Skeptical Challenge Research Articles

Relational egalitarianism and moral unequals

Relational egalitarianism and moral unequals

Pragmatist quietism: A meta‐ethical system. By Andrew Sepielli, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 2022. vi + 231 pp. £55 (Hbk)

Pragmatist quietism: A meta‐ethical system. By Andrew Sepielli, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 2022. vi + 231 pp. £55 (Hbk)

A functional analysis of cheating and corruption in sports

ABSTRACT My main goal here is to develop a functional analysis of cheating and corruption in sports, and to differentiate cheating within the broader category of corruption. Whereas officials can act corruptly, they cannot cheat. In contrast, sports participants, since they occupy two roles, can do both. I argue that although acts of cheating are acts of corruption, not all corrupt acts by competitors are acts of cheating. I also respond to some skeptical challenges and criticisms of the concept of ‘cheating’ by providing some opposing arguments and a provisional definition. I argue that cheating in sports occurs in the context of a complex institutional practice. It transpires due to some failing in the efforts and/or limitations of sports officials to prohibit it. In central cases it consists in both the functional and ethical violation of the constitutional norms of a sport in the service of obtaining unearned victory for the cheater.

The logical structure of Michael Williams's response to skepticism

AbstractThis paper aims to reconstruct the overarching logical structure of Michael Williams's response to philosophical skepticism. One goal is to forestall overhasty dismissals of his position based on failures to understand the logical relations among his various anti‐skeptical claims and arguments. In many places, Williams suggests that the strategy he calls “theoretical diagnosis” is sufficient to defuse the skeptical challenge and that, accordingly, his anti‐skeptical strategy consists solely in developing theoretical diagnoses. According to the account developed here, this claim is misleading—in need of significant qualification, if not outright false. Even so, the paper concludes that, in its essentials, Williams's response is structurally sound, given his understanding of the problem posed by skepticism. The paper ends with a brief assessment of the merits of that response.

Epicurean view on the validity of sensation: On the contextual reading of the content of the perception

Scholars have argued that we have good reason to defend the Epicurean view of the validity of sensation on the basis of a contextual reading of the content of perception. More specifically, it has been suggested that we can respond to skeptical challenges by acknowledging the contextual character of perceptual content and by linking its truth to the conditions under which it occurs. By examining these proposals, we identify some sources of concern and point out the limitations in providing an adequate framework for the Epicurean idea that the senses are capable of providing the ultimate criteria of truth. In particular, we argue that we should be wary of a contextual reading of perceptual content, not only because this is not a viable model for reliably distinguishing truth from falsity, but also because it is not adequately supported by the available textual evidence of Epicurean empiricist epistemology. Finally, we point out further problems for the Epicurean viewpoint by drawing on some later considerations in the history of the philosophy of perception.

Islamski Wittgensteinovski fideizam?

This paper examines recent deployments of Wittgenstein’s thought, by Mustafa (2018) and Asad (2020), in defense of the Islamic “traditionalism” of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Hanbali school. I will briefly summarize the key features of Wittgenstein’s thought crucial to this, and then examine their ramifications. I argue that Wittgenstein’s position actually undermines any claim to interpretive authority, whether of the “rationalist” or salafi “traditionalist” sort. Secondly, the approach to religious language most commonly associated with Wittgenstein—so-called “Wittgensteinian Fideism” may pose bigger problems for traditionalists than the influence of classical philosophy or “rationalist” theological responses to modern skeptical challenges.

Debunking creedal beliefs

Following Anthony Downs’s classic economic analysis of democracy, it has been widely noted that most voters lack the incentive to be well-informed. Recent empirical work, however, suggests further that political partisans can display selectively lazy or biased reasoning. Unfortunately, political knowledge seems to exacerbate, rather than mitigate, these tendencies. In this paper, I build on these observations to construct a more general skeptical challenge which affects what I call creedal beliefs. Such beliefs share three features: (i) the costs to the individual of being wrong are negligible, (ii) the beliefs are subject to social scrutiny, and (iii) the evidential landscape relevant to the beliefs is sufficiently complex so as to make easy verification difficult. Some philosophers and social scientists have recently argued that under such conditions, beliefs are likely to play a signaling, as opposed to a navigational role, and that our ability to hold beliefs in this way is adaptive. However, if this is right, I argue there is at least a partial debunker for such beliefs. Moreover, this offers, I suggest, one way to develop the skeptical challenge based on etiological explanation that John Stuart Mill presents in On Liberty when he claims that the same causes which lead someone to be a devout Christian in London would have made them a Confucian in Peking. Finally, I contend that this skeptical challenge is appropriately circumscribed so that it does not over-extend in an implausible way.

Empathy in Education: A Critical Review

This paper offers a systematic review of the literature on the nature of empathy in educational research. This synthesis of the literature will reveal four salient themes that SoTL authors have used to understand the concept of empathy. The value of empathy, according to SoTL researchers, will also receive a summarized treatment in this paper. Findings from this first part of the paper promote more accurate interpretations and comparisons of publications about empathy. Relatedly, a less ambiguous definition of empathy allows researchers and practitioners to design more precise studies that attempt to measure empathy in tutors or students, and to implement more precise educational policies involving empathy. The second goal of this paper is to raise a sceptical challenge to advocates of empathy in teaching—this will be done by drawing from the disciplines of psychology and social neuroscience. This paper concludes with a sketch of some pedagogical implications for tertiary educators in light of the worry that was raised against empathy in teaching.

Two challenges for ‘no-norms’ theism

AbstractA number of theistic philosophers have recently denied that God is subject to moral and rational norms. At the same time, many theists employ epistemological and inductive arguments for the existence of God. I will argue that ‘no-norms’ theists cannot make use of such arguments: if God is not subject to norms – particularlyrationalnorms – then we can say nothing substantive about what kind of worlds God would be likely to create, and as such, we cannot predict the likelihood of any particular evidence given theism. What is more, I argue that this lack of constraint on God's creative act raises a serious sceptical challenge for no-norms theism.

A new bridge principle for the normativity of logic

AbstractLogic appears to be normative for rational belief. The thesis of the normativity of logic holds that indeed logic has such a normative status. Gilbert Harman has questioned it, thereby giving rise to what has been called “Harman's skeptical challenge”. MacFarlane has clarified that in order to answer this challenge and support the normativity of logic, one needs a “bridge principle” that appropriately connects logical entailments and norms for belief, as well as relevant desiderata for the evaluation of candidate bridge principles. Steinberger has identified a list of desiderata, on the basis of which he has proposed his own bridge principle and shown the inadequacy of previous proposals. This paper argues that Steinberger's list is in need of revision and his principle is unsatisfactory, and then puts forward a revised list of desiderata and a new bridge principle in support of the normativity of logic.

Review of Suzy Killmister, Contours of Dignity

Review of Suzy Killmister, Contours of Dignity Remy Debes It seems that talk of dignity is everywhere. In my first formal study of dignity in 2009, I noted a marked uptick in interest in the subject during the latter half of the twentieth century. Since then, the enlargement of appeals to dignity is even more striking. The idea is now constantly referenced in everyday Western moral and political debate and news coverage. It is featured in all kinds of institutional policies, codes of conduct, and handbooks, especially in the areas of health care. And the number of scholarly articles and books published on the subject over the past decade is impressive, to say the least. Whether all this increased talk has been productive is far less obvious. I argued in 2009 that scholarly inquiry into the subject of dignity was mired in ambiguity. The concept suffered from diverse and often confusing usage, with some meanings cutting in seemingly opposite directions. For example, consider the most obvious tension between the way we sometimes use the term to pick out a distinctively higher social status, such as what a member of a royal family might enjoy, versus the widespread couplet 'human dignity' to denote the kind of basic worth or status that supposedly grounds the moral equality of all persons. I was by no means the first to make this complaint about ambiguity. But that is hardly a flattering clarification for the scholars I was discussing at the time. Moreover, and compounding the ambiguity problem, there was (then) a surprising lack of systematic study. I thus noted that not only was there little explanation of how different senses of dignity related; but also, when it comes specifically to human dignity, I complained that scholars were failing to distinguish the conceptual level they were working at. More exactly, they were often running together two levels. On the one hand, they were talking about the form of dignity: the distinguishing properties, characteristics, or explanatory demands that were supposed to apply to any contentful account of dignity – e.g., the idea that dignity is "incommensurable" with other values, or the idea that it is in some sense "unearned," etc. On the other hand, they were talking about the substance of dignity: they were giving accounts of what dignity consists in, such that it satisfies the formal criteria – e.g. rational autonomy, or a normatively privileged but politically conferred status on all human beings, etc. Finally, and partly due to this rampant ambiguity, I complained that the concept of dignity was ill equipped to fend off its skeptics. Specifically, [End Page E-4] I worried that going theories of dignity were not taking seriously skeptical challenges to the moralized connotation of "human dignity." The intervening years have evidently not resolved either of these problems. Pick up any major work in the past decade and you will find similar laments about ambiguity, the tensions in its meaning, and the lack of systematic study. What may be worse, you will likely find many new meanings. For example, a quick glance at recent scholarly "handbooks" of dignity shows the concept being applied to virtually every academic field outside the hard sciences.1 Moreover, dignity skeptics seem to be multiplying, or at least coming out of the closet. In a recent essay entitled, "Dignity: The Case Against," Michael Rosen remarks that "animus against dignity is widely shared among philosophers, in my experience, and goes back a long way." He buttresses his claim by recounting the encouragement of a colleague to give the concept "a good kicking," and by quoting his favorite historical challenges by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the former of whom called dignity, "the shibboleth of all the perplexed and empty-headed moralists."2 I don't mean to suggest that Rosen's worries about dignity rest on appeals to historical authority or personal testimony. Far from it. Rosen dives into the conceptual history of dignity in a related book. And his essay spells out a few serious, free-standing philosophical challenges for proponents of dignity. Also, it must be noted that Rosen doesn't side unequivocally with the skeptics. There are, however, other skeptics in the wings. For example...

Meaning in time: on temporal externalism and Kripkenstein’s skeptical challenge

The main question of metasemantics, or foundational semantics, is why an expression token has the meaning (semantic value) that it in fact has. In his reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, Saul Kripke presented a skeptical challenge that threatened to make the foundational question unanswerable. My first contention in this paper is that the skeptical challenge indeed poses an insoluble paradox, but only for a certain kind of metasemantic theory, against which the challenge effectively works as a reductio ad absurdum argument. My second contention is that as a result of rejecting the theory which entails a paradoxical outcome, we will see that the foundational question essentially involves a temporal dimension. After arguing that the skeptical challenge gives us a strong reason to adopt a historical view of meaning, I shall further argue against certain authors who claim that meanings not only have histories but futures as well, or that the meaning of a word may change retroactively in time as a consequence of counterfactual change in its future use. The major aim of the paper is thus to bring together the arguably interrelated debates about the skeptical challenge and temporal externalism in philosophy of language.

Blame as a sentiment

ABSTRACT The nature of blame is not to be identified solely with a judgment, or an overt act, or an angry emotion. Instead, blame should be identified with a sentiment: more specifically, a multi-track disposition that manifests itself in various different emotions, thoughts or actions in a range of different circumstances. This paper aims to argue for these two claims. I start by arguing that blame is not solely a judgment, overt act, or an angry emotion. Then I develop the view that blame is a sentiment. In doing so, I also show how viewing blame as a sentiment avoids objections that justifies us in dismissing the previous accounts. In addition, I argue that it significantly affects other inquiries concerning blame. I end by answering a skeptical challenge that there cannot be an illuminating and unifying analysis of blame.

Moral underdetermination and a new skeptical challenge

In this paper, I introduce a new challenge to moral realism: the skeptical argument from moral underdetermination. The challenge arises as a consequence of two recent projects in normative ethics. Both Parfit (On what matters, vol 1. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011a) and a group called consequentializers have independently claimed that the main traditions of normative theories can agree on the set of correct particular deontic verdicts. Nonetheless, as Dietrich and List (Philos Rev 126(4):421–479, 2017) and myself (Baumann in J Ethics Soc Philos 13(3):191–221, 2018; Australas J Philos 97(3):511–527, 2019; Ethical Theory Moral Pract 24(4):999–1018, 2021a) have argued, the traditions still disagree about why these are the correct verdicts. This means that we can understand the situation in terms of an idea from the philosophy of science, the underdetermination of theory by the evidence. Yet underdetermination figures in one of the most important skeptical challenges to scientific realism. I show how an analogous skeptical argument can be construed for the moral realm. I propose a standard form for that argument. I then defend it against three possible objections, arguing that it is at least as plausible as, if not more plausible than, its counterpart in the philosophy of science.

What the Adoption Problem Does Not Show

Saul Kripke proposed a skeptical challenge that Romina Padró defended and popularized by the name of the Adoption Problem. The challenge is that, given a certain definition of adoption, there are some logical principles that cannot be adopted—paradigmatic cases being Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens. Kripke has used the Adoption Problem to argue that there is an important sense in which logic is not revisable. In this essay, I defend two independent claims. First, that the Adoption Problem does not entail that logic is never revisable in the sense that Kripke addresses. Second, that, to assess whether an agent can revise their logic in the sense that Kripke addresses, it is best to consider a different definition of adoption, according to which Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens are sometimes adoptable.

Entitlement, generosity, relativism, and structure‐internal goods

AbstractCrispin Wright is widely known for having introduced epistemic entitlement, a species of non‐evidential warrant, as a response to certain skeptical challenges. This paper investigates a fundamental issue concerning entitlement: it appears to be quite generous, as it appears to apply indiscriminately to anti‐skepticial hypotheses as well as a range of radically different—indeed, even incompatible—propositions. It argues that the generosity of entitlement is reflective of an underlying commitment to a form of epistemic relativism. In addition, the paper presents an axiology that helps entitlement theorists to address the pressing issue of how, given the absence of evidence, there can be anything epistemically good about acceptance of anti‐skeptical hypotheses and other cornerstones for inquiry. Lastly, the paper argues that the issues of generosity and epistemic relativism are rather deeply rooted: they surface at the level of value. It explains why.

Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test

ABSTRACT The so-called expertise defence against sceptical challenges from experimental philosophy has recently come under attack: there are several studies claiming to have found direct evidence that philosophers’ judgments in thought experiments are susceptible to erroneous effects. In this paper, we distinguish between the customary ‘immune experts’ version of the expertise defence and an ‘informed experts’ version. On the informed expertise defence, we argue, philosophers’ judgments in thought experiments could be preferable to those by the folk even if it were true that philosophers’ judgments are no less immune to confounders than judgments by the folk are. We present results from an experimental study comparing philosophers and non-philosophers (n = 484), which support this version of the expertise defence.

Three theories of the unity of grounding

One of the distinguished theoretical advantages of the concept of grounding is its ability to unify various cases of the metaphysical dependence and determination relations. That presupposes that the concept of grounding is itself unified. The unity of grounding was usually tacitly presupposed among grounding theorists, but it gradually became a subject of discussion because of various skeptical challenges. In this article, I will examine three most general theories of the unity of grounding: 1) singularism: the view that the unity of grounding is based on the idea that there is a single relation of grounding; 2) generalism: the view according to which grounding should be understood as a generic notion; and 3) the view that the unity of grounding rests upon an objective resemblance between different grounding relations. Special attention will be given to the third option which was a largely neglected view. Our considerations will show that this standpoint, due to its inherent theoretical virtues, deserves more serious treatment in metaphysical disputes on grounding.

Kripke against Kripkenstein

What was Saul Kripke’s personal stance on the sceptical challenge that he famously attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein? It will be argued that despite his statements to the contrary, we can, in fact, outline at least a rough sketch of Kripke’s own views on the challenge and its aftermath on the basis of the remarks he left in the text. In summary, Kripke (a) rejected the sceptical solution to the challenge and (b) leaned towards a non-sceptical primitivist solution. If this is correct, it follows that there is a way in which Kripke's view makes his causal-historical picture of reference potentially able to solve the sceptical challenge.

Moore against the sceptics

Moore’s “Proof of an external world” and his “Four forms of scepticism” have long puzzled commentators. How are these adequate responses to sceptics? How, for that matter, is the so-called proof of an external world even pertinent to the challenge of scepticism? The notion of relativized burdens of proof is introduced: this is a burden of proof vis-à-vis one’s opponent that one takes on when trying to convince that someone of something. The relativized burden of proof is a making explicit (in the topic of rational discourse) the truism that if you argue with someone with the intent of trying to convince that someone of something, and if you fail to, you have not met your own conversational goal. Assuming Moore is implicitly relying on the notion of relativized burdens of proof illuminates his approach in these papers.