Russell's Philosophy Research Articles

The Relationship between the World and Language in Bertrand Russell's Philosophy

In the contemporary philosophy and more specifically in philosophy of language, one of the essential issues of philosophical studies is the relationship between language, the World and knowledge about the world. Bertrand Russell as one of the leaders in logical analysis in contemporary philosophy considers logical foundation as significant pillar for language. He defines language, meaning knowledge in the context of logic and he forms the world in the logical facts. From here, a link between language and reality will be created, and thus there is an intention to break the other traditions.
 Bertrand Russell tried to write many books and essays and his literary heritage has become an important asset in philosophical discourses. This study aims under the Russell’s arguments to analyze the relationship between language and the world. It attempts from a different perspective to reach a different form of existence and world. This purpose helps in language activities in manifesting correct knowledge about the world that it has facts, events, state of affairs, reality and logic.
 Russell's attempts to connect between language and reality in the world produced many valuable arguments and thesis. This is on the foundation of logical analysis changes language to propositions and changes the world to facts instead of things. In addition, arranges all theories about meaning, descriptions, proper names and knowledge through the atomic propositions. Furthermore, he based his understanding to the external world, existing of things and the relations between them on logical language.

B. Russell's Philosophy of Mathematics before Logicism

The analysis of B. Russell's philosophy of mathematics does not lose its relevance due to the emergence of new modern programs of philosophy of mathematics. This article explores the intellectual path of B. Russell in the transition from Kant's philosophy of geometry, presented in his dissertation "On the foundations of Geometry" in 1897, to his position in the work "Principles of Mathematics" in 1903, where for the first time the ideas of B. Russell's logicism are explicitly presented, according to which all mathematics is derived from formal logic. The problematic question is whether the transition is really B. Russell's transition from Kantianism in the philosophy of mathematics to logicism was a cardinal change in the philosophical and mathematical paradigm. The purpose of the study is to analyze the evolution of B. Russell's philosophical and mathematical views. The research uses historical and philosophical analysis and historical and philosophical reconstruction, methods of comparative and interpretive analysis. The argumentation of J.'s statement is analyzed. Hayes says that B. Russell, when writing "On the Foundations of Geometry", was already committed to a kind of "logicism" that does not correspond to the traditional interpretation of his work. The expediency of separating the general concept of logicism and the specific tasks to be performed by this program is argued. It is also shown that intuition plays a small role in Russell's early philosophy of mathematics. It is revealed which ideas of B. Russell should be revised and excluded in order for B. Russell to accept logicism. It is shown that the concept of logic in B. Russell's early philosophy of mathematics does not correspond to the goals and objectives of logicism. At the same time, it is demonstrated that, regardless of the logic used, the position of B. Russell can conform to the spirit of logicism (but is unable to fulfill its tasks). It is concluded that some basic ideas of logicism are expressed in the early work of B. Russell. At the same time, the very concept of logic in B. Russell has fundamental differences in different periods of his work. Анализ философии математики Б. Рассела не теряет своей актуальности в связи с появлением новых современных программ философии математики. В этой статье исследуется интеллектуальный путь Б. Рассела при переходе от кантовской философии геометрии, представленной в его диссертации «Об основах геометрии» 1897 г., к его позиции в работе «Принципы математики» 1903 г., где впервые эксплицитно представлены идеи логицизма Б. Рассела, согласно которому вся математика выводится из формальной логики. Проблемным является вопрос, действительно ли переход Б. Рассела от кантианства в философии математики к логицизму был кардинальной сменой философско-математической парадигмы. Цель исследования – анализ эволюции философско-математических взглядов Б. Рассела. В исследовании используются историко-философский анализ и историко-философская реконструкция, методы компаративного и интерпретирующего анализа. Анализируется аргументация утверждения Дж. Хейса о том, что Б. Рассел при написании «Об основах геометрии» уже был привержен своего рода «логицизму», несоответствующего традиционной интерпретации его творчества. Аргументируется целесообразность разделения общего понятия логицизма и конкретных задач, которые должны быть выполнены этой программой. Также показано, что интуиция в ранней философии математики Рассела играет небольшую роль. Выявляется, какие идеи Б. Рассела должны быть пересмотрены и исключены для принятия Б. Расселом логицизма. Показано, что концепция логики в ранней философии математики Б. Рассела не соответствует целям и задачам логицизма. Вместе с тем демонстрируется, что вне зависимости от используемой логики позиция Б. Рассела может соответствовать духу логицизма (но не в состоянии выполнить его задачи). Делается вывод о том, что некоторые базовые идеи логицизма высказываются в раннем творчестве Б. Рассела. Вместе с тем сама концепция логики у Б. Рассела имеет принципиальные различия в разные периоды его творчества.

On Infinitesimals and Indefinitely Cut Wooden Sticks: A Chinese Debate on ‘Mathematical Logic’ and Russell’s Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy from 1925

In the years following Bertrand Russell's visit in China, fragments from his work on mathematical logic and the foundations of mathematics started to enter the Chinese intellectual world. While up until 1925 Chinese intellectuals like Zhang Shenfu, Zhang Dongsun and others mainly contributed to the dissemination of general notions from Russell's logicism, epistemology and mathematical philosophy, two aspiring Chinese mathematicians, Fu Zhongsun and Zhang Bangming, introduced to Chinese readers the first Chinese translation of Russell's Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. One year after the second edition of the book was published in 1924, Chinese intellectuals started to respond to Russell's ‘mathematical logic’ and philosophy of mathematics, as contained in the work. Consequently, in 1925 the first public debate on this topic broke out in Chinese periodicals. This article aims at providing a summary of these 1925 discussions, from criticisms of Russell's work to a general debate on ‘infinitesimals’. Through close examination of the arguments and discursive strategies used in the debate, the article tries to highlight the state of Chinese discourse on mathematical logic during the time in question, while also shedding some light on the mechanisms and strategies in the undergoing process of the adoption of Western scientific ideas.

Analysis, Mathematics, and Logic in Russell's Early Philosophy [review of Jolen Galaugher, <em>Russell's Philosophy of Logical Analysis: 1897–1905</em>

Analysis, Mathematics, and Logic in Russell's Early Philosophy [review of Jolen Galaugher, <em>Russell's Philosophy of Logical Analysis: 1897–1905</em>

Russell on Incomplete Symbols

AbstractRussell's notion of an incomplete symbol has become a standard against which philosophers compare their views on the relationship between language and the world. But Russell's exact characterization of incomplete symbols and the role they play in his philosophy are still disputed. In this paper, I trace the development of the notion of an incomplete symbol in Russell's philosophy. I suggest – against Kaplan, Evans, and others – that Russell's many characterizations of the notion of an incomplete symbol are compatible. To this end, I examine and reject arguments for the purported incompatibility between declaring an expression to be incomplete and incorporating that symbol into a compositional semantic theory. I then examine how Russell puts the notion of an incomplete symbol to use in metaphysics.

Wittgenstein's New Method and Russell's The Analysis of Mind

I argue that Wittgenstein's engagement with Russell's The Analysis of Mind was crucial for the development of his new method. First, I show that Wittgenstein's criticism of the causal theory of meaning (namely: that it generates an infinite regress and that it does not determine the depiction of a fact) is motivated by its incompatibility with the pictorial conception of language. Second, I show that in reacting against that theory he comes to invent the calculus conception of language. Third, I argue that the calculus conception is vulnerable to critiques that parallel those presented against Russell's theory (a rule-following regression and the inde- terminacy of depicted facts). Fourth, the striking similarity between the problems present in Russell's theory and in Wittgenstein's own views makes him realize that both were working under misleading trains of thought and false analogies. It is this realization that brings Wittgenstein to the view that his task is to investigate the genesis of philosophical puzzlement in order to stop philosophical theorizing right from the beginning. Thus, in explaining the invention of Witt- genstein's new method I show its relation to Russell's philosophy and indicate the origins of the rule-following problem.

Historical dictionary of Bertrand Russell's philosophy

Academic philosopher, logician, public intellectual, educator, political activist, and freethinker, Bertrand Russell was and remains a colossus. No other single philosopher in the last 200 years can be said to have created so much and influenced so many. His Principia Mathematica, written with A. N. Whitehead, ranks as one of the greatest books on logic since Aristotle. His philosophical work on language, meaning, logic, mind, and metaphysics formed the basis of 20th-century philosophy. Russell was active in numerous political movements of liberation and peace, and his popular writings, including the best-selling History of Western Philosophy, won the Nobel prize in literature in 1950. Historical Dictionary of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy offers a comprehensive, current guide to the many facets of Russell's work. Through its chronology, introductory essay, bibliography, and hundreds of cross-referenced dictionary entries on concepts, people, works, and technical terms, Russell's impact on philosophy and related fields is made accessible to the reader in this must-have reference.

Russell and the Unity of the Proposition

AbstractIn this article I present a summary of Bertrand Russell's protracted attempts to solve the problem of the unity of the proposition, and explain the significance of the problem for Russell's philosophy. Unlike many other accounts which take the problem to be confined to Russell's early theories of propositional content, I argue that the problem (or variants of it) is a recurring theme throughout the whole of Russell's career.

Toward a Topic-Specific Logicism? Russell's Theory of Geometry in the Principles of Mathematics.

Russell's philosophy is rightly described as a programme of reduction of mathematics to logic. Now the theory of geometry developed in 1903 does not fit this picture well, since it is deeply rooted in the purely synthetic projective approach, which conflicts with all the endeavours to reduce geometry to analytical geometry. The first goal of this paper is to present an overview of this conception. The second aim is more far-reaching. The fact that such a theory of geometry was sustained by Russell compels us to question the meaning of logicism: how is it possible to reconcile Russell's global reductionist standpoint with his local defence of the specificities of geometry?

O Platonismo de Russell na metafísica e na matemática

Neste artigo, analiso o surgimento e a superação do Platonismo em B. Russell, tanto na sua filosofia da matemática como na sua metafísica. Começo por explicitar os argumentos que levaram Russell a aderir ao chamado "Platonismo Proposicional" - posição que será tecnicamente relevante na definição de números. Na seção seguinte, discutirei até que ponto a teoria das descrições definidas determina, necessariamente, uma adesão ao nominalismo, e as dificuldades que surgem para o logicismo conseqüentes do abandono do platonismo. Finalmente, mostrarei como a posição madura de Russell caracteriza-se mais como um reducionismo do que propriamente como um nominalismo, e como este é fundado no princípio do mínimo vocabulário.

Wittgenstein's Tractarian Apprenticeship

<p>The years since the publication of Wittgenstein's Tractatus have produced a good many interpretations of its central tenets. Time has produced something of a consensus concerning the nature of the Tractarian criticisms of Russell's philosophy. Recent work on Russell's philosophy of logic reveals, however, that the agreed account of Tractarian criticisms relies upon characterizing Russell with positions he did not hold.</p>

Epistemology of Modernism

88 Reviews EPISTEMOLOGY OFMODERNISM WILLIAM R. EVERDELL History/ St. Ann'sSchool Brooklyn, NY 11201, USA EVERDELL@AOL.COM Ann Banfield. The Phantom Table:Woolf,Fry,Russelland the Epistemology of Modernism. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge U.P., 2000. £35.00; US$49.95. In Virginia Woolf's difficult masterpiece, The Waves(1931),each of several separate interior monologues-"streams of consciousness" in the American critical idiom-is separated from the next by an interpolated "Interlude". The interior monologues are assigned co different characters, bur the Interludes are rendered from no perspectiveat all, verymuch like the "Time Passes"chapter of Woolf's earlier and better known novel, Tothe Lighthouse (1927).The passive voice and the demonstrative and indefinite pronotms are essential, removing from the scene not only the characters' points of view, but the author's as well. Numbered among the consequences of the new twentieth-century technique of interior monologue, the Interludes can be accepted today as one more trick of literary "Modernism", but for Woolf it was new, and the task of preventing any of her Interludes from becoming just another report from the rypical "omniscient narrator" of Victorian fiction was one of the most demanding she ever set herself as a writer. Like her friend the Post-Impressionist critic Roger Fry, she wanted to analyze the world outside the self into its smallest sensible elements, then show human selvesasthey formed by accumulating the experience of these myriad, random, discontinuous components, and finally to recombine these components in their two kinds, selvesand sense-able things, into a meaningful whole-a work of art. Rejecting both the idealism of Bradley and the British philosophical generation of the 1890sand the naive positivist materialism coming out of the 1850s, Bertrand Russell eventually settled on an ontology most philosophers call "realist " in that it rejected the view that the world accessible to the senses was no more than a mental construct and considered it naive to assign the origin of subjectivity to matter. The material world was, Russell thought, actually external -"out there". He did think, however,that all we knew of the external world was what wassensed by the sensesand pictured by the mind. He alsoconcluded (in essayslike "The Relation of Sense-data to Physics"written in 1910-17)d1at both that world and what we knew of it was presented in very small parts, and Reviews 89 analyzable down to them, or, in other words, that both ontology and epistemology were atomized. Each mind, with its senses, occupied, he thought, one of an infinite number of occupied and unoccupied "perspectives", each of which Lmiquely focused che "sensibilia"-whatever was perceived in che external world-like a Leibnizian monad. Machemacicallogic, on which Russell set che highest store, would be able, he thought, to bring together perspectives by providing a minimal secof cruchswhich, though abscracc,were objective in che sense chaccheywere noc private and could be agreed to by all. Something similar though rougher mighc be done for chesensibilia in cheworld "ouc chere" by che science of physics. Did Virginia Woolflearn from Bertrand Russell?To a latcer-dayacademic ic sounds too urrerly improbable, for che simple reason (obvious to academics) chat anyone who has made icto the upper levelsof English literature must have chosen cheseparticular heights to scale because the trail was so blessedlyfreeof chosenasry mathematical burrs and logical reazles,and the air so filledwith che pure chatter of French phenomenologisrs, that no hiker would ever have to struggle with analytical philosophy again. Lessmetaphorically, the separation of departments of literature from those of philosophy has come so close to divorce chat few in U.S. English Departments can make head or cail of che graduate thesis that one of Russell's philosophy students wrote on F.H. Bradley, and fewer still can trace the term "objective correlative" used by thac student (who was in fact T. S. Eliot) back to an early work of Husserl. Meanwhile, ic is taken for granted by those in Philosophy that there are no ideas worth discussing in Woolf, or, indeed, in any other novelise,greacthough she may be, Lmlessone is to descend from ontology and epistemology to the foothills of ethics and politics , or worse, aesthetics. (Among...

RUSSELL'S HIDDEN SUBSTITUTIONAL THEORY

This book explores an important central thread that unifies Russell's thoughts on logic in two works previously considered at odds with each other, the Principles of Mathematics and the later Principia Mathematica. This thread is Russell's doctrine that logic is an absolutely general science and that any calculus for it must embrace wholly unrestricted variables. The heart of Landini's book is a careful analysis of Russell's largely unpublished theory. On Landini's showing, the substitutional theory reveals the unity of Russell's philosophy of logic and offers new avenues for a genuine solution of the paradoxes plaguing Logicism.

Nightmares of Eminent Biographers

,%views NIGHTMARES OF EMINENT BIOGRAPHERS KEITH GREEN English/Linguistics / Sheffield Hallam U. Sheffield, S. Yorks, SIO 2BP, UK K.M.GREEN@SHU.AC.UK Ray Monk. Bertrand Russel~ [Vol. 2:] 1921-70: the Ghost ofMadness. London: Cape, 2000; New York: Free P., 2001. Pp. xv, 574. 31 illus. £25.00; Cdn$75.00; US$4°.00. This second volume of biography of Russell completes Monk's largely revisionist account ofRussell's life, covering his last fifty years, from 1921 to . 1970. That the research and writing of the project as a whole occupied Monk for over ten years is hardly surprising. Russell's vast written output, longevity, huge number ofcontacts, roller-coaster love-life and considerable philosophical and political activities, to note just some aspects ofhis life, naturally present the biographer with a daunting task. Previous biographers such as Ronald Clarki and Caroline Moorehead/ despite their often engaging styles, tended to bypass the more difficult aspects of Russell's character and to avoid discussion of the technicalities ofhis philosophy. These were not hagiographic in tone, but in general approving of Russell the man. Yet Clark in particular is scathing about some of Russell's (fleetingly held) views on women and race, for instance, and readily draws attention to some of the philosopher's more absurd statements. Monk tackles the more troublesome and contrary side of his subject head on, exposing it in way that makes Clark and Moorehead's complaints rather slight. The real problem for any critic and reader of Monk's work is to assess the accuracy ofhis damming portrait ofRussell, as it has become in this second volume. The second half of Russell's life is bound to seem less enthralling than the first in a numb.er of respects. Instead of life at Cambridge, overwhelming first love, the monumental effort ofthe colossal Principia Mathematica (1910-13), the intellectual wrestling with Wittgenstein, the bold resistance to the Great War, 1 The Life ofBertrand Russell (London: CapelWeidenfeid & Nicolson, 1975; New York: Knopf, 1976). 1 Bertrand Russell: a Life (London: Sinclair Stevenson; New York: Viking, 1992). russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. n.s. 20 (winter 2000-01): 151-84 155M 0036-01631 152 Reviews the love of Ottoline Morrell, the brief and passionate friendship with D. H. Lawrence and the formulation of the Theory of Descriptions, we have a vast journalistic output, endless lecture tours, failed marriages, bitter divorces, deteriorating relations with both family and friends, and the extraordinary final years under the influence of Ralph Schoenman. Like Clark and Moorehead before him, Monk spends a hundred fewer pages on this second part of Russell's life.. There are reasons for this, of course; most simply that the first part of Russell's life is more interesting, certainly philosophically, but also personally, than the second. In the same way Russell's autobiography is less engaging after the Great War. But in the case of Monk's second volume, another issue arises: the author finds the later Russell a thoroughly repugnant figure, incapable of love, emotionally maimed, colossally vain, and obsessed by fear of madness. In Volume I, The Spirit ofSolitude (1996),3 Monk had already admitted that he found his subject less than endearing, yet his admiration for Russell's achievements, ifnot so much his personality, was evident. The first volume was a significant biography and important addition to Russell studies because it threw new light on Russell's motives and was solidly based on Russell's own words. Monk looks coolly at Russell's life and philosophy while using much of his writing to elucidate key aspects ofa vastly complex figure. The most pleasing aspect of the volume, however, as has been generally recognized and applauded, was the ease in which Monk was able to move from commentary about Russell 's life to analysis of Russell's philosophy-something previous biographers had not been able to do. Volume 2 appears to conform to the same plan, but with one crucial difference: the author's lack of respect for his subject is obvious . However, in the preface Monk also states that he is "conscious that other pictures could be drawn...

Russellian Propositions

Reviews 181 RUSSELLIAN PROPOSITIONS GIOVANNI DE CARVALHO Rua Adriano, 102/801 cob 20735-060 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil GIOVANNIDUARTE@UOL.COM.BR Guillermo Hurtado. Proposiciones Russellianas. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional AutonoIlla de Mexico, 1998. Pp. 337. $120.00 Mexican pesos. G iven its scope and the amount of problems with which it deals, this bO.:Jk is not an easy one. Hurtado assigned himself the job ofscrutinizing an old project Russell had plit aside under severe criticism from Wittgenstein. I'm talking about the 1913 manuscript of Theory ofKnowledge. Wittgenstein showed Russell that the theory of belief he presented in that manuscript was inconsistent . Hurtado was particularly intrigued by the fact that Russell was paralysed by Wittgenstein's famous objection. The problem was a hard one, he admitted, bur it could be resolved, given enough effort. Then why didn't Russell resolve it? Hurtado's inquietude led him to proceed with an investigation, which resulted in the writing of this book. The book provides a completely new and systematic account of Russell's early philosophy by focusing on its cornerstones: Russell's ideas of predication, propositional function and the proposition. Hurtado claims to have fullyexamined what Russell said about those subjects during the years 1900 through 1913, which are considered his most productive years. It turns out that these conceptions are far more profound and obscure than is currently supposed. His task was to examine them under a new light. The book has a hybrid nature, in which historical facts are mixed together with Hurtado's own philosophical insights into Russell's ideas. In spite of Hurtado's efforts to separate things, this way of exposing Russell's viewpoint in contrast to his own, in my opinion, may bring some confusion, and at times it is hard to tell whether he is elucidating what Russell said or stating his own 182 Reviews ideas about it. Hurtado divides the book into three parts, dealing respectively with (1) relations and predication; (2) denotation and propositional functions; and (3) descriptions, logical types and beliefs. In the epilogue he proposes what he claims to be his own contribution to "a neo-Russellian theory of predication". The first part of the book deals with relations and predication. It is currently accepted that Russell vigorously rejected the idea that all relations are internal. But Hurtado shows that neither Russell nor the idealists were very clear about what an internal relation is. It is against this background that Russell's doctrines of external relations must be understood. And what about Russell's conception of predication? Here Hurtado sees Russell subject to apparently antagonistic intuitions. On pages 84-5 of The Principles ofMathematics, Russell supports the intuition that the copula is not a relation but has a relational nature. In Chapter IV of the same book he says that predication is logically a relation but is not a relation. This means that Russell recognizes the relational nature ofpredication but cannot accommodate this view in the framework of his ontology. The problem remains offinding a substratum for predication, something that relates without being a relation. In the epilogue Hurtado proposes a way of doing it. The second part of the book deals with denotation and propositional functions . Hurtado is particularly intrigued by the fact that Russell's positions regarding propositional functions have always been ambivalent. It is true, he points out, that on occasions, in the Principles, Russell held the position that we have to take the notion of propositional function as primitive, but Hurtado thinks this position must be understood in the context of the Russellian logicist project in the Principles. To the specific ends of that project (mainly to reduce mathematics to formal logic without the theory of types), yes, we have to take the notion of propositional function as primitive. On the other hand, Russell also said many interesting things about propositional functions that go far beyond the necessities of the logicist project. If, according to Hurtado, we can find in the Principles the elements for a theory of propositional functions, then why did Russell say that we have to take this notion as primitive? Hurtado's interpretation is, in his own words, that "maybe Russell...

On Odell on Russell

82 Reviews ON ODELL ON RUSSELL RAy PERKINS Philosophy / Plymouth State College Plymouth, NH 03264-1600, USA PERKRK@EARTHLINK.NET S. Jack Odell. On Russell. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2000. Pp. 90. US$13.95 (pb). S Jack Odell has produced a book on Bertrand Russell's philosophy for • the Wadsworth Philosophers series under the general editorship of Daniel Kolak. It's no easy task to turn out a book on a philosopher of RusReviews 83 sell's complexity in 90 pages. But Odell has done it. The book undertakes to present the main ideas of Russell's philosophy, and to show their meaning by contrast with some of his philosophical contemporaries, including G. E. Moore, Peter Strawson and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It's a worthy undertaking, and Odell presents some good exposition and original critique. Unfortunately, there are several problems with the book, apart from the many typographical errors and erroneous references. One problem~perhaps inevitable in a brief introduction-is omission of- important material. For example, in his first chapter, "The Man", Odell never mentions the City College case nor any of the post-World War II activism--especially Russell's anti-nuclear efforts and his opposition to the war in Vietnam-that helped define his greatness as a man of practical wisdom and public conscience. Sometimes Odell's details are annoyingly inaccurate, as when he says Russell's fourth wife was "over thirty years" younger (she was actually 28 years younger) and that Russell served six months in prison (he served four and a half months). And sometimes when the details are accurate one wonders whether the emphasis is appropriate. For example, his first chapter is only eight pages long, but nearly three pages are devoted to Russell's love affairs (Ottoline Morrell and Helen Dudley) and to reflecting on his alleged psychological shortcomings, especially his "feelings of estrangement from others which bordered on the pathological". More seriously, Odell sometimes seems unaware of important Russellian doctrines. For example, his chapter on ethics begins: "His efforts to develop a theory of ethics are limited to two works, one early in his career, 'The Elements of Ethics' (19IO), based on, as he acknowledges, Moore's Principia Ethica, and one much later, Human Society in Ethics and Politics (1954)." Eight of the chapter's twelve pages are devoted to the first of these, which the author does a decent job of explicating. But he seems oblivious to the fact that Russell repudiated much of his objectivist ethics after 1913, and he completely omits any mention of Russell's subjectivist/emotivist views-according to which moral judgments are outside the realm of science and knowledgewhich dominated Russell's thinking in ethics for the intervening 40 years. From the title of Chapter 4, "The Scope and Limits of Knowledge", one might think that Russell's 1948 book, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, would be an important focus of the chapter, but it gets barely a mention. Instead Odell takes Russell's epistemic writings as a whole as supposedly revealing that Russell was an advocate of "epistemological scepticism"-there is no knowledge other than sense-data beliefs and analytic judgments---:and proceeds to examine this thesis in the light of Moore's attack in "Four Forms of Scepticism". Odell decides that Moore is unconvincing, but insists that Russell must be wrong because even the sceptic's claims must presuppose 84 Reviews knowledge of definitions (of what his words mean). But the whole exercise (three-fourths of the chapter), though clear and well developed, seems irrelevant to Russell's theory of knowledge. It's true that Russell and Moore differed over which propositions had the highest degree of certainty, but Russell was never· an epistemological sceptic in the sense that he was "forced to adopt Humian [sic] scepticism" (p. 54)· Even in The Problems ofPhilosophy (1912), which Odell cites as evidence of his alleged scepticism, Russell accepts a prio~i .non-demonstrative ?rinciples, !,nclu~i~,g the principle of induction, as provIdmg knowledge (albeIt less than certam) of things beyond experience, including physical objects. Th~ view expres~ed in My Philosophical Development (which Odell shows no eVidence of havmg consulted) is representative: "Everybody...

Russell the Political Theorist

Reviews 85 RUSSELL THE POLITICAL THEORIST PETER STONE Political Science / U. of Rochester Rochester, NY 14627, USA PRSE@TROI.CC.ROCHESTER.EDU Bart Schultz, ed. "The Social and Political Philosophy of Bertrand Russell", Parts 1-2. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 26 Gune, Sept. 1996): 157-266, 317-68. US$30 (the 2-issue set). Talent requires training in order to produce consistent strong performance . Indeed, without training of some sort, talent may not count for much. Michael Jordan might well have played basketball better than anyone else in history. Had he received no training or coaching at all, however, I 86 Reviews doubt that his extraordinary natural ability would have proven a match for the highly developed skills of even a mediocre NBA player. He might have excelled, but more likely there would have been a lot of variance, flashes of brilliant play surrounded by much that was commonplace, with an abundance of truly abysmal mistakes. Interestingly enough, this description also fits Bertrand Russell's career as a political theorist, and with good reason. The recent two-part symposium in Philosophy ofthe Social Sciences on "The Social and Political Philosophy of Bertrand Russell" demonstrates this fact. The contributors to this valuable symposium-an august group of philosophers and political scientists, several of whom are noted for previous work in Russell studies-address a varIety of issues relating to Russell's political theory and practice. Together, they paint a picture of a wildly intelligent and passionately concerned thinker who lacked the training for first-rate political thought. Russell, in short, could have used a good coach in political theory. Training, of course, is not an end in itself; possession of a doctorate in political theory is neither necessary nor sufficient for good work in the field. Rather, training has value because of what it imparts. Political theory, like most other human endeavours,I benefits from careful reflection on the nature of the activity, with an eye to eliminating mistakes and improving performance . In basketball, players study techniques leading to better dribbling, passing, and shooting; in political theory, practitioners consider the warrant for the various parts of the normative arguments they advance. In both cases, of course, the development of skill usually requires some sort of coach; no man is an island, and both political theorists and' basketball players need mentors to train them. But the best players and political theorists become "self-coaching", able to engage in critical reflection on their own work which will lead to improvements in the long run. Not everyone can become a Michael Jordan or a John Rawls, but virtually any player in any "sport" can do better through practice, provided that practice is accompanied by reflection as to what needs improvement. Over the course of his long life, Russell reflected upon and wrote about many topics, including mathematics, philosophy, and social and political affairs. He attacked the first two with a passion for precision, permitting neither himself nor others any sloppiness or lack of rigour. But despite an engagement with political affairs that lasted approximately 75 years,2 Russell I For a sustained defence of this conception of human activity, one that explicitly relies on the analogy with playing and coaching in sportS, see Eugene Meehan, The Thinking Game: a Guide to Effective Study (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1988). 2 I take Russell's interventions in politics to stare with the publication of his book German Social Democracy in 1896, and to end only with his death in 1970. 'Reviews 87 never gave political issues the sort of careful attention and painstaking analysis he devoted to epistemology, metaphysics, and mathematics. In short, he never became a self-coaching political theorist; and his work reflected this fact.3 Many people have noted this gap between Russell's technical philosophy and his political theory. Bart Schultz, the editor of the symposium (and one of the few political scientists not to ignore Russell), wrote in his introduction, "It is difficult ... to fit Russell together as a whole, to bring the life, the ethics, and the politics into easy relation with the analytic philosophy" (p. 158). Russell himself, however, would probably not have found this lack of...

Russell and the Boer War: from Imperialist to Anti-imperialist

cA"rticles RUSSELL AND THE BOER WAR: FROM IMPERIALIST TO ANTI-IMPERIALIST DAVID BLITZ Philosophy and Honors Program / Central Connecticut State U. New Britain, CT 06050, USA BLITZ@MAIL.CCSU.EDU· B ertrand Russell's philosophy of war and peace, like other aspects of his philosophy, underwent an evolution during the course of his long life, though his commitment to peace and his opposition to war, like his commitment to logic and his distaste for mysticism, was strongly held once it had been established.l How Russell's commitment to peace became established is the subject of this paper.2 For Russell was not always an opponent of war: at the outbreak of the Boer (or South African) War in 1899, Russell, then twenty-seven years of age, was a defender of British imperialism. But by the end of that war, Russell had abandoned this view and had shifted to an anti-imperialist and pro-peace stance which would characterize the rest of his life. My claim for this paper is the following: contrary to published views on the subject-both by Russell himself and one of his most able political biographersI Nonetheless, Russell's philosophy ofwar and peace, like his philosophy oflogic and mysticism, was not a simple one, since he took into account not only general principles, but also concrete circumstances. Although Russell's position was a basically pacifist one after the debate with Louis Couturat that is analyzed in this paper, he nonetheless was a supporter of the Second World War once it had broken out. Similarly, though his commitment to an analytic approach informed by logic was characteristic of all of his later work, he nonetheless had moments, such as the 190I experience discussed below, which he termed "mystical". 2. The editorial assistance of Kenneth Blackwell and the archival assistance of Carl Spadoni of the McMaster Archives were essential to the writing ofthis paper. russell: the Journal of Bemand Russell Studies McMaster Universicy Press n.s. 19 (winter 1999-2.000): 117-42. ISSN 0036-01631 118 DAVID BLITZ Russell's move away from liberal imperialism was neither the result of what has been referred to as his 1901 "conversion experience", nor a product oflater reflections on his part. Rather, it occurred in the course of Russell's debate with the French logician Louis Couturat during the year 1900. Not only was Russell unable to refute Couturat's pacifist arguments; but by his silence and lack of reply he acknowledged that Couturat had refuted Russell's own best efforts at defending imperialism and the rule of the most powerful. THE 1901 CONVERSION EXPERIENCE I will begin with a quotation from Russell's Autobiography, dealing with the well known 190I "conversion experience") On 10 February, having returned to the home of Alfred North Whitehead and his wife after attending a reading ofGilbert Murray's new translation ofa Greek play, Russell found Mrs. Whitehead in great pain, suffering from severe angina or a heart attack. Overwhelmed by her suffering, Russell went through what has been described as his "conversion experience": Suddenly the ground seemed to give way beneath me, and I found myself in quite another region. Within five minutes I went through some such reflections as the following: the loneliness of the human soul is unendurable; nothing can penetrate it except the highest intensity ofthe sort oflove that religious teachers have preached; whatever does not spring from this motive is harmful, or at best useless; itfollows that war is wrong, that a public school education is abominable , that the use of force is to be deprecated, and that in human relations one should penetrate to the core of loneliness in each person and speak to that. (Auto., I: 146; emphasis added) 3 Some commentators have situated the essence of the conversion experience in Russell's childhood loss ofhis parents, as Andrew Brink does in his Bertrand Russell: the Psychobiography ofa Moralist (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities P., 1989). Victor Lowe in his chapter on Russell in AlftedNorth Whitehead: the Man and His WOrk, Vol. I: 1861-1910 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. P., 1985) cited the psychoanalytic views of Dr. and Mrs. Bennett Simon, who argued that Russell...

Wittgenstein on Mind and Language (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 151 as the basis of descriptive functions, one-one relations as the basis of Russell's construction of cardinals, and serial relations as the basis, e.g., of progressions and the natural numbers--were particularly important in this phase. The author is also critical of how Russell's views in this phase have been misunderstood by Imre Lakatos and others. The empiricist phase, the author notes, was "marked by a retreat from the realism of subsistent being" that was characterisitic of the Platonist phase (49). It is also noted that Russell's construction in this phase of a neo-Leibnizian three-dimensional world of perspectives of sensibilia, some but not all of which are perceived by subjects, depends essentially on spatial and temporal relations. The modified empiricist phase, finally, is marked by the "the inescapable necessity of postulating inferred (or nonexperienced) entities"--namely, events--and the abandonment of the relational theory of sensation (56). It is in this phase that Russell adopts the doctrine of neutral monism. In Part II the author explains how the changes in Russell's theories of space and time are the "key" to the changes in his philosophy. Each of the four phases of development in Russell's philosophy are characterized by a different theory of space and time. The author traces these changes to Russell's "continuing efforts to provide an alternative to Kant" with respect to the need to bridge appearance and reality (~79). Just as Kant's philosophy is an attempt to reconcile British empiricism and Continental rationalism, Russell's philosophy is an attempt to reconcile empiricism and rationalism--but with rationalism based on the newly developing field of mathematical logic and the Kantian subject-predicate form replaced by relational propositions. Also, unlike Kant, Russell rejected the category of substance and denied that space, time, and relations are restricted to the phenomenal world of appearance. For Russell, qualities are subjective (secondary), but the relations between their instances correspond to the structure of the external world. Subjective space and time are correlated by Russell with different entities in the three post-idealist phases of his philosophy, resulting in this way in different theories of space and time and the bridge between appearance and reality. NINO B. COCCHIARELLA Indiana University David G. Stern. Wittgenstein on Mind and Language. Oxford University Press, 1995. PPxii + ~26. Cloth, $39"95Stern 's book is ferociously well-researched. Though it covers little of Wittgenstein's mature philosophy (from the time of the writing of Philosophical Investigations [PI] onward), it has much to offer, especially on what is sometimes Called Wittgenstein's "transitional" period (1929-c.1933), of which Stern may have given us a neardefinitive rendering. But one should note that Wittgenstein on Mind and Langauge is not exactly what it sounds like from the title; the research is not toward a philosophical account of Wittgenstein 's philosophy of language/mind. For in practice Stern's chief interest is figuring out the development of Wittgenstein's thoughts on topics in mind and language, not in offering/supporting the best available reading of his texts. In short, Stern's pretty- 159 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 35:1 JANUARY 1997 exhaustive Nachl~s-based research largely services a study of part of the temporal development of the man Wittgenstein's philosophical thought. While Stern clarifies parts of the early Wittgensteinian "system" (e.g., the highly, deliberately abstract conceptualization of "objects" in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicu~ [T L-P]), he often follows Wittgenstein in the one respect in which arguably one ought not to: in interpreting uncharitably his (own) work. Stern generally accepts at something like face-value the scorn heaped by Wittgenstein's later self on "the author of T L-P," failing to assess whether the letter of the text is guilty as charged. This is particularly problematic in that Wittgenstein repeatedly projected "positions" contemplated during his "transitional period" back onto"T L-P. I think Stern misses an opportunity here; one has to read between Stern's lines to see how tendentious much of Wittgenstein 's philosophical self-criticism is. Perhaps a deeper difficulty, and the one on which I concentrate in this review, is...

Het Ik En De Persoonsidentiteit In Russells Logisch Atomisme

(1997). The ‘I’ and Personal Identity in Russell's Logical Atomism. Bijdragen: Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 29-55.