Understanding the General Will

Abstract

EW CONCEPTS in history of political thought have proved so troublesome as Rousseau's notion of general will. Rousseau must bear much of blame for this, of course, for discussion of general in his Social Contract is uncharacteristically terse and abstract. Troublesome as it has been, though, there is reason to believe that we are now approaching an adequate understanding of general will. I say this because there seems to be growing agreement among Rousseau's commentators that general not only can be understood, but that it can best be understood in rationalistic terms.' Indeed, where explications once were couched in terms of real and higher wills, one is now more likely to find general explained in terms of prisoners' dilemma and Paretooptimality.2 While I do not accept all of these rationalistic readings of general will, I do share general conviction that we can make sense of Rousseau's concept, and his argument, without resorting to metaphysics or psychology. What I shall offer here, accordingly, is in some respects only a variation on a theme now well known to students of Rousseau's political philosophy. It is an important variation nonetheless, for it enables us to reconcile passages in Social Contract which otherwise appear to be contradictory. That, at least, is what I shall argue in this essay. I proceed in following manner. First I set out a general account of what Rousseau means by the general will an account which resembles in its main lines, if not all its details, Brian Barry's analysis of general will.3 This account is defended in second part of essay, where I show how it helps us to understand two of more controversial aspects of Rousseau's argument in Social Contract. In part three I extend this account (and provide variation mentioned in last paragraph) by drawing a distinction, implicit and almost unmarked in Rousseau's writings, between general and a general will. With aid of this distinction, I argue, we can make sense of Rousseau's baffling and apparently contradictory remarks about voting. Once this is demonstrated, I conclude by raising some questions about utility of concept of general will.