Rule Of Recognition Research Articles

10.2307/3505051

Inclusive positivists subscribe to the Incorporation Thesis, according to which it is conceptually possible for a legal system to have a rule of recognition that incorporates moral norms. Joseph Raz counters that inclusive positivism is inconsistent with the nature of authority. This influential critique depends on a number of controversial theses about the nature of authority and legal systems. Most conspicuous among these are the Authority Thesis, which asserts that every conceptually possible legal system claims authority, and the Preemption Thesis, which asserts that authority figures (or ought to figure) into practical deliberations by replacing the subject's evaluation of the balance of reasons. In this essay, I challenge an underlying assumption of the Razian critique also depends on a thesis that has gone largely unchallenged in the literature: according to the Instantiation Thesis, law cannot sincerely claim authority unless it is capable of instantiating authority. I argue that this seemingly plausible thesis is false, in part, because there is widespread disagreement among legal officials about what authority is.

The Synthesis of Novel Macrocycles, Part V. The Coumarin Crown Ethers and Cation Binding with Fluorescence Spectra

The 4-H, 4-methyl and 4-phenyl derivatives of benzo-α-pyrone of 12-crown-4 and 15-crown-5 were synthesised starting from 4-substituted-6,7-dihydroxy- and 7,8-dihydroxybenzo-α-pyrones which reacted with dichloropolyethylene glycols in DMF/water/alkali carbonate. The coumarin-macrocycles were identified by elemental analysis, IR, EI-GC-MS as well as 1H, 13C NMR spectroscopy. The full experimental and spectral data is reported along with ion binding data studied in acetonitrile using fluorescence spectroscopy. The binding of the fluorogenic coumarin-crowns with Li+, Na+ and K+ were recognized as specific alterations on their fluorescence spectra that strongly originated from the structures. The observed CEQFS depending on the bound cation radii and macrocycle size evidenced the rules of cationic recognition of macrocycles. Some 15-crown-5 derivatives exhibited interesting Li+ and Na+ binding selectivities.

3DFS: 3D Flexible Searching System for Lead Discovery ? New Version 1.2

3DFS is a 3D flexible searching system for lead discovery. Version 1.0 of 3DFS was published recently (Wang, T.; Zhou, J. J. Chem. Inf. Comput. Sci., 1998, 38, 71-77). Here version 1.2 represents a substantial improvement over version 1.0. There are six major changes in version 1.2 compared to version 1.0. 1. A new rule of aromatic ring recognition. 2. The inclusion of multiple-type atoms and chains in queries. 3. The inclusion of more spatial constraints, especially the directions of lone pairs. 4. The improvement of the query file format. 5. The addition of genetic search for flexible search. 6. An output option for generating MOLfiles of hits. Besides the above, this paper supplies: 1. More query examples. 2. A comparison between genetic search and Powell optimization. 3. More detailed comparison between 3DFS and Chem-X. 4. A preliminary application of 3DFS to K+ channel opener studies.

Legal Pluralism as Evolutionary Achievement of Community Law

After the Maastricht and Amsterdam Conferences the European Union can no longer be conceived as an intergovernmental arrangement: It is a polity founded on an “overlapping consensus.” Consequently, to reconstruct the relations between national and Community law, legal monism does not work, neither in its statist, nor in its international version: Legal pluralism is needed, not in a sociological‐descriptive sense, but as a normative criterion by which a judge (and a citizen) must refer to many and various sources of law to settle a dispute. Legal pluralism, however, can operate only under a rule of recognition: a common normative framework within which a reasonable number of sources can be handled. What Europe needs, therefore, is an interactionist constitution, which should emerge through an “open‐ended”discursive process.

WALUCHOW’S DEFENSE OF INCLUSIVE POSITIVISM

In “The Model of Rules I,”1 Ronald Dworkin argues that judges are often bound by principles that do not derive their authority from having been formally promulgated by a judge or legislature in accordance with a rule of recognition. But, on Dworkin’s view, the existence of such principles is inconsistent with positivism’s pedigree thesis, according to which propositions are legally valid solely in virtue of having been promulgated in accordance with a rule of recognition. Thus, Dworkin concludes that positivism is false.

The Separation Thesis and the Limits of Interpretation

There are many versions of legal positivism; perhaps as many as there are legal positivists around. All the versions of legal positivism, however, subscribe to the so-called Separation Thesis. This thesis basically maintains that detenriining what the law is, does not necessarily, or conceptually, depend on moral or other evaluative considerations about what it ought to be in the relevant circumstances. Legal positivists differ, however, and quite substantially, over the appropriate interpretation of this thesis. The so-called ‘strong’, or ‘exclusive’ version of legal positivism maintains that moral considerations never determine the legal validity of norms. ‘Soft’ positivists, on the other hand, do maintain that there is a close relation between legal validity and morality, but they hold that this relation is, at best, a contingent matter; it does not derive from the nature of law or legal reasoning as such. Soft-positivists claim that moral considerations determine legal validity only in certain cases, namely, in those cases which follow from the rules of recognition that happen to prevail in a given legal system.

Legal Conventionalism

There are two questions I would like to address in this article. The first and main question is whether there are rules of recognition, along the lines suggested by H.L.A. Hart. The second question concerns the age-old issue of the autonomy of law. One of the main purposes of this article is to show how these two issues are closely related. The concept of a social convention is the thread holding these two points tightly knit in one coil. Basically, I will argue that a novel account of social conventions can be employed to reestablish Hart's thesis about the rules of recognition, and that this same account shows why, and to what extent, law is partly an autonomous practice.

Realism, Hard Positivism, and Conceptual Analysis

The American Legal Realists, as I read them, are tacit legal positivists: they presuppose views about the criteria of legality that have affinities with positivist accounts of law in the sense that they employ primarily pedigree tests of legal validity. Ever since Ronald Dworkin's well-known critique of H.L.A. Hart's positivism a generation ago, however, it has been hotly contested whether there is anything about positivism as a legal theory that requires that tests of legal validity be pedigree tests. So-called Soft or Inclusive versions of positivism are willing to relax the restrictions on the content of a Rule of Recognition to admit non-pedigree criteria of legal validity; Hard or Exclusive versons of positivism deny that such a move is compatible with the central commitments of positivism. Hard Positivism, of which Joseph Raz has been the leading proponent, thus competes with various Soft Positivisms, defended by, among others, Coleman, Lyons, Soper, Waluchow, and now, explicitly, Hart himself in the “Postscript.” If the Realists are positivists, as I claim, then it cannot be the case that Soft Positivism is a genuinely positivistic doctrine. But there is more at stake here than just labels. Realist arguments for the indeterminacy of law—arguments central to the whole Realist enterprise—depend crucially on their tacit Hard Positivism. If, in fact, positivism has a more relaxed view of the criteria of legality than Hard Positivism supposes, then Realist arguments depend on unsound tacit premises about legal validity. What is at stake, then, is not whether Realists should be called (tacit) “Positivists” or merely (tacit) “Hard Positivists,” but whether their underlying view of the criteria of legality is sound. It can only be so if the best arguments favor Hard Positivism.

Legal Principles and Legal Theory

Current legal theory is concerned with the presence of principles in law partly because they are at the core of Dworkin's criticisms of Hart's rule of recognition. Hart's theory is threatened by the possibility that the identification of some principles follows an extremely relaxed rule of recognition, or even no rule at all. Unfortunately, there is no conclusive test to ascertain what is the case in actual practice. On the other hand, the evaluative arguments which support Dworkin's proposal of principled adjudication are forceful but not conclusive. Moreover, since ultimate controversy over values is plausible, judicial discretion may sometimes be inevitable.

What's So Great About Constitutionalism?

This paper identifies and then criticizes ten of the leading accounts of constitutionalism: enforcement of a principal-agent relationship; enforcement of societal precommitments; providing a mechanism for checks and balances; protection of minority rights; maintenance of continuity or tradition; symbolizing national unity; serving an educational function; securing finality for disputed issues; providing a rule of recognition for law; satisfying a majoritarian preference for constitutionalism. The bulk of the paper consists of normative and positive criticism of these ten putative justifications for constitutionalism; that is, I argue that they are neither unambiguously attractive, nor do they describe particularly well our own constitutional system. In a brief, second part of the article, I offer what I believe to be a better description of our constitutional system and then assess whether that account is normatively attractive. Boiled down to essentials, my positive account of the American system of judicial review is this: The Supreme Court, in politically unpredictable ways, imposes culturally elite values in marginally countermajoritarian fashion.

Sovereignty, the Rule of Recognition and Constitutional Stability in Britain

Sovereignty, the Rule of Recognition and Constitutional Stability in Britain

Construction of recognition decision rules in the class of logical functions

AbstractWe consider the class of logical decision rules of pattern recognition and introduce the concept of optimal rules from the given class. It is shown that the methods of construction of logical rules have a set of positive characteristics. A short description of program system LASTAN, which realizes the methods of data analysis, is given.

Mutant lac repressors with new specificities hint at rules for protein--DNA recognition.

Proteins which recognize specific sequences of DNA play a fundamental role in the regulation of protein synthesis in all organisms. A particular helix of the bacterial protein lac repressor recognizes the bases in the major groove of the lac operator. We show that the first two residues of this recognition helix interact independently with two base pairs. This allows us in many cases to predict repression as an indicator of strength of the repressor-operator complex. Rules of recognition can be derived for 16 symmetric operators. They also apply to the gal repressor and possibly to other bacterial repressors.

On the Relationship Between Law and Morality

Abstract. Instead of being embarrassed and uneasy about the implications of the separation thesis, positivists should welcome the fact that they cannot account for the obligatoriness of law. The rule of recognition is only a social rule and introduces no grounds for obligation.

Law and Authority

The nature of authority has been much debated in legal and political philosophy, and the terminology is not stable. I shall begin by stipulating how I understand some of the key terms used in this paper1. I consider authority here as a property of laws and of legal systems. Authority must be distinguished primarily from power, efficacy, and validity. Authority is not the same as power. A person or institution may have the power to affect the way that people behave, but lack authority because he, she, or it is purely coercive. Authority is not the same thing as efficacy; efficacy simply means that there is conformity to the rules of the system, whether willing conformity or not. But it is possible for there to be conformity to the laws of a successful repressive system, and such a system would not have authority. Authority is not the same as validity. To be valid is to be pedigreed by the rule of recognition of the legal system. A legal rule may have that property, and yet lack authority because it is not a rule which there is any obligation to obey. If the law has authority, then the demands that the law makes of us are such that we ought to conform to them. Theorists sometimes distinguish between “legitimate authority” and “de facto authority”. It follows from the above that in my terminology “authority” means legitimate authority as that term has been typically understood, as authority which issues directives we have an obligation to obey. “Legitimate authority” is pleonastic.

Hart's Rule of Recognition and the United States

Abstract. This essay explores the implications of H.L.A. Hart's rule of recognition for identifying ultimate standards of law in the United States. The effort reveals that these standards are much more complex than is commonly supposed. Not all of the federal constitution is part of the “ultimate” rule of recognition, and much else must be included in that rule. The analysis uncovers many possibilities for how ultimate standards relate to derivative standards that are omitted or barely hinted at in Hart's account. Some of these possibilities pose genuine difficulty for Hart's basic theory and help illuminate the relation of conventional and normative elements in an adequate account of law, a subject addressed in the final section of the essay.

Piccoli v. Association of Italian Knights of The Sovereign Order of Malta

States — Foreign sovereign entities — Sovereign Order of Malta — Whether a subject of international law — Whether judgments of its courts are to be equated with judgments of the courts of foreign States with regard to rules of recognition and enforcement — The law of Italy

Imperial Visions and Mundane Practices

In his first book, Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin opposed the view that law is a body of publicly ascertainable rules identifiable by some basic master test or rule of recognition. In place of that account he offered a rival vision. Law was portrayed as inherently controversial in content. Discovering the law on this or that subject is not, Dworkin argued, simply a matter of looking up the established rules: it is a matter of constructing a justificatory theory beneath which the established legal rules can be subsumed. In his latest book, Law's Empire, that account of the nature of law has been backed up by an analogous account of the nature of legal theory. A sound theory of law, we are told, is not one that unearths semantic rules governing the use of the word ‘law’. Disputes between rival legal theories do not hinge on the discovery of such deep semantic criteria, any more than disputes about the content of the law in hard cases hinge on the correct application of a rule of recognition. Disputes of both kinds are interpretive disputes: they concern the proper interpretation of legal practices.

Coordination and the Moral Obligation to Obey the Law

Previous articleNext article No AccessCoordination and the Moral Obligation to Obey the LawWilliam S. BoardmanWilliam S. Boardman Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 97, Number 3Apr., 1987 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/292865 Views: 22Total views on this site Citations: 9Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1987 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Ludvig Beckman Popular sovereignty facing the deep state. The rule of recognition and the powers of the people, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2018 (Jul 2019): 1–23.https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2019.1644583Matthias Brinkmann Coordination Cannot Establish Political Authority, Ratio Juris 31, no.11 (Feb 2018): 49–69.https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12193Anthony R. Reeves Practical Reason and Legality: Instrumental Political Authority Without Exclusion, Law and Philosophy 34, no.33 (Nov 2014): 257–298.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-014-9221-xDorota Mokrosinska Communal Ties and Political Obligations, Ratio Juris 26, no.22 (May 2013): 187–214.https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12010Kenneth Ehrenberg Critical Reception of Raz’s Theory of Authority, Philosophy Compass 6, no.1111 (Nov 2011): 777–785.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00444.xOliver Black Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust, 17 (Jul 2009).https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511494666Oliver Black Reliance and Obligation, Ratio Juris 17, no.33 (Sep 2004): 269–284.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2004.00269.xMatthew D. Adler Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2004).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.603442George Klosko The Moral Force of Political Obligations, American Political Science Review 84, no.44 (Aug 2014): 1235–1250.https://doi.org/10.2307/1963261

The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution

The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution