ion 'rational maximising exchangers'. Labour theorists, on the contrary, attempt to show that human behaviour, including exchange behaviour, is the outgrowth of sociality and is strikingly and importantly different from one socioeconomic system to another. Second, since only labour produces, it follows that in a society in which labourers receive only a portion of what they produce and non-producers (usually through some system of ownership) receive the surplus there is a fundamental, antagonistic conflict between these social classes. Therefore, whereas harmony is the normal state of affairs in utility theory, conflict is seen as the normal state of affairs by the labour theory—normal, that is, until This content downloaded from 207.46.13.146 on Tue, 23 Aug 2016 05:10:14 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Labour theory of value 341 that historical point at which non-producers cease having social, political and economic control over producers. Third, since the labour theory does not view individuals as social entities with metaphys ically given desires, but rather sees desires as coming into being within the process of social interaction, it follows that labour theorists reject the ethical foundations of neoclassical efficiency analysis. The labour theorists generally deny the 'well-behaved' utility and pro duction functions as well. Thus, neoclassical efficiency analysis is seen as almost entirely ideological and non-scientific. Fourth, the denial of exogenous production functions is sufficient grounds for rejecting the ethical conclusions to which the neoclassical income distribution theory generally leads. More importantly, however, the view that value is a purely social phenomenon reflecting merely one historically particular form of social labour leads inevitably to the view that under capitalism property income is not only derived from parasitic exploitation of labour but is the inevitable outcome of a particular kind of alienated labour and ought ethically to be abolished. I have argued elsewhere (Hunt, 1982, pp. 7-25) that once the definitional basis of the labour theory of value is understood it can be shown that it is integrally related to Marx's early philosophical writings on the alienation of labour, and hence it becomes an integral part of the ethical condemnation of capitalism. But just as neoclassical economic theory is not identical to bourgeois ideology but leads to it through the utility theory of value, so the labour theory of value is not itself an evaluative theory. Like the utility theory, however, it links economic theory to a social philosophy that is evaluative. The labour theory of value intellectually connects an analysis of capitalism with an ethical outlook that inevitably condemns capitalism. Indeed, I believe that it can be convincingly argued that the marginal productivity theory of distribution was developed because of this implication of the labour theory perspective. One of the most important originators of the marginal productivity theory of distribution, John Bates Clark, wrote: The welfare of the laboring classes depends on whether they get much or little; but their attitude toward the other classes—and therefore, the stability of the social state—depends chiefly on the question, whether the amount that they get, be it large or small, is what they produce. If they create a small amount of wealth and get the whole of it, they may not seek to revolutionise society; but if it were to appear that they produce an ample amount and get only a part of it, many of them would become revolutionists, and all would have the right to do so. The indictment that hangs over society is that of 'exploiting labor'. 'Workmen' it is said, 'are regularly robbed of what they produce. This is done within the forms of law, and by the natural working of competition'. If this charge were proved, every right-minded man should become a socialist; and his zeal in transforming the industrial system would then measure and express his sense of justice (Clark, 1965, p. 4). It is clear that these contrasting preanalytical visions have most drastically conflicting practical and political implications. It is also clear that practical and ethical criteria are at least as important as empirical and logical criteria in choosing between the two theories of value. Many neoclassical economists would argue that I have made an invalid comparison. They argue that their theorising is merely the working out of the logical implications of various sets of arbitrary assumptions. Since nearly all Marxists argue that their theory rests on abstractions of real processes, one might argue that I have attempted to compare the incomparable, that I have wrongly conflated the very different roles of assumptions and abstractions in economic theory. There are undoubtedly a few neoclassical economists interested solely in deductive logic. The Austrian School of neoclassical economics has, This content downloaded from 207.46.13.146 on Tue, 23 Aug 2016 05:10:14 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms