Abstract
The Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the WTO has been praised as the most successful example of international adjudicatory mechanism capable of resolving efficiently complex disputes in a multilateral framework, moreover inducing or ensuring compliance. The existence of a standing Appellate Body (AB) has been a key element of this success. While the DSS was going beyond the 500 disputes mark in 2015-2016 and new disputes were being tackled, the system has showed “success fatigue” so that practical and more long-term proposal of reforms have been envisaged. Against this positive context, which contrast with the inability of the members of the WTO to conclude further negotiations thus encouraging alternative regional agreements, the US has voiced more and more criticism at the DSS, mainly at the AB, accusing it of “overreach” and of procedural disrespect of the rules. This has lead the Trump administration to block the process of reappointment of AB members to fill vacancies, with the prospect of the demise of the AB at the end of 2019 and a paralysis of the WTO functioning. While these criticisms have been opposed by other WTO Members and rejected by independent observers as groundless, the US has resisted until recently to engage with other WTO members in finding acceptable multilateral solutions. This has given credit to the suspicion that through its challenge to the adjudicatory body of the WTO the Trump administration is in reality challenging the multilateral approach to the governance of international trade relations in general, a key feature of the rule-based international order established after WWII which maintains its value.
Published Version
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