Rousseau's Concept Research Articles

KONSEP PENDIDIKAN NATURALISTIK JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU DAN RELEVANSINYA BAGI PENGEMBANGAN SISTEM MERDEKA BELAJAR DI INDONESIA

The current educational orientation is more toward a mechanistic education system. That is, the entire series of education carried out has been designed and very structured. So that teachers and students only follow the previously designed structure. Thus, the meaning of education that expects the development of the potential possessed by students will be hampered because of the structure that has been made. In understanding the reality of the world, students are kept away from their world. So that what is born is students who learn and understand about nature, but never learn together with nature. And Jean Jacques Rousseau presents the concept of naturalistic education as a rationale for returning students to natural reality. Through qualitative research methods with a philosophical hermeneutic approach, this study will attempt to uncover the meaning behind the reality of the world of education today by exploring the concept of naturalistic education initiated by Jean Jacques Rousseau. Thus, the results in this study indicate that Rousseau's idea of ​​the concept of naturalistic education departs from his concern about the direction of education which hinders the development of the potential of students in accordance with their natural nature. Students are likened to a robot that only follows the learning programs that have been designed. Thus, education must be returned to the natural aspect, so that students understand the realities of the world well. As well as the development of a “Merdeka Belajar” system in Indonesia, it is very important to understand Rousseau's concept of naturalistic education, so that it fully gives freedom to students to return to the natural nature of each student.

Timing the laws: Rousseau’s theory of development in Corsica

This paper reinterprets Rousseau’s theory of political and economic development through the lens of time. In his governmental plan for Corsica, Rousseau sees an infirm political body about to heal, grow, and prosper under changing conditions, not a static experiment of autarkic agrarianism. Therefore, Rousseau's prescriptions of a hybrid economy, intergenerational office-holding, and future-oriented defence are themselves designed to evolve over time. Rethinking Rousseau's concept of time clarifies long-running debates over the seemingly conflicting images of the philosopher. Neither ‘founding’ nor ‘re-founding’ Corsica, Rousseau legislates in the interim, aiming for the longevity, not the immortality, of a healthy political economy.

Research on the design of children’s nature education camp guided by rural natural experience -- a case study of Children's Natural Education Camp in Shijing Village

With the continuous improvement of people's living standards, children's natural education has gradually entered the public's field of vision and has begun to receive widespread attention. Taking Shijing Village of Mountain in Fujian Province as an example, this paper profoundly discusses the design strategy of rural children's nature education camp based on Rousseau's concept of natural education to find an effective way to reconnect families, children, and nature, to promote the healthy development of children's physical and mental health, and to help the countryside. Revitalize to explore new approaches and strategies.

Konsep Kebebasan Menurut Jean-Jacques Rousseau dan Relevansinya Bagi Demokrasi Indonesia Saat Ini (Sebuah Kajian Filosofis - Kritis)

The focus of this paper is a discussion of the concept of freedom according to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one of the philosophers of the Enlightenment. Rousseau's concept of freedom is always interesting to discuss in the context of a country that applies democracy as its political system, one of which is Indonesia. In discussing the concept of Rousseau's freedom, it is relevant to Indonesia's current democracy, which is in a state of flawed democracy according to the research results of The Economist Intelligence Unit in 2020. The goal to be achieved is to find new ideas as a solution to improve the quality of Indonesian democracy for the better. The method used in this paper is a qualitative method in the form of literature review. The findings in this paper is that the quality of freedom in Indonesian democracy is still very low, especially in the fields of religion and education. The task to fight for this freedom is first of all in the hands of the leaders of the nation and state.

Negative and positive liberty and the freedom to choose in Isaiah Berlin and Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Berlin has made the famous distinction between negative and positive liberty. For many liberals, negative liberty is modern individual liberty manifested in markets, while interference by the State is a form of positive liberty. Berlin was also repelled by Rousseau's concept of the general will, which he considered as a form of collectivist holism. The paper argues that this philosophy is a mistaken interpretation of Berlin's two concepts of liberty and of Rousseau's general will. In a simple model of individual and collective choice under conditions of bounded rationality, it is shown that positive and negative liberty are interdependent. The collective choices made under positive liberty can be modeled as the stochastic version of Rousseau's general will, provided that liberal democracy enables the conditions of free public deliberation. In that case, the individual freedom cherished by Berlin is compatible with positive liberty.

CHARLES DICKENS'S NOVEL "OLIVER TWIST" AS A NOVEL-ALLEGORY OF THE GOD AND THE DEVIL

In the novels written by Ch. Dickens, is the only child who manages to stay the same until the end of the novel. He managed to go through a kind of initiation or forbidden threshold, but he did not change and stayed alive. Thus, the image of a boy is psychologically quite conditional. Why? The answer to this question is the purpose of this article, in which the novel Oliver Twist written by Ch. Dickens is considered and analyzed as an allegory of the God and the Devil, based on the study of archetypes of C.G. Jung. The novel of Ch. Dickens is inextricably linked with Christian symbolism, ancient view of the world. In order to consider it from this point of view it is necessary to rely on the ideas of C.G. Jung's archetypes that cause complex ideas to life, acting as mythological motifs. They are mediated by the consciousness of the author and are displayed in the form of conditional statements, in which the visual image is something other. The approach of Ch. Dickens to write this novel was inspired by Rousseau's concept of the original innocence of the child, as well as the romantic poets who gave the childhood the highest sacred value. Introducing as a sacred, unchanging static entity in a severely fallen world, the writer conveys his image of God or the divine archetype of the child, as opposed to the archetype of the Devil embodied in Fagin.

Sociability, Perfectibility and the Intellectual Legacy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the concept of sociability was used mainly to refer to the putative range of primary human qualities or capabilities that preceded—or existed independently of—the formation of political societies. This article is an examination of the impact of Rousseau's thought on this then standard usage. Its initial focus is on Rousseau's concept of perfectibility and its bearing on the thought of Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet, and Friedrich Schlegel. Its broader aim is to show how their respective responses to Rousseau were part of a more deep-seated transformation of the concept of sociability itself.

“Like a Fanciful Kind ofHalfBeing”: Mary Wollstonecraft's Criticism of Jean‐Jacques Rousseau

The article investigates the philosophical foundations and details of Mary Wollstonecraft's criticism of Jean‐Jacques Rousseau's views on the education and nature of women. I argue that Wollstonecraft's criticism must not be understood as a constructionist critique of biological reductionism. The first section analyzes the differences between Wollstonecraft's and Rousseau's views on the possibility of a true civilization and shows how these differences connect to their respective conceptions of moral psychology. The section shows that Wollstonecraft's disagreement with Rousseau's views on women was rooted in a broad scope of philosophical disagreement. The second section focuses on Rousseau's concept of nature, and I argue that Rousseau was neither a biological determinist nor a functionalist who denied that nature had any normative significance. The section ends with a discussion of Wollstonecraft's criticism of Rousseau's application of the distinction between the natural and the artificial. The third section focuses on Wollstonecraft's critique of Rousseau's claim that there are different standards for the perfectibility of men and women. The article concludes with a critical discussion of the claim that Aristotle would have provided Wollstonecraft with the philosophical tools she needed for her criticism of Rousseau.

Terrorism—A (self) love story: Redirecting the significance quest can end violence.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's concepts of self-love (amour propre) and love of self (amour de soi même) are applied to the psychology of terrorism. Self-love is concern with one's image in the eyes of respected others, members of one's group. It denotes one's feeling of personal significance, the sense that one's life has meaning in accordance with the values of one's society. Love of self, in contrast, is individualistic concern with self-preservation, comfort, safety, and the survival of self and loved ones. We suggest that self-love defines a motivational force that when awakened arouses the goal of a significance quest. When a group perceives itself in conflict with dangerous detractors, its ideology may prescribe violence and terrorism against the enemy as a means of significance gain that gratifies self-love concerns. This may involve sacrificing one's self-preservation goals, encapsulated in Rousseau's concept of love of self. The foregoing notions afford the integration of diverse quantitative and qualitative findings on individuals' road to terrorism and back. Understanding the significance quest and the conditions of its constructive fulfillment may be crucial to reversing the current tide of global terrorism.

Performance and Femininity in Eighteenth-Century German Women's Writing: The Impossible Act (review)

Reviewed by: Performance and Femininity in Eighteenth-Century German Women's Writing: The Impossible Act Julie Koser Wendy Arons , Performance and Femininity in Eighteenth-Century German Women's Writing: The Impossible Act (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Pp. x, 270. $69.95. Over the last several decades scholarly efforts to draw attention to women's writings and their contribution to the German literary tradition have resulted in the publication of multivolume collections of works by authors such as Therese Huber, Caroline Auguste Fischer, and Friederike Helene Unger as well as in significant new scholarship ranging from biographies of women writers to the exploration of female authors' challenges to social and political discourses. Wendy Arons takes up the latter project in her book Performance and Femininity in Eighteenth-Century German Women's Writing: The Impossible Act, in which she investigates how eighteenth-century German women writers challenged the social discourse of ideal femininity by employing the theater and the notion of performance "as an activity and an abstract idea" (2) in their literary works. Arons's study expands on the works of German scholars who have examined the ways in which eighteenth-century women sought to transcend the boundary between the public and private spheres. She lays the foundation for her analysis by retracing the development of "antitheatrical subjectivity" (4), which she defines as the notion that the individual, and woman in particular, is "naturally" sincere, naive, and authentic, a concept associated with the Enlightenment's growing middle class. Antitheatricality, she argues, emerged alongside bourgeois culture's increasing desire to distinguish itself and its values from those of the aristocratic class of the Baroque and early modern periods. Arons opens her study with a focus on the impact of mid- to late-eighteenth-century gender debates and theater reforms that presented the image of ideal femininity as "naturally" antitheatrical. She briefly addresses the evolution of gender debates within the German context, a subject explored more extensively by Claudia Honegger in Die Ordnung der Geschlechter (1991), and concentrates specifically on Rousseau's concept of ideal womanhood embodied by his literary figure Sophie. Arons convincingly argues that Rousseau's image of the naive, sincere woman had a profound impact on how German social theorists and female authors conceptualized and defined ideal femininity. Characteristics such as passivity, virtue, and emotionality became synonymous with femininity and were used by German intellectuals in order to justify women's exclusion from the traditionally masculine public sphere. Yet Arons distances herself from the "separate spheres" approach to eighteenth-century literature by rejecting the assertion that women were entirely absent [End Page 128] from the public sphere and instead suggests that women's pursuit of writing and theatrical performance on stage made them participants in the public sphere; female authors used the theatrical public realm in order to explore feminine subjectivity at a time when bourgeois society privileged an image of ideal femininity that was antitheatrical and private. Arons employs an interdisciplinary approach to reconstruct not only the context within which women wrote but also the means by which they reaffirmed and contested dominant social views of ideal femininity. She draws on Judith Butler's theory of "gender subjectivity" and "performed acts" (5) and Joan Riviere's concept of "femininity as masquerade" (6) to demonstrate female authors' awareness of antitheatrical femininity as constructed and performed, and the consequent insights constitute Arons's most significant contribution. Arons chooses to investigate a handful of works by female authors in which theater and performance figure prominently in the lives of their female characters: Sophie La Roche's epistolary novel The History of Lady von Sternheim (1771); Karoline Schulze-Kummerfeld's memoirs "The Whole History of My Life" and "True History of My Theatrical Life" (written 1782 and 1793 respectively and first published posthumously); Marianne Ehrmann's epistolary novel Amalie: A True Story in Letters (1788); Elise Bürger's story "Aglaja" (1799); Friederike Helene Unger's Melanie, the Foundling (1804); and finally Sophie Mereau's "Marie" (1798) and "Flight to the City" (written 1796, published 1806). Arons reads each of these works as revealing the paradox of the antitheatrical, sincere female subject in the personal lives and practices of the authors and...

Zwischen Abenteuer, Wissenschaft und Kolonialismus: Der deutsche Afrikadiskursim 18. Und 19. Jahrhundert by Matthias Fiedler

MLR, I02.2, 2007 597 allows him todefine the social and cultural function of thedebates as one of collective self-assurance or self-definition vis-a-vis the extreme, the abhorrent, the unknown. Those readerswho arewilling to read past some high-brow theory and tolerate some convoluted, quotation-soaked, and occasionally rather inflated language will be re warded with a thrillingjourney into a strange and fascinating area of encounter with extremes and with an enhanced understanding of the attraction inherent in under taking, reporting, and fictionalizing such transgressions. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND, MAYNOOTH FLORIAN KROBB Zwischen Abenteuer,Wissenschaft undKolonialismus: Der deutscheAfrikadiskurs imi8. und I9. Jahrhundert. By MATTHIAS FIEDLER. Cologne: Bohlau. 2005. 30I PP. E34g90. ISBN 978-3-412-I9Io5-4. Since the I990S, postcolonial enquiry inGerman literature,culture, and history has made the rediscovery and re-evaluation ofGerman colonialism and Germany's wider implication in the cultural history of European colonialism a new focus both in Anglo-American German studies, which pioneered this development, and inGer many itself.Fiedler's study,which is based on his doctoral thesis at theUniversity ofGottingen (2004), contributes to the further mapping of this increasingly popular field by critically reviewing the development of Germany's discourse about Africa from theEnlightenment to imperial colonialism around I900 and by offeringvaluable new insight into the crucial role of travelwriting about Africa in the emergence of German colonial discourse. Tracing continuities between eighteenth-century 'colo nial fantasies' (as Susanne Zantop called them) and late nineteenth-century colonial discourse, Fiedler provides furtherevidence ofGermany's full implication in thecul turalhistory ofEuropean colonialism, while also supporting recenthistorical research into the significance of laternineteenth-century colonial discourse for the politics of German national identity both before and during Germany's short-lived colonial empire (I884-19I8). Fiedler's analysis ofboth literaryand non-literary sources illustrates theemergence of a set of tropes in eighteenth-century writing about Africa and Africans (African nature vs. European culture; the 'ugliness' of the black body; African inferiority justifying European guidance; etc.), which continue to inform nineteenth-century literature and travelwriting, while gradually transforming into the colonial ideology of European superiority and African development through European colonization. Fiedler's earliest example is Peter Kolb's account of his residence in South Africa (17I9), which already exhibits the emerging 'colonial gaze' by highlighting theHot tentots' amenability toWestern education (p. 45). In his discussion of Christoph Martin Wieland's fictionalReise des PriestersAbulfauaris ins innere Afrika ( 768), he thenhighlights the dilemma of critical exoticism, sinceWieland critiques Rousseau's concept of the 'noble savage' and exposes the (gendered) violence of colonial conquest, while at the same time reinforcing theEnlightenment's vision of cultural development defined by Europe. The monograph's centrepiece, however, isa detailed discussion of the travel writing by German nineteenth-century explorers inAfrica such as Heinrich Barth, Georg Schweinfurth, Gustav Nachtigal, Gerhart Rohlfs, and Hermann von Wissmann. Fiedler illustrates the crucial role of these publications inpromoting growing public interest inAfrica since the i85os and in shaping the emerging discourse about Ger many's own colonial involvement inAfrica. His discussion also notes a shift in themes and style fromscientificaccounts in thecontext of contemporary geography tocolonial narratives of heroic adventure and conquest. And yet Fiedler finds recurring narra tive tropes (such as the symbolic scenes of departure from themargins of European 598 Reviews civilization into the 'darkcontinent') and a conspicuous reluctance throughout toen gage incross-cultural encounter. German nineteenth-century travelwriting presents Africa as empty landscape or as evidence of preconceived stereotypes about Africans while at thesame timeconstructing theGerman travellers as 'heroes of science' whose achievements compensate for the lack ofGerman colonial power (p. 139). Preparing the ground forGerman colonialism, this type of travelwriting was ultimately to provide some of itsauthors with a career inGermany's emerging colonial empire. Turning to other instances of the increasingly popular colonial discourse about Africa, Fiedler readsWilhelm Raabe's novel Abu Telfan (I865) as a literary reponse to thisdiscourse, a critique ofGerman exoticism and European presumptions of cul tural superiority, but he argues thatRaabe's technique of comparing and contrasting Africa and Germany ultimately reinforces colonial tropes.Wider engagement with relevant specialist research could have helped to take this discussion further.The popular culture shows of the...

Struggling with the issue of who the client is in organization development interventions

Recently, the author facilitated a particularly difficult organization development (OD) intervention with a private non‐profit organization. It was an organization whose staff and governing board were deeply divided by interpersonal conflict. Although he tried to avoid it, the author found himself pulled into the politics of this organization. This intervention caused him to ask the question: Who is the client in an OD intervention? Is it the person who hired him? The entire organization? The organization's board? OD practitioners, as reflected in the academic literature, either provide conflicting views on this point or ignore the question altogether. Citing quotations from many prominent OD practitioners, including Golembiewski, Bennis, Burke, French and Bell, and Weisbord, the author searches for a definitive answer in the literature. In this paper, which is part literature review and part case study, he takes a critical look at the OD literature on this topic; ties OD to Jean Jacques Rousseau's concept of the general will; writes an in‐depth case study; and provides his reflections on this issue. The author concludes that within a highly politicized and contentious organization, it can be highly problematic for the OD practitioner to work for the organization as a whole, since he/she may, at times, be forced to take sides.

Rousseau and the image of 'modern education'

The concept of 'modern education' is directly connected with Rousseau's theory of education. It is often said that Rousseau 'founded' modern education, or at least was its most influential predecessor. The paper argues that 'modern learning' or 'experimental education' was discussed within the late-17 th century 'quarrel of the ancients and moderns'. After this historically important debate, education and learning could be connected with the open experience of modern science. When compared to this tradition, Rousseau was not a modern writer. His concept of education has been far too paradoxical to serve as a groundwork for what was considered to be 'modern' or 'progressive education' at the end of the 19 th century. The image of progressive education was strengthened by child psychology, especially by theories of learning and development. Rousseau's stoic concept of 'negative education' is in many respects the opposite to such a viewpoint.

Of Pongos and Men:Orangs-Outangin Rousseau'sDiscourse on Inequality

Rousseau's concept of human perfectibility and his suggestion that a group of anthropomorphic animals might actually be human beings in a primitive state of nature have led an increasing number of studies to cite hisDiscourseonInequalityfor offering an early version of Darwinian evolution. I argue that a different picture emerges once we examine Rousseau's discussion against the backdrop of eighteenth-century debates on the viability of the chain of being and the possibility of multiple human species. The significance of his speculation has less to do with his special insights on human descent than with the political point to be made were it true. Rousseau usesorangs-outanglike the pongo to construct a viable model for criticizing his contemporary Europe and to defend his claim that the kind of political inequalities associated with late European society do not issue from God or nature but are accidental events in the life of the species.

Technology and the civil epistemology of democracy

In analogy with Rousseau's concept of ‘civil religion’ as a system of ‘positive dogmas’, ‘without which’, as he observed, ‘a man cannot be a good citizen’, this paper advances the concept of ‘civil epistemology’ as the positive dogmas without which the agents of government actions cannot be held accountable by democratic citizens. The civil epistemology of democracy shapes the citizen's views on the nature of political reality, on how the facts of political reality can be known and by whom. Modern liberal democratic politics assumes that the exercise of political power can be manifest in a visible domain of publicly accessible facts. It rests on the Enlightenment faith in the powers of light and visibility to demystify political power, render political actors more exposed and therefore more honestly accountable and enlist the sense of sight as a vehicle of universal political participation. It is, in this context, that technology has come to play such an important symbolic role in the construction of the ...

Moral authority and reformation religion: On charisma and the origins of modernity

From the late 17th and 18th centuries, much of modern western social and political thought has developed in terms of the contract tradition of govern? ment. Within this tradition, the locus of moral authority has been posited as rooted within society. Jean Jacques Rousseau and Emile Durkheim may be con? sidered two of the foremost expounders of this conception.1 The apotheosis of society in the writings of Durkheim is, in a certain sense, a reformulation of Rousseau's concept of sovereignty rooted in the general will. These assumptions on the source of moral authority are, furthermore, rooted in some of the major intellectual traditions of Western Christian civiliza? tion. We may think for example of Vico's immanent historicist conceptions of natural equity and universal jurisprudence or of the republican tradition of civic humanism, as among its intellectual antecedents.2 The existence of precursors notwithstanding, the notion of moral authority as rooted in society, as a strain of political thought in the Western tradition calls for some inquiry, for a number of reasons. First, this tradition continues to be but one of a number of political traditions which defined the locus of moral authority in very different spheres. In this context Burke's traditionalism or Hegel's World Spirit (or the marxian dialectic of history) exemplify alternative notions of the sources of moral ac? tion.3 Second, the conception of moral authority as resting in the community must be distinguished from the contract-tradition per se.4 That is, the very posit? ing of society in ethical terms adds a moral dimension to the notion of contract which was absent in the Utilitarian followers of David Hume. Third, this notion goes well beyond the concepts of natural law which ?in their various forms ?

Rousseau's Concept of "Sisteme musical" and the Comparative Study of Tonalities in Nineteenth-Century France

Rousseau's Concept of "Sisteme musical" and the Comparative Study of Tonalities in Nineteenth-Century France

Rousseau's Concept of Sistême musical and the Comparative Study of Tonalities in Nineteenth-Century France

Rousseau's Concept of Sistême musical and the Comparative Study of Tonalities in Nineteenth-Century France

Understanding the General Will

EW CONCEPTS in history of political thought have proved so troublesome as Rousseau's notion of general will. Rousseau must bear much of blame for this, of course, for discussion of general in his Social Contract is uncharacteristically terse and abstract. Troublesome as it has been, though, there is reason to believe that we are now approaching an adequate understanding of general will. I say this because there seems to be growing agreement among Rousseau's commentators that general not only can be understood, but that it can best be understood in rationalistic terms.' Indeed, where explications once were couched in terms of real and higher wills, one is now more likely to find general explained in terms of prisoners' dilemma and Paretooptimality.2 While I do not accept all of these rationalistic readings of general will, I do share general conviction that we can make sense of Rousseau's concept, and his argument, without resorting to metaphysics or psychology. What I shall offer here, accordingly, is in some respects only a variation on a theme now well known to students of Rousseau's political philosophy. It is an important variation nonetheless, for it enables us to reconcile passages in Social Contract which otherwise appear to be contradictory. That, at least, is what I shall argue in this essay. I proceed in following manner. First I set out a general account of what Rousseau means by the general will an account which resembles in its main lines, if not all its details, Brian Barry's analysis of general will.3 This account is defended in second part of essay, where I show how it helps us to understand two of more controversial aspects of Rousseau's argument in Social Contract. In part three I extend this account (and provide variation mentioned in last paragraph) by drawing a distinction, implicit and almost unmarked in Rousseau's writings, between general and a general will. With aid of this distinction, I argue, we can make sense of Rousseau's baffling and apparently contradictory remarks about voting. Once this is demonstrated, I conclude by raising some questions about utility of concept of general will.

Prisoner's Dilemma and Social Justice: A Reply

In a recent notel prompted by a paper of ours published in Mind in I965, John Smyth first quotes, but does not dispute, our claim a useful sense may be given to Rousseau's concept of the 'general will' by reference to the theory of non-zero-sum non-cooperative games, and then goes on to dispute our argument 'a contract falling within a set of rules conforming to an unambiguous general also falls within a set of rules that satisfy the (Rawlsian) criterion of social '. He argues 'the problem of obtaining the object of the general will is essentially a problem not of obtaining a Rawlsian rule or contract, but a problem of enforcing a rule or a contract' (p. 427). It seems to us Smyth's objection is based on a confusion between two different problems: (i) How can the 'general will', as we interpret it, be enforced? (2) Will an 'unambiguous general will' pass Rawls's test of 'social justice'? Smyth is interested in (i), and is accordingly led to the difficulties of devising enforceable sanctions in the case of the Prisoner's Dilemma. He seems, however, to be under the impression this somehow undermines our affirmative answer to question (2). This is clearly a mistake, since Smyth himself agrees subsequently 'a just contract is not necessarily an enforceable contract' (p. 430). It would, if our argument required it, be perfectly possible to envisage the parties to Prisoner's Dilemma being subject to an automatic penalty device of the form of a Doomsday Machine. But even if it were not, it still would not follow their contract embodying the 'general will' would fail to meet Rawls's criterion of social justice. The relation of a contractual theory of fairness and justice in the manner of Rawls to the notion of the general will rests precisely on the supposition parties to the contract would recognise it to be to their interest to make some sort of firm commitment in advance. Mr. Smyth says nothing which invalidates our claim men in Rawls's 'original position ' 2 would agree, among other things, not to confess if they were in due course to find themselves in a 'Prisoner's Dilemma' situation, and should therefore accept if they were to confess they would be behaving unjustly. Enforcement is a separate issue altogether.