Sea Fleet Research Articles

Crimean Mosaic: Spatial Analysis of the Structure and Dynamics of the Regional Museum Network

Referring to the data of the author’s database of Crimean museums, this article offers a spatial analysis of the structure and dynamics of the museum network. The official digital resources (websites) of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, the Museums of Russia portal, the website of the Private and Folk Museums of Russia, and the websites of municipalities are used as the main sources of information. The database information makes it possible to reconstruct the images of the region, taking into account their geographic reference. The museum landscape of the region forms a polyphonic historical and cultural image of Crimea, which is divided into five clusters (zones): literary and historical (Southern coast of Crimea); military-historical (Sevastopol); historical and local history (steppe Crimea); historical and archaeological (Kerch Peninsula); historical and ethnographic (mountainous Crimea). Clusters differ in the structure of the museum network and the historical dynamics of its formation. The author analyses the features of the formation of each museum cluster and the images of the past it broadcasts. The image of the war is most intensively present in the museums of Sevastopol and Balaklava as the places of the deployment of the Black Sea Fleet. Literary Crimea is concentrated in cities and urban-type settlements of the southern coast of Crimea, where many famous writers rested, were treated, and created their works. Images of the Soviet past are disseminated by local history museums of the steppe Crimea. The ancient civilization and medieval Crimea are represented in the Kerch cluster and partly by the historical and archaeological museums of the South Coast and the mountainous Crimea. And, finally, the national (Crimean-Tatar) image of Crimea is preserved in the museums of Bakhchisaray and Simferopol. Such a complex mosaic of Crimean images is the result of the influence of external and internal factors — the richness and diversity of the historical and cultural heritage of the region formed over the centuries and the zigzags of the state cultural policy. The change of statehood over the twentieth century (imperial, Soviet, post-Soviet — Ukrainian and Russian — periods) has left its mark on the museum space of Crimea.

Fleet Support to the Army Offensive on the Caucasus Front in 1916

At the beginning of 1916, the Caucasus was the only theatre of operations of the Great War from which good news for the Entente were coming. The Russian Caucasus Army successfully advanced on Erzurum and captured this Turkish fortress in early February. In February 1916, the forces of the Russian Caucasus Army’s right flank group started an offensive along the southern coast of the Black Sea. It soon became clear that the main factor of its success will be naval support. Mountainous territory and the absence of roads made the Army entirely dependent on the Russian Navy. It provided the land forces with artillery support, logistics, communication and reconnaissance. Even tactical maneuvers were not possible without the Navy: the only way to envelop a Turkish defensive line was to land troops in its’ rear. The Russian Black Sea Fleet managed to establish an effective system of communication and coordination with the advancing army units, helping them reach their goals. This is one of not well-known examples of the dominant role of naval support in the success of the army offensive. In this article, the author examines the scope and forms of interaction between the Army and the Navy in order to demonstrate how the warfare conditions could force to overcome traditional mistrust and misunderstanding of the two Services.

Russian politics in the Balkans and the 1903 crisis

After the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, the situation in the Far East became increasingly dangerous. The contradictions between Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Korea were growing. To activate its policy in the Far East, Saint Petersburg needed a calm rear in Europe and the Balkans. Meanwhile, the situation in Macedonia threatened to put this rear in jeopardy. Russian-Ottoman relations were threatened by the actions of the VMRO activists and acts of terror committed by Albanians against Russian diplomats. Neither Constantinople nor Saint Petersburg wanted further complications. Nevertheless, Russia was forced to organize a naval demonstration and send its Black Sea Fleet Squadron to the European coast of Turkey. That did not lead to further development of the crisis. Faced with the prospect of a common European diplomatic front, which was based on the Russian-Austrian agreement in Mürzsteg, the Ottoman government took a number of measures against the organizers of terror and accepted a reform program in Macedonia, proposed by Russia and Austria-Hungary

Legal aspects of the stay in the territory of Ukraine by units of the armed forces of another stat

The article presents the results of the study of the problem of legislative regulation of the stay of military formations of a foreign state on the territory of Ukraine as a factor that significantly affects the state of ensuring national security. The issue of the legal grounds for making a decision to grant permission for such a stay, the procedure for admitting units of the armed forces of other states to the territory of Ukraine, the conditions for the stay of units of the armed forces of other states in Ukraine, and the procedure for monitoring their activities during their stay on the territory of Ukraine were consid- ered. An analysis of separate legislative norms regulating the is- sue of foreign military presence on the territory of Ukraine was carried out, and recommendations were formulated regarding the measures that must be taken to eliminate the identified shortcomings in the formation and implementation of state policy in this area. The authors believe that the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine became one of the factors that led to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and gave Russia the opportunity to increase the personnel and military equipment of the armed forces during 2014-2022, as well as to create new military units and units. who were later involved in a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

The Creation of Arresting Departments at the Maritime Authority in Kherson Governance

The article examines the process of formation of arresting departments at the Maritime Authority in Mykolaiv. The reasons underlying the creation of maritime arresting departments and the difficulties that arose during their formation are analysed. In particular, it is found that the main reason was the need for cheap labor for the active development of Mykolaiv and the strengthening of the Black Sea Fleet. Sources of equipment and replenishment of the arresting companies, as well as their location and role in the process of Mykolaiv urbanization and the development of the Black Sea Fleet are studied. The detainees were mostly convicted military men who were transferred from other places of imprisonment to ensure the construction of important facilities of the city and the navy. A large part of the detainees was filled with beggars. The use of their work contributed to the development of the infrastructure of Mykolaiv as an important seaport. The management system of detention centers and their internal structure are also investigated. The detainees were at a low level of the social hierarchy, their rights were limited, and their activities were subject to strict military control. It is concluded that the arresting companies were founded in order to build the infrastructure of Mykolaiv, to meet the needs of the Black Sea Fleet and, in general, to militarize forced labor in the empire in the first half of the 19th century.

“We Arrived Openly and Without any Disguise on this Coast…”: The Schooner “Vixen” Case in the Investigation Papers and British Press of the Late 1830s

In this article, the author examines the details of the detention of the British schooner “Vixen” on the north-east coast of the Black Sea in November 1836. Although the analysis of the Russian-British diplomatic controversy surrounding the incident has been undertaken in Russian historiography, it has not made use of original investigative material or official accounts of the perpetrators in the English-language press of the late 1830s. The use of historical computer reconstructions can significantly clarify both the “Vixen” Inquiry materials and correct the conclusions of some contemporary researchers who have addressed the political background of the incident. It also allowed the author to check the credibility of the investigative material collected between 1836 and 1837 as part of the original “Vixen” files. It also clarifies the political conclusions drawn by both Russian imperial authorities and British politicians, and corrects some of the assumptions of contemporary historians focused on examining the political repercussions of the case. The author also examines the conditions of the Russian blockade of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus at the end of the 1830s. This is consistent with the aim of the study, namely to recreate a complete picture of the capture of the schooner “Vixen”. The latter was beyond the scope of previous studies. The study is based on materials from the Russian Navy State Archives (RGA VMF), as well as publications in British, American, and Australian newspapers. The author used the memoirs of the owner of the “Vixen”, James Stanislaus Bell, and the captain of the Russian ship, N.P. Volf, as additional primary source material. The study corroborates the conclusions that the “Vixen” incident was a premeditated provocation, but disputes the popular perception that the ship was actually carrying a cargo of weapons and gunpowder, as insisted on by the Russian side. The breach of the blockade by “Vixen” was a clear reconnaissance operation, which allowed the British to observe not only the technical inferiority of Russian ships in terms of modern requirements, but also the excessive bureaucratisation of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet's management system. This gave British diplomacy, which had contested the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople, additional arguments for its diplomatic efforts.

ВІЙСЬКОВО-МОРСЬКА ПОЛІТИКА 1917–1920 РОКІВ У НАУКОВОМУ ДОРОБКУ ЛЕЙТЕНАНТА СВЯТОСЛАВА ШРАМЧЕНКА

The article comprehensively analyzes the scientific output of the scientist, fleet lieutenant Sviatoslav Shramchenko, which is dedicated to the naval policy of the era of the National Liberation War of 1917–1921. On the basis of official orders, state documents, and his own memories, the author described the peculiarities of the formation of the structure of the Maritime Ministry, the development of the Black Sea Fleet, identified external and internal political factors that both contributed to and hindered these processes, characterized the general aspects of the concept of naval policy. Examining the era of the Central Council, the author noted that in 1917, the Black Sea Fleet underwent processes of Ukrainization, national and state self-awareness of sailors and officers (captains). However, the leadership of the Central Council and the General Secretariat approached the principles of the formation of the Armed Forces in general and the navy in particular from socialist positions, filled the management staff of naval departments basing on the principle of party affiliation rather than expertise, actually ignored the issue of the Crimea and, thus, did not use the potential of Ukrainianized sailors. Analyzing naval policy during the days of the Ukrainian State, Sviatoslav Shramchenko proved that its leadership attached great importance to the construction of an effective Black Sea fleet. At the state level, negotiations were held on the return of warships actually occupied by German troops, work was underway on the legal registration and staffing of ships of the fleet. The author claimed that these reforms were interrupted by the change in the geopolitical situation in November 1918 and the anti-Hetman coup of the Directory. Determining the basic aspects of the naval policy of the Directory era, Sviatoslav Shramchenko emphasized that at the first stage it followed mistakes identical to those of the Central Council era. Stabilization of the policy took place during the time of the Minister of the Navy Mykhailo Bilinskyi, but the capture of the Black Sea Fleet by the Entente and the occupation of the south of Ukraine by the Volunteer Army of Lieutenant General Anton Denikin did not allow the ideas of the naval sphere to be implemented.

СТАНОВЛЕННЯ І РОЗВИТОК ВІЙСЬКОВО-МОРСЬКОЇ МЕДИЦИНИ НА ПІВДНІ УКРАЇНИ (кінець ХVІІІ – початок ХХ ст.)

The purpose of the article is to study the peculiarities of the formation and development of naval medicine in the South of Ukraine using the example of the city of Mykolayiv, as a centre of shipbuilding and command of the Black Sea Fleet at the end of the ХVІІІth – the beginning of the XXth century. To find out its compliance with the state of development of medicine and the health care requirements of the military personnel of the naval department and the residents of the city at that time. The research methodology is based on the principles of historical knowledge (scientific, historicism, objectivity, systematic and comparative analysis), as well as on the application of general scientific, special and historical, special source studies methods. The scientific novelty of the research consists in the fact that for the first time the formation conditions and features of the initial functioning of naval medicine in Southern Ukraine, which laid the foundations for the development of this important branch of domestic medicine, have been highlighted and analyzed. The Conclusion. The birth of naval medicine in the South of Ukraine had its beginnings precisely in Mykolayiv, where a centre of practical and scientific medical professional elite of naval doctors was formed. The establishment of naval hospital in Mykolayiv played a significant role in the recovery of patients with infectious diseases and wounded servicemen during the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish Wars, as well as weakening the spread of epidemics among the urban civilian population. Mykolayiv naval doctors made a significant contribution to the development of the city's public medicine, the science of domestic naval medicine and the development of sanitary and anti-epidemic measures during epidemics both in the troops (including on warships) and among the civilian urban population.

The Issue of the Establishment and Activities of the Ukrainian Navy in Crimea (March 1917 – December 1918) in Contemporary Ukrainian Historiography

The article highlights the issues of formation and activity of the Ukrainian Navy in Crimea (March 1917 – December 1918) in modern Ukrainian historiography. It is noted that in the writings of modern Ukrainian historians, the material and technical base in the Black Sea, which existed as of 1917, was characterized, the prerequisites for the construction of the Ukrainian military fleet were revealed, the processes of the struggle for its creation during the days of the Ukrainian Central Rada (UCR) and the Hetmanate of P. Skoropadskyi were highlighted. In particular historical, geographical, ethnic, political, material and technical components for the creation of this military structure were investigated. The works of modern Ukrainian scientists were considered, in which they emphasize a complex of mistakes on the part of the leaders of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the government in the field of naval construction, their inconsistent defense of Ukrainian national interests regarding the Black Sea Fleet, which significantly affected the activity of Ukrainian forces in Crimea and Sevastopol and disorientated their further state-building activities. It was stated that during the existence of the Ukrainian State of Hetman P. Skoropadskyi, the government immediately took a course to join Crimea to Ukraine. Despite the indignation of the Germans, a complete economic blockade of the Crimean Peninsula was announced. The leadership of the Ukrainian State did everything to return the Black Sea Fleet under its jurisdiction, and it finally succeeded, but only after the defeat of Germany in the First World War, the beginning of the anti-Hetman uprising on November 14, 1918, the abdication of power by P. Skoropadskyi a month later, and the eventual capture of Black Sea Fleet by the Entente countries.The author also focuses on the wishes of many Ukrainian researchers of this period to the power structures of modern Ukraine, especially in the current conditions of the full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine, taking into account the positive and negative experience of the state and military construction of Ukrainian state entities in 1917–1921.

Professor Georgy Savvovich Chepcheruk (on the 80<sup>th</sup> anniversary of his birthday)

Georgy Savvovich Chepcheruk was born on September 8, 1942 in the village of Gremyache, Rivne region of the Ukrainian SSR. After graduating from elementary school in 1955, he studied at the Dubna Medical School in the Rivne region until 1958. Then, for two years, he worked as the head of the feldsher-midwife station. In 1960, he was drafted into the ranks of the Soviet army. He began his service as a paramedic of an artillery regiment, from where, in 1962, he entered the Military Medical Academy named after S. M. Kirov. He graduated from the Academy in 1968 with a GOLD MEDAL. After graduating from the Academy, he served for 4 years as the head of the medical service of a submarine in the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet. In 1972, having successfully passed the entrance exams, he entered the postgraduate course at the Department of Hospital Surgery of the Military Medical Academy named after S. M. Kirov. In 1976, he defended his PhD dissertation on the subject: «Clotted hemothorax and early fibrinothorax after pneumonectomy». He held positions from teacher to deputy head of the department. From 1984 to 1987, he served in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as an adviser to the chief surgeon of the Central Military Hospital in Kabul. In 1988, he defended his doctoral dissertation on the subject: «Pathogenetic bases for the prevention and treatment of pleural empyema». From 1989 to 1994 – Deputy Head of the Department of Hospital Surgery. From this position in 1994, he retired from the ranks of the Armed Forces continuing to work in civil healthcare on the basis of the hospital of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of St. Petersburg until 2018. Georgy Savvovich devoted all his main activities in medicine to thoracic surgery. The results of his practical and scientific activity of many years were published in more than 170 scientific papers, 7 monographs and guidelines for physicians. Georgy Savvovich was a «pioneer» in the use of direct-acting fibrinolytic therapy in thoracic surgery as an alternative to surgical treatment in such pathological conditions as fibrinothorax, pleural empyema, clotted hemothorax.

The Black Sea Russian Navy Is Not an Overnight Creation – A Brief History of the Black Sea Russian Navy

"The maritime power of a state is not built overnight. That is the result of a long process based on articulated strategies, the needs of a state to defend and promote its maritime interests, and it depends on the economic power as well as the maritime ambition. In this regard, it must be said that the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet has not appeared from nowhere. It has had a step-by-step strategy with relevant presence and military actions having significant strategic influences in the region. As part of this endeavour, a presentation will be made on the emergence, evolution, and modernisation of the Black Sea Fleet, in relation to the geopolitical realities and regional interests of the Russian Federation. Thus, the purpose of this approach is to identify the principles that underpin the promotion of a maritime strategy in the Black Sea region, in relation to the peculiarities of a semi-enclosed sea, and how they influence the development of the fleet. The novelty is determined by some important lessons learned. One of the main tasks of naval strategy in peacetime is to obtain sufficient space for the operations of one’s naval forces and aircraft in times of war, so the size, configuration, and strategic position of the coast in a Narrow Sea do matter. Having this relevant example, we can highlight some characteristics of the centuries-old strategy for the development of Russian maritime power (especially that of the Black Sea) and its projection capacity in the World Ocean. From these conclusions, the Black Sea littoral states, members of NATO, can extract some lessons to be capitalised on. As a result of this analysis, we can underline the fact that, throughout history, the states involved could learn to win more through war than through peace."

Activity of the Admiral A. Pokrovskyi in the Development of the Ukrainian Fleet in Crimea and in Southern Ukraine in 1917—1918 (To the 160th Anniversary of the Birth)

In the article, the power of the formation and development of the Ukrainian military-naval forces near Crimea and in the South of Ukraine (1917–1918) at the duty of Admiral of the Ukrainian State Andriy Georgiyovich Pokrovskyi (1862–1944) is shown. Great attention is paid to the significant contribution of A. Pokrovskyi in the times of the Ukrainian Central Rada (UCR) and the Hetmanate of P. Skoropadskyi to the organization of the national Ukrainian fleet. It is noted that Vice-Admiral of the former Russian Empire A. Pokrovskyi became one of the highest representatives of the fleet team, who actively supported the process of Ukrainian state-building. He actively denied the attempts of the Central Rada to implement the idea of voluntary service in the fleet and believed that the fate of the young state should be decided not by political slogans, but by the force of arms. This was especially evident during hetman's rule, when A. Pokrovsky, being the commander of the Black Sea Fleet and the Minister of Marine Affairs, managed to restore a full-fledged Ukrainian naval fleet on the Black Sea.It was stated that after the victory of the anti-Hetman rebellion, A. Pokrovskyi did not accept the new republican form of government and left the Ukrainian military movement. It is noted that in the current conditions of full-scale aggression of Putin's Russia against Ukraine, the experience of our predecessors in organizing national-state and military life will help preserve the state-building traditions of our people and serve to strengthen the self-awareness of the servicemen of all Ukrainian armed forces.

To the Question of Chronology of the Organization of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia of Sevastopol "Kobzar" at the Beginning of the 20th Century

The study is devoted to the question of time, period and forms of existence and changes in the leadership of the organization of the Ukrainian intellectuals “Kobzar”, founded in the early twentieth century in Sevastopol and associated with the name of engineer Levko Matsiievych, who was one of the most prominent Ukrainian activists of national movement in the city in said period of time. According to available data, the secret organization “Kobzar”, nameless at the time, was founded in 1901 on the basis of an amateur workers' theater in the People's House of Sevastopol, which operated as a group of Ukrainian dramatic art lovers under the direction of Levko Matsiievych and Oleksandr Kovalenko. Members of the organization established branches among the employees of the seaport and garrison of Sevastopol, later joining the Ukrainianization of local military units. The organization could be involved in the united autonomous community of Sevastopol, which was part of the General Non-Party Ukrainian Organization. According to available data, in 1905/1906 the organization “Kobzar” either began legal activities under the leadership of Levko Matsiievych or started any at all but data from Matsiievych's biography in 1906–1908 does not allow us to claim that he led the organization “Kobzar” or engaged in public activities in Sevastopol at all. From 1905 to 1907, the organization “Kobzar” was the center of the Ukrainian national and public movement, which united servicemen of the Black Sea Fleet and civilians of Sevastopol. In March–April 1917, virtually all members of the organization “Kobzar” joined the Main Council of the Ukrainian Black Sea Community. Subsequently, existing in various forms under German, Bolshevik, Denikin and Wrangel rule in Crimea, the Ukrainian national formation of Sevastopol ceased to exist in the late 1920s with the establishment of Soviet power on the peninsula.

(Не)залученість у російсько-українській війні

The policy commentary aims to determine how the engagement of Russia and Ukraine in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict fluctuated from the beginning of the war to the annexation of part of Ukrainian lands. Drawing on Randall Collins’s analytical framework of conflict, the analysis uncovers the tendency to increase or stabilize a high level of engagement on the Ukrainian side and a decrease on the Russian side. In such a case, one might suppose that it is possible to end the war with Ukraine’s victory. Russia does not have adequate material and logistical resources. Its group solidarity, ideological polarization, emotional mobilization, and the allies’ support are insufficient to tip the tide of war in its favor. The partial mobilization of Russians and sending 300,000 soldiers to war will not change this situation because it is only one and not the essential feature of engagement.Unlike Russia, Ukraine has no weapons of mass destruction. Simultaneously, Russia is treating nuclear weapons as a last resort. Ukraine will be significantly destroyed if Russia launches several dozen tactical nuclear missiles. It inevitably will be followed by NATO’s decision to use a parallel, though not necessarily nuclear, response, leading to the destruction of the Russian key military potential. In this case, the land forces and the Black Sea Fleet are usually mentioned as targets. The desire for retaliation and the inability to acknowledge defeat may be the main reasons for Putin’s next step and the mobilization of strategic nuclear forces. It will force the US to respond immediately with MAD doctrine, resulting in the complete annihilation of at least the Northern Hemisphere. This scenario is only possible if Putin’s decisions remain irrational and implemented.

РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЕ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ ВОДНОГО ТРАНСПОРТА ФИНЛЯНДИИ В 1914-1915 ГГ

The article states that since the beginning of the 1st World War, in addition to general concerns about the defense and preservation of law and order in Finland, special attention was paid to ensuring the regulation of commercial and commercial shipping, maintaining water communications between various regions of the country and the outside world, the safety of communication routes and all interested parties. The main regulation was carried out by resolutions and announcements of the Governor-General of Finland, local governors, commandants of fortresses, the commander of the Baltic Sea fleet, the Maritime Ministry through the directorate of the pilot and lighthouse department in Finland, general imperial laws adopted before 1914 and relating to various aspects of the country’s life during the war period, including the activities of various types of transport.

Crisis of the eastern vector of foreign policy of Ukraine

The discourse and the essence of the crisis of the eastern foreign policy vector of Ukraine are analysed in the article. It is proved that the issue of the Russian direction of Ukraine’s foreign policy has become relevant since its independence. A sharp surge in scientific and expert discourse occurred in 2014 and 2022, when, respectively, a hybrid war began and Russia’s open aggression against Ukraine. Based on the analysis of political science discourse, it was concluded that the primary crisis of the eastern vector of Ukraine’s foreign policy is primarily an objective factor in Russia’s aggressive imperial policy based on Eurasian revanchism – the desire to revive total influence in the post-Soviet space. It has been confirmed that the deployment of a Russian naval base in Sevastopol on Ukrainian territory, multiplied by the loss of nuclear status, and a sharp economic downturn have deprived Ukraine of prospects for adequate geopolitical status in a post-bipolar world order. After all, Ukraine has in fact agreed to deploy the Russian Black Sea Fleet on its sovereign territory. Such a position, according to scholars, contradicted the Concept of Foreign Policy of Ukraine of 1993, which stated the inadmissibility of the presence of armed forces of other states on its territory. All this led to the occupation of Crimea, Russia’s inspiration for the hybrid conflict in Donbass in 2014 and open armed aggression in 2022. Ukraine has made significant progress in its confrontation with revanchist Russia, against which large-scale sanctions have been imposed. Having received significant military and technical assistance from the West, Ukraine has thwarted Moscow’s strategic plans to strip it of its statehood and restore the Soviet Union to much of the post-Soviet space. In the course of the armed confrontation with Russia, Ukraine acquired geopolitical subjectivity and gained the prospect of joining the EU. It is also proved that Ukraine has significant prospects for obtaining a new Marshall Plan for the post-war reconstruction of the economy and infrastructure. At the same time, Ukraine must support the policy of technological transformation and not abandon the strategy of gaining full membership in NATO.

Reconsidering the Campaign of Dnieper Liman

The naval campaign of the Dnieper Liman, fought from the autumn of 1787 to the end of 1788, was one of the most decisive maritime confrontations in the modern history of the Eastern Mediterranean. Fought in conjunction with two major siege operations, the campaign between the naval forces of the Ottoman and Russian empires decided the fate of the key Turkish fortress of Özi (Ochakov), which controlled the mouth of the Dnieper. The campaign was part of the Russian empress Catherine II’s second war with the Ottomans, a confrontation initiated by the Porte in response to Catherine II’s provocative “Greek Project” and fought with the aim of liberating the Crimean Khanate, annexed by Russia through force of arms in 1783. For the Ottoman side, the decisive operation was the storming and reduction of the Russian fortress of Kinburn, which blocked access to the Crimean interior. Since both Russians and Turks were fighting at the furthest point from their supply lines, gaining naval support and superiority was of paramount importance. Conscious of the role of sea power, Ottomans had prepared the greatest armada they ever put to the seas since the Morean Wars of 1684–1718, greatly outnumbering their adversary, the nascent Russian Black Sea Fleet. The protracted campaign of Liman resulted in the most shattering and costly Ottoman naval defeat of the Russo-Turkish Wars. Russia’s much trumpeted but in reality barren victory at Chesma in 1770 pales in comparison regarding the strategic results of the Liman campaign. The incident also serves as a perfect case study to reassess the Age of Sail in the Mediterranean.

The legacy of Admiral von Tirpitz: a geopolitical understanding of China's naval buildup through sea-denial strategies

AbstractAs manifest challenger of the United States (US)-led international order, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has inaugurated a revisionist strategy that encompasses a multifaceted spectrum of initiatives, including an ambitious naval military build-up. History has shown that revisionist and challenging powers tend to defy the established order through arm races. US Admiral Mahan and German Admiral Tirpitz theorized two different approaches to naval strategy, the former focusing on global maritime hegemony and the latter on regional counterbalance based on risk theory. This article attempts at explaining the puzzle of China's naval buildup through the lenses of geopolitics, adding a geopolitical dimension to the current debate. It suggests that the PRC's naval military development does not follow a Mahanian global maritime strategy aimed at challenging the US primacy worldwide, but rather a Tirpitzian regional approach focused on counterbalancing the US presence within the scope of China's sea power projection, that is, the Pacific region. To substantiate this hypothesis, the study compares diachronically contemporary Chinese naval arm race with Wilhelmine Germany's High Seas Fleet. The findings underscore that, in maritime terms, China's revisionism vis-à-vis the US somewhat resembles that of Imperial Germany vis-à-vis Imperial Britain, both aiming at regional counterbalance and anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) tactics rather than global maritime counterhegemony. Although Chinese sea power is still far from posing a serious threat to that of the US and its allies, an unrestrained continuation of Beijing's naval buildup could encourage arms races and direct confrontation due to regional security dilemmas.

Planning the Blockade of the Bosphorus by the Black Sea Fleet in 1916. Part 3

Planning the Blockade of the Bosphorus by the Black Sea Fleet in 1916. Part 3

Configuration of forces in the Black Sea after Russian annexation of Crimea

The article analyzes the new configuration in the Black Sea after Russian annexation of Crimea. The Black Sea has an important role for Russia to promote its interests in the southern direction. Crimea in this strategy has the role of an important bridgehead. The peninsula has modern coastal and air defense systems that cover the skies over the Crimea and control the airspace of Eastern European countries. The deployment of nuclear weapons in Crimea threatens almost all of Europe. Russia uses factories of the occupied peninsula to build new ships for the Black Sea Fleet. Russia is using the energy factor in the region to attract NATO members to Bulgaria and Turkey. Bulgaria is taking a cautious ambivalent stance, while Turkey is playing its own game with Russia, raising its status in the region. Western analysts’ skepticism about the strategic importance of the Black Sea and the fragmentation of the region make it difficult to formulate a joint NATO strategy to counter Russia. Therefore, the main actions of the Alliance in the region remain the visits of warships, joint exercises and reconnaissance flights, the number of which in 2020 increased by 40%. But this is not enough to curb Russia’s aggressive policy. Therefore, NATO needs to increase its presence in the Black Sea by expanding the format of joint action and intensifying cooperation with partners Ukraine and Georgia. The normalization of US-Turkish relations should play a significant role in the security of the region. Tightening sanctions against the Kremlin and restricting energy cooperation should be an important tool to deter Russia from the collective West.