Rule Of Recognition Research Articles

HIV Type 1 Env Precursor Cleavage State Affects Recognition by Both Neutralizing and Nonneutralizing gp41 Antibodies

HIV-1 is relatively resistant to antibody-mediated neutralization; however, rare antibodies to the exterior envelope glycoprotein, gp120, and the transmembrane glycoprotein, gp41, can neutralize a broad array of isolates. Two antibodies, 2F5 and 4E10, are directed against the gp41 membrane proximal external region (MPER); however, the kinetic neutralization signature of these antibodies remains unresolved. Previously, we reported that the fully cleaved, cell surface envelope glycoproteins (Env) derived from the primary isolate, JR-FL, are well recognized exclusively by gp120-directed neutralizing ligands and not by nonneutralizing gp120 antibodies. However, the gp120 nonneutralizing antibodies can recognize HIV spikes that are rendered fully cleavage defective by site-directed mutagenesis. Here, we extended such analysis to gp41 neutralizing and nonneutralizing antibodies and, relative to the rules of gp120-specific antibody recognition, we observed marked contrasts. Similar to gp120 recognition, the nonneutralizing gp41 cluster 1 or cluster 2 antibodies bound much more efficiently to cleavage-defective spikes when compared to their recognition of cleaved spikes. In contrast to gp120 neutralizing antibody recognition, the broadly neutralizing gp41 antibodies 2F5 and 4E10, like the nonneutralizing gp41 antibodies, did not efficiently recognize the predominantly cleaved, primary isolate JR-FL spikes. However, if the spikes were rendered cleavage defective, recognition by both the neutralizing and nonneutralizing ligand markedly increased. CD4 interaction with the cleaved spikes markedly increased recognition by most nonneutralizing gp41 antibodies, whereas such treatment had a minimal increase of 2F5 and 4E10 recognition. These data indicate again the profound influence that cleavage imposes on the quaternary packing of primary isolate spikes and have important implications for soluble trimer candidate immunogens.

Uncertainty in the Rule of Recognition and in the Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty

Uncertainty in the Rule of Recognition and in the Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty

Secondary Rules of Recognition and Relative Legality in Transnational Regimes

Understanding the nature and contours of transnational legality is an important challenge, as it may bear on the place that transnational law should be given within the existing frameworks of public and private international law. This article discusses three questions, which have emerged in the field of international arbitration and are primarily of a philosophical nature, that help us understand certain aspects of transnational legality: (1) What is the role of social conventions among international adjudicators for the development of transnational regimes? (2) What are the ethical considerations connected to the recognition as law of one or several transnational arbitral regimes? (3) What are the legal consequences of the recognition as law of one or several transnational arbitral regimes? These three questions shed light on the nature and role of secondary rules of recognition in transnational regimes and on the distinction between relative legality (what a legal system considers to be law, its own or that of other systems) and absolute legality (what a neutral observer considers to be law).

Farewell to the Rule of Recognition?

I will argue that the rule of recognition, as it has been conceived by Hart, is either a redundant, and hence mostly useless, concept, or a concept with limited explanatory potential —in either case, at best a concept whose scope is, in contemporary legal systems, much narrower than Hart envis- aged. I will also argue that the rule of recognition, in one of its possible (and plausible) reformulations, can nevertheless play a significant, non-redundant role, but only if employed in a rather different way than the one proposed by Hart, as well as by much of post-Hartian positivist literature Resumen: En este artículo se argumenta que la regla de reconocimiento, tal como fuera concebida por Hart, es o bien un concepto redundante —y en consecuencia inútil— o un concepto limitado en su poder explicativo. En cualquier caso, se trata de un concepto cuyo alcance es, frente a los sistemas jurídicos contemporáneos, mucho más estrecho de lo que Hart pudo imaginar. De igual modo se argumenta que la regla de reconocimiento, en alguna de sus posibles (y plausibles) reformulaciones, puede tener a pesar de todo un papel significativo y no redundante, pero solamente si se emplea en un sentido radicalmente distinto al que propuso Hart o que se propone en buena parte de la literatura positivista posthartiana.

Between Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda? Customary International (Criminal) Law and the Principle of Legality

International courts serve an important function in finding and interpreting existing law, but as noted already forty years ago the focal problem of international courts is that: “the borderlines between interpretation of existing law and the making of new law are inevitably fluid.” Particularly in interpreting customary international law the courts face situations which call for innovative methods in determining the definition and the scope of the law. International criminal law has only recently grown more coherently codified, but still bears much on customary law elements, unlike some other fields of public international law, in which rules have been quite thoroughly codified. Additionally, in criminal law issues such as foreseeability, and non-retroactivity, to mention a few, ought to be given a high credence, or the reason that it is the liberty of an individual that is at stake. In discovering and applying customary international law, international criminal courts are confronted with the balancing exercise between following positivist approach – attaching itself to law as it is, as enacted or adopted by an authority, and may lead to an undesired, even unjust outcome in criminal trials – and natural law approach – arising from inherent rights and duties regardless of their formal recognition, and may risk the violation of the principle of legality. Principle of legality determines the limits of the law-making process and encompasses norms that legal rules must adhere to, such as clarity, promulgation and non-retroactivity.The question arises, how can the courts preserve the principle of legality, and especially the prohibition of retroactive effect of law, in interpreting – and in formulating – customary international law in a progressive manner. Should the principle of legality be applied liberally in order to bring perpetrators to justice, or is strict application necessary in criminal courts, even at the cost of some impunity? This paper analyses how these two aspects should be balanced and reconciled against one another in discovering, interpreting, and applying customary international law, with reflections on theories of H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller – the two influential proponents of modern positivist and natural legal thought, respectively – and recent case-law of international courts in fields of international criminal law and human rights law. Also, Hart‟s primary and secondary rules, and rule of recognition are considered in the determination of what may count as customary international law. First, I consider the principle of legality and its importance in the formation of law – with emphasis on customary international law, followed analysis of its link to morality and the concepts of lex lata and lex ferenda. I have included a brief discussion on the application of primary and secondary rules and rule of recognition in the formation of (customary) international law. Finally, I analyze selected recent court decisions which deal with international crimes and the principle of legality, with the aim of reflecting on the above issues.

DNA recognition and the precleavage state during single-stranded DNA transposition in D. radiodurans

Bacterial insertion sequences (ISs) from the IS200/IS605 family encode the smallest known DNA transposases and mobilize through single-stranded DNA transposition. Transposition by one particular family member, ISDra2 from Deinococcus radiodurans, is dramatically stimulated upon massive γ irradiation. We have determined the crystal structures of four ISDra2 transposase/IS end complexes; combined with in vivo activity assays and fluorescence anisotropy binding measurements, these have revealed the molecular basis of strand discrimination and transposase action. The structures also show that previously established structural rules of target site recognition that allow different specific sequences to be targeted are only partially conserved among family members. Furthermore, we have captured a fully assembled active site including the scissile phosphate bound by a divalent metal ion cofactor (Cd²(+)) that supports DNA cleavage. Finally, the observed active site rearrangements when the transposase binds a metal ion in which it is inactive provide a clear rationale for metal ion specificity.

Nationhood and Law in the Hebrew Bible

This paper continues the analysis of political theory in the Hebrew Bible. The Book of Exodus identifies nationhood as the best form of political organization. Nationhood, in turn, requires self-government, centralized institutions, and control over territory. The narrative of Mount Sinai addresses the topic of centralized institutions. The author here distinguishes and insightfully analyzes four types of legal institution: the fundamental commitment, the rule of recognition, fundamental law, ordinary law, and rules pertaining to the organization of government.

Student understanding of the direction of the magnetic force on a charged particle

We study student understanding of the direction of the magnetic force experienced by a charged particle moving through a homogeneous magnetic field in both the magnetic pole and field line representations of the magnetic field. In five studies, we administer a series of simple questions in either written or interview format. Our results indicate that although students begin at the same low level of performance in both representations, they answer correctly more often in the field line representation than in the pole representation after instruction. This difference is due in part to more students believing that charges are attracted to magnetic poles than believing that charges are pushed along magnetic field lines. Although traditional instruction is fairly effective in teaching students to answer correctly up to a few weeks following instruction, especially for the field line representation, some students revert to their initial misconceptions several months after instruction. The responses reveal persistent and largely random sign errors in the direction of the force. The sign errors are largely nonsystematic and due to confusion about the direction of the magnetic field and the execution and choice of the right-hand rule and lack of recognition of the noncommutativity of the cross product.

Self Determination vs. Rule of Recognition

Self Determination vs. Rule of Recognition

Reguły prawne jako istota pojęcia prawa w ujęciu H.L.A. Harta

H.L.A. Hart is considered the most famous 20th century legal positivism philosopher. The main ideas of Hart’s conception of law are: the concept of legal rules and the distinction between an internal and external point of view of law. Hart defi nes the law as the concept of primary and secondary rules. The most important of the secondary rules is the rule of recognition which is used to examined and defi ne the rules as the legal ones. The Ronald Dworkin’s critic of Hart’s conception of law makes the other agree that rules are the main core of law but there are other norms present in legal system-principles. The question is: is this – even revised – concept of law the best defi nition of legal practice? Does the appliance of law refl ects this concept of law or the most important to understand this process is the culture of law and the political morality that develop principles?

The Rules of DNA Recognition by the Androgen Receptor

The androgen receptor (AR) and glucocorticoid, progestagen, and mineralocorticoid receptors all recognize classical DNA response elements that are organized as inverted repeats of 5'-AGAACA-3'-like motifs with a three-nucleotide spacer. Next to such elements, the AR also recognizes a second type of androgen response element (ARE), the so-called selective AREs, which resemble more the direct repeats of the same hexamer. In this work, we show that not only the AR but also the progestagen receptor can recognize the selective AREs, whereas neither glucocorticoid nor mineralocorticoid receptor can. Recently, genomic AR-binding fragments have been postulated to contain AR-binding sites that diverge considerably from the classical ARE consensus. Extensive mutational analyses of these candidate motifs, however, reinstalls the values of the consensus sequence for the AREs as mentioned above, the importance of their dimeric nature and the presence of exactly three-nucleotide spacing. We developed a position-specific probability matrix that was used to predict with higher accuracy new AREs in different AR-binding regions. So far, all AR-binding genomic fragments that were analyzed contain AREs defined as receptor-dimer binding motifs with the ability to confer responsiveness to a reporter gene.

A Concise Interpretation of Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law

The principal value of the pure theory of law is that it presents the subject of its study, that is, positive law such as it is, without any unfamiliar additions. It is not only that the methodological doctrine of great heuristic possibilities is in question, but system learning as well that within its investigations ends to embrace the universal legal order interwoven in the composition of which are certain ideas of natural law all contained in many international law documents of general or regional character. Thus, the pure theory of law of Hans Kelsen, regardless of its principled negative relation towards the natural law teaching, starting exactly from the attitude that law must be presented such as it is, is forced, whether it wants to or not, also to deal with the study of the corresponding contents of natural law, which in present times under the name “human rights make an essential integral part of the existing international law. One cannot say that Hans Kelsen was totally wrong in classifying law as pure and impure. H.L.A. Hart, a later positivist, though criticized Kelsen to some extent for the exclusion of “alien elements,” derived the rule of recognition from Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. Hart viewed the concept of rule of recognition as an evolution from Kelsen's Grundnorm. Kelsen’s pure theory of Law had a far reaching impact on the later positivists like Tony Honore and Hart. Kelsen made original, striking and valuable contribution to jurisprudence and he considerably influenced the modern legal thought.

Marketing/Sales Students Understanding Of What Counts As Sales

Improper sales revenue recognition is the single largest issue contributing to financial restatements. Understanding and applying the rules of sales revenue recognition is not just an accounting problem; it is a marketing problem, too. Thus, it is important that the sales force has a basic understanding of the rules of sales recognition and be aware of when they should seek advice from accounting on the details of sales agreements. Unfortunately, most marketing and sales curricula neither expose nor alert students to sales revenue recognition issues and the resulting ethical, financial, legal and marketing consequences of improper revenue recognition. Such students, after joining the workforce, may pursue certain marketing goals, strategies and tactics which may lead them unknowingly to engage in unethical and/or illegal practices. Our findings based on a survey of 300 undergraduate students highlight the deficiencies in their understanding of what counts as sales. The survey used real cases where SIC found that misreporting of sales has occurred.

Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism*

AbstractIn this essay, I characterize the original intervention that became Inclusive Legal Positivism, defend it against a range of powerful objections, explain its contribution to jurisprudence, and display its limitations and its modest jurisprudential significance. I also show how in its original formulations ILP depends on three notions that are either mistaken or inessential to law: the separability thesis, the rule of recognition, and the idea of criteria of legality. The first is false and is in event inessential to legal positivism. The second is inessential to legal positivism. The third is likely inessential to law. I then characterize the central claim of ILP in a way that relies on none of these: ILP is the claim that necessarily social facts determine the determinants of legal content. I show that ILP so conceived leaves the central debates in law largely untouched. I suggest how the most fundamental of these—the question of the normativity of law—at least can be usefully addressed. The essay closes by suggesting that even though one can distinguish the social from the normative dimensions of law, a theory of the nature of law is necessarily an account of the relationship between the two: It is a theory either of the difference that certain distinctive social facts make in normative space, or it is an account of the distinctive normative difference that law makes, and the social and other facts that are necessary to explain that difference. One can distinguish between but one cannot separate the social from the normative aspects of legality.

The rule of law beyond the state: Failures, promises, and theory

Resorting to the “ rule of law ” within the traditional environment of international law generates diffi culties, especially when circumstances require us to square the circle by accommodating normative claims with state legal orders, fundamental rights, and democracy. Unsurprisingly, in recent cases brought before supranational courts, such as the European Court of Justice (Kadi and Al Baarakat, for example), or domestic courts, such as the United States Supreme Court (Hamdan, for example), the import and notion of the rule of law have been interpreted in ways that reveal the uncertainty surrounding the concept and the rather idiosyncratic or instrumental uses to which it is put. Through the analysis of such instances, this article proposes a restatement of the rule of law that better explains its use beyond state borders. Then, it shows how the relation between different orders, as a factual matter, does not obey some monist hierarchy and does not even refl ect the logic of the “ dualism ” of self-contained systems. Given that the autonomy of legal orders is a vital contemporary reality, confrontation between them and with international law appears to be replacing the formal primacy of sources as well as blind or dogmatic closure by content-dependent constitutional assessments. In this connection, a road taken in the European environment shows that communicative pluralism can embark on a practice of giving reasons inherently capable of producing common standards, the rule of law, and thin lines of principle. All of these factors are ingredients that might fi nally evolve further into a rule of recognition for the international legal order.

Legality Policies and Theories of Legality: From Bananas to Radbruch's Formula*

Abstract. In this paper I shall take an inferential approach to legality (legal validity), and consider how the legality of a norm can be inferred, and what can be inferred from it. In particular, I shall analyse legality policies, namely, conditionals conferring the quality of legality upon norms having certain properties, and I shall examine to what extent such conditionals need to be positivistic, so that legality is only dependant on social facts. Finally, I shall consider how legality is transmitted from norm to norm and whether the ultimate legality policies (the rules of recognition) of a legal system need to be constituted by social facts.

Who Needs Rules of Recognition?

I argue against the idea (made popular by H.L.A. Hart) that the key to legal system is its of I argue that much of the work allegedly done by rule of recognition is either done by different kind of secondary rule (what Hart called a rule of change) or it is not done at all (and doesn't have to be done). A rule of change tells us the procedures that must be followed and the substantive conditions that must be satisfied if law is to be changed legislatively; and judge recognizes changes simply by using this checklist. In common law, there is no clear rule of change (because we are profoundly ambivalent about judicial lawmaking). But we get by without one, and without determinate rule of recognition that would tell us precisely how to infer rules from precedents. It is quite liberating, really, to abandon the idea of rule of recognition. Apart from anything else, it relieves us from having to participate in endless debates about whether the US Constitution is (or contains) rule of recognition for American law. The Constitution contains rules of change; that's what matters.

Russell's Paradox and Legal Positivism

In 1902, Bertrand Russell overturned set theory, which aspired to reduce all sets to their rules of recognition. These rules were to have logical priority to empirical sets posited by empirical human beings. As a result of Russell's Paradox, set theory gave up the hope of theorizing sets. This paper claims Russell's Paradox can be applied directly to jurisprudence. The result is that legal positivism (carefully defined as the claim that law can be reduced to rules of recognition) is invalid and must be abandoned. The corollary to this proposition is that law cannot be entirely separated from morality.

The Structure of Social Practices and the Connection between Law and Morality*

AbstractIn his work, Jules Coleman has held that the rule of recognition, if conceived of as a shared cooperative activity, should be the gateway through which to incorporate moral constraints on the content of law. This analysis, however, leaves unanswered two important questions. For one thing, we do not know when or even why morality becomes a criterion of legality. And, for another thing, we still do not know what conception of morality it is that we are dealing with. In this article, we will attempt to clarify in greater depth what relations there are between the social practice of law and morality. We will thus see how the cooperative nature of social practices imbues law with a moral force, and how this makes it possible to establish a “weak” connection between law and morality: To see this, we will need to single out some basic features of cooperative social practices, thus setting out a suitable framework for the view just mentioned.

The Concept of 'Law' in Global Administrative Law

What constitutes ‘law’ in the efflorescent field of ‘global administrative law’? This article argues for a ‘social fact’ conception of law, emphasizing sources and recognition criteria, but it extends this Hartian positivism to incorporate requirements of ‘publicness’ in law. ‘Publicness’ is immanent in public law in national democratic jurisprudence, and increasingly in global governance, where it applies to public entities rather than to identifiable global publics. Principles relevant to publicness include the entity's adherence to legality, rationality, proportionality, rule of law, and some human rights. This article traces the growing use of publicness criteria in practices of judicial-type review of the acts of global governance entities, in requirements of reason-giving, and in practices concerning publicity and transparency. Adherence to requirements of publicness becomes greater, the less the entity is able to rely on firmly established sources of law and legal recognition. ‘Private ordering’ comes within this concept of law only through engagement with public institutions. While there is no single unifying rule of recognition covering all of GAL, there is a workable concept of law in GAL.