Rule Of Recognition Research Articles

GROUND-BASED EXPERIMENTAL TESTING OF ELEMENTS OF AUTOMATION OF PNEUMATIC-HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS OF ROCKET AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY

The design and production of sophisticated technical systems, which include modern rockets and other aircraft, requires their reliability and trouble-free operation. To achieve the required level of reliability of aerospace products, a wide variety of test methods are applied at all stages of the life cycle. One of the most important systems of the launch vehicle is the pneumatic hydraulic power system of the liquid rocket propulsion system. Development of new and improvement of existing methods of control and diagnostics is one way of increasing the design and technological reliability of products of aviation and space technology. The use of functional diagnostics systems for bench and flight tests significantly increases the reliability and efficiency of space rocket technology. Researches are directed on increase of a level of reliability of products of aerospace branch. Application of systems of functional diagnostics is described at bench tests. The results of experimental researches of elements of automatics of pneumatic hydraulic power supply systems of liquid rocket engines are considered. The technique of processing of experimental data of a pulsing-acoustic method of diagnostics with use of the mathematical technology of recognition of images is presented. Deciding rules of recognition of a technical condition of object of diagnosing by results of tests are resulted. The developed method with a high degree of accuracy allows to determine the technical condition of the object of diagnosis as defective or to detect the presence of characteristic defects. Experimental testing and the proposed method of processing the results showed the efficiency of the method.

Mandatory Disclosure Level, Sports and Financial Performance of Brazilian Soccer Clubs

Purpose : The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the level of mandatory disclosure of Brazilian soccer clubs in order to verify the existence of a relationship between accounting disclosure, financial performance, and the clubs’ sporting performance. Methods : We employ a qualitative and quantitative research method by empirically developing a disclosure index. The data were collected on the websites of football clubs and their federations. The sample is composed of 76 Brazilian soccer clubs by belonging to the ranking list of the Brazilian Football Confederation. A multiple linear regression allowed investigating the relationship between the main variables of the study. Relevance : The work contributes to a discussion about the soccer performance and the conformity of the recognition, measurement, and disclosure of the accounting acts and facts of the Brazilian soccer clubs. These entities have become important sources of business and stakeholders are more interested in the transparency of their transactions. Results : There is a low adhesion of sports entities to the mandatory disclosure requirements. It was observed that of the 36 items of mandatory disclosure no club met 100% of the rules of publication, recognition, measurement, and disclosure accounting. While the average of all clubs was 33.8%, Clube de Regatas Flamengo and Sport Club Internacional reported 88.9% mandatory disclosure. Theoretical/methodological contributions : We find that the level of mandatory disclosure is positively related to the intangible asset, revenue, sports performance, locality of the club and the period of experience in disclosing the mandatory accounting items. Social Contributions : This analysis can provide insights that allow the stakeholder to observe the level of economic and sports organization of Brazilian football clubs, and the degree of commitment to transparency and governance

Mandatory Disclosure Level, Sports and Financial Performance of Brazilian Soccer Clubs

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the level of mandatory disclosure of Brazilian soccer clubs in order to verify the existence of a relationship between accounting disclosure, financial performance, and the clubs’ sporting performance.Methods: We employ a qualitative and quantitative research method by empirically developing a disclosure index. The data were collected on the websites of football clubs and their federations. The sample is composed of 76 Brazilian soccer clubs by belonging to the ranking list of the Brazilian Football Confederation. A multiple linear regression allowed investigating the relationship between the main variables of the study.Relevance: The work contributes to a discussion about the soccer performance and the conformity of the recognition, measurement, and disclosure of the accounting acts and facts of the Brazilian soccer clubs. These entities have become important sources of business and stakeholders are more interested in the transparency of their transactions.Results: There is a low adhesion of sports entities to the mandatory disclosure requirements. It was observed that of the 36 items of mandatory disclosure no club met 100% of the rules of publication, recognition, measurement, and disclosure accounting. While the average of all clubs was 33.8%, Clube de Regatas Flamengo and Sport Club Internacional reported 88.9% mandatory disclosure.Theoretical/methodological contributions: We find that the level of mandatory disclosure is positively related to the intangible asset, revenue, sports performance, locality of the club and the period of experience in disclosing the mandatory accounting items.Social Contributions: This analysis can provide insights that allow the stakeholder to observe the level of economic and sports organization of Brazilian football clubs, and the degree of commitment to transparency and governance

Constitutional Legal Relations and State Legal Relations: Peculiarities of the Methods of Implementation

The article investigates constitutional legal relations and state legal relations as legal relations united by the common subject of legal regulation and different in purposes and methods of legal regulation. Constitutional legal relations are considered as relations aimed at building the rule of law state, recognition, observance and protection of human rights and freedoms. State-legal relations are aimed primarily at the implementation of public interests. The author concludes that the result of formation of legal relations is significantly influenced by the applied methods of legal regulation. Constitutional legal relations are formed on the basis of the application of such methods as: 1) restriction of interference of public authorities in regulation of human rights and freedoms; 2) self-regulation on issues of own competence of constituent entities of the Russian Federation and bodies of local self-government; 3) the contractual method of regulation on matters falling within the joint competence; 4) delegation of exclusive powers to the lower level of public authority. State-legal relations differ due to the application of the following methods: 1) detailed regulation and restriction of human rights and freedoms in order to realize public interests; 2) legislative delegation of powers on issues of joint jurisdiction; 3) redistribution of powers in favor of the higher level of public authority.The development of constitutional and state-legal relations in modern legal reality is possible only in the context of competition of applied methods of legal regulation. The constitutional norm enforced mainly by state-legal methods is implemented in state-legal relations and excludes the construction of constitutional legal relations. The prevalence of state-legal methods can lead to the construction of pseudo-parallel constitutional legal relations, i.e. legal relations that do not affect the existing legal reality. On the contrary, the preferential application of constitutional and legal methods can be considered as a guarantee of impossibility of abuse of state legal methods in the process of enforcement of public interests.

Speech act theory and the rule of recognition

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I re-interpret Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition using the theoretical framework of J. L. Austin’s speech act theory, in particular by treating recognition, change and adjudication primarily in terms of acts, not rules. This re-interpretation elucidates why the phenomenon Hart called the ‘rule of recognition’ differs in kind from the rules of change and of adjudication, as it is not a fixed, pre-defined rule, as the latter are, but rather a paradigm-based judicial practice. The function of that practice is to recognise authoritatively both the sources and the content of individual legal rules. The proposed re-interpretation sheds a new light on the criterial nature of the rule of recognition, and elucidates why legal philosophers debate whether the rule of recognition is duty-imposing or power-conferring, as well as whether it is redundant to the rule of change or not.

Категория принципов в философии права Р. Дворкина

<p>В статье излагается анализ философии права Р. М. Дворкина (1931–2013), представителя англо-американской аналитической философско-правовой традиции. Категорию принципов Дворкин вводит как инструмент для критики правового позитивизма Г. Л. А. Харта (1907–1992) и как теоретическую базу своей правовой теории. Принципы, согласно Дворкину, являются правовой категорией и действуют наравне с нормами. Принципы относятся к более общему понятию «стандарты», так же, как и стратегии, поэтому для Дворкина важно разграничение принципов и стратегий. Принципы ориентируются на права, а стратегии на коллективную цель. Отличается понимание принципов Дворкиным и позитивистами, что влияет на определение пределов права.</p><p>Ссылаясь на хрестоматийные прецеденты, Дворкин показывает, что принципы обосновано входят в объем понятия права и доказывают несостоятельность подхода Харта: во-первых, его теории сложных дел, согласно которой судья в отсутствие нормы или ясной нормы, выносит решение, основанное на судейском усмотрении; во-вторых, трактовки права как открытой текстуры, которая может упускать из своего круга регулирования те или иные случаи, вследствие чего судья своим решением создает новые права и обязанности. В-третьих, через принципы Дворкин критикует норму признания — основополагающую норму или критерий, который определяет, что относится к праву, а что нет.</p>

Moralidade, legalidade e institucionalização: o debate Hart-Fuller

O artigo aborda o debate sobre o vínculo conceitual entre direito e moral travado a partir de 1958 entre dois grandes expoentes da teoria do direito no século XX: H. L. A. Hart e Lon Fuller. São focadas principalmente duas controvérsias. De um lado, Fuller defendeu a tese de que alguns princípios de legalidade compõem uma moralidade inerente ao direito, de caráter formal e procedimental. Hart argumentou que se tratava apenas de regras técnicas, sem caráter moral. De outra parte, foi colocada em jogo a teoria hartiana da regra de reconhecimento como uma regra social. Se, para Hart, tratava-se de uma forma de autodefinição do sistema jurídico como uma união de regras primárias e secundárias, para Fuller não há caráter jurídico, de regra, envolvido, por exemplo, no fato político da transição (revolucionária) de um sistema jurídico a outro.

In Defense of the Practice Theory

AbstractHart proposed that law is made possible by the practice among legal officials of observing conventional social rules, the most important being rules of recognition. This view has been dubbed the practice theory, and it has been attacked by many legal theorists. This paper argues that many criticisms of the practice theory fail because they misunderstand the nature of the organizational challenge to which rules of recognition are the solution. The challenge of constituting a legal system is essentially the challenge of constituting a group agent, and when viewed through Pettit’s account of group agency, the practice theory can easily be defended.

Evolutionary Legal Theory with A Brief Note on The Possible Subversive Character of Originalism

This paper has one main aim. It will sketch a theoretical framework for a descriptive account of legal change. The framework will identify some social facts as being relevant for a political or moral value-free enquiry about the law. The main contention will be that social conventions for identifying the sources of law, i.e., the hartian rule of recognition, are not enough for a proper understanding of legal phenomena. Thus, other conventions should be taken into account. The paper will end with a brief note on how, according to the theoretical framework sketched in the first section, it is possible that originalist doctrines of constitutional interpretation may be rather subversive of a certain legal culture. Despite its official justification of keeping the law as it is, originalism may be, in certain contexts, an invitation for a radical change in the legal system.

Constitutional Statutes—Roots and Recognition

Abstract Sir John Laws, the originator of the principle of constitutional statutes, suggests that the protection accorded to them has its roots in the protection from implied repeal given to the European Communities Act 1972 and to constitutional fundamentals. We argue that this suggestion is more convincing with regard to the latter than it is with the former. Further, we contend that founding constitutional statutes on the protection afforded to constitutional fundamentals rather than the 1972 Act may provide a stronger basis for the principle of such statutes if the United Kingdom leaves the European Union. We then provide evidence that the idea of constitutional statutes has been accepted across the three arms of state and argue that, as a consequence, the rule of recognition may be taken to have changed to encompass the amendment to the implied repeal rule that such statutes represent.

Popular sovereignty facing the deep state. The rule of recognition and the powers of the people

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the relationship between the idea of popular sovereignty and the conditions for legal validity and argue that the latter imposes definitive limits to the former. Popular sovereignty has been defined as the condition when the will of the people is the “supreme authority in the state”. Following this conception, there is no authority above the people and this is traditionally understood to mean that the authority of the people is above the constitution. Legal validity, though admittedly still debated, is here understood along Hart's “rule of recognition” According to which the validity of norms ultimately depends on the social practices of public officials. Though presumably uncontroversial that democratic peoples are entitled to remake the constitution, the powers of the people with respect to the substance of the law are nevertheless limited with respect to decisions of legal validity. The most basic rules in a legal system are not found in the constitution as they are the rules deciding what is to count as a legal norm within that system. They are more fundamental than the constitution because they also define what norms is the constitution legally speaking.

Power-Conferring Laws and the Rule of Recognition

As every reader of THE CONCEPT OF LAW is aware, H.L.A. Hart severely criticized John Austin for failing to take account of the operativeness of power-conferring laws in legal systems. Given the trenchancy of Hart’s animadversions on Austin’s disregard of power-conferring norms, it is surprising that Hart himself omitted to take account of such norms at some key junctures in his theorizing. Quite a few examples of his neglect of power-conferring norms could be adduced here, but –- to keep this paper within the prescribed word limit –- I will confine myself to one especially important instance. After doing so, I will explore how the power-conferring aspect of the Hartian Rule of Recognition has been denied or obscured by many present-day legal philosophers. Though the Rule of Recognition does impose duties, it also confers powers; it authorizes as well as obligates legal-governmental officials to ascertain the law of their jurisdiction in accordance with certain prescribed criteria. In the final few sections of this paper, I will maintain that some recent objections to Hart’s conception of the Rule of Recognition are misconceived precisely because they disregard the hybrid character of the Rule of Recognition as both duty-imposing and power-conferring. This paper has been written for an Oxford symposium on the work of John Gardner. As my citations will suggest, some of the arguments advanced in this paper align me with positions taken by Gardner, whereas other arguments herein are opposed to Gardner’s stances.

Two Views of the Rule of Recognition

Two Views of the Rule of Recognition

On legal things to do: external and internal legal reasons

The normativity of law is usually discussed by reference to the concept of reasons for action. Legal philosophers frequently avoid referring to the dispute among different conceptions of reasons in moral philosophy. This paper briefly presents basic positions in this dispute (distinguishing motivating and justificatory reasons, and the dispute between internalism, counterfactual internalism, and externalism). Brian Bix appears to adopt the internalist stance. The paper argues that internalism is not able to explain the normativity of law, since legal reasons are objective and external, as they do not depend on actual knowledge and motivation of the agent. A specific problem arises with respect to the rules of recognition. If the rule of recognition is a duty-imposing rule, the reasons for the official to follow this rule must be internal. It is argued that the rule of recognition is not a legal rule and the obligation to follow it is not a legal obligation.

Where did the Donoghue v. Stevenson Decision Come From? A Jurisprudential Inquiry

Is the concept of law primarily about taking rights seriously or a sociological process which produces a rule of recognition? Are Judges either Herberts or Hercules or they are simply consciously looking out to enforce values that have gone through the washing machine and consequently seeking stability, certainty, and following precedents? When judges depart from this role how far should they go creating new forms of rights even if that will disturb the natural order of society? The UK Supreme Court decision in Donoghue v. Stevenson was a landmark precisely because it extended the boundaries of torts and contract law; completely upending the principles of privity of contract and the traditional conception of the torts of negligence. In this essay, I will attempt to use Hartian ‘rules of recognition’ and Dworkinian ‘principles’ to explain how the Law Lords navigated the strict structures of legalism to arrive at a very fundamental ‘neighborliness principle’ that continues to be expanded so long as there is an established duty of care; a breach of that duty; and injury suffered.

Crowdsourcing-based semantic relation recognition for natural language questions over RDF data

ABSTRACT Natural language query systems over RDF data need to rely on the semantic relations in query. First, we propose the new crowdsourcing model that used to produce semantic relations dataset. The model not only inherits completeness of the iterative model and accuracy of the parallel model, but also saves human resources. Second, we mine the rules of semantic relation recognition from the correlations between dependency structures and semantic relations. Third, we propose an algorithm of semantic relation recognition for natural language query over RDF data, and experiments demonstrate that it can recognize more semantic relations than existing methods.

Constitutional Design, Rule of Law and Mutual Recognition in the Czech Republic

Constitutional Design, Rule of Law and Mutual Recognition in the Czech Republic

Literature as Law? The Confucian Classics as Ultimate Sources of Law in Traditional China

This paper argues for the idea of “literature as law” in the Chinese context. It looks at Han dynasty jurisprudence and examines the use of the Confucian Classics as sources of law. Because the Chinese tradition had a broader understanding of “literature” than the West, these Confucian Classics are understood as literary works and as literary works that functioned as sources of law. In some cases, they even functioned as ultimate sources of legal validity, overriding positive, dynastic law. The Confucian Classics can thus be understood, in Hartian terms, as a “rule of recognition” in the traditional Chinese legal system.

Purification and Identification of Naturally Presented MHC Class I and II Ligands.

The large-scale and in-depth identification of MHC class I- and II-presented peptides is indispensable for gaining insight into the fundamental rules of immune recognition as well as for developing innovative immunotherapeutic approaches against cancer and other diseases. In this chapter we briefly review the existing strategies for the isolation of MHC-restricted peptides and provide a detailed protocol for the immunoaffinity purification of MHC class I- and II-presented peptides from primary tissues or cells.

Non-Lewisian Conventionalism and Law

Despite the multi-dimensional criticism leveled at his theory, David Lewis is still considered the philosopher who laid the groundwork for our modern understanding of the nature of conventions. This paper presents a radically non-Lewisian approach to conventions, viz. that of Ruth G. Millikan, and argues that Millikan’s conventionalism has more explanatory power than Lewis’s when applied to legal conventions. I first present the main tenets of Millikanian conventionalism, and in particular, the notion that conventions are behaviors reproduced in a community and based on a leader-follower model. I then focus on six points of comparison between the Lewisian and Millikanian approaches to conventions, and show that Millikan: (1) proves that conventions are precedent-based, not rule-based; (2) recognizes that the arbitrariness of conventions is gradated; (3) contends that universal adherence to conventions is not necessary, and that compliance-dependence is not a factor when deciding to follow conventions; and (4) argues that their primary function is not to ensure co-ordination, but to enable information that cannot be derived by observing the natural world to be extracted. I also present (5) Millikan’s convincing arguments for the immanent normativity of conventions, and (6) the unique ability of her theory to explain the mechanism of conventional change. This paper concludes by stating that Millikan’s conventionalism is better suited to serving jurisprudential needs than Lewis’s, and that it is particularly useful in explaining the conventional nature of the Hartian rule of recognition.