Russian National Identity Research Articles

Curating Russia: The Shchukin Collection, Nationalism, and Border Crossing from Lenin to Putin

Russia’s relationship with nation is marred by contradictions that stem from its place in comparison to the West. Cultural nationalism in artistic production originated with the arrival of the Peredvizhniki [Wanderers] in the 1870s. Moscow merchant Pavel Tretyakov, in collecting Russian and European art, openly embraced a nation that encompassed Western ideas in conjunction with distinctly Russian themes. The unparalleled collecting of French modern art by Moscow merchants Sergei Shchukin and Ivan Morozov in the early 20th century continued this embrace. The nature of their collected paintings produced shockwaves in late tsarist and Soviet society and politics before being inculcated into Russian national identity in the 21st century. This article explores the life of Henri Matisse’s The Dance (1909), commissioned by Sergei Shchukin. It follows the work across time and regimes as it assumes pride of place in not only Russia’s national collections but also within its identity. Through a focus on the 2008 exhibition From Russia at the Royal Academy of Arts in London, this article examines Russia’s relations and protection of this work to understand, why even as the country seeks to define itself once more actively through its opposition to the West, their cultural diplomacy speaks to an openness built on a transnational history of the most prized works in their national collections.

Katkov: Moscow Publicist at the Church Gates

From the onset, the traditional image of the prominent Russian conservative of the second half of the 19th century, the famous founder of the Moscow Vedomosti newspaper M. N. Katkov as a “defender of traditional values” was questionable. Representatives of various ideological camps: Westernist liberals, Slavophiles and nationalists from the editorial board of the Novoye Vremya newspaper were united in viewing him as a smart opportunist, who had chosen a convenient time for supporting the government to forward his personal ambitions. Despite the fact that speeches in defense of the Church could indeed be heard in Katkov’s journalism and his publications, in many ways they occupied rather an instrumental place in the system of his ideological views, which was far from the fi rst and which was repeatedly noted at the time by both Slavophiles and church traditionalists per se, such as T. I. Filippov and K. N. Leontiev. In this respect, Katkov came to be rehabilitated by Soviet historiography, which in a simplifi ed form argued the unity of “the liberal” and “the conservative” periods of his activity. This simplistic and ideologized image of Katkov is still present in modern research. Post-Soviet, especially conservative-minded, authors often tend to present Katkov as a consistent monarchist guardian and a no less consistent Orthodox conservative. And yet, Katkov’s political ideology assumed the transformation of Russia into a centralized and homogeneous national state of the European type, in which there could be no place for status in statu. Maintaining the unconditional loyalty to the Orthodox Church, at the same time the Moscow publicist denied its political subjectivity. By his propaganda of “the Russian Catholicism” and “the Russian Judaism”, Katkov came to be the fi rst one in the Russian conservative tradition to separate the Russian national identity from religion as such and Orthodoxy in particular.

World Heritage and Cultural Statecraft in Putin's Russia: Patriotic Agendas, Flexible Power Relations, and Geopolitical Ambitions

Over the past two decades, heritage has become a political instrument in the nation-building portfolio of the Kremlin. To restore Russia as a great geopolitical power and promote Russian national identity, culture has become a vehicle to instill national pride. World Heritage (WH) Sites have played a small but important role in cultural politics in Russia. UNESCO-labeled cultural landscapes, architecture, and classical sites are mobilized to instill patriotism at home and convince international audiences that Russia is a grand civilization.

2022년 여론조사로 본 우크라이나 동·남부의 내셔널 아이덴티티(National Identity)

The Russia-Ukraine conflict over territory is rekindled by the Russia’s military invasion into Ukraine in February 2022. Russia takes it as the pretext of this invasion to protect the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine which accounts for about one-third of the Ukraine population. Russia has insisted that Ukraine does not have a separate and independent national identity distinct from Russia. Russia further insists that Ukraine was historic allyl a part of Russia and should be incorporated into the Russian civilization world. Radical Russian nationalists believe that it is their duty to reclaim the Eastern Ukraine which rightfully belongs to Russia but is mistakenly given to Ukraine. Ukrainian politicians and scholars deny any of these claims made by Russian nationalists. This debate between Russia and Ukraine over Ukraine’s identity largely depends on the definition of national identity. national identity can be defined as ethnical or civic one. Ethnically, Ukraine has a national identity close to Russia’s. However, in terms of civic identity, Ukraine has a distinct identity from Russia’s. Ukrainian scholars emphasize that most residents in Ukraine have Ukraine civic identity and have fortified it in the wake of the Crimean Peninsula annexation and the Donbass war in 2014. On the other hand, Russian nationalists deny this argument. To answer the questions, this article conducts a nationally representative telephone survey in Ukraine in February, 2022. The survey shows that about 70% of the respondents identify themselves as entirely Ukrainian citizen. Even in the East Ukraine, over 50% of the respondents do so. Thus, the Russian nationalists claim that the Russian-speaking people in the East feel Russian national identity is not empirically supported by our survey. However, the Ukrainization of Russian-speaking people in the East has not occurred as widely as some scholars assert although there is clear evidence for the phenomenon.

“Think More about Camels”, or A Usual Year in the History of Russia Seen from an Unusual Angle

The authors review 1837. Russia’s Quiet Revolution, a monograph by P. Werth published by Oxford University Press in 2021. The book is an attempt to conceptualise the reign of tsar Nicholas I until 1837, the year of a “Quiet Revolution” in the Russian Empire – manifesting itself in a series of sweeping changes leading to the creation of new institutions, concepts, and experiences that finally showed its results in the following periods of Russian history. The author examines ten thematic episodes (historical events) that took place in the Russian Empire during the year 1837 in its broader historical contexts (within the country and beyond its borders), which he united around the common issue of the formation of the Russian national identity. The book is interesting, on the one hand, as a genuinely scholarly study, which, on the other hand, includes all characteristics typical of popular science in terms of structure and linguistic style. Apart from this, the author’s conceptual observations make it possible to take a new look at the well-known events of Russian history during the period of Nicholas I’s “minor reforms”.

Author's Response: A Russian Reckoning?

Author's Response:A Russian Reckoning? Timothy Frye (bio) The only thing better than reading a smart review of your book is to read four smart reviews, as is the case with this Asia Policy book review roundtable. I thank Aleksandar Matovski, Christopher Miller, Andrew Monaghan, and Mark Katz for their close readings of Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin's Russia. They not only provide many useful insights but also raise important questions that can help set a research agenda for studying Russia going forward. All book reviews are written in the shadow of current events, and few events have recently loomed larger than Russia's invasion of Ukraine. I was pleased to see that the reviewers found the book's emphasis on Russia's institutional pathologies to be a useful framework for understanding the invasion in all its senselessness. I address some of these issues in more detail in a new foreword to the paperback version that will appear in September. I was also pleased to see the broad acceptance of the main arguments of the book, such as the benefits of looking beyond Putin, the importance of a comparative perspective, and the value of social science research for comprehending Russian politics. Rather than dwell on the points of agreement, though, this essay will focus on the reviewers' calls to give greater attention to particular issues. I am sympathetic to this call for more detail. In writing a book aimed at the intersection of specialist and general interest readers, I recognized the trade-off in achieving the depth necessary to persuade the specialist reader while not straining the patience of the general interest reader. This made for some uncomfortable choices and hard cuts. Matovksi and Miller applaud the book's emphasis on the importance of public opinion for Putin's regime but each would like to push the argument in slightly different directions. Matovski calls for a deeper probe into Russia's national identity politics and makes the very helpful suggestion of comparing Russia to other post-imperial countries like Weimar Germany and Turkey, to which one might add Britain and France as well. Miller makes a similar insight by noting that "we will need to explore how this [End Page 197] apparently deep-set nationalism interacts with the wobbly state apparatus and political structure" to understand Russian politics. This critique to pay greater attention to nationalism has much going for it. In trying to downplay the "magical" qualities often attributed to Vladimir Putin's popularity, such as his publicity stunts, personal charisma, and Russians' supposed support for strong leaders, I urged observers to look at the more mundane factors that are often critical to a leader's popularity but often discounted in general discussions of Russian politics. I argue that performance matters for the popularity of leaders like Putin—not just information or propaganda about performance, but actual performance. It matters for Putin's support that living standards in Russia soared, that Russia annexed Crimea without bloodshed, and that pensions have been paid on time. Green and Robertson find that even controlling for personality traits, respondents whose economic situation improved in the last year were more likely to vote for and approve of Putin.1 But Matovski and Miller are surely right that we need a better understanding of the causes and consequences of nationalism and national identity. Recent works have made some progress. Gulnaz Sharafutdinova uses social identity theory to argue that Putin has exploited the trauma of the 1990s.2 Green and Robertson point to the intense emotional appeals that bolstered Putin after the annexation of Crimea.3 Matovski's own work on Putin's exploitation of crises and fears of political instability fills an important need.4 These are all important contributions, but this is hard work. Nations have multiple identities that change over time. One person's historic trauma is another person's historic opportunity. National identities are not given in nature but are contested political creations. Identities and interests interact in ways that are difficult for observers to capture. Understanding why and when appeals to identity strike home is not easy. After the anti-government demonstrations of 2011, Putin banged...

The Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 and “White” Russia

Abstract Relations in the Polish-Ukrainian-Russian triangle have never been simple. The history of the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 is one of the illustrative moments. Although the Polish offensive against the Bolsheviks in April 1920 was tactically beneficial to Petr Vrangel's Russian Army, the Russian white emigration was largely hostile to Józef Piłsudski's Ukrainian policy. The main reason for this hostility was the project of Poland's support for the independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Russian public opinion could not support either the Bolsheviks or the Poles with the Ukrainians in this war. The article examines a wide range of Russian non-Bolshevik political thought. Through the prism of Russian national identity, the article explains how a wide range of Russian anti-Bolshevik politicians and public figures, from monarchists to Mensheviks, perceived Polish policy toward Ukraine in 1920. This research is not a study of Vrangel's Ukrainian policy, although this is an important background, but rather a study of political thought and history of ideas.

"발레 뤼스의 자본주의적 운영시스템에 관한 연구 - 벨 에포크 시기 프랑스 파리와의 연관성을 중심으로 "

The purpose of this study is to examine the capitalist management system of the Ballet Russes by exploring the relationship with the socio-cultural context of Paris, France, during the Belle Époque period. The research analyses the field of dance scene and economic situation of Paris during the Belle Époque period based on socio-cultural context. The second section investigates the two aspects of the capitalist management system of Ballet Russes; performance planning and marketing and the system of an organization and personnel management. A discussion led the Ballet Russes to implement a branding strategy for Russian national identity, a commercial strategy of ballet artistry by incorporating tour performances, and a star marketing strategy promoting affiliated dancers. Further, they recruited rising star dancers to nurture their talents and formed a supporters'' association with influential individuals. As a result, the Ballet Russes became significant as a company in the era of free competition market during the Belle Époque period. It presented a modern art management model that encourages consumption and maximizes promotion in the process of producing and distributing works of art.

Slavophiles on the Relationship between “Internal” and “External” in the Construction of the Boundaries of Russian Identity

The article is devoted to the philosophy of classical Slavophilism, which the author considers as the first conception of Russian national identity, which reached the generalizations of the philosophical level. Self-identification of a people, as well as person, presupposes an understanding of their own characteristics in relation to “others”. The Slavophilеs viewed the West as the “Significant Other”. For the Slavophiles, one of the most important markers allowing to define the boundaries of the Russian identity was the antithesis of “internal” and “external”. Comparing her position with the one of the modern European researcher K. J. Mier, the author analyzes the use of this antithesis in Slavophil anthropology.

“Russian Question” in the History of Formation of the State National Policy of the Russian Federation

Russian national policy, which is being developed and implemented, inevitably presents its official vision to the society, firstly, of the place and role of the Russian people both in history and at the present stage of the development of national statehood, and secondly, of the correlation of Russian self-consciousness and Russian national identity. Throughout the entire post-Soviet period, the severity of the "Russian question" in the above-mentioned interpretation remains, which determines the relevance of the subject of the research. Based on the study of the development, adjustment and updating of the official narrative of the state national policy of the Russian Federation — the Constitution of the country, doctrinal documents (concepts and strategies), statements of the highest leaders of the state this article shows how the understanding of the Russian cultural dominant as the basis of the Russian national identity and the idea of the state-forming role of the Russian people were developed and refined. Theoretical approaches developed by Russian and foreign researchers (E. Smith, M. V. Remizov, V. A. Tishkov et al.), allowed to substantiate the regularity of cultural and value homogenization of a complex multiethnic society based on the culture of the dominant ethnic group in the process of forming and strengthening modern national identity. Noting the incorrectness of reducing Russian national identity to its purely civil component, the authors argue that the concept of Russian cultural dominant (a single cultural code) in the lexicon of modern state national policy of Russia indicates the cultural component of Russian national identity. In the last decade, the idea of the state-forming role of the Russian people has been firmly established in the official discourse of Russian politics. This is reflected in the 2020 constitutional amendment on the Russian language, which, as the language of the state-forming people, is the state language of the Russian Federation throughout its territory.

ОБРАЗ УКРАИНЫ КАК ВРАГА РОССИИ В СОЗНАНИИ РОССИЙСКИХ ГРАЖДАН

Aim . To reveal the elements of the image of the enemy in the image of Ukraine as it exists in the minds of the citizens of the Russian Federation. Methodology . The article is based on the results of sociological studies of the image of foreign countries in the consciousness of Russian citizens. The data were obtained during the empirical research conducted in 2018–2019 by the Department of Sociology and Psychology of Politics, Faculty of Political Science, Moscow State University. To interpret the obtained data obtained, qualitative and quantitative research methods were used (focused semi-standardized interviews and coding of the data obtained). Results . The study has shown that the image of Ukraine in the minds of the Russians indeed contains components of the image of the enemy to a large degree. At the same time, the Russians predominantly see the ruling elites and state structures of Ukraine as the enemy rather than the people of Ukraine. There is a heightened sense of danger from Ukraine, of geopolitical nature as well as a threat to Russian national identity. At the same time, the geopolitical threat in minds of the Russians is indirect rather than direct, and comes not so much from Ukraine itself, but from its status as a kind of “conductor” and catalyst of the threat from larger Western players. The threat to national identity is rooted in a sense of cultural and historical closeness to the people of Ukraine and the tendency of Russian citizens to equate the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Due to these factors, Ukraine’s turn towards an anti-Russian vector and the anti-Russian political discourse that has grown out of it are perceived rather negatively by the Russians. Research implications . The results of this research are of practical importance, since they contribute to the academic understanding of the image of the “evil other” that exists in the consciousness of the Russians, the importance of which for the national identity of Russian citizens has greatly increased in the recent years. This article supplies the academic understanding of the processes of the formation and transformation of the Russian national identity, which is currently unfolding. The questions related to strengthening its foundations are now of particular importance at the level of discourse of Russian political elites.

How Are “Bad Guys” Possible? The Agency-Structure Gap in Russian Foreign Policy Analysis

In the light of the ongoing geopolitical tensions and the situation in Ukraine specifically, Russian foreign policy constitutes a puzzling area of social science research, particularly central to international relations (IR) scholarship. However, the academic discourse within the IR field often focuses too much on the rather visible layers of Russian politics, at times reducing Russian studies to solely “Putin studies.” Overlooking the structural factors that have made it possible for Vladimir Putin to come to power predominantly invites a channeled agency-led perspective into Russian foreign policy. This review essay sheds light on the gap between agency and structure within Russian foreign policy analysis. Building on a focused review of three recent scholarly contributions on Russian political leadership, foreign policy, and national identity, it suggests that Russia can barely be understood unless looked upon through the intertwined lenses of agency and structure. Text in English

ACCULTURATION OF ARMENIANS IN RUSSIA: ROLE OF SOCIAL IDENTITIES AND DIASPORA ACTIVITY

The Armenian diaspora is one of the largest in Russia and in the world. The Armenians living in the Krasnodar Territory are a large and active group, thus, an investigation into the problem of their acculturation is of scientific and practical importance. Based on the theory of social identity, the theory of acculturation, and the regional socio-cultural context, the study focused on the role of ethnic, regional and Russian national (civic) identities and diaspora activity in the acculturation of the Armenians in the Krasnodar Territory. The study used the scales from the MIRIPS project questionnaire (Mutual Intercultural Relations in Plural Societies). The sample consisted of 181 respondents. Using structural equation modeling, the ethnic and Russian national identities of the Armenians living in the Krasnodar Territory were revealed as factors that contributed to their integration, and regional identity—as factors that fostered assimilation. Diaspora activity was determined by both ethnic and regional identity and predicted the Armenians’ attitudes towards integration and separation. Also, diaspora activity of the Armenians in the Kuban region facilitated the interconnection of ethnic and regional identities with the separation strategy. In general, the study revealed that all identities (ethnic, regional and Russian national) contribute to a certain degree to the acceptance of the host society culture by the Armenians in the Krasnodar Territory. At the same time, diaspora activity can be an effective mechanism for the adaptation of migrants or a source of problems associated with increased impenetrability of diaspora’s borders, the migrants’ exclusive focus on their ethnic group and their decreased desire for sociocultural integration into the host society. It is important to take this into account when shaping the regional interethnic relations policy.

Bronisław Ferdynand Trentowski vs. panslawizm rosyjski

In the article I recreate and analyze the attitude of Bronisław Ferdynand Trentowski (1808-1869), one of the leading Polish representatives of “national philosophy”, participant of November Uprising and political emigrant, towards Russian Pan-Slavism. In opposition to Pan-Slavism, Trentowski introduced the idea of the Slavic Reich. Originally he based it on values specific to Western culture (occidentalism), and later on the conservative-catholic idea of Poland as the “Christ of Nations”. Combination of these two doctrines (Russian pan-Slavism and Polish messianism) offers an insight into historical premises of Polish and Russian national identities. The reconstruction of Trentowski’s position is proceeded by synthetic characteristics of Slavophilia and Pan-Slavism in Russia.

Good Intentions Exploited Badly: Contested Metaphors of Russian Patriotism

ABSTRACT Generating and cultivating patriotic sentiments has been universally recognized as being critical for any nation. The originally sacralized Russian patriotism has evolved into an ambiguous concept due to its discrediting in the post-Soviet era. The paper claims that patriotism is an essentially contested concept, frequently employed as a promotional tool in political campaigns, with figurative language serving as a tool for articulating patriotic sentiments. By applying corpus-based methods, the study elicits dominant metaphors employed in the discursive construction of Russian patriotism. It reveals variation, found in a set of preferred metaphors, which reflects diverging metaphorical narratives in the current patriotic discourse. The paper argues that metaphors are effective explanatory and framing tools applied in constructing the Russian national identity.

Limited at best? Changing discourses on China in Russia’s identity structure before and after the 2014 crisis

ABSTRACT This paper aims to reconstruct the “Asian” dimension of Russian national identity discourse by using relations with China as a case study. It analyses the foreign policy debate before and after the 2014 Ukrainian crisis (2010–2016) by focusing on the emerging concept of “pivot to the East.” Based on a discourse analysis of official documents, elites’ speeches, and think-tank views, this paper inductively recovers the identity discourse, structured around linking/differentiation and such themes as the relative perception of China’s threat. This research shows that the identity structure put several limitations in the way of engagement with China. These interlinked structures made it extremely difficult for the more intense economic turn toward China, which eventually occurred only when the relationship with the West (as the significant Other in Russian identity) broke down after the 2014 crisis. By comparing the identity structure and policies before and after the crisis of 2014 and following the poststructuralist notion of mutually constitutive relations between identity and foreign policy, this paper argues that policy changes after 2014 affected the gradual changes in identity narratives. However, there was not enough time and pressure to change the deeper layer of the core identity discourse.

Isaak Levitan’s enduring appeal and Russian national identity, 1891-present

ABSTRACT Since the late nineteenth century, the landscapist Isaak Levitan (1860–1900) has been praised for his ability to convey the Russian countryside’s beauty and mood. Throughout the czarist and Soviet eras, Levitan remained respected and often admired, and in post-Soviet Russia, Levitan is considered one of Russia’s foremost landscapists. Although Levitan has remained an important figure in Russian cultural history, he is somewhat understudied in the English-speaking world. Moreover, scholars who have discussed Levitan in English- and Russian-language publications have situated him within the context of a specific timeframe, such as late-Imperial Russia or the Soviet era. In order to gain insight into the reasons for the continuous respect and appreciation for Levitan amid Russia’s changing political dynamics, my examination focuses upon the writings of art critics and historians in late-czarist/imperial Russia (1890–1917), communist Russia/Soviet Union (1917–1991), and post-Soviet Russia (1991-Present). Specifically, my inquiry expands upon existing research 1) through an analysis of scholars’ perceptions of the Russian Realists’ (the Itinerants) and Western European artists’ influence upon Levitan, and 2) through an exploration of the varying interpretations of two of his most famous paintings, Tikhaia obitel (Quiet Monastery) (1890) and Nad vechnym pokoem (Above Eternal Peace) (1894). Through a study of these two topics, my article demonstrates that writings from scholars in the late-czarist, Soviet and post-Soviet eras reflect prominent political ideas and ideological beliefs within these three eras, and that these scholars’ interpretations emphasize aspects that have defined and that currently accent Russia’s distinct character.

ПРЕЛОМЛЕНИЯ ИМПЕРСКОГО КОМПЛЕКСА В ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ ИМПЕРСКОГО НАРОДА. (НАРОД — «ЦЕМЕНТ», ЗАСЕЛЯЮЩИЙ «ЗАБРАННЫЙ КРАЙ» ИЛИ «РУССКОЯЗЫЧНОЕ НАСЕЛЕНИЕ» С МЕЖНАЦИОНАЛЬНЫМИ БРАКАМИ)

The article examines the phenomenon of the imperial people, which has some special qualities that allow it to integrate peoples and territories. Many researchers of the empire recognize the importance of the imperial people factor, but it is quite difficult to indicate its specific characteristics. It is concluded that the Russians, having moved to the outskirts of the empire, to some extent changed their behavior patterns and became what is sometimes called “other Russians”. They differ from the Russians from the indigenous territories and have the qualities of a “cement people” that holds together parts of the empire. The Russians identity turned out to be duplex. They are predominantly occupied with themselves in their autochthonous territories as one of the peoples of the Earth and can perceive themselves as an ethnic whole. But they absorb the contradictions between peoples on the outskirts of the empire and create a kind of new — imperial — integrity. Then they have not have only a special Russian national identity, but rather a messianic one, coupled with an imperial function. Russians as an imperial people understand themselves (and others too) as bricks of a single empire. We aim to cover this topic in this article we rely on data from sources about the Russian peasant colonization of the late 19th — early 20th centuries. We also use the statistics of interethnic marriages in the USSR, which were an important factor in the homogenization of the peoples of the Soviet empire.

CIVIL NATION AND ETHNIC IDENTITY: ON THE QUESTION OF THE “ESSENCE OF THE RUSSIAN NATION”

The purpose of the article is to reveal the importance of embedding «Russian national identity» in the normative distinction between civil nations and ethnic nations, which has been carried out in Western social studies for more than seventy years. This presupposes the study of the way of representing the nation in the horizon defined by “liberal metaphysics” (K. Schmitt) - in the liberal version of the economic paradigm of the political (J. Agamben’s term). The research method is a philosophical interpretation, which makes it possible to demonstrate the “foundations” (axioms, dogmas, principles, imperatives) that determine the way of presentation, perspectives and conclusions as necessary - for an objective scientific study of nations and national identities, the object of research of which in the presentation is as a given. It is established that a civil nation is a project for which «historiographic recalculation» (M. Heidegger) is a way of combining the reality of a concept and reality; a civil nation as an association based on civic loyalty is reduced to the free self-determination of an autonomous individual-citizen, which necessarily considers any “remnants of naturalness” as invalid, illegal and morally disqualified as “evil” - such a “remnant” is recognized as ethnicity: the methodologically inadmissible confusion of “attribution to value” and “evaluation” is based on the idea. The conclusion is drawn: “civil nation”, being a theoretical concept, is at the same time a political project and is used as an instrument of ideological influence: qualification as an “ethnic nation” singles out the object as a “political enemy” that needs to be removed - “Russian national identity” as European and ethnic is, in consequence of what has been said, a “paradigm case”.

Geographic Indeterminacy of the Russian Youth State and Civic Identity

The article is devoted to the consideration of the nature and characteristics of Russian national identity. The research focus is concentrated on the youth state and civic identity study. State and civic identity was defined through its spatial embodiment. The spatial identity of Russians is largely subject to cognitive processes, and is associated with knowing, or not knowing the names of the cities of the residence country and ideas about their territorial location in the geographical space. Students of Moscow universities acted as carriers of information on the problem. A survey technique was used. The author assumed that the representatives of Russian youth adequately perceive the geography of the country. In particular, it had to be expressed in a relatively correct idea of the location of large cities in Russia. The hypothesis was based on the knowledge that the citizens of Russia socialized in the socio-cultural conditions of Russian society, took on the formative influence of educational and upbringing institutions, and therefore have a formed Russian identity.It was found that socialization in the current socio-cultural conditions does not lead to the formation of an adequate state-civil identity of young people. Based on the quantitative and qualitative analysis of empirical data, the article discusses the reasons that determine the current state of affairs. Considerations are expressed about the potential negative consequences of such a state of identity for the national security and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.