Three theories of the unity of grounding

Abstract

One of the distinguished theoretical advantages of the concept of grounding is its ability to unify various cases of the metaphysical dependence and determination relations. That presupposes that the concept of grounding is itself unified. The unity of grounding was usually tacitly presupposed among grounding theorists, but it gradually became a subject of discussion because of various skeptical challenges. In this article, I will examine three most general theories of the unity of grounding: 1) singularism: the view that the unity of grounding is based on the idea that there is a single relation of grounding; 2) generalism: the view according to which grounding should be understood as a generic notion; and 3) the view that the unity of grounding rests upon an objective resemblance between different grounding relations. Special attention will be given to the third option which was a largely neglected view. Our considerations will show that this standpoint, due to its inherent theoretical virtues, deserves more serious treatment in metaphysical disputes on grounding.