Russian Regime Research Articles

Ruská pravoslavná církev a ochrana křesťanů jako směr zahraniční politiky

The Russian Orthodox Church has become a significant actor in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union. This text is dedicated to its role in Russiaʼs foreign policy, specifically to the topic of the Russian interest in problems and protection of Christians, which is one of the most essential parts of the cooperation between the state and the Church. Analyzing primary sources (state and Church documents), the author shows when and under what circumstances this topic became relevant to both actors, what role the Russian Orthodox Church played in this regard and how the topic of protecting Christians is used by the Russian regime today. The study shows that the interest in protection of Christians did not arise simultaneously on both sides and that it is connected mainly with situations where a threat for Christians is posed by unfriendly actors.

The Russian Orthodox Church and the Protection of Christians as a Direction of Russia's Foreign Policy

The Russian Orthodox Church has become a significant actor in Russia afterthe fall of the Soviet Union. This text is dedicated to its role in Russiaʼsforeign policy, specifically to the topic of the Russian interest in problemsand protection of Christians, which is one of the most essential parts of thecooperation between the state and the Church. Analyzing primary sources(state and Church documents), the author shows when and under whatcircumstances this topic became relevant to both actors, what role theRussian Orthodox Church played in this regard and how the topic ofprotecting Christians is used by the Russian regime today. The study showsthat the interest in protection of Christians did not arise simultaneously onboth sides and that it is connected mainly with situations where a threat forChristians is posed by unfriendly actors.

“Kiev Citizen” Movie by T. Levchuk: Ukrainian Revolution of 1917—1921 in the Ukrainian Soviet Cinematography

Cinematography is one of those unique cultural phenomena, whose history has always attracted historians’ interest. In the 20th century, this phenomenon did not only determine the direction of cultural transformations development but also impacted the formation of ideologies and political regimes. Today this topic is especially relevant considering the fact that the propaganda methods, intrinsic of dictatorship systems, namely the Soviet totalitarian regime, are actively used by the antidemocratic Russian power for achieving its political goals. The special interest in the context of the “hybrid warfare” which is currently going on between Russia and Ukraine, causes the construction in the Soviet period cinematography of the image of a “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist” as the instrumental technologies of ideological manipulations used in such movies proved their effectiveness for shaping the outlook of a “new Russian citizen”. Such phenomenon, especially in the 20th century, determined not only the direction of aesthetic transformations of cultural development but also had an impact on the formation of ideologies and strengthening of political regimes. This topic is relevant because the methods of propaganda that were actively used by totalitarian regimes (including the Soviet totalitarian one) are now actively applied by the undemocratic Russian regime to achieve political goals. The construction of the image of the "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist" in the Soviet cinema constitutes special interest in the context of today’s Russia’s "hybrid warfare" against Ukraine. The instrumental technologies of ideological manipulation used in the creation of films have shown their effectiveness in shaping the worldview of the “new Soviet man.” Forms of this type of consciousness still continue to influence the political choices of many citizens of our state. The film “Kiev Citizen”, studied in the article, was created in 1958 by Ukrainian Soviet film director T. Levchuk at Kyiv O. Dovzhenko Studio. This film is a classic example of ideologically biased film production. Using this movie, we can observe technological principles and constructive models of falsification of the 20th–century history of Ukraine by the Soviet regime, in particular the events of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917–1921. In the film “Kiev Citizen”, the events of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917–1921 were falsified in order to illustrate the audience the Soviet version of the history of Ukraine and the events connected with the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. Soviet propaganda tried to form in this way the audience loyal to the “Soviet empire” type of psychological perception of reality. In particular, the facts related to the Bolsheviks’ attempt to seize power in Kyiv in October 1917, the battles for the Arsenal plant in January 1918, and the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Ukrainian People’s Republic and Germany were falsified.

Wildfire history of the boreal forest of south-western Yakutia (Siberia) over the last two millennia documented by a lake-sediment charcoal record

Abstract. Wildfires, as a key disturbance in forest ecosystems, are shaping the world's boreal landscapes. Changes in fire regimes are closely linked to a wide array of environmental factors, such as vegetation composition, climate change, and human activity. Arctic and boreal regions and, in particular, Siberian boreal forests are experiencing rising air and ground temperatures with the subsequent degradation of permafrost soils leading to shifts in tree cover and species composition. Compared to the boreal zones of North America or Europe, little is known about how such environmental changes might influence long-term fire regimes in Russia. The larch-dominated eastern Siberian deciduous boreal forests differ markedly from the composition of other boreal forests, yet data about past fire regimes remain sparse. Here, we present a high-resolution macroscopic charcoal record from lacustrine sediments of Lake Khamra (south-west Yakutia, Siberia) spanning the last ca. 2200 years, including information about charcoal particle sizes and morphotypes. Our results reveal a phase of increased charcoal accumulation between 600 and 900 CE, indicative of relatively high amounts of burnt biomass and high fire frequencies. This is followed by an almost 900-year-long period of low charcoal accumulation without significant peaks likely corresponding to cooler climate conditions. After 1750 CE fire frequencies and the relative amount of biomass burnt start to increase again, coinciding with a warming climate and increased anthropogenic land development after Russian colonization. In the 20th century, total charcoal accumulation decreases again to very low levels despite higher fire frequency, potentially reflecting a change in fire management strategies and/or a shift of the fire regime towards more frequent but smaller fires. A similar pattern for different charcoal morphotypes and comparison to a pollen and non-pollen palynomorph (NPP) record from the same sediment core indicate that broad-scale changes in vegetation composition were probably not a major driver of recorded fire regime changes. Instead, the fire regime of the last two millennia at Lake Khamra seems to be controlled mainly by a combination of short-term climate variability and anthropogenic fire ignition and suppression.

Legal and organizational aspects of tourist visa processing: international and national peculiarities

The paper examines the legal and organizational aspects of obtaining tourist visas that affect the state of inbound tourism. Visa formalities are one of the attributes of modern tourism, which has a contradictory nature. The purpose of the study is to identify the features and problems of visa formalities for tourist enterprises and tourists and to identify ways to simplify visa procedures when tourists enter the territory of Russia. The article systematizes the rules for obtaining a visa obtained in the framework of this study, which are part of the formation of the tour. Based on the highlighted features of visa formalities for tourist enterprises and tourists, as well as the analysis of the forms of the visa regime, the article identifies the problems of visa formalities and presents ways to simplify visa procedures for the entry of foreign citizens (non-residents) into the territory of Russia. The proposed methods are a tool for a continuous, consistent, and progressive process of simplifying the visa regime in Russia.

Just in time: Will Putin's revitalized Northern Sea Route reorder global shipping?

This paper examines Russia's Arctic Strategy, in general, and the development of the Northern Sea Route, in particular. The current Russian regime regards the successful development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as the linchpin of its Arctic endeavors and the harbinger of Russia's economic future, focusing upon not only creating a faster and cheaper shipping route from Asia to Europe, but also spiriting out to world markets the vast fossil fuel and mineral deposits that lie in Russia's frozen north. After discussing recent factors causing Russia's leaders to invest significant resources in its Arctic region and the novel transportation artery, we then focus upon recent steps made toward building out the NSR. The article concludes with an examination of significant problems plaguing the route's development and provides a tentative assessment of the project's overall soundness.

Spatial and Social Behavior of Single and Coupled Individuals of Both Sexes during COVID-19 Lockdown Regime in Russia

Testing individual motivations for social activity in violation of the mandated lockdown regime is a challenging research topic for evolutionary psychology. To this purpose, we analyzed twenty popular weekly routes and the potential impact of sex and relationship status (single versus coupled) on the reported level of spatial-social activity during the quarantine in Russia between March and June 2020 (N = 492). Our study revealed a significant difference between men’s and women’s mobility: men, in general, tend to exhibit substantially higher spatial activity. The results have shown that individuals living on their own have more social interactions with friends and exhibit more profound spatial mobility via public transport. On the other hand, spatial activity of coupled individuals of both sexes were mostly devoted to solving a list of economic and matrimonial tasks. At the same time, men already cohabiting with a partner leave their homes for dating purposes more frequently than single men and women. We interpret these findings in the sense that both individual and sex-specific differences in observed sociality could be a result of a fine-tuned adaptive populational response to a contemporary virus threat, predominantly rooted in the evolution of behavioral strategies in the reproductive and economic spheres of each sex. Indeed, unlike women, coupled men have been preserving highly risky and intense social behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Weiss-Wendt , Anton Putin's Russia and the Falsification of History: Reasserting Control over the Past (review)

SEER, 99, 2, APRIL 2021 378 The treatment of the interview data thematically allows for a comparison of the variety of experiences in each of the subjects under review, but it also serves to obscure the single life story thread that might otherwise have been written. Helpful very brief biographical data on nine of the respondents, on whose testimony McKinney draws most regularly, is provided in the introductory chapter, but readers are left to piece together the remainder on their own. As is now becoming standard for academic texts, this book has clearly been produced with electronic access and distribution in mind, including the sale and download of individual chapters. Useful cross-references are included to direct the reader to related themes and areas of discussion in other sections of the book. One downside, however, is that whilst each of the chapters has its own short bibliography at the end, there is no overall comprehensive bibliography for the complete volume. Whilst the index provides an outline guide to specific topics discussed in the text, it is not particularly detailed. This volume is likely to find its place in Russian and Soviet women’s history and gender studies. As those of us who remain fascinated with Russian history will already be aware and as McKinney references the remark of one of her own respondents in the conclusion, ‘In Russia, everything changes in five years, but nothing changes in 200 years’ (p. 278). University of Gloucestershire Melanie Ilic Weiss-Wendt, Anton. Putin’s Russia and the Falsification of History: Reasserting Control over the Past. Bloomsbury Academic, London and New York, 2021. x + 326 pp. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index.£85.00. The politics of history has become increasingly important for the current Russian regime. Anton Weiss-Wendt offers an extensive overview, covering all the central aspects — plus some rather peripheral ones. His account begins with the Commission against the falsification of history, established in 2005 by Dmitrii Medvedev and explicitly intended to combat what the Kremlin regarded as attacks on Russia. Instead of trying to ascertain the substance underlying such accusations against others, Weiss-Wendt immediately turns the tables on the Russians and argues that the Russian state is practising what it attributes to others: the falsification of history. Indeed, Russian officialdom often serves up dubious, one-sided, tendentious versions of historical events. Some statements made by former Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinskii, for instance, are simply ludicrous. Also very disturbing are the many examples which Weiss-Wendt gives of how the authorities REVIEWS 379 attempt to muzzle critical voices, and even persecute them. Although most of what he documents here is known from other sources, this is in my view the most important and valuable part of the book. That being said, I must point out several problematic aspects. Weiss-Wendt claims that he ‘strives for objectivity’ and avoids ‘emotional language’ (p. 255). According to a scholar quoted on the back-cover blurb, the analysis is ‘objective and the tone courteous’. I beg to differ, on both counts. Rather, Weiss-Wendt seems to be on a crusade, seeking to indict more than to explain. The book abounds in sweeping generalizations supported by only weak documentation.History politics inRussia is presentedasacentrallyorganized, top–down enterprise: ‘what may appear as an exercise in pluralism is actually a massive operation rigidly coordinated from the top’ (p. 43), but this flies in the face of much of the material Weiss-Wendt presents. To give just one example, we are told that around one hundred Stalin statues have been erected in Russia under Putin. If this was a ‘massive operation rigidly coordinated from the top’, surely that would indicate a conscious and deliberate campaign of official re-Stalinization. Indeed, Weiss-Wendt maintains that Stalin is currently making a ‘rapid ascent’ in the Russian public sphere, and that Stalinism has ‘penetrated the state’s foundational myth’ (p. 119). In fact, however, the vast majority of these statues have been financed and built by local Communist Party organizations, or a quack Ossetian activist who believes that Stalin was a fellow Ossetian. Many initiatives have been stopped or obstructed by (local) authorities; and due to the difficulties in obtaining an official...

Populism and Memory: Legislation of the Past in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia

This article belongs to the special cluster “Here to Stay: The Politics of History in Eastern Europe”, guest-edited by Félix Krawatzek & George Soroka. The rise of historical memory, which began in the 1970s and 1980s, has made the past an increasingly important soft-power resource. At its initial stage, the rise of memory contributed to the decay of self-congratulatory national narratives and to the formation of a “cosmopolitan” memory centered on the Holocaust and other crimes against humanity and informed by the notion of state repentance for the wrongdoings of the past. Laws criminalizing the denial of these crimes, which were adopted in “old” continental democracies in the 1980s and 1990s, were a characteristic expression of this democratic culture of memory. However, with the rise of national populism and the formation of the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes in Russia, Turkey, Hungary, and Poland in the 2000s and 2010s, the politics of memory has taken a significantly different turn. National populists are remarkably persistent in whitewashing their countries’ history and using it to promote nationalist mobilization. This process has manifested itself in the formation of new types of memory laws, which shift the blame for historical injustices to other countries (the 1998 Polish, the 2000 Czech, the 2010 Lithuanian, the June 2010 Hungarian, and the 2014 Latvian statutes) and, in some cases, openly protect the memory of the perpetrators of crimes against humanity (the 2005 Turkish, the 2014 Russian, the 2015 Ukrainian, the 2006 and the 2018 Polish enactments). The article examines Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian legislation regarding the past that demonstrates the current linkage between populism and memory.

Villain or victim? Framing strategies and legitimation practices in the Russian perspective on the European Union’s Third Energy Package

This article investigates the Russian reaction to the Third Energy Package (TEP) of the European Union (EU). This legislation aimed at integrating the EU’s internal gas market but also became a game-changer for EU–Russia energy relations. The framing strategies through which the Russian regime has made sense of TEP are explored and the entanglement of these strategies with the Kremlin’s claim to great power status – one of the key pillars of its legitimation strategy – are scrutinized. Altogether, three frames are identified. They differ from each other in their depictions of the EU and of the legislation itself. The EU is perceived as a misguided partner, deceptive counterpart, or geopolitical rival, while TEP is viewed as an ill-informed policy, a unilateral decision which disregards Russia’s legitimate interests, or a direct attack on Gazprom and, consequently, on Russia. At least one frame also bears a strong legitimation message as it connects with Russia’s mythology and collective memory. It resonates with Russia’s deeply-rooted desire to be recognized as a great power and posits TEP as an act of rejection through which Russia is denied this status.

Patent Box Regime: possibilities of implementation in the Russian practice of profit taxation

The subject of this research is the foreign experience of stimulating innovation activity of the companies via introduction of Patent Box Regime. The author underlines the importance of this mechanism as a measure for supporting the actors of the innovation economy on the stages of introducing innovations into production, and making profit from the efficient use of intellectual capital. The author analyzes the international statistics of acquisition of patents and key elements of preferential taxation of their income. Based on the collected material, the author examines the possibilities of implementation of such mechanism in the Russian practice. Special attention is given to the potential consequences of granting new incentives from the perspective of formation of the revenue part of the budgets of the budgetary system of the Russian Federation. The main result of this research consists in the development of a specific taxation regime for income from the use of intellectual property objects to be implemented in the Russian Federation. The author believes that the optimal mechanism is a deduction of up to 40% of qualified incomes from the corporate income tax base; at the same time, the incentive should not lead to the decrease of federal budget receipts. As sources of covering the shortfall in budget revenues of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, the author considers the abolition of reduced tax rates for certain categories of taxpayers, as well as the extension of the limit on the transfer of loss, The conclusion is made on feasibility of implementation of Patent Box Regime in Russia considering foreign experience and domestic specificity of the country.

Preferential regimes to ensure investment and innovation activity

To ensure investment and innovation, it is necessary to develop theoretical and practical aspects relating to the use of preferential investment and innovation regimes in Russia. Preferential investment and innovation regimes are both special areas of a company’s activity and special agreements which provide for guarantees and in accordance with which the fulfillment of investment obligations is regulated. Based on a comparative analysis, this article highlights the features of preferential regimes: the updated mechanism of special investment contracts (SPICs), regional investment projects (RIPs), and agreements on the protection and promotion of investments (APPIs), and analyzes their impact on investment and innovation. The results of providing preferential tax regimes and the use of SPICs and RIPs are set out below. New developments in the regulation of SPICs, agreements on the protection and promotion of investments, and the creation of special regulatory regimes (regulatory sandboxes) all help to increase investment and innovation.

Ideology and influence in the debate over Russian election interference

The salience of the debate over Russian political interference in the USA has increased significantly during the Trump administration. However, there is no consensus over how to respond to the interference of this openly illiberal power. This paper argues that we need to reconceptualize our understanding of Russian influence to understand this high level of contestation. While the current understanding of Russian influence is characterized as a problem of unwanted information flows, we argue that we also need to take seriously the ideological influence that the Russia regime has in the USA—that the appeal of the Russian regime’s conservative and populist ideology can help to explain this division. By taking ideological attraction seriously, we can explain why it is currently difficult for the USA to respond to this threat and why solutions to Russian interference based on the information flow models need to be reconsidered.

Constitutionalism of the contemporary Russian political regime in Russia

CONSTITUTIONALISMOFTHECONTEMPORARYPOLITICALREGIMEINRUSSIA The article analyzes the origin and development of the institution of the political regime, gives the points of view of the concept of various scientists, studies the types of political regime, methods of government of the current government with a certain political regime. The elements of the implementation of political regimes are correlated with other similar political categories, such as power, political system, political process, as well as constitutional principles characterizing the political regime in the Russian Federation with similar and other regimes taking place in other countries of the world. The role and significance of the political regime in modern Russia has been determined.

Secret Notes to the Supplementary Treaty of August 27, 1918: an Unknown Plot From the History of Soviet-German Relations at the End of the First World War

. The 1917 Russian Revolution made fundamental adjustments to the course of the First World War at its final stage. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty was supposed to deliver Germany from the Eastern Front, but instead, it put the question of finding a modus vivendi with the new political regime in Russia. The continuation of the German expansion in the territory of the former Russian Empire, the support of the newly formed limitrophe states, financial claims, and the problem of repatriation of prisoners required the development of a legal framework for bilateral relations. At the end of May 1918, the preparation of the Supplementary Treaty began in Berlin. It was concluded only on August 27, 1918. The Soviet envoy in Berlin, A.A. Ioffe, while aiming at the implementation of Lenin's concept of “respite”, was forced to integrate Soviet Russia into the system of international relations generated by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. During the negotiations, the fate of the territories from the Barents Sea to the Caspian Sea, as well as the prospects for cooperation between the two powers were discussed: from military cooperation against the Entente to countering the Turkish expansion in the Transcaucasus. A special role was played by the financial nuances of the obligations assumed by the parties. The Bolsheviks’ participation in the new round of secret diplomacy was a deviation from the principles they had previously adhered to. Unlike Brest, where Soviet diplomats were forced to accept the winner's ultimatum, the contents of the Supplementary Treaty and the secret notes to it indicate their efforts to achieve the reconstruction of the Russia of the future and its sphere of geopolitical influence. The end of World War I saved the Brest system from being stress-tested, but some aspects of these agreements remained important in the following years, determining the place of Soviet Russia in the world of the interwar period. This article analyzes three secret notes, which specified the most important provisions of the Supplementary Treaty, including joint military actions against the Entente. The notes are published in Russian for the first time.

К вопросу об оценке государственной политики по развитию Дальнего Востока России

A brief overview of the evolution of the new public policy for the development of the Russian Far East is presented. Thanks to active federal policy, the Far East macroregion became a testing ground for new mechanisms and instruments of regional development aimed at stimulating economic growth and promoting private investment. Currently, there is no other macroregion in Russia within which all the possible investment promotion policy tools and measures are in operation. An inventory of budget expenditures (including shortfalls in income) relating to the implementation of measures to stimulate economic growth and promote private investments in the Far East of Russia is conducted. The direct results of the implemented policy (the volume of attracted investments, the number of jobs created, the volume of tax payments) are summarized. Although it is still premature to talk about the high budgetary efficiency of preferential regimes in the Far East of Russia, there is a widespread opinion among the official circles about the uniqueness of the created system for supporting the investment process. This view is primarily based on the high value of the private to public investments ratio pertaining to preferential regimes in Russia’s Far East. A comparative analysis of the performance of the key macro-indicators of the Far East economy and those of the rest of the Russian Federation is carried out for two comparable periods: five years before and five years from the beginning of the implementation of the federal policy. It is concluded that the active policy of creating favourable conditions for investment in the Russian Far East is not yet transformed into the desired pace of the socio-economic dynamics. Such a dissonance with optimistic assessments of the implemented measures and instruments introduced for the development of the macroregion prompts the question of whether the goals of public policy for the development of the Far East are consistent with the means used to achieve them. The starting point for finding an answer to this question is the difference in understanding the content of the categories ‘growth’ and ‘development’

ФЕНОМЕН «ЗНАМЕНИТОСТИ» В РОССИЙСКОМ ПУБЛИЧНОМ ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ ПЕРВОЙ ПОЛОВИНЫ XIX ВЕКА: ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВАНИЯ

In modern historiography, the phenomenon of "celebrity" attracts close attention of specialists and experts. The study of this phenomenon is closely related to the history of the emergence and development of the public sphere, publicity, public and public opinion. The article examines the historical context of the formation of the public sphere in Russia in the second half of the 18th – the first half of the 19th centuries; the conceptual points of Jürgen Haber-mas’s model and Antoine Lilti’s theory, which are the main methodological guidelines for investigating the construc-tion of "celebrity" in public space; and the opinions of modern researchers on the issue. The author draws attention to the temporal features of the genesis of the public sphere in the conditions of the existence of an autocratic regime in Russia. The article presents a version of the multifactorial and multi-temporal history of the Europeanization of Rus-sia in the 18th century, which in short period helped integrate Russia into the context of modern European processes. In accordance with it, the society first experienced “Peter's Europeanization”, a purely foreign policy wave, thanks to which an imperial state emerged with the right to participate in European international affairs. The natural conse-quence of the previous period was “Catherine’s Europeanization”, an internal political wave that imported Western axiology, norms and practices of European governance, changes in the everyday life of the nobility, etc. into the country. The article contains an analysis of the concrete historical situation in Russia in the first half of the 19th centu-ry, which determined the time route of movement towards the establishment of a full-fledged public space in the society. In conclusion, the main factors contributed to the formation of the phenomenon of "celebrity" in the domes-tic public sphere are determined.

How the Putin Regime Really Works

How the Putin Regime Really Works Celeste A. Wallander (bio) Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order. By Kathryn E. Stoner. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. 344 pp. Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin's Russia. By Timothy Frye. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021. 288 pp. Is President Vladimir Putin an all-powerful dictator, to be feared above all other threats to democracy? Or is the Russian regime to be dismissed as a pale shadow of its Soviet and Czarist past, living off hydrocarbons and a Cold War–era nuclear stockpile? Neither, these two books argue. Though Timothy Frye focuses on the regime's grip on society and Kathryn E. Stoner on its capabilities abroad, the authors arrive at a common conclusion: Russia's actions, purpose, power, and weakness are rooted in the personalistic autocracy that has consolidated since Putin's election in 2000. Putinism is the source of Russian resurgence and also its greatest vulnerability. This conclusion stands out from the simplistic explanations of the Kremlin's behavior prevalent in Western public discourse. Neither Putin's psychology and background nor an exceptional Russian history and culture, Frye explains, account for the authoritarian regime's persistence. Standard measures of power and a static set of national interests, Stoner demonstrates, paint a misleading picture of the regime's weakness on the international stage and inadequately explain the country's post-Soviet foreign policy. Both authors turn to political science to frame their arguments. Frye [End Page 178] asserts that far from being exceptional, Putin's regime mirrors the dynamics of autocracies extensively studied in comparative politics. Authoritarian regimes are typically led by a political party, the national military, or a powerful individual. In the first two types, institutions rule, as is the case in China under the Communist Party and Burma under the military. But in a personalist autocracy, such as Putin's Russia, political power is exercised through individual relationships, and thus state institutions are feeble. Hence we can see why Putin is both "weak" and a "strongman": According to Frye, weak institutions make "it easier for autocrats to take power … but [make] it harder for them to govern once in office" (p. 40). Politics is on manual control: Russia functions when Putin is managing and arbitrating conflicts among elites. These elites, in turn, run the country's most important businesses and control the government economic, financial, social, and security organs that enable Putin to remain in charge: It is a relationship of codependence. And while Putin wields enormous power, weak institutions limit his ability to solve every problem or achieve every goal. So power breeds vulnerability: Because everything depends on a single person, the stakes of Putin's failure (or departure) are extremely high for the elites who have wealth and influence by dint of his effectiveness alone. This presents a dilemma for the leader of a personalist autocracy: Pleasing (or pacifying) inner-circle cronies with the state's resources leaves less for the public. Every elite giveaway stifles economic performance, undermining the regime's grip on society at home and power abroad. From 2003 to 2008, Russia's oil-fueled economy averaged 7 percent annual growth, leaving plenty for Putin to satisfy the rapacious elite while delivering a rising standard of living to the public. But the 2008 global economic crisis and international-sanctions regime imposed since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, combined with the weight of corruption, uncertainty, and predatory business behavior, have slowed the economy, exposing the fragile balance that Putin must maintain to keep control. The regime cannot figure out how to escape this balancing act without risking the political change it fears. Increasingly, Putin turns to repression. The Kremlin criminalized free speech, prohibited criticism as a threat to national security, and in August 2020 poisoned Russia's most effective political-opposition figure, Alexei Navalny. A court sent him to prison for violating parole while he was in a toxin-induced coma. The government declared his grassroots [End Page 179] anticorruption movement an extremist organization, decreed that it must be disbanded, and detained the movement's defense lawyers. Yet as Frye emphasizes, cracking down presents another dilemma. Many...

Elites and Institutions in the Russian Thermidor: Regime Instrumentalism, Entrepreneurial Signaling, and Inherent Illiberalism

The modern Russian regime is one of the more prominent states espousing an explicitly illiberal ideological worldview domestically and abroad. Although regime illiberalism is many-sided, including authoritarian governance characteristics, international diffusion practices, and domestic political management, observers have often assumed that illiberalism is at its core an instrumental or cynical approach employed by the Russian leadership to bolster regime security and promote its foreign policy. This article suggests rather that observed illiberalism has additional roots in the dynamics of authoritarian domestic politics and society, rather than being characterized as simply a cynical top-down strategy of the Kremlin. Rather, regime illiberalism is congruent with many domestic drivers of political and societal influence. While decision-making elites certainly play up illiberalism instrumentally for purposes of regime maintenance and positional international influence, large institutional constituencies for substantive illiberalism also exist independent of regime goals. After suggesting two institutional formats—the Russian parliament and national broadcast media—in which observed illiberalism can best understood as an entrepreneurial behavior by lower-tier elite signaling loyalty and usefulness to the regime center, three further institutional sources are identified to be constituted by inherently illiberal organizational and symbolic forms that would promote illiberalism regardless of the regime’s strategic preferences: the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian Armed Forces, and the symbolic center of the patronal presidency.

Is Democracy Possible in Russia?

Abstract This article discusses the question of why a Western-style democracy has not been formed in Russia. The prerequisite for the formation of a democracy as a political regime is the domination of small and medium-sized private property and a middle class. Since the middle class has been small in Russia throughout most of its history for a number of objective reasons, the country has hardly known full-fledged democracy, and the current political system only imitates it. Russia’s attempts to enter the trajectory of democratic development—both in the early twentieth century, and since the early 1990s–have failed, and the trend of abandoning the basic principles of democracy has prevailed over the past two decades. The blame for this lies not only on the current Russian leadership but to no lesser extent on the political leadership of the West, which for the sake of short-term self-serving interests or political ambitions has contributed much to the formation of the current Russian regime.