopting a second-person account of social interaction in clinical psychology. Studies show profound differences between actual social interactions and mere observations. The full extent of impairments in social functioning unfolds only in complex social interactions. New methodological developments hold great potential for research on social interaction deficits.

Reactive Attitudes, Forgiveness, and the Second-Person Standpoint

Philosophers discussing forgiveness have usually been split between those who think that forgiveness is typically virtuous, even when the wrongdoer doesn’t repent, and those who think that, for forgiveness to be virtuous, certain pre-conditions must be satisfied. I argue that Darwall’s second-personal account of morality offers significant theoretical support for the latter view. I argue that if, as Darwall claims, reactive attitudes issue a demand, this demand needs to be adequately answered for forgiveness to be warranted. It follows that we should reject the thesis that unconditional forgiveness is appropriate in the absence of repentance.

Second-Personal Reasons and Special Obligations

The paper discusses the second-personal account of moral obligation as put forward by Stephen Darwall. It argues that on such an account, an important part of our moral practice cannot be explained, namely special obligations that are grounded in special relationships between persons. After highlighting the problem, the paper discusses several strategies to accommodate such special obligations that are implicit in some of Darwall’s texts, most importantly a disentanglement strategy and a reductionist strategy. It argues that neither one of these strategies is entirely convincing. The last part of the papers sketches a novel account of how to accommodate special obligations in a second-personal framework: According to this suggestion, special obligations might be due to the fact that relationships change the normative authority that persons have over each other.

The Very Thought of (Wronging) You

Claiming rights against one another is a perfectly familiar phenomenon. We express the elementary thought you cannot do that to me in a variety of ways. And yet, in spite of the perfect familiarity of this phenomenon, the two standard philosophical theories of rights (the interest and the choice theories) face notorious difficulties in accounting for it. My aim in this paper is to introduce a distinctive, second-personal account of rights. I will call this the independence theory of rights, the view that rights are specifications of a basic right to independence against another. And I will argue that by taking as basic the second-personal thought you cannot do that to me the independence theory best illuminates the basic phenomenon of having rights against one another.

Second-personal reasons: why we need something like them, but why there are actually no such things

Stephen Darwall, in his book The Second-Person Standpoint (2006), has argued for an account of morality grounded in what he calls second-personal reasons. My first aim in this paper is to demonstrate the value of an account like Darwall’s; as I read it, it responds to the need for an account of morality as ‘intrinsic’ to the person. However, I go on to argue, as my second aim in this paper, that Darwall’s account is ultimately unsuccessful. I hope to achieve these aims by contrasting Darwall’s second-personal account with two other accounts, Hobbes’ and the neo-Kantians’. In the first case, I aim to show that Darwall’s account meets a need that the other accounts don’t in virtue of its differences from the other accounts; and in the second case, I aim to show that Darwall’s account ultimately fails in virtue of its residual similarities to at least one of them.

Responsibility Incorporated

Responsibility Incorporated