In the era of ecological transformations that are unprecedented in human history-especially the complex phenomena that have been grouped under the titles climatic change and sixth extinction-it has become necessary to ask what the place of in history is. Does have a history? How does interfere in human history? What is the place of in the philosophy of history? Despite their simplicity, these questions have received so little attention in the philosophy of history that one needs to start by posing them; and this can only be done after two digressions that show (1) the absence of in the philosophy of history and (2) the sketch of history in natural sciences.1.Absence of Nature in Philosophy of HistoryWhen the philosophy of history was born in the aftermath of Kant and Herder, reaching its first complete formulation in Hegel's system, it was born as the question of the rationality of human history, and it was explicitly opposed to nature. Hegel thought that in nature, spirit was alienated,1 because reason was not conscious of itself, and although he did not elaborate the question specifically, this also explains why in time is just the pure punctual negativity,2 meaningless repetition of ever the same forms, and not history. Hegel's great philosophical innovation was the historiality of the spirit-but he let fall outside of spirit and history. After Hegel, the philosophy of history was to develop in many regards, but the exclusion of from history has remained intact practically until our days; only Schelling has described an originary temporalization of that makes natural evolution metaphysically possible-but he came too early to think its realization as a concrete evolution of species. For instance, Marx, who ambitioned to turn Hegel's philosophy around so that it would at last walk its feet and not on its head claimed to study history from a materialist point of view instead of a spiritualist one, but as by material conditions of humanity he mainly understood technological progress and class relations; his materialism really refers to a cultural substructure rather than to any wild domain that deserves the name of nature In this regard, Marxism continues the Baconian program of man's mastery over nature: there is a history of man's mastery of nature, but not of itself.The subsequent history of German Idealist conceptions of history is well known, but it is better understood if it is related to the question that animates them. Since Kant,3 and much more thoroughly since Hegel and Marx, the whole project of a philosophy of history was born as a question concerning reason. Modernity as a whole had challenged the ancient idea of a transcendent reason (idea beyond reality, creator beyond world) by seeking reason in the concrete world itself. Descartes found reason in human thoughts. Since Francis Bacon, philosophy strove to discover reason in nature, and in becoming experimental science it found an impressive amount of natural laws-but as long as law was understood as certainty that can be calculated mathematically, reason in was timeless and without history. The Enlightenment sought to find reason in human existence and society, and by following this impulsion German idealism ended by seeking reason in human history as well. Finding reason in human reality has always seemed to be much more difficult than finding it in because of the particularly human way of freely choosing unreason and evil: while lacks reason, humanity goes willingly against the reason that it has. This is why, as both Kant and Hegel show, reason cannot be found in history without explaining the evident unreason of history as disguised reason. Pain, suffering, backwardness, contradiction, injustice . . . all forms of evil are certainly contrary to individual reason but they may still be means of the absolute spirit.4 But how to recognize reason in the unreasonable fabric of reality? …