In 1972, the United States returned the Ryukyu island chain to Japa nese sovereignty, ending negotiations over the status of this chain and the Bonin islands. The return of these two island chains, which in cluded Okinawa and Iwo Jima, was an example of diplomacy at its very best. The United States and Japan reached a settlement through negotiations that met the minimum needs of both nations. Japan re gained lost territory, while the United States maintained an alliance critical to an international system that made it the predominate power in the Pacific. The return of these islands brought continuity through change. Previous writers working on this topic have focused only on the changes Okinawa reversion brought about. The failure to mention continuity is present in studies exploring this event from either a bi lateral or international perspective. Two scholars examined U.S.-Japa nese relations in light of the war in Vietnam. Walter LaFeber contends that Okinawa, trade, China, and the war wrecked relations between the two countries, invoking a new era. This new relationship resembled the 1920s more than the time between 1945 and 1960. While Japan was strong, it was hardly capable of or interested in pursuing a course totally independent of the United States, because of Okinawan rever sion. Thomas H. R. Havens argues that the war forced the United States to return Okinawa, and Japan to expand its defense commit ment to include South Korea. Havens gives too much credit to the war. Even if there had there been no Vietnam War, Okinawa still would have been returned. There were a number of bilateral factors, sepa rate from the war, that compelled the United States to do so. Given that fact, studies examining the return of the island solely from Japa nese and American perspectives are more likely to give a more accu rate account. Even then, these works only discuss the changes reversion brought. In a doctoral dissertation published as a book in 1970, Akio