Iran Sanctions Research Articles

The transatlantic and Cold War dynamics of Iran sanctions, 1979–80

This article examines the transatlantic economic sanctions levied against Iran following the US embassy hostage crisis. It charts their shifting objectives and notes their integration with US–Iranian relations, transatlantic dynamics and Cold War concerns. Two main conclusions are drawn. Firstly, that the sanctions pursued multiple objectives besides efforts to coerce the Iranian regime. Secondly, that their economic scope is an unreliable indicator of their effectiveness or transatlantic cooperation. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan enhanced the tactical value of sanctions as a substitute for actions that posed greater geo-political risks for the United States. The European allies, though eager to protect their substantial financial investments in Iran, eventually acquiesced to demonstrate transatlantic solidarity and prevent a US military intervention that threatened their vital interests.

China vs. the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions

The EU, Israel, and United States have been conducting an intensive campaign of diplomatic skirmishes with Brazil, China, Turkey, and others over imposing sanctions on Iran to stop it from moving f...

US presses ahead with Iran sanctions

As part of its effort to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, the United States is seeking to tighten sanctions on it. The US has tabled a draft United Nations Security Council resolution that would place heavy restrictions on Iran's nuclear industries, military procurement and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Meanwhile, the US Congress is close to finalising its own bill expanding sanctions on Iran, including on energy companies with significant interests there. In an apparent effort to stall sanctions, on 17 May 2010 Iran issued a Joint Declaration, with Turkey and Brazil, under which low-enriched uranium would be transported to Turkey for processing and returned as fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. The declaration has instead so far served only to accelerate US sanctions efforts.

Sanctioning Iran: If Only It Were So Simple

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Mark Landler, “U.S. Officials to Continue to Engage Iran,” New York Times, June 13, 2009, p. A14, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/us/politics/14diplo.html?_r=1. 2. Dan Bilefsky, “France and Germany Warn of New Iran Sanctions,” New York Times, August 28, 2009, p. A10, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/28/world/middleeast/28iht-nukes.html. 3. Najmeh Bozorgmehr, “Refusal to ‘Bargain About Our Sovereign Rights’ Fuels Pessimism,” Financial Times, September 30, 2009, p. 5, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/845724ce-ad58-11de-9caf-00144feabdc0.html. 4. Patrick Clawson, “Iran's Vulnerability to Foreign Economic Pressure,” testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, July 22, 2009, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/cla072209.pdf. 5. Robert Carswell and Richard J. Davis, “Economic and Financial Pressures,” in American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, ed. Warren Christopher et al. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 174. 6. Iran Press News, December 3, 2008. 7. Executive order no. 12957 declared that Iran constituted an extraordinary threat to U.S. security and prohibited U.S. transactions with the Iranian petroleum sector. Its intended purpose was expanded two months later with executive order 12959 that banned nearly all trade and investment with Iran. See Executive Order no. 12957, Code of Federal Regulations, March 17, 1995, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/eo/12957.pdf and Executive Order no. 12959, Code of Federal Regulations, May 9, 1995, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/eo/12959.pdf. 8. David Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society and Power (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 200. 9. “Europe Takes Steps to Lift its Embargo,” New York Times, January 22, 1981, p. A11. 10. See Vladimir Isachenkov, “Putin: Iran Sanctions Not Needed for Now,” MSNC.com, October 14, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33312492/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa/; Mary Beth Sheridan, “Russia Not Budging on Iran Sanctions,” Washington Post, October 14, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/13/AR2009101300221.html. 11. “Spiegel Interview with Iran's Chief Nuclear Negotiator,” Der Spiegel, September 30, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,652104,00.html. 12. “Iran to Launch Campaign to Condemn Sanctions on Aviation Industry,” Fars News Agency, December 2, 2008, http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8709120965. 13. “Sanctions on Airline Industry Still Killing People,” Mehr News Agency, July 21, 2009. 14. Mark Landler, “U.S. Is Seeking a Range of Sanctions Against Iran,” New York Times, September 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/28/world/middleeast/28iran.html?hp. 15. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute of International Economics, 2009); Meghan O'Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 16. “Statement Number 13 of Mir Husayn Musavi Published,” September 28, 2009, http://mowjcamp.com/article/id/38585 (in Persian). Additional informationNotes on contributorsSuzanne MaloneySuzanne Maloney is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy and formerly served on the policy planning staff of the Department of State

Medical Education Under Economic Sanctions in Iran

Medical Education Under Economic Sanctions in Iran

The Problem with Nuclear Mind Reading

during the Second World War by the United States for purely military purposes. Since then, extensive civilian research and the use of nuclear technologies for peaceful ends has not erased this military heritage. Almost all nuclear technology in use around the world today is ‘dual use’, able to contribute to the production of fuel for nuclear reactors or the explosive components of nuclear weapons. For this reason, there is serious concern that supposedly peaceful nuclear programmes are being used for, or could become, cover for the development of nuclear weapons. The inherent ambiguity surrounding almost all nuclear technology complicates the control of nuclear energy. Under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), non-nuclear-weapons states must declare all their nuclear facilities and activities and permit them to be safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To date all cases of noncompliance have involved states failing to declare nuclear facilities or activities, rather than diverting safeguarded nuclear material.1 In the last few years, for instance, clandestine nuclear activities have been uncovered in Egypt,2 Iran3 and South Korea (Republic of Korea),4 and strong evidence of a clandestine reactor in Syria has emerged.5 These discoveries have prompted debates, of varying intensity, about what, if any, action should be taken in response. The Problem with Nuclear Mind Reading

The Evolution of Sanctions in Practice and Theory

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. ‘Sanctions: History Lessons’, Economist, 19 October 2006. 2. David Lektzian, Making Sanctions Smarter: Are Humanitarian Costs an Essential Element in the Success of Sanctions? (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute and Norges Rode Kors, 2003), p. 4. 3. See for example Lucy Komisar, Journal of Commerce, 24 September 1991, p. 8A. 4. Lektzian, Making Sanctions Smarter, p. 21. 5. For one point of view on this issue, see ‘Iraq Sanctions: Humanitarian Implications and Options for the Future’, Global Policy Forum, 6 August 2002, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraq1/2002/paper.htm. 6. ‘In Slobodan Milosevic's Yugoslavia, Sanctions Virtually Fused the State with the Criminal Class’, Economist, 19 October 2006; see also Lektzian, Making Sanctions Smarter, p. 12. 7. See ‘Iraq Sanctions’, Executive Summary, section 2. 8. Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, ‘Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?’, World Politics, vol. 54, April 2002, pp. 373–4. 9. Ibid., pp. 379–80. 10. ‘Iraq Sanctions’, p. 6.4. 11. Kofi Annan, Annual Report on the Work of the Organization (New York: United Nations, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/Report98. 12. This story is well told in Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006). 13. This section is drawn from the very thorough discussion of Title III in the testimony of Herbert A. Biern, senior associate director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, ‘The Bank Secrecy Act and the USA Patriot Act’, Before the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, 17 November 2004. 14. Ibid. 15. Peter A. Prahar, director of the Office of Africa, Asia and Europe Programs, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, Statement before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and International Security, Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, 25 April 2006, p. 12. 16. Steven R. Weisman, ‘The Ripples of Punishing One Bank’, New York Times, 3 July 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/03/business/worldbusiness/03bank.html. 17. ‘North Korean Accounts to Remain Frozen for Long’, Kommersant, 18 May 2007. 18. Prahar, Statement, p. 12. 19. For a useful discussion of the North Korea case, see Ruediger Frank, ‘The Political Economy of Sanctions against North Korea’, Asian Perspective, vol. 30, no. 3, 2006, pp. 5–36. 20. ‘U.S. Assumes Financial Risks in N. Korea Money Transfer-Lavrov-1’, RIA-Novosti, 20 June 2007. 21. ‘N. Korea Agrees to Start Talks on Closing Nuclear Reactor’, RIA-Novosti, 25 June 2007. 22. For an excellent review of US legislation and the intended investment targets, see Kenneth Katzman, ‘The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)’, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RS20871, US Library of Congress, updated 9 July 2007. 23. Ibid., p. CRS-2. 24. A full description of the sanctions negotiations in the UNSC through 15 May 2007 can be found in Kenneth Katzman, ‘Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses’, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL32048, The US Library of Congress, updated 15 May 2007. 25. Elaine Sciolino, ‘Atom Work Expanding in Iran, UN Agency Says’, International Herald Tribune, 31 August 2007. 26. One example of this phenomenon is the ‘Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’, which was launched by Presidents Bush and Putin at the time of the St Petersburg G8 summit in July 2006. The United States and Russia are co-leaders of this initiative, which has since attracted 51 partner nations. Media Note, ‘Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Joint Statement’, Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, Washington DC, 12 June 2007. Additional informationNotes on contributorsRose GottemoellerRose Gottemoeller is Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Before joining the Endowment in October 2000, she was Deputy Under Secretary for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in the US Department of Energy. Previously, she served as the department's Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and National Security, and Director of the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security. She has written widely on arms control and non-proliferation topics.

The End of Dual Containment: Iraq, Iran and Smart Sanctions

The following is an edited transcript of a conference sponsored by the African and Middle Eastern Division of the Library of Congress, the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Middle East Policy Council and the Stanley Foundation. The meeting was held on June 20, 2001, in the Library of Congress with Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. and Mary Jane Deeb moderating.

European Union-United States: Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act

[The U.S. will suspend enforcement of Title III in lieu of efforts by the EU and other allies to promote democracy in Cuba; the U.S. President will seek authority to grant waivers of enforcement of Title IV to countries that have developed disciplines and principles for the strengthening of investment protection, particularly through the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)]

United States: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996

United States: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996