Rules-based International Order Research Articles

COVID Information Warfare and the Future of Great Power Competition

The coronavirus pandemic has ushered in a golden age of information warfare. Russia and China—the two most prominent authoritarian regimes contraposing the liberal, rule-based international order the West has strived to build and promote—have prospered most during the current COVID crisis. We look at the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) and Kremlin’s key COVID information warfare characteristics and explore how they are reshaping Great Power competition. We conclude with some suggestions regarding resilience and a joint counterstrategy.

The Nordic Balance Revisited: Differentiation and the Foreign Policy Repertoires of the Nordic States

Nordic governments frequently broadcast their ambition to do more together on the international stage. The five Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Norway) also share many basic goals as foreign policy actors, including a steadfast and vocal commitment to safeguarding the ‘rules-based international order.’ Why then, do we not see more organized Nordic foreign policy collaboration, for example in the form of a joint ‘grand strategy’ on core foreign policy issues, or in relation to great powers and international organizations? In this article, we draw on Charles Tilly’s concept of ‘repertoires’ to address the discrepancy between ambitions and developments in Nordic foreign policy cooperation, highlighting how the bundles of policy instruments—repertoires—that each Nordic state has developed over time take on an identity-defining quality. We argue that the Nordic states have invested in and become attached to their foreign policy differences, niches, and ‘brands.’ On the international scene, and especially when interacting with significant other states, they tend not only to stick to what they know how to do and are accustomed to doing but also to promote their national rather than their Nordic profile. While Nordic cooperation forms part of all the five states’ foreign policy repertoire in specific policy areas, these are marginal compared to the distinctive repertoires on which each Nordic state rely in relation to more powerful states. It is therefore unlikely that we will see a ‘common order’ among the Nordic states in the foreign policy domain in the near future.

‘Patriot’ games? Visions of a post-liberal international order and how to keep peace

Declaring the so-called Liberal International Order, and Multilateralism in general, obsolete has become fashionable after the Russian invasion of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Among others, Russian and American leaders have emphasized competition and the uncompromising quest for the national interest as the basic and natural elements of inter-state relations. This worldview is reflected within societies throughout the world in populist nationalist movements and smacks of ‘strongman politics’ with its undertones of toxic masculinity, in which the only check against outright conflict is the balance of power.This worldview is, clearly, bad news for small states. Alternatives such as Xi Jinping’s ‘Community for the Shared Future of Mankind’ would also, at closer look, seem to refer back to the primacy of national sovereignty – in this case that of one particular state, China. Instead, small states with open economies such as Finland would prioritize strengthening multilateral cooperation and the rules-based international order. Adapting the present international order rather than abandoning it wholesale is key to overcoming these challenges. That adaptation should be driven by a constructive critique of the current state of affairs. But we also need to look critically at the ‘brave new worlds’ that populists and strongmen are promoting. An international order based on the balance of power and a search for absolute national sovereignty will rob us of the ability to overcome global threats as well as to seize opportunities provided by global civil society activism and scientific innovations.

Phil Mullan, Beyond Confrontation: Globalists, Nationalists and Their Discontents

This article is a book review of Beyond Confrontation: Globalists, Nationalists and Their Discontents by Phil Mullan. Like other writers, Mullan warns of the danger of rising global tensions, but what marks out his contribution is a demystifying historical analysis which identifies the underlying sources of conflict and offers an optimistic and forward-looking vision. The first part of the book examines the emergence of the current rules-based international order in the aftermath of the Second World War, uncovers its inherent flaws, and draws out how it has now become a source of conflict rather than stability. Part two is devoted to debunking myths about trade and trade agreements—particularly the idea that these are central to economic dynamism. Arguing that the relationship between trade and economic growth has been turned upside down, Mullan aims to put it back on its feet. The concluding part sets out some positive proposals for how to reimagine economic policy approaches in ways that could enable root-and-branch renewal and to think afresh about what type of political culture would facilitate such necessary changes.

Japan’s quest for a rules-based international order: the Japan-US alliance and the decline of US liberal hegemony

ABSTRACT The decline of US liberal hegemony raises the following questions for Japan: What is Japan’s vision of international order and strategy? How does the Japan-US alliance influence Japan’s vision? Some have argued that Japan is reactive and lacks a strategy, whereas others have claimed that the country has pragmatically pursued its interests within the given circumstances. This paper argues that Japan has maintained its own vision and strategies since the Cold War. Also, in the 2010s, Japan’s diplomatic tradition was updated to focus on actively shaping the Asia-Pacific region. Japan seeks to preserve existing liberal international (rather than domestic) rules; however, its method is classical as it includes a balance-of-power approach involving military expansion and alliances, and a diplomatic approach to making agreements with a variety of political regimes, whether democratic or authoritarian, including China. I call this emerging vision in Japan a ‘rules-based order’.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Dilemmas of Middle Powers

“Middle powers,” variously defined, have served relevant and significant roles in the post-WWII regional and global orders, facilitated by structural conditions of “long peace” among great powers and proactive leadership by and among creative middle powers. Within the complex Asia-Pacific security order, “middle powers” such as Australia, Canada, and South Korea have had the “space” to engage the non-like minded and advance multilateralism with security guarantees from the US. However, Beijing and Washington today are eliminating this space and its associated choices for middle-power diplomacy by increasingly characterizing their rivalry as a confrontation of “existential threats” between incompatible “civilizations” and securitizing trade and technology. China and the US are each selectively ignoring or purposely eroding key aspects of a rules-based international order. This paper highlights the dilemmas of South Korea, Australia, and Canada, middle powers who have found themselves individually and collectively “stuck” facing contradictory global and regional policy choices.

Cosmopolitanism and unipolarity: the theory of hegemonic transition

ABSTRACTCosmopolitans typically argue that the realization of cosmopolitan ideals requires the creation of global political institutions of some kind. While the precise nature of the necessary institutions is widely discussed, the problem of the transition to such an order has received less attention. In this paper, we address what we take to be a crucial aspect of the problem of transition: we argue that it involves a moral coordination problem because there are several morally equivalent paths to reform the existing order, but suitably placed and properly motivated political agents need to converge on a single route for the transition to be successful. It is, however, unclear how such a convergence can take place since the duty to create global institutions does not single out any coordination point. We draw on the so-called theory of hegemonic stability to address this problem and conceptualize what we call the hegemonic transition. From an explanatory point of view, we rely on the theory’s insights to explain how a hegemon may contribute to the creation of a rules-based international order by providing salient coordination points and accordingly, enabling coordination among states. From the normative point of view, we identify necessary conditions for the hegemonic transition to be morally permissible. To the extent that these conditions obtain, other states have pro tanto moral reasons to follow the salient coordination point provided by the leading state.

The Territorialization of Airspace in the East and South China Seas: Unraveling the Security Dilemma

executive summary: This article examines the perspectives and policies of both China and the U.S. regarding airspace claims in the East and South China Seas and offers a policy prescription to address the underlying political issues driving both nations toward a collision. main argumentThe U.S. and China are moving further into a downward spiral based on misperceptions regarding each other's airspace policies in the East and South China Seas. Weary of U.S. surveillance flights close to its borders, China has responded to such activities by increasingly challenging the right to conduct such flights. The desire to push U.S. military flights farther away has prompted China to establish an East China Sea air defense identification zone and erect similar restrictions, albeit on a smaller scale, in the South China Sea. The U.S., meanwhile, has interpreted these actions as incrementally destabilizing the rules-based international order as well as posing a direct threat to its long-held freedom of navigation interests. The Treaty on Open Skies provides a model to ease the political differences between the two countries by accounting for the core concerns driving U.S. and Chinese policies. policy implications • Far from making the country more secure, China's policy of contesting freedom of navigation outside its twelve nautical mile territorial sea demarcation invites the U.S. and other regional powers to oppose China through military operations to ensure access to the international commons around its mainland. • Absent other measures that take Beijing's perspective into account, continued U.S. freedom of navigation operations and surveillance flights in close proximity to China meant to keep air and sea space free and open will induce aggressive counterreactions that produce the opposite of the intended outcome. • A bilateral framework based on the Treaty on Open Skies model that addresses the concerns of both states, while preserving their underlying interests, would add balance to the confrontational policies adopted by both states heretofore.

Is China Spoiling the Rules-Based Liberal International Order? Examining China’s Rising Institutional Power in a Multiplex World Through Competing Theories

Driven by structural theories of international relations, some scholars have described China as either spoiling or shirking the rules-based liberal international order (RBLIO). The convergence of the relative US decline since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and China’s assertive diplomacy has aggravated this anxiety. This paper examines the theoretical and empirical validity of this argument by utilizing competing theories of social constructivism and issue–path dependence. Specifically, this paper conducts a brief empirical analysis of China’s stances on four core issues of global governance, including (1) voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly, (2) trade and the World Trade Organization (WTO), (3) South China Sea disputes and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and (4) the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The results indicate that China has been passive toward the restructuring of legal norms, merely invoking them when a specific dispute arises. Concurrently, China occasionally pursues an alternative institutional platform if the functional concentration of a target institution is diffused and fragmented. In short, the empirical analysis demonstrates the salience of claims for China’s issue–path dependence. The paper concludes with theoretical and policy implications, concluding that as China holds no predetermined, concrete stance on all components of the rules-based liberal international order, disintegrating the country from it could be a fatal mistake.

Cooperating with “Maritime India” in the Indo-Pacific context – A Japanese view

ABSTRACT The main purpose of this article is to identify a common basis for Japan and India as maritime democracies to work together for the maintenance and enhancement of the rules-based liberal international order at sea in the face of a variety of challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, China’s maritime advancement in particular. As powerful maritime democracies in the Indo-Pacific, Japan and India will be able to engage in a wide variety of maritime security cooperation. The opinions of security experts of both countries should be mustered so that bilateral cooperation keeps up its momentum. Synergy of Tracks 1, 1.5 and 2 dialogues should be pursued for maritime security cooperation. In this bilateral effort, the US-centred alliance network, of which the Japan-US Alliance is the central portion, and India’s autonomous and multi-directional approach toward international security must be intertwined effectively. Also, security dialogues between the two countries and between the two navies should work out the division of labour between Japan and India to contribute to the Indo-Pacific regional maritime security more effectively.

Japan's ‘Indo-Pacific’ question: countering China or shaping a new regional order?

Abstract Japan's primary objective of the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called ‘tactical hedging’. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future.

Australia, China and the maritime ‘rules-based international order’: comparing the South China Sea and Timor Sea disputes

Abstract Despite systemic internal and external differences, Australia and China have shown striking similarities in their pursuit of disputed maritime resource and jurisdictional claims. This high-stakes area of international politics is governed by a codified, globally accepted international legal regime (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), making it an important case for examining the relationship between states’ foreign policies and the ‘rules-based international order’. In the South China Sea, Beijing is haunted by the legacy of its strong geopolitically driven support for an expansive law of the sea regime in the 1970s. Strategic considerations also drove Australia’s belated embrace of international legal processes in the Timor Sea in 2016. Before that, successive Australian governments had been as keen to pursue national maritime interests through bilateral negotiations as their Chinese counterparts. Australia’s shift was enabled by pro-Timor domestic public opinion and a confluence of geographic and commercial circumstances not present in the South China Sea.

Reclaiming the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Through the EU–China Partnership and Cooperation Agreement: Taking Stock and Moving Forward

This chapter traces the evolution of the EU–China strategic partnership, explores the role of a PCA in this partnership, and investigates major challenges facing the two parties for its successful conclusion. This chapter will focus on two dimensions of the proposed partnership: political and security; trade and economy. In the context of the political and security dimension, this chapter addresses the troubling relationship between sovereignty and human rights and the EU’s call for China’s collaboration in building a rules-based international order and advancing effective multilateralism. In the trade and economic dimension, this chapter examines China’s pursuit of MES and the EU’s demand for a transparent, open and predicable regulatory environment in China. This chapter then points to the difficulties in issue linkages or human rights prioritisation in the PCA negotiations, and probes whether a comprehensive investment agreement (CAI) constitutes a satisfactory alternative to the PCA.

Japan, South Korea and the rise of a networked security architecture in East Asia

This article explains Japan’s and South Korea’s role in the transition from the hub-and-spokes alliance system to a networked security architecture in East Asia. It is argued that China’s contestation of the rules-based international order in East Asia has been confronted by East Asian states through a mixture of resistance and accommodation. From a Japanese point of view, Beijing’s ascendency is considered particularly disruptive for the regional order. Consequently, Japan has become a central hub in the development of the networked security architecture enacting two complementary strategies: the consolidation of the alliance with the United States and the creation of new and less binding forms of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral security partnerships with Asian allies. By contrast, since Seoul considers China as an essential partner for the stabilisation of the Korean Peninsula, it has played a more peripheral role in the development of this regional networking dynamic.

权力转移、模式之争与基于规则的国际秩序 -- 国际关系与国际法视角下的中美关系 (Power Transition, Battle of Models, and Rule-based International Order: Sino-U.S. Relations from the Perspectives of International Relations and International Law)

Chinese Abstract: 本文试图从国际关系与国际法的角度来解读当下的中美关系。文章认为，中美当前的战略互疑、紧张和冲突，是基于两个方面的认知：一是因为中国自身实力迅速接近美国而引发“权力转移”的焦虑，二是中美双方经济模式的差异所引发的“交易公平”的抱怨。这两个问题在中美关系中其实一直存在，但在最近才被公认为是两国之间根本性和战略性的矛盾所在。这两个问题对当代国际法的运作造成了莫大挑战，表现在：第一，权力转移，甚至仅仅是因为对权力转移的焦虑所引发的连锁反应，可能对以国际法为依托的当代国际秩序造成巨大的冲击甚至是毁灭性打击。第二，如果国际（经济）法或者国际经济的主要参加方不再相信国际（经济）法能够为他们之间的贸易纠纷提供充足、可操作的行为规范和有效纠纷解决机制，经济模式之争就可能陷入无规则的丛林式经济之战，国际（经济）法所维持的国际经济体系也会崩塌。面对这两种权力之争所可能引发的严重后果，中国与美国亟须回到以规则为导向的国际秩序，并通过互相尊重的谈判来共同制定新的规则以完善国际秩序，使其能继续为国际社会提供规则和秩序方面的公共产品。 English Abstract: This article attempts to approach the contemporary China-U.S. relations, which is undergoing dramatic changes in the recent years, from the perspectives of international relations and international law. It argues that the strategic mistrust, tensions and conflicts between the two leading powers in the world now stems from two sources: (1) the anxieties about “power transition” which further leads to concerns about security dilemma and even the so-called Thucydides Trap in U.S.-China bilateral security relations, and (2) the emerging complaints about unfairness in international economic relations resulted from China’s state-driven economic model. The paper asserts that, although a new Cold War is unlikely to occur immediately between the United States and China due to several constraining factors, concerns about the two issues are posting tremendous challenges to the arguably rule-based international order of our age: (1) reactions in response to the perceived power transition could lead to devastating damages to the international political order as the increasingly intensified power play will inspire the powers to even play harder at the expense of the rules of international law, and (2) the beliefs that the existing international economic system, sustained by international economic law, could not supply proper rules to deal with the battle of models as evidenced by the on-going trade war between China and the United States, are already significantly undermining and marginalising the WTO-centered world trading system. The paper discusses several future scenarios in U.S.-China relations. Although the future is quite uncertain, China’s sincere efforts to demonstrate good in safeguarding the liberal international order may help bring the world back to a rule-based international order.

The WTO Dispute Settlement System and the Challenge to Multilateralism: Is the Rule of Law in Peril?

The Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the WTO has been praised as the most successful example of international adjudicatory mechanism capable of resolving efficiently complex disputes in a multilateral framework, moreover inducing or ensuring compliance. The existence of a standing Appellate Body (AB) has been a key element of this success. While the DSS was going beyond the 500 disputes mark in 2015-2016 and new disputes were being tackled, the system has showed “success fatigue” so that practical and more long-term proposal of reforms have been envisaged. Against this positive context, which contrast with the inability of the members of the WTO to conclude further negotiations thus encouraging alternative regional agreements, the US has voiced more and more criticism at the DSS, mainly at the AB, accusing it of “overreach” and of procedural disrespect of the rules. This has lead the Trump administration to block the process of reappointment of AB members to fill vacancies, with the prospect of the demise of the AB at the end of 2019 and a paralysis of the WTO functioning. While these criticisms have been opposed by other WTO Members and rejected by independent observers as groundless, the US has resisted until recently to engage with other WTO members in finding acceptable multilateral solutions. This has given credit to the suspicion that through its challenge to the adjudicatory body of the WTO the Trump administration is in reality challenging the multilateral approach to the governance of international trade relations in general, a key feature of the rule-based international order established after WWII which maintains its value.

Chronology of Events: October 2018 to December 2018

Chronology of Events:October 2018 to December 2018 CHEN Juan (bio) As a research institute based in Singapore, the EAI monitors developments in relations and interactions between China and the individual countries of Southeast Asia as well as the ASEAN grouping as a whole. This material is presented in the form of (i) a chronology of events and (ii) important documents. —the Editors CHINA–ASEAN RELATIONS OCTOBER 2018 TO DECEMBER 2018: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS Compiled by CHEN Juan OCTOBER 2018 12th The 18th Meeting of the ASEAN Plus Three Ministers on Agriculture and Forestry is held in Hanoi, Vietnam. The meeting reaffirms support for the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) Agreement through the signing of a protocol to amend "Attachment 2" of the agreement. The amendment extends financial contribution to the operational cost account of the APTERR Fund by five years (2018 to 2022). The Sixth ASEAN–China Ministerial Meeting on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Cooperation, also held in Hanoi, adopts the Plan of Action for 2019–2020 that covers food safety, plant and animal inspection and quarantine. This plan also maintains the previous scopes of cooperation on the establishment of a communication system, personnel exchanges, organising trainings and seminars, collaborative research and the setting up of consultation mechanism. 13th The Sixth Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Intersessional Ministerial Meeting is held in Singapore. The ministers from the 16 RCEP participating countries highlight the need to further narrow the gaps in market access and note the progress made in the negotiations of other chapters on rules. All RCEP participating countries are also urged to fulfil the targets set out in the Package of Year-End Deliverables, which the ministers have reiterated to be important particularly at the time of uncertainties in global trade. 18th At the Third Meeting of the China–Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea held in Beijing, China, both sides exchange views on issues of concern and mutually beneficial approaches to address the issues. There are also discussions about the methods to enhance maritime cooperation, and possible cooperation in joint exploration and development of maritime oil and gas. 18th–19th Leaders of 51 European and Asian countries, European Union representatives and the ASEAN Secretariat convene at the 12th Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), held in Brussels, Belgium under the theme "Global Partners for Global Challenges". They agree to renew support for the rules-based international order during their discussions that focus on sustainable and rules-based connectivity. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang delivers a speech at the meeting, urging participating countries to strengthen "soft connectivity" in areas such as institutions, policies, rules and standards in order to invigorate factors of production. On the sidelines of the ASEM, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang meets with Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, who welcomes Chinese enterprises to build industrial parks in Vietnam. The latter also affirms willingness to jointly work with China to maintain maritime peace and stability. Cambodian Prime Minister Samdech Techo Hun Sen also meets with Chinese Premier Li on the sidelines of the ASEM. Li says that China will continue to import Cambodia's competitive agricultural products, and calls upon the two countries to enhance synergy of their development strategies and expand bilateral trade. Li also expresses China's support for Cambodia to host the next ASEM summit. Hun Sen hopes to expand practical cooperation with China in trade and agriculture, and welcomes investments from Chinese companies. Hun Sen adds that Li's visit to Cambodia and co-chairing of the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation (LMC) leaders' meeting in 2018 had injected new impetus into Cambodia–China relations and the LMC. 20th The Fifth ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) on Preventing and Countering the Threat of Terrorism, held in Singapore, discusses specific initiatives to deal with terrorism and prevent mishaps in the air for military aircraft. The ADMM-Plus convenes defence ministers from the 10 ASEAN countries and also defence ministers from Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia and the United States. Consensus achieved at the meeting results in the issuance of two joint statements, one on Preventing and Countering the Threat of Terrorism, and the other on Practical Confidence...

Russia's Indirect Grand Strategy

Modern Russia is a revisionist, if not a revanchist, nation-state. It seeks to end the efficacy of the post-World War II institutionalized rules-based international order, which was created and maintained by the U.S.-led Western alliance. Russia pursues this objective to reclaim great power status and dominate the region and its borders. However, it lacks the strength to achieve this goal directly. To be successful, Russia must devise a strategy for bringing about cumulative changes in the relative power of the United States and Russia. And, it must do so while avoiding direct confrontation. A model for such an indirect approach exists.

Modern Islamic International Law between Accommodation and Resistance: The Case of Israel and BDS

Most scholarship on modern Islamic conceptions of international law and global peace emphasize two diametrically opposed trends. The first amounts to an accommodationist view of Islamic law, whereby it abandons Islamically distinctive doctrines such as jihad in order for Muslim states to live peaceably in the post-World War II global community. The second amounts to a rejectionist view, whereby Islamic law continues to adhere to classical views on world order developed in the first centuries of Islam during the heyday of Islamic imperial expansionism, and rejects the legitimacy of contemporary international law. Most scholarship dismiss the second trend and asserts the triumph of the first. Yet, even among the contemporary Muslim jurists who most categorically endorse modern international law and the United Nations, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the State of Israel presents a conceptual conundrum. Given Muslims’ universal rejection of its legitimacy, even accommodationist jurists such as Qaradawi continue to refer to Israel as part of the dar al-harb – a territory of war – and not part of global community living on the basis of peaceful relations. Yet, applying the category of dar al-harb, even to Israel, is incoherent when other commitments, such as the commitments to the UN system, are taken into account. Using the framework of international law developed by the Egyptian jurist `Abd al-Raziq al-Sanhuri, I argue that Sanhuri’s conception of a modern, rules-based international order, provides a properly Islamic response to the challenge of states that formally profess adherence to international norms, but systematically breach them. Because such states recognize the law, they are not outside of the law, and accordingly, cannot be deemed to be part of a territory of war. Rather, such states are internal to a league of states legally at peace with another, but are law-breakers, and in extreme cases, their violations of law may be criminal. From the perspective of modern Islamic international law, the law-abiding members of the international community have a duty to restrain the law-breaking member. If they fail to do so, drawing on Islamic law principles governing the duty to refrain from transacting with a known criminal, the paper argues that boycott by civil society is the remedy that must be pursued against a law-breaking state when the law-abiding states of the world community are unwilling or unable to check its transgressions. From this perspective, the Boycott, Divest and Sanction Movement that resists continued Israeli colonization of Palestine can serve as exemplary case study in the development of modern Islamic international law’s responses to international lawlessness that goes unremedied.

Multilateral Economic Institutions and U.S. Foreign Policy

Virtually every major international gathering of world leaders recently has ended in failure—or at least failure to reach enough agreement to issue a concluding statement or communique. These failures come at a time when many have been looking for signs that world leaders would come together to address the most pressing problems facing the world—including climate change, the breakdown in the rules of the international trading system, the need everywhere for good jobs that pay a living wage, and rapidly growing income inequality. The failure of these meetings to produce formal agreements—or even specific paths to reaching agreements in the future—despite the high stakes has left many questioning the ability of the world’s leaders to meet global challenges, shedding a spotlight on the institutions and fora that were established for the purpose of achieving multilateral solutions—particularly the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The failure to reach agreements can best be seen as part of a long-term trend toward increased complexity in the world that makes it nearly impossible to reach traditional multilateral binding accords, combined with a waning of faith on the part of many countries in multilateralism and multilateral institutions. A number of clear trends emerge from the failures to reach accords at virtually all recent international gatherings: 1) Government policies and international arrangements for collective decision-making have not kept pace with changes in the world, especially the high degree of international economic integration and interdependence. Much of the increasing complexity in the international economic order stems from the explosive growth in the number and size of multinational corporations and financial institutions, many of which now dwarf the size of most of the nations in the world. Added to the complexity is the increase in the speed at which goods, money and technology moves around the globe in our digital age. 2) Learning to operate in this vastly more complex world will require more multilateralism, not less. As countries emerged from the era of colonialization and began opening their markets, the number of players on global stage increased, making reaching consensus among a much larger group of disparate interests more difficult. But because the most significant problems facing the world cross many international boundaries, solving them will require that countries come together to find regional, plurilateral, or global solutions. 3) It is essential that the international economic institutions be updated and improved, not destroyed or left to wither. Because it is clear that reaching major new binding accords or creating new international institutions is quite difficult, the best and most achievable solution is to renovate our existing institutions. Each needs to modernize and improve their governance structures to ensure that work can get done despite the increases in complexities and to update their mandates to ensure the ability to address the problems of the 21st century, many of which are quite different from those that existed in the 1940s when these institutions were created. Given that the crisis is most acute at the WTO, this testimony will focus on what must be done to renovate the World Trade Organization and why doing so is critical, both for the trading system and for the continued existence of a rules-based international economic order. The need for the WTO and its dispute settlement system to remain viable is particularly critical if we are to address the challenges presented by the explosive growth of China and its transformation into the largest exporter of goods in the world.