Russian Leaders Research Articles

Education of Montenegrins in the Russian Empire as a Tool of Political and Cultural Influence (By the Example of the Activities of the MFA and slavic charity committees)

The article is dedicated to the issue of the participation of the officials and public organizations of Russia in the selection of candidates for education in our country among Montenegrin youth in schools and higher educational institutions. Russian officials were interested in creating a number of specialists in the Slavic lands of the Balkan Peninsula, connected with Russia, who knew and loved Russian culture. Today, such a policy is called “soft power”, and in the XIX and early XX centuries this was a manifestation of pragmatism and strategic calculation in the foreign policy of the empire. Montenegro, which received international recognition after the Berlin Congress of 1878, became a privileged partner and client of Russia. Monarch Nikola Petrovich managed to convince the Russian government that in case of military complications in the Balkans, the Montenegrins would be able to assist Russia in the hostilities. In the last third of the XIX — early XX centuries Russian autocracy paid substantial subsidies to the Montenegrin authorities for the modernization of the state apparatus and the armed forces. Benefits were constantly increased and added up to huge sums. However, the ruler of Montenegro turned out to be an obstinate ward, inclined to forget about the support provided and ignore the political recommendations of the Russian tsar and his entourage. At the beginning of the twentieth century relations between the two countries were strained, and the behavior of Nikola Petrovich often seemed unpredictable. He easily broke his own promises, from time to time he showed a willingness to change Russian patronage for the friendship of Western Europe. Many Russian diplomats and public figures saw a way out of this impasse in preparing as many highly educated specialists as possible for Montenegro, who would join the political elite of the principality and become more reliable allies than the greedy older generation. Moreover, in Montenegro, which had recently switched from a tribal way of life to state life, there was neither a complete secondary school in the European sense, nor higher educational institutions. The calculations of the Russian leadership were only partially justified. However, in this small Balkan country, graduates of Russian educational institutions, sincerely grateful and devoted to Russia, did live and work.

Georgia's Main External Threat and Insurance External Orientations

Since the beginning of mankind, concern for survival and therefore safety has been one of the main components of human life. History remembers states and empires that ceased to exist as a result of wars and conquests. The recent past shows that the main threat to Georgia is the unfriendly neighbor Russian Federation with imperialist intentions. This fact is clearly stated in the conceptual documents of our country. The present paper discusses the important stages of the Russian-Georgian relations since the 15th century and the problems that these relations brought to Georgia. Russia's aggressive policy and aspirations to constantly expand its borders at the expense of conquering natural-geographically protected territories are described. The author reviews the traditional concepts of Russian politics presented in the scientific literature, which originated in different periods. Special attention is paid to the more radical and extremist direction than "Eurasianism" to "Russism", the same "Rachism", which is the unofficial name of the political ideology of the ruling regime of Russia. In the visions of modern ideologues of Russia lies the denial of law and the assertion of the priority of force, disrespect for the sovereignty of neighbors and self-assertion at the expense of disorder and violence. The center of the ideology of Russism is the cult of the national leader, who will have the power to restore glory to Russia. This glory lies in its restoration within the borders of "historical Russia", I.E. the Soviet Union, which is the biggest challenge for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. The Russian leadership uses the military as one of many tools to shape its "near abroad" and global positions. It has wide interests in the South Caucasus from the military, political, economic and energy point of view. But, the current political leadership of the Russian Federation, objectively, acts from the position of military and economic inferiority towards NATO. It is clear that at this stage, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization appears as one of the main restraining forces of "Russianism" and therefore of Russia's expansionist policy. According to the author, where the powerful states determining the world order want to create an alliance that will guarantee the protection of their civilizational choices, the preservation of their identity and statehood, Georgia's failure to declare a clear foreign orientation will be disastrous. Accordingly, he believes that Georgia is obliged to clearly express its foreign policy. e. year Balanced politics and the desire to put the conflicting interests of large countries to their own service is an illusory approach that may have once worked. Keywords: Security, aggression, Russian Federation, Rashism, NATO.

ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ ДИНАМІКИ ЗАХВОРЮВАНОСТІ НА COVID-19 В УКРАЇНІ ПІД ЧАС ВІЙСЬКОВОГО СТАНУ

COVID-19 has seriously affected various aspects of our lives, and above all the health of people around the world. The high level of transmission and so far, the lack of effective therapeutic agents have challenged all mankind. COVID-19 is an infectious disease that was first detected in December 2019 in Wuhan, China, after which the virus quickly spread around the world. On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared an international public health emergency outbreak, and on March 11, 2020, a global pandemic. Compared to other acute respiratory diseases, such as SARS or MERS, COVID-19 is spreading faster due to increased globalization. According to reports of the first 40 cases of COVID-19, the majority of infected patients (73%) were males, and less than half (i.e., 32%) had comorbidities such as diabetes, hypertension, and cardiovascular diseases. It is also reported that the average age of patients was 49 years. The mortality rate in this group was almost 2%. In Ukraine, the first cases date back to March 3, 2020. Since the beginning of the epidemic in Ukraine, the average mortality rate was almost 3.5%, and the average age of patients was 41 years. On the night of February 24, 2022, after the Russian leader addressed his citizens, Russia launched a large-scale offensive on the territory of Ukraine. Martial law was declared by presidential decree at 05:30 on the same day throughout the controlled territory of Ukraine. Following the declaration of martial law, most businesses, food and entertainment establishments were forced to suspend operations due to the threat of airstrikes. Educational institutions of various levels were forced to close on vacation, and later open only for distance learning to prevent the accumulation of large masses of people in one place. As for the incidence statistics for COVID-19, at the beginning of the war, they didn't update at all or were limited updated. Therefore, it is now very important to know what the dynamics of the disease should be expected. To study these dynamics, we will use the SIR model, based on the results of which it will be possible to forecast what to expect from COVID-19.

A Diplomatic Meeting: Reagan, Thatcher, and the Art of Summitry by James Cooper

<i>A Diplomatic Meeting: Reagan, Thatcher, and the Art of Summitry</i> by James Cooper

The Return of History as Travesty

Abstract The ‘war against fascism’ constitutes one of the most eccentric tropes in today’s Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Russia is currently mirroring the battle against fascism and National Socialism during World War II in its own brutal invasion of Ukraine in a most extraordinary way. Yet, the ‘antifascism’ rhetoric provides the crucial link between the old Soviet historical narrative and contemporary Russia’s politics of memory. It serves as a concept ‘frozen in time’ and demonstrates how the current Russian leadership espouses an essentially cyclical world view that caters to its own policies of expansion and aggression.

Anti-communism as a factor in shaping the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in 1991–1992

The purpose of the paper is to consider the anti-communist component in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation during the first post-Soviet years. Based on the material of the socio-political periodicals of that time and the documents of the archive of the Presidential Center of Boris Yeltsin, the influence of the struggle against the threat of communist revenge inside the country on the foreign policy of the state is traced. The paper examines the international reaction to the persecution of the Communist Party in Russia and attempts to use this event to promote foreign policy interests. The specific steps of the Russian leadership in the fight against the international communist movement and the assessment of this activity by contemporaries are considered. Various conceptual approaches to overcoming the Soviet in the field of international relations, which were formulated in Russia at that time, are highlighted. The main directions of using anti-communist rhetoric in building relations with a number of states, successes and failures in this direction are outlined. The conclusion is made about the preservation of the ideological component in the Russian foreign policy of the first post-Soviet years, despite the declarations on the de-ideologization of this sphere. It is noted that the anti-communism of the new government has not always been an effective tool in achieving foreign policy goals and has not always found a positive assessment even in Western countries.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTIMIDATION IN RUSSIA’S POLICY

Nuclear weapons play a key role in Russia’s security thinking. Concepts of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the Russian Federation include both doctrinally defined nuclear deterrence and doctrinally indefinite nuclear intimidation. The latter has become a central element of the hybrid war waged by Russia. The failure to achieve the initial goals of Russian large-scale military aggression against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has affected Russia’s nuclear policy. The criteria for the use of nuclear weapons in conventional warfare and the forms of nuclear intimidation have changed.&#x0D; The effectiveness of Russia’s nuclear policy depends on the degree of compliance of its components with established international norms, formed within the framework of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. These norms can be defined as the global nuclear order. Russia’s policy of nuclear intimidation falls out of this order and creates a “nuclear disorder”. Currently, it is losing effectiveness for the Russian leadership, since it is increasingly seen as a “nuclear bluff”. Russia is trying to hide its nuclear intimidation behind the doctrinal provisions of nuclear deterrence, which generally remains effective.&#x0D; In the war against Ukraine, Russia is actively trying to artificially create criteria for the use of nuclear weapons that would formally correspond to the global nuclear order, while leaving room for nuclear intimidation. In particular, this may explain accusations against Ukraine of developing weapons of mass destruction and Russia’s attempts to annex the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories as soon as possible.&#x0D; The creation of a postwar architecture of international security will require bringing Russian nuclear policy to the norms of the global nuclear order.

THE CHURCH AS AN ELEMENT OF “SHARP POWER” OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The article analyses the essence of the term “sharp power” and deals with the role of “sharp power” in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. First of all, the article focuses on the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) and the role they play as an elements of Russia’s “sharp power” directed against Ukraine. During the war that Russia wages in the territory of Ukraine the main function of the Russian Orthodox Church is to justify aggression in the eyes of Orthodox believers. The ROC resorts to spreading disinformation and constructing myths that are intended to serve as argumentation for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. One of such myths is a false statement about Ukrainians and Russians being the same people, which is being actively spread by the ROC and the Russian leadership. Although the official statements of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which is canonically and administratively subordinated to the ROC, are more cautious, but, as demonstrated in the article, it has been promoting pro-Russian narratives among Orthodox believers for years. It was spreading disinformation about Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Russia’s aggression in the Donbas region and making efforts to create a favourable image of Russia among Ukrainians. The article analyses the changes in the UOC-MP official position that have taken place after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. The article particularly assesses the statement made by the Council of the UOC-MP in May 2022 about its decision on the “complete independence and self-sufficiency” and break with the ROC. The article argues that this decision is manipulative and purely declarative and did not bring any changes into the status of the UOC-MP. The article concludes by emphasising the importance of informing the Ukrainian society about the dangers of the Russian church “sharp power”, which is especially relevant during the war the Russia wages against Ukraine not only on the battlefield but also in the information realm.

Russia’s war crimes against Ukraine and attempts to conceal them (1939–2022): comparative analysis

The article provides a comparative analysis of the methodology for concealing war crimes committed by Russia against Ukraine from the beginning of World War II to the current Russian-Ukrainian war (since 2014); show the similarity of the actions of the Nazi regime of Hitler and the racist regime of Putin in the struggle against the Ukrainian national liberation movement and its leaders in the European context. The beginning of Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine, the horrific atrocities of the Russian army in Bucha, Irpin, Borodyanka, Mariupol and other cities and villages of our country, uncovered in racist areas, confirmed that nothing had changed from Stalin’s punitive occupiers. times, and in many cases it became even more inhumane and cruel, surpassing the atrocities of the Nazis during World War II. The mass atrocities of the Russian military against civilians, especially women and children, the destruction of maternity hospitals, kindergartens, schools, hospitals, and cultural institutions surpassed the Nazi atrocities of the Nazis during World War II. Today, Russia has acted as a Nazi aggressor not only against Ukraine, but also against the entire Western world. At the same time, the Russian leadership is trying to cover up the traces of their crimes, or shift the blame on the Ukrainians themselves, as in previous years on the Poles, Germans, Finns and others. The aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine is manifested in the use of armed force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Ukraine. War crimes were committed by representatives of the authorities of the Russian Federation, the leadership of its armed forces, regular troops and military units that are not formally subordinate to the leadership of the armed forces under current law. Methods of fabricating and disclosing false information and the methodology of Russian lies have a long tradition. The historical parallels between Hitler’s Nazi regime during World War II and modern-day Putin’s Russia, and the answer to the question of whether their crimes are different, clearly show that there is no such difference. After all, Bucha, Mariupol, Irpin and other Russian-occupied towns and villages in eastern and southern Ukraine have shown the true nature, scale and consequences of the racist regime in action. Key words: Ukrainian national liberation movement, Nazism, racism, war crimes, World War II, Russian-Ukrainian war (since 2014).

The existence of Putin's Russia is a Threat to International Law and Order (on the example of aggressive actions in Ukraine)

The article analyzes the causes, preconditions, geopolitical and geohistorical goals of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The reaction of the West to the Russian geostrategy of revenge has been clarified. It has been proven that the hybrid war which has been going on since February 2014 has created a deep crisis in the global security system. The Russian Federation, having violated the norms and principles of international law, bilateral and large-scale agreements, annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. Russia attacked Ukraine without declaring war and again called into question the international order in Europe on February 24, 2022, when the Russian leader announced the launch of a "special military operation" against Ukraine. He called its goal the "demilitarization" of the country. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation began shelling the cities of Ukraine and its military and civilian infrastructure. The recognition of the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics by Russian President Vladimir Putin preceded this madness on February 21, 2022. However, the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation has deep historical roots. The absorption of Ukraine and its human resources is one of the key tasks in the development of the project of Russian imperialism. The current process of formation and development of Putin's Russia has always been accompanied by war with Ukraine. Russia aimed to destroy our young state. The history of relations between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples is a chronicle of wars, the liberation struggles of Ukrainians, and a consistent policy of Russification and assimilation of our people.

Партийные лидеры в регионах России: анализ логики отставок

The article is devoted to the analysis of the dynamics and factors that explain resignations of regional party leaders in Russia via the example of the United Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). The authors studied rotations of the leaders of the above mentioned parties’ regional branches and revealed the general logic of this process, documenting important differences in its intensity. Possessing limited resources, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation does not seek to frequently replace its first secretaries in the regions; on the contrary, the turnover within the regional organizations of the United Russia is extremely active. The authors found a correlation between personnel turnover in the United Russia and electoral cycles, with federal elections having a more profound effect on them than regional ones. In the recent years, resignations after elections have become a priority choice, while earlier, during the formation of the United Russia party network, replacements often took place during the preparation of election campaigns. In turn, the regression analysis has revealed only an unstable influence on the removal from office of regional leaders of Russian parties of external and internal factors, usually identified by researchers of Western democracies, including the results obtained by these parties in the elections. One possible explanation for this finding, according to the authors, could lie in the high importance of intra-party patron-client networks, the analysis of which is hampered by the difficulties with data verification. Another reason is the impact of the principles of personnel selection, set by the central party leadership, on the turnover. This influence is especially clear-cut in the United Russia that in the recent years has relied on the combination of the posts of regional party leaders and governors, the practice that was previously discouraged. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which is experiencing a shortage of personnel, is more likely to demonstrate a tendency towards conserving the party leadership. Therefore, the replacement of party secretaries in the CPRF is more often due to the advanced age or death of the former leader, as well as internal conflicts.

Формирование стратегии политического позиционирования современной России: внутриполитический и международный аспекты

The article analyzes the formation of the political image of Russia and its development in the era of a new political reality. The authors of the study in this work answer two questions: firstly, what factors influenced the formation of political positioning of Russia; secondly, how the Russian authorities should respond to challenges and threats in order to keep the necessary vector of political positioning formation. The authors conclude that the Russian leadership needs to form a high-quality political PR strategy in the domestic and international dimensions for effective implementation of the goals set in the process of forming a political image.

The Inclusion of the Eastern Baltic in the Russian Empire: Methods of Peter I to ‘Increase the Fatherland’

The article examines the issue of how the Baltic territory was included in the Russian Empire during the Great Northern War. This process turned out to be very difficult in several aspects - military, diplomatic and managerial. In the first years of the war, Peter I did not at all consider the Baltic as a territory that could become part of Russia; the Russian troops devastated the territory; and ahead of the Swedish offensive in 1708, the occupied cities were ruined. After the victory at Poltava, in 1710, the situation changed; the entire Baltic region was occupied, and the Russian leadership began to establish relations with the local population. On this territory, the elements of local self-government were preserved, freedom of religion was proclaimed; in Riga, Revel and Pernau there were small garrisons with artillery weapons, which were under the jurisdiction of the local authorities. At the same time, a diplomatic struggle was waged for the inclusion of the Baltic in Russia. On the one hand, Sweden did not want to leave these territories at all. On the other hand, before the beginning of the Great Northern War, Peter I and Saxon Elector August II (who was also the king of Poland) reached an agreement that the territory of the Baltic States would be given to him. But as the Russian troops succeeded, Peter I began to gradually strive for the Baltic lands’ transferring to Russia. For a decade, diplomats had to maneuver, and in the end, they were able to achieve success - following the results of the Treaty of Nystad of 1721, the territory of the Baltic States (as well as Ingria) was included in the Russian Empire not only de facto, but also de jure. After that, it took several more years to resolve the situation related to landed estates.

THE LINGUISTIC IMAGE OF RUSSIA IN THE GENRE OF INTERVIEW (BASED ON THE COLUMN “SPIEGEL-GESPRÄCH” OF THE JOURNAL “DER SPIEGEL”)

The article deals with the linguistic aspect of the image of Russia, which is formed in the materials of the "Spiegel-Gespräch" column of the "Der Spiegel" magazine. This column contains only interviews with famous German politicians, public figures, scientists. The main positions with regard to Russia were defined, the role of lexical and syntactic means of artistic expression in their representation was investigated. Attention was paid not only to the linguistic means of reflecting the image of Russia in the interviews themselves, but also to the headlines. A journalistic headline has great semantic potential for attracting readers' attention and for capaciously reflecting the essence of the material. Various interviews use metaphor, antithesis, metonymy, parceling and many others. The aim of the article is also to analyze the linguistic personality of German figures, which allows us to draw certain conclusions. In the interviews, the image of Russia is considered in the context of the opposition "us and them". Despite the abundance of criticism of Russian leadership and policy, an emerging tendency to view Russia not as an "aliens", but in the context of "ours" is revealed. The inclusion of Russia in the circle of each of these concepts has its own means of expression, forming either a discrediting or complementary context.

The Russian Globalization Project in the XX Century. Anatomy of a Military-Political Strategy

The article discusses the main components of the military-political strategy of Russia in the «short» 20th century – from 1900 to 1991. Special attention is paid to how the foreign policy and the use of Armed Forces were planned. Reconstructing the intellectual ideas that created the framework of the foreign and military policy of the Russian state at that time, the author focuses on the elements that unite the leaders of Russia of the 20th century from Nikolai Romanov to Mikhail Gorbachev. Such issues as the «globalization» of the USSR in world affairs, relations with neighboring Asian centers of power, such as China and Iran, the sphere of «special state interests» of the USSR in Eastern Europe are discussed in the work. The evolution of Russian military strategy in the 20th century is studied: from betting on victory in the World War in the first half of the century to focusing on the actions of expeditionary groups during the Cold War. The article analyzes in detail the strategic deterrence measures carried out by the Armed Forces of the USSR in the 1950-1970. The issue of the resources of military-political strategy is considered separately.

Unpredictable Muse: The Ukrainian War and History in Progress. In Putin's Russia, the Past Erupts into the Present

We explore the definitions of the history of the present according to Edgar Moran and François Hartog. The present is a script in progress and demonstrates the fluidity of the story. The essay carries out archeology of the Ukrainian war, debating the past of the Ukrainian contenders, Imperial Russia, and the USSR that always needed a defensive accentuation around its borders. It incorporated Ukraine, creating an industrial region and completing its economy despite repression and Russification. The dissolution of the USSR gave rise to independent countries such as Georgia and Ukraine, supported by the US and NATO. The essay discusses the Ukrainian war without demonizing the contenders by explaining Russian leader Putin's fascination for his country's history. The past that emerges is archaic, demonstrating that Putin wants to control history. Consolidating its nationalist positions rescues the greatness of the Russian Empire, of the extinct USSR, reaffirming its country as a world power in the present. US and NATO foreign policy compromised with the USSR's military actions until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The American government supported the rebels as it does in Ukraine and detached his identity from the Russian past by joining the West. The chapter concludes by showing the time of conflict from the perspective of Giorgio Agamben and Heidegger as the moment of kairós when taken war decisions.

The Roots of Russian Naked Aggression (RRNA) Versus Unjust Shortsighted Support to Ukrainian Secessionists (USSUS): Constituent Tools of Re-Emerging to the Position of New International Hyper Hegemonic Power (NIHHP) in the Unipolar World of 1991-2022

This paper brings out arguments concerning the unjust and naked aggression inflicted by Russia over the Ukraine why sorting out why the International Community as the Global mechanism for World peace and security remains partially inactive to impose immediate sanctions in view of the United Nations(UN) charter with the Security Council rising with strong standing orders. The prohibition on the unjustified use of force is the cornerstone of contemporary international law and requires the implications of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) not only on press released but full action to stop the aggressor from its continuance aggression. The ICJ which deals with disputes between states, can only intervene in cases where the countries involved agree that it should have a role is unbearable. In, fact, any country which gives total support to divide another country from its unity requires serious sanctions in view of the violation of territorial integrity and state’s sovereignty. The question of bouncing back to the position of NIHHP is very challenging to the recent aggressor Russian. Therefore, it is not possible to pass through the former Satellite States of the Soviet Union to gain that position and Western European countries will never give the Russia a full ticket to once more rise to that position in international affairs of the 21st Century is what the Russian leaders failed to know. The scrutiny of specialized sources and related valuable documentaries called for our attention to adopt a historical approach in our analyses. This paper is very important to specialist of international relations concerning the strength and weaknesses of the global and continental International Organisations engagements of resolving the Russo-Ukrainian War of the 21st Century.

EDITORIAL: Fighting self-delusion and lies

WELCOME to this double edition of Pacific Journalism Review, the second to appear as an independent publication. Since we last appeared, a world already groaning under the weight of COVID and climate change has had to endure the added burden of Russia’s murderous and totally unjustified attack on Ukraine. Ukraine has found allies all over the world, not least from those concerned that Russian leader Vladimir Putin, who now apparently thinks of himself as a Tsar, has used the war as an excuse to try to crush even further the few remaining free journalists and artists surviving in his mafia fiefdom.

Russia and the Caucasus Regions

According to Russian leaders, the traditional sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, mainly Central Asia and the Caucasus, is the first defensive bulwark to protect Russia’s national security; Moscow’s behavior in the context of Tsarist Russia and the former Soviet Union should seek to dominate the region.However, Russia has taken different approaches to Central Asia and the Caucasus over the past two decades. A closer look at the reason for such techniques reveals that these approaches were purely tactical and aimed at realizing Russia’s grand strategy in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Current trends indicate that the Russian governing body has always sought to portray Russia as an oil emperor in formulating its long-term strategy.An actor who, by promoting his position, can play a geopolitical and critical role in the field of energy and exploit Russia’s energy resources and the monopoly of energy transmission pipelines as a political and economic tool to secure its geopolitical interests in the Eurasian region, particularly in relations with the European Union. This study will examine Russia’s obstacles in achieving its goals in the Central Asian region and the Caucasus after the Cold War.&#x0D; Keywords: Russian politics, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Iran, Ukraine, Cold War, Geopolitics

Russia’s war goals in Ukraine

ABSTRACT The paper analyzes the reasons for the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It examines both the stated goals and the deeper reasons, noting that the invasion owes more to the imperialistic policies of the Russian leadership than a desire to remove a “neo-Nazi” government in Kyiv or to protect the quasi-states of Donetsk and Luhansk. It looks also at hostile Russian attitudes toward the European Union, NATO, and the United States and the importance of the capture of Mariupol as a pathway to Crimea. It observes that the attacks on civilians and atrocities that Russia has perpetrated to date reveal a desire to end Ukrainian statehood and expand further into territories of the former tsarist empire. The costs of the war and the economic limitations of Russia are likely to undermine such ambitions.