Sea-launched Cruise Missiles Research Articles

Nuclear Arms Control: Coming Back from Oblivion, Again

This symposium essay analyzes the comparison of our present moment -- one of rising nuclear tensions and an arms control regime in retreat -- with the Cold War’s frigid and perilous depths in the early 1980s. I argue that the historical analogy is not perfect, but it is instructive. The Cold War teaches us both that nuclear arms racing is hazardous and that arms control can come back from oblivion. Our top priorities right now should be enhancing strategic stability and preparing for arms control's future return. Extending the last Washington-Moscow bilateral accord on the books -- New START (2010) -- has only upsides, including its stability-enhancement and intelligence collection functions. The arguments against New START extension have little merit. With the benefits of New START captured for another half-decade, this piece urges use of the present moment to generate a pragmatic slate of actionable stability-enhancing proposals can be ready off-the-shelf when leadership and geopolitical currents change and prospects for nuclear arms control recover. This article identifies a menu of options: a US-Russia-China cap on INF-range missiles in Asia; a three-way deal on all missiles (including China's conventional missiles); a bilateral package deal including allowance of a limited Russian INF force, a ban on MIRVed land-based missiles, and US abandonment of planned sea-launched cruise missiles; a code of conduct for nuclear forces that among other things bans close approaches to each party's airspace and waters; regular data exchanges on warheads, INFs, and/or tactical (non-strategic) nuclear hardware; and indefinite extension of New START's inspection regime and data exchanges. Arms control is not easy today, but of course it never was. It produced massive successes and can again. The time to prepare for major progress on arms control is precisely now, when the outlook is grim.

“Tailored” Country Strategies in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review

The new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), published in January 2018, stipulates a “tailored” strategy towards each country which Washington sees as presenting a nuclear challenge to the United States. Yet each “tailored” strategy is based on the same reiterated assumption that the U.S. measures and programs are developed in response to external hostile actions. The NPR cites other countries’ aggressive behavior and military buildup as the reason to reinstitute the role of nuclear weapons as the key component of the U.S. deterrent, modernize the U.S. strategic triad and dual-capable aircraft, develop new small-yield warheads, create sealaunched cruise missiles, and reinforce the C3 systems to support them. These initiatives go along with the new expanded understanding of “extreme circumstances” which allow for a U.S. nuclear response to a non-nuclear attack, as well as with other new features of the U.S. nuclear doctrine: the creation of “more usable” types of nuclear weapons, the integration of nuclear and conventional elements of planning and operations, the enhanced focus on cyber threats, and the prioritization of “flexibility,” “uncertainty,” and “hedging” – which all increase the danger of an actual use of nuclear weapons. The NPR presents Russia as a higher threat compared to China, while China – as a major challenge to the United States in the Asian region. Yet the NPR does not call these two states “adversaries” and stresses the need to avoid confrontation and an arms race. Besides Russia’s “aggressive policies,” military programs and bellicose declarations, the NPR focuses on its alleged adherence to the concept of “escalation for de-escalation” – early first use of nuclear weapons to end a conventional conflict on favorable terms – a notion that the NPR sets to counteract. The requirements formulated by the NPR towards Iran and North Korea include ensuring their non-nuclear status, countering their growing influence in the respective Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions, preventing the transfer of nuclear and missile technologies and sensitive materials to third parties and states, and convincingly demonstrating that their aggression, including a conventional one, would be met with resolute action by the United States and its allies. Yet, in a shuffle of a kind, opposite to how the Obama Administration renounced military solution to the Iran problem and chose negotiations with this country with no preliminary condition, – and at the same time preferred the tactics of isolating North Korea and disregarding its claims, – now it is with Seoul that Washington may engage with, while simultaneously demonstrating a tough line towards Teheran. Yet the shifts towards a settlement on the Korean Peninsula, along with certain signs of restraint in the NPR, offer some grounds to hope that – given political will and active international efforts – the worst-case scenarios and further deterioration of international situation may successfully be avoided.

Emerging from obscurity: small navies and sea-launched land-attack cruise missiles

ABSTRACTSea-launched land-attack cruise missile (SLCM) strikes, one of the most common expeditionary force projection tasks, is traditionally performed by major navies using long-range offensive platforms such as major surface warships and nuclear submarines prized for their range, endurance and capacity. By contrast, small navies are deemed unsuited for such a role, since they typically comprise small warships and conventional submarines, which thereby suit them for peacetime constabulary and wartime sea denial and defensive sea control missions. However, the Russian Navy's use of such assets in late 2015 to launch SLCM strikes against Islamic State (Daesh) targets in Syria demonstrates that expeditionary force projection is not an exclusive province of major navies. Attendant challenges such as the lack of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities may limit such roles by small navies but will still potentially spark greater interest amongst them in acquiring SLCMs to bolster their deterrent capabilities.

Israeli nuclear weapons, 2014

Although the Israeli government neither confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons, it is generally accepted by friend and foe alike that Israel is a nuclear-armed state—and has been so for nearly half a century. The basis for this conclusion has been strengthened significantly since our previous estimate in 2002, particularly thanks to new documents obtained by scholars under the US Freedom of Information Act and other openly available sources.1 We conclude that many of the public claims about the size of the Israeli nuclear arsenal are exaggerated. We estimate that Israel has a stockpile of approximately 80 nuclear warheads for delivery by two dozen missiles, a couple of squadrons of aircraft, and perhaps a small number of sea-launched cruise missiles.

Cooperative verification for sea-based cruise missiles

The problem of verifying sea-launched cruise missiles, which has the potential to undermine current intentions of the US and USSR to reduce their strategic arsenals by half, is examined. A cooperative approach could be based on a simple satellite monitoring system, which would have modest hardware problems. Verification requirements has tasks are discussed in the context of such an approach, and the problems that remain are highlighted.< <ETX xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">&gt;</ETX>

Dispelling Myths About Verification of Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles

It is widely believed that an arms control limit on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles would be nearly impossible to verify. Among the reasons usually given are: these weapons are small, built in nondistinctive industrial facilities, deployed on a variety of ships and submarines, and difficult to distinguish from their conventionally armed counterparts. In this article, it is argued that the covert production and deployment of nuclear-armed sealaunched cruise missiles would not be so straightforward. A specific arms control proposal is described, namely a total ban on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. This proposal is used to illustrate how an effective verification scheme might be constructed.

Verification of limits on long‐range nuclear SLCMs

Arms control negotiators have identified a number of problems in verifying limits on long‐range nuclear sea‐launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). These are the difficulties of counting deployed SLCMs, of distinguishing nuclear from non‐nuclear SLCMs, and the possibility of secret production or stockpiles. On‐site inspection measures to monitor either a limit or a ban on nuclear SLCMs could include inspection of: ships and submarines where SLCMs are deployed or being loaded; production facilities; maintenance operations; and storage sites. While verification plans that involved either very few inspections or, at the other extreme, frequent inspections of ships and submarines might be acceptable, a reasonably effective verification plan with an intermediate level of in‐trusiveness is also possible. This would include monitoring of the production and maintenance of any non‐nuclear long‐range SLCMs and any nuclear long‐range SLCMs not banned by the agreement. Tagging of these missiles to allow identification at s...

Could cruise missiles stop START?

Sea-launched cruise missiles are outside the scope of the US–Soviet treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The consequences for the next step in arms control will be far-reaching.

Nuclear SLCMs Add to Deterrence and Security

witnessed a spate of articles outlining the ”problems” that sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) present for arms control in general and START in particular. These articles have focused almost exclusively on the admittedly tremendous difficulties of verifymg numerical limits on such missiles. Despairing of any way to verify such limits, some have gone so far as to propose a complete ban on sea-launched cruise missiles, a ban enforced, if necessary, by a total ban on all tactical nuclear weapons on U.S. and Soviet navy warships. Those who decry SLCMs because of their alleged arms control problems have their frame of reference wrong. They have forgotten that arms control is not the ultimate goal. National security is. Arms control is only one of several tools to be used in constructing a secure and stable world. Seen from the perspective of national security, sea-launched cruise missiles are not part of the problem-they are part of the solution. The term ”sea-launched cruise missile” means different things to different people, for these are exceptionally versatile weapons. The United States deploys nuclear-armed land-attack missiles, conventionally armed land-attack missiles, and conventionally armed antiship missiles. The Soviets deploy both nuclear and conventionally armed antiship missiles, and are developing and deploying two different nuclear-armed missiles for land attack. The importance of conventional variants of sea-launched cruise missiles to United States military strategy is widely accepted by U.S. defense experts.* There is universal agreement within the professional military and the administration that these important conventional weapons must not be restricted as a result of a START agreement. Indeed, much of the verification discussion has focused on how to limit nuclear-armed cruise missiles without inhibiting essential conventional programs. The strong Congressional interest expressed during the recent INF ratification debate in ensuring that conven

U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile (June 1987)

The US. nuclear stockpile is at its lowest level since late 1958 or early 1959. In the past year, many weapons were returned to central military storage depots in the United States and funneled to the Energy Department's Pantex facility for final disassembly and disposal. This article presents a table showing the author's current estimate of the composition of the current operational stockpile, which contains some 10,500 warheads. Also categorized are warheads in [open quotes]inactive reserve[close quotes] and warheads awaiting eventual disassembly. The warheads are generally grouped as bombs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and sea-launched cruise missiles. Initial production dates and yield are listed for the warheads.