Russian National Interests Research Articles

Historical aspirations and the domestic politics of Russia's pursuit of international status

What determined Russia's national interests and grand strategy in the first decade after the Cold War? This article uses aspirational constructivism, which combines social psychology with constructivism, to answer this question. Central to aspirational constructivism are the roles that the past self and in-groups, and their perceived effectiveness play in the selection of a national identity and the definition of national interests. This article explains why Russian political elites settled on a statist national identity that focused on retaining Russia's historical status as a Western great power and hegemon in the former Soviet Union and in engaging the country in bounded status competition with the United States.

(Development of Strategy of the Foreign Policy to Ensure Russia's National Interests in Regional Economic Associations)

Russian Abstract: В данной работе подвергнуты анализу отношения России с ЕЭП, СГ и Каспийской пятеркой. Такой выбор связан с тем, что Единое экономическое пространство объявлено своеобразным «локомотивом» евразийской интеграции. Одновременно проект Союзного государства России и Белоруссии продолжает функционировать, хотя и существенно сбавил обороты в связи с тем, что оба государства входят в ЕЭП. ЕврАзЭС в соответствии с недавно принятыми решениями постепенно передает свои функции Евразийской экономической комиссии и к 2015 г. прекратит свое существование. ГУАМ за последние годы потерял свою политическую значимость, а экономического смысла в нем было мало и раньше. Каспийская «пятерка», хотя и оформлена менее формально, представляет для России огромный геополитический и геоэкономический интерес.English Abstract: In this paper we analyzed the relationship between Russia and the EEA, the SG and the Caspian Five. This choice stems from the fact that the Common Economic Space announced a kind of "locomotive" of Eurasian integration. At the same time the project of the Union State of Russia and Belarus continues to operate, albeit significantly slowed down due to the fact that both countries are included in the EEA. EEC in accordance with the recent decisions gradually transfers its functions Eurasian Economic Commission and by 2015 will cease to exist. GUAM in recent years has lost its political importance and economic sense it was a little earlier. Caspian "five", although less formally framed, is Russia's huge geopolitical and geo-economic interest.

Turning the Gaze Towards Asia: Russia's Grand Strategy to Neutralize Western Sanctions

Russia’s intrusion into the Ukraine in February 2014 and the ensuing annexation of the Crimea have been prompted by energy and geopolitical factors. The energy factors are that 50% of Russia’s gas and oil supplies to the European Union (EU) are piped through the Ukraine. It is in Russia’s energy interests to make sure that the gas and oil pipelines transiting the Ukraine are well defended not only against sabotage but also against the Ukraine making use of the gas without paying for it. Ensuring that there is a pro-Russian government in the Ukraine becomes a very important Russian national interest. There is, however, a geopolitical dimension. The Ukraine has become like a chess pawn in a grand chess game being played by the United States and the EU with Russia. At the heart of the Ukraine-Russia crisis is the EU’s attempts incited and abetted by the United States to draw the Ukraine away from Russia into the EU and eventually into NATO, thus bringing NATO to the borders of Russia. Having failed to achieve their aim, the EU supported by the US instigated internal strife in the Ukraine which ended with the ousting of the legally-elected president and eventually the annexation of the Crimea. If the conflict between the West and Russia continues to escalate, an oil and gas embargo could be one of the sanctions that is considered against Russia. Even before the current tension with the West over the Ukraine, Russia was in the process of reorienting its energy posture to Asia in view of the growth in energy demand in that continent and the likely stagnation or decline of demand in Europe over the next few decades. This paper will argue that opportunities for the West to hurt the Russian economy are limited especially when it comes to natural gas since it will be hard to find alternatives for Russian gas supplies to the EU. It will also argue that if the US tries to manipulate oil prices to hurt the Russian economy, the dollar will suffer. The paper will conclude that sanctions against Russia will most probably fail as they mostly did against Iran whose economy is 18% of Russia’s economy in size.

RUSSIA AND EAST ASIA: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

The article focuses on major dimensions, achievements, challenges and prospects of relations between Russia and East Asia. Strategic importance of the region is shaped by East Asia's increasing role in world politics and economy as well as by its appeal for Russia's modernization agenda. Russia's great power status rests upon the effectiveness of its East Asian policy and development model of Siberia and the Russian Far East. Russia's positions in East Asia have improved substantially over the 2000s. However, its involvement in regional economic interaction is still insignificant and Russia cannot be regarded as a full-fledged regional player in this domain. Russian-Chinese strategic partnership has been the axis of Russia's East Asian foreign policy, though overdependence on China threatens Russia's independent policy in the region and encourages Russia to search for ways to diversify its ties. Russia's national interests reside in multivector policy, aimed at developing substantive relations not only with China but also with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN (Vietnam in the first place) and India along with Russia's involvement in the resolution of Korean nuclear crisis. The rise of China and the US counter-offensive have resulted in a changing strategic environment in East Asia. A need for balancing between the US and China has brought about ASEAN countries' desire to welcome Russia as a "balancer" or an "honest player" in the region. It corresponds with Russia's course on playing a greater role in regional cooperation and integration. Russia's improving ties in political, economic, energy and security dimensions have the potential to contribute to the stability of the emerging polycentric regional order in East Asia and development of Russia's regions of Siberia and the Far East.

National economic security as a fundamental aspect of development country development

Current changes in an international situation cause need of achievement of such level of economic as security, which would guarantee internal stability, active participation in the international division of labor and at the same time national sovereignty. National interests of Russia form the main aspects of system of economic security and reflect the role both for society, and for the state as a whole. The stable economic environment allows economy to function effectively, increasing thereby not only well-being of nation, but also allows to develop to innovative technologies.

Komünizmin Milliyetçilikle İttifakı: II. Dünya Savaşında Rus Milliyetçiliği

It is a historical reality that there was a great debate about which development way to be chosen and in which civilization to be included in between the two active Russian intellectual groups called Westerners and Slavophiles. Communism became a brilliant solution for this issue: Russia was entirely opposed to the West because of its far distance and difference from it. Russia claimed a future advanced Soviet Union but the reactionary Asian history. However the Communist Dictatorship led by Stalin turned into the nationalism by the time and did not allow the government to be collapsed on the contrary of Marx alleged that it would occur during the Communism Government. It glorified the state and made it authoritarian and despotic as much as an extreme nationalist’s desires. Furthermore, Russian national interest was the same as international proletariat. Especially, the beginning of The World War II made the Bolsheviks to buckle down to the Nationalism and Russian Nationalism tasted the most vigorous times in these years by the personal approval and effort of Stalin.

The modelling of migratory flows into the region

In the article, the values of management of migratory processes for labor market stabilizing for the purpose of definition of categories of the population necessary for the country/region and a number of manpower are shown. Also, measures of economic incentives of migratory inflow (outflow) of the population in the necessary scales and directions for an increase in a contribution of external migrations in the demographic and labor capacity of the country, and the changing of the direction of internal migration flows according to the socioeconomic and national interests of Russia and its regions are presented. Mathematical and economic-mathematical modelling in the management of labor migration are considered as a component of the mechanism of region's labor market stabilization. In this regard, the system of indicators allowing most adequately to estimate a migratory situation and its influence on the formation of labor potential and development of regional labor market is analyzed. The assessment is given to the existing methods of the migration modeling used for the management of the labor migration processes, forecasting, planning, and optimum distribution of manpower. As the analysis result, the most acceptable methods of the migration forecasting, which can be used in justification of the measures directed to the achievement of balanced supply and demand of labor and, respectively, ensuring sustained economic growth and transition to an innovative way of economic development, are defined.

Россия и Европейский союз в Балтийском регионе: тернистый путь к партнерству

This article examines policies of Moscow and Brussels in the Baltics since the launch of the European Union’s Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region in June 2009. An increase in the efficiency of Russia’s policy in the region requires not only the development of bilateral relations with the region’s countries but also a dialogue with the European Union, the key player in the Baltic. The author identifies Russian economic, military, political, and humanitarian interests in the region, and describes the structure, content, and main areas of the implementation of the EU Baltic strategy in 2009—2013. The article examines the evolution of the Strategy, which initially ignored Russian national interests in the region, yet eventually resulted in cooperative efforts in the areas of common interest such as energy, transport infrastructure, environment, research, education and culture. The results of the Russian presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (2012—2013) are evaluated. It is noted that, despite an appealing presidency strategy and certain achievements in its implementation, Russia was unable to draw up a regional agenda and use the CBSS as an efficient platform for harmonizing its Baltic strategy with that of the EU. The causes of the current deadlock in EU — Russian relations regarding the Baltic are analyzed. The author formulates policy recommendations on fostering Russian-European cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. These recommendations range from the suggestion of joint revisions of mutual conceptual perceptions and strategic goals pursued by the EU and Russia in the Baltic Sea region to more practical measures in the institutional, administrative, and financial fields.

Georgian Direction of Russian Foreign Policy: Negative Scenario

Correction of the assessments of Russian national interests in international low intensity conflicts is particularly relevant with regard to Russian policy in the the South Caucasus. Replacement of the ruling elites in Georgia expands the space for dialogue with Tbilisi, but the main trend in the foreign policy orientation of Georgia's - Euro- Atlantic integration - seems to remain unchanged. Due to the fact that "political legacy" of Saakashvili's government continues to influence Georgia's policy it is reasonable to refer to the possible strategy of indirect actions of Russia to win sympathies of the Georgian society and inhibit the "Atlantic" tendency “from below”.

The environmental conditions of the Kavkazskie Mineralnye Vody (Caucasian Mineral Waters) health resort region, methods for their monitoring and improvement

This paper describes the unique environmental conditions of the Kavkazskie Mineralnye Vody (Caucasian Mineral Waters) health resort region with special reference to its paramount importance for the national interests of Russia. It is emphasized, however, that the environmental conditions in the region under consideration are far from being satisfactory. In connection with this, the authors point out to the necessity of expanding areas of protective forest stands and prohibition of the implementation of new building projects in the frontal mountain sanitary zones; they draw special attention to the potential danger of degradation of mineral water springs under the influence of changes in the distribution of vertical hydraulic gradients in the upper part of the lithosphere leading to the deterioration of their composition and the contamination of ground and surface waters with municipal and domestic effluents. Special attention is given to the harm and impermissibility of illegal extraction of mineral waters from producing wells. An original method for water quality control and estimation of the optimal production rate is proposed. The authors hypothesize the possible causes behind the discontinuation of mud formation at the Tambukan deposits and substantiate the necessity of using the resource-saving technologies for processing raw materials and urgent measures to eliminate the factors responsible for desalination and pollution of this mineral mud lake. It is concluded that strict state control should be exercised in the region by means of the introduction of the multilevel automated information system for round-the-clock environmental monitoring. The authors believe that only joint efforts of scientists, legislative and executive authorities can preserve Kavkazskie Mineralnye Vody health resort region for the future generations.

Rulers and Victims Reconsidered: Geoffrey Hosking and the Russians of the Soviet Union

Post-Soviet has become known as a xenophobic land, a place where non-Europeans are reluctant to go for fear of encountering hostility and violence. Public opinion evidence shows that these fears are not entirely misplaced. In 2004, the slogan Russia for the was supported by 59 percent of Russians polled, while nearly half agreed that minorities have too much power in this Large numbers of ethnic Russians wish to curtail immigration, maintain that non-Russians are themselves responsible for the ethnic violence committed against them, and believe that Russians live worse than other ethnic groups within the country. Popular hostility is directed not only toward visiting foreigners from Asia and Africa but also toward the peoples who have historically been bound up in an imperial relationship with Russia--Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia. (1) How can we explain the rise of such virulently nationalist attitudes in the past few years, so seemingly at odds with the Soviet-era discourse of antiracism and internationalism? Geoffrey Hosking's work on Russians in the Soviet Union, while not explicitly focused on the post-Soviet period, is a compelling introduction to the roots of this phenomenon. The contrast he describes between Russia's status as the leading of the Soviet Union and its impoverished and degraded condition in the final Soviet decades is one important reason for the resentment felt by many Russians during and after the Soviet collapse. Professor Hosking has never been shy about tackling the big questions of Russian history. His works appeal to specialists as well as nonscholars, recalling a time when historians were not so minutely specialized and reluctant to make broad arguments. Engagingly written and erudite, Hosking's books draw on archival research as well as literary sources and memoirs to analyze key themes in Russian society and culture. Rulers and Victims: The Russians in the Soviet Union is a sprawling, ambitious, and highly readable book, a sequel to the equally magisterial Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917. (2) The fundamental premise of both works is that imperial state building interfered with the consolidation of a Russian nation. For Hosking, a cohesive sense of nationhood is essential for stability in the modern world, so the lack of a clearly defined sense of national identity is the fundamental problem--indeed the tragedy--of Russian history both before and after 1917. Hosking argues that the overlap between russkii (referring to the ethnic group) and rossiiskii (referring to the state) helps explain the fluidity and ambiguity of Russian national identity. Because of the gradual expansion of the Russian state over centuries, the territorial and ethnic boundaries of the Russian nation were poorly defined. The identification of with a larger, messianic ideal--Orthodox messianism before 1917, global proletarian revolution thereafter--added to the confusion, making it difficult to disentangle national from imperial identity or even to conceive of a Russian nation-state apart from empire. Hosking was the first to analyze the interplay of empire and nation in Russian history in such a sustained and nuanced way, with careful attention to politics, society, and culture. For this reason alone, Rulers and Victims holds an important place in the historiography of the Soviet Union. Yet this is not the book's only big theme. Hosking goes further, identifying what he sees as a tragic consequence of the conflict between empire and nation in the Soviet era. Russians, he writes, were not only the largest and most powerful ethnic group within the Soviet Union but in many ways its most disadvantaged. In the early Soviet period, Russian national interests were neglected and Russians themselves were condemned as inveterate great-power chauvinists and imperialists. This blanket rejection of Russian national identity was abandoned in the 1930s. …

The Russian Military in 2020: Russia’s Way Back to Power Projection? Implications for NATO

IntroductionRussia Has Lost its Army. This headline of an editorial published on the global defense and military portal DefenceTalk in October 2003 gives proof of the perception of the Russian military leadership at the beginning of the twenty-first century.1 The developments after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to multiple efforts to reform the Russian armed forces. In the early 1990s, former Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev initiated a number of military reforms, but met heavy resistance within the Russian officer corps (still strongly influenced by the Soviet era) who were trying to preserve their system and positions.2 Most of the additional reform efforts of the last twenty years - which were mostly limited to downsizing manpower and equipment, without addressing the larger military system and organizational structure - failed to achieve the goal of a restructured modern Russian military. This led the Russian military journalist Alexander Goltz to publish a book in 2004 titled The Army of Russia: 11 Lost Years, in which he concludes that between 1993 and 2004 the military reforms that were carried out in had no meaningful results.3 In response to the lack of progress in armed forces reform, the newly appointed civilian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov introduced the so-called Look on 23 February 2008. Will the Look reforms lead to the reappearance of the Red Star, the symbol of the former Soviet Army? What are the possible implications of such a resurgence for NATO? To understand the imperatives behind Serdyukov' s Look, it is necessary to understand Russia's national interests, as every government will calculate their military reforms based on their perceived national interests, as well as on identified threats and risks.Key Aspects of Russian Foreign PolicySince the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's national interests have remained basically unchanged, with one exception. The importance of economic prosperity with respect to oil, natural gas, and other extractive resources has risen considerably, as this wealth is perceived as the foundation of any Russian attempt to tackle existing and future domestic challenges, as well as a way back to gaining dominance in Russia's socalled abroad.4 Russia's traditional national interests, which are stated in the July 2008 Foreign Policy Concept and the 2009 National Security Strategy, include bolstering demographic health and security as well as maintaining security on its borders and within the near abroad. Additionally, wants to ensure that it remains the primary actor in the region, especially in Central Asia.5 The more recently published Military of February 2010 refers to the importance of the abroad and underlines Russian concerns about NATO encroachment in this region. To ensure its regional dominance and to protect Russian interests, the Russian armed forces might be used operationally outside Russia unilaterally, according to this doctrine.6 seems also to be more willing to deploy their forces within the arrangements of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.7 Russia's national interests and their translation into the New Military Doctrine as well as the ongoing focus on the abroad have to be considered when analyzing any efforts to reform Russia's military.After the Collapse of the Red Army: Russian Forces at the Beginning of the Twenty-first CenturyNot since 1941 has the Russian military stood as perilously close to ruin as it does now, stated Dr. Alexei Arbatov, the Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee in the Duma in 1998.8 At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Russian armed forces - which inherited the larger part of the Soviet Red Army in terms of soldiers and equipment - still struggled with a heritage that relied heavily on the mentality of the Soviet era and with the legacy of outdated equipment. The first review of Russia's military doctrine, carried out in 1993, was largely unsuccessful in organizing the Russian forces and in changing the old Soviet military mentality; Russian forces were spread out all over the expansive area of the former Soviet Union, with a lack of general strategy and organization. …

Россия – Германия: попытка стратегического партнерства (1998–2005 годы)

The article presents the dynamics of Russian-German cooperation between the late 1990s and the first half of the 2000s. It is established that the relationship between Russia and Germany have developed in cycles because they had passed the phase of rise and fall. The official interpretation of the bilateral relations as strategic partnership can not be considered successful in view of the conflicts generated by the contradictions in the national interests of Russia and Germany.

Is Russia's Foreign Policy That of a Corporatist-Kleptocratic Regime?

Is Russian foreign policy the foreign policy of a struggling democratic, hybrid, semi-authoritarian, rentier, or corporatist-kleptocratic state? Russia possesses all the trappings of a state with a long-established set of institutions representing state interests abroad, but it also has a set of elites whose purpose is both to represent and promote state interests abroad and to enrich themselves, very often at the state's expense. While Russian foreign policy continues to promote Russian national interests abroad, this article examines the impact of these new kinds of elite rules on Russia and states where corrupt Russian elites find willing partners. Research in the Wikileaks documents is used to study this topic.

Jets, Flags, and a New Cold War?

Russia's interest in the Arctic shouldn't come as a surprise to anyone. Since 1991, post-Soviet Russia has pursued a foreign policy course that was based upon a fairly narrow calculation of its national interest. By necessity, Russia has had to forego grand discussions of its new identity and place in the world in favour of a more practical assessment of its basic economic and security needs in a world that, arguably, still has not figured out what it wants from Russia.Numerous accounts of Russian foreign policy in the 1990s under President Boris Yeltsin (1991-99) note the pragmatic nature of foreign policy decisions. Foreign policy decisions were often made on an issueby-issue basis, rather than according to some grand design or a clear conceptualization of Russia's national interest. Little appears to have changed today; in fact, foreign policy has arguably become more pragmatic. However this pragmatism has in recent years been accompanied by an unapologetic tone that has been observed by western governments. Russia's new-found assertiveness - aggressiveness, by some accounts - has led some analysts to decry a new era of Russia- west relations akin to a new Cold War.Proponents of the new Cold War thesis point to as evidence, among other things, the suppression of freedoms in Russia, its aggressiveness toward Georgia, its strategic use of its natural gas leverage over its neighbours, the Kremlin's direct manipulation of its energy sector and authoritarian management of the Russian economy, Russian suspicion of western motives and more assertive language toward the west (notably, Putin's icy dismissals of western criticisms about Russia's internal political affairs), and its bullying treatment of its Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) neighbours.1For Canada, a couple of recent incidents - the dropping of a Russian flag on the Arctic seabed in 2007 and the presence of a Russian strategic bomber aircraft conducting a surveillance flight near Canadian airspace in 2009 - have reinforced concerns about a new Cold War. The flag incident in particular prompted then-Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter MacKay to cry, You can't go around the world these days dropping a flag somewhere. This isn't the 14th or 15th century.2 More recently, Canada's current minister of foreign affairs, Lawrence Cannon, responded dismissively to Russian plans to drop paratroopers at the north pole in commemoration of the first Russian scientists to parachute there in 1949. Cannon scoffed, It seems to me that the Russians are just pulling stunts.3Canada is not the only northern country to be concerned about Russia's intentions. The Norwegians have perceived an escalation in the tactics Russia employs to convey its territorial claims, notably the 2008 decision to resume Russian surface naval patrols near Spitsbergen Island, which is a region long disputed between the two countries. In addition, the Russians have been attracting attention from their northern neighbours for decisions to rebuild their under-ice capabilities (which the Americans have also done); to activate the nuclear reactor on a new post-Cold War ballistic missile-carrying submarine (SSBN); and to commission five SSBNs, two SSNs, and six diesel-powered submarines.4 The precise meaning of these actions is not certain, but it is not hard to see why concern exists about what Russia's motives are.This article asserts that, while the jet and flag incidents may contain some worrying symbolism, Russia is behaving somewhat predictably. Moreover, there is little compelling evidence to suggest that Russia wishes to transform territorial disputes in the Arctic into a northern frontier of a new Cold War. This article takes the view that both former president, now prime minister, Vladimir Putin and current President Dmitry Medvedev have pragmatically identified Russia's national interests and pursued them assertively. Putin has referred to Russia as a sovereign democracy, which implies its ability to pursue its goals on the basis of elite calculations ofthe national interest, rather than be pressured externally to conform to certain standards or expectations. …

Russia in the Arctic

There are a number of elements of Russian Arctic foreign policy that have raised concerns among many experts: a highly publicized scientific expedition planted the Russian flag in Arctic waters near the north pole as if it were meant to establish rights to sovereignty in this area; the Russian muitary has resumed regular flights that sometimes pass overly close to the borders of neighbouring circumpolar countries; and Russian fishermen often clash with their Norwegian peers in the so-caUed grey zones in the Barents Sea and near Greenland. All these actions have taken place in the context of a growing rivalry over increasingly accessible resources in the Arctic, as weU as over important sea routes in the area. It should also be noted that the Arctic is a border region, which makes security a touchy issue for aU concerned. Moreover, the existing legal framework dealing with the partition of the seabed in this area is not only highly complex and sophisticated but also leaves many questions unanswered.These considerations at times generate nightmare scenarios for all interested actors as weU as for the entire world. Thus, it becomes relevant to assess Russia's actual interests and goals in the Arctic - beyond its frequently projected scary and assertive image - and to consider what avauable means it has to reach them.THE PATTERN OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICYFirst of all, it is important to mention that Russian Arctic policy is a coherent part of the overall pattern of Russian foreign policy. After a period of economic weakness and difficult decisions, Russia is using its newly acquired wealth to regain great power status, at least at a regional level. Moscow is very concerned about an excessive western, and especially American, presence near Russia's borders, which it most often considers a threat. I argue that Russia's reaction to these threats should be understood as a soft-balancing strategy. In contrast to the classical concept of balance of power, which is meant to depict the state of the international system, or the traditional strategy of hard balancing, which includes the open buildup of military capacities and formal alliances, soft balancing - as introduced to international relations and foreign policy analysis by TV. Paul and his coauthors - is a limited military buildup and security understanding among actors, combined with preventive strategies as well as nonmilitary tools, to discourage, delay, or dismantle unilateral aggressive polides by another great power.1 The ultimate goal of this type of foreign policy strategy is to build the vital economic and military capacities necessary to protect and reinforce national sovereignty. The economy is crucially important for the strategy of soft balancing as it is considered a warranty of the state's security. This is the reason that elements of soft balancing are to be found in vital domains of the national economy.In Russia's case, one of these this vital domains is the energy sector. Indeed, Russia owes a great part of its assertiveness and renewed material capacities to oil and gas revenues. Thus, it is not suprising that it is seen as crucial to protect this source of wealth from any threat, and especially from the US. Vladimir Putin has explicitly called the economy a synonym of security.2 This vision is reflected in the doctrine of national security of the Russian Federation, which states:[The] national interest of the State is to preserve the fundamental stability of the constitutional institutions, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and political, economic and social stability... to develop equitable and mutuaUy beneficial international cooperation. The implementation of Russia's national interest is only possible on the basis of sustainable economic development. That's why our interests in this domain are crucial.3It is very important to add that soft-balancing strategies are guided by zero-sum game logic. As such, they exclude the option of absolute gains and of long-term cooperation in a vital domain. …

The global markets of renewable energy sources and the national interests of Russia

The current state and the prospects of the use of renewable energy sources (RES) in the world, their total and technical potential and fields of application, and their advantages and disadvantages in comparison with fossil kinds of fuel are considered. Special attention is given to nonconventional RES. The reasons why Russia is lagging behind in the use of these sources are analyzed.

The Fruits of a Bourgeois Education

I studied Russian history in school in the 1950s; my son studied it with my help in the 1970s, and my grandson in the 2000s. I attended St. Petersburg State University in the 1960s and have taught there since 1972. My experience tells me that the textbook under discussion is the best one so far) It is part of an Educational-Methodological Set (EMS) that also includes a teacher's manual, (2) a handbook on teaching methods, (3) a set of maps, (4) a lesson plan for school courses, (5) an electronic supplement, (6) and a supporting website (history.standard.edu.ru). Teacher's Manual was published first and, after discussion of its contents, the rest of the set appeared. More than 3,000 people throughout the country took part in the debate about the manual, and another 2,000 participated in direct meetings with the authors, who then seriously addressed many concerns that the public expressed before publishing the second edition of the Teacher's Manual and the Textbook. (7) For example, they dropped the political evaluations of Soviet leaders and cut a chapter titled Debates about the Role of Stalin in History, which argued that one of the causes of the repression was the desire to achieve maximum efficiency of the management apparatus. chapter also described the outcome of the purges as the creation of a new managerial class adequate to the goals of modernization under conditions of a deficit of resources. Two new chapters were added to the Teacher's Manual'. Nationalities Policy: Situation in the Republics of the USSR, and Russia in 2007-Early 2008. authors also re-edited the last chapter, New Course. my opinion, it makes more sense to evaluate the EMS as a whole instead of dwelling on its parts. Conception and Methodology authors designed the EMS as a tool to educate and patriots by reevaluating the key events of Russian history between 1945 and 2008 as well as redefining Russia's place and role in the world and the Russian leadership's new strategic course. Textbook attempts to form positive values and a positive attitude toward the country and toward oneself. It also encourages civic values. conceptualization of the EMS aims to fulfill these goals by offering a Russocentric analysis and evaluation wherein Russia's national and state interests are the point of reference. (8) EMS treats Russian history as continuous in terms of path dependence and erases the artificial barrier between pre- and postrevolutionary Russian history, which demonstrates the continuity and stability of its historical path. Above all, the texts posit continuity in the nature of political institutions and in principles of domestic and foreign policy. The most significant of these principles was the concentration of power in a single center and a firmly centralized system of state administration.... formation of a firm, militarized political system acted as an instrument for solving extraordinary goals in extraordinary circumstances, while the system as a whole was a modification of that which existed during the Muscovite period and the Russian empire (Teacher's Manual, 83-84, 88). EMS, however, also maintains that Russians have the freedom to choose an alternative form of development. To maintain that the [Soviet] system was incapable of renewal and had to be destroyed is highly naive, given the examples of China and Vietnam (Teacher's Manual, 368). fate, the determination of its unique historical path, is in the hands of its citizens (Handbook on Teaching Methods, 3-4). Textbook maintains that democracy is the best political system. In today's world, a democratic political regime ensures effective direction.... separation of powers and a system of checks and balances prevent personalized and hasty decisions and involve society in decision-making. contrast, power struggles within the Soviet system took on a destructive character; decisions were made by either single individuals or narrow groups; society was completely removed from participation in the articulation and execution of political decisions. …

Russian National Interests, Use of Blood and Treasure, and Energy Price Assessments: 2008-2009

Do Russian foreign policy elites' definitions of the geographical domain of Russia's interests change with the stability of oil prices? Using survey data from March and April 2008, Russian foreign policy elite conceptions of national interest are examined. Key foreign policy matters are the foci. The ways expectations about an oil price decrease shaped views of Russia's national interest, and how these impinged upon elite predispositions concerning use of military power and energy resources to protect state interests and support the interests of Russians outside Russia, are considered as are attitudes toward unification with Ukraine and Belarus.

Soyuz in French Guiana: A strategic perspective

Abstract After a proposition from Russia to France, ESA agreed to see Soyuz rockets take off from French Guiana. From industry, to governments and agencies, many Russian and European actors were involved in this project and they all had different motives. It is therefore relevant to try to discern them so as to understand the rationale behind this cooperative endeavor. Soyuz's primary role is to consolidate Arianespace commercial position in the launching market and to bring activity and founding to a stagnating Russian space sector. With this decision Arianespace will have a full range of commercially available launchers with Soyuz completing the two European rockets Vega and Ariane V. But since Vega and Ariane must have the priority, there is a risk to see an insufficient launch rate for Soyuz, which would not satisfy the Russian partners. Commercial elements alone cannot justify the agreement. There is a larger strategic ambition behind. What is at stake is the future development of innovative launch systems. It is important for ESA to maintain an autonomous access to space and to maintain a dynamic and strong European propulsion industry. Cooperation with Russia can offer an increase of expandable rockets capabilities and can pave for the next generation of launch vehicles. Moreover, we can detect an interest in acquiring a system that has the potential for human space flight capacity. Finally, the decision to launch Soyuz from French Guiana was the conjunction of Russian and French national interests, which led to a complete redefinition of the relations between Europe and Russia. It is of strategic importance that we, Europeans, adapt to this evolution and understand the new place that Russia takes in our space sector.