This study analyzes the characteristics and contents of strategic competition between the U.S. and China through the reorganization of the Trans-Pacific semiconductor value chain (SVC). The research results are as follows: First, the Trans-Pacific SVC grew under the leadership of the U.S. government in the 1960s. In the 1980s, the U.S. faced a crisis with the growth of Japan’s semiconductor industry; however, the U.S. recovered leadership in semiconductors through an agreement based on predatory hegemony. The globalization of the semiconductor industry was differentiated by production process and consequently geopolitical risks and vulnerabilities, the decline of the manufacturing capacity of the U.S.’s semiconductor industry, and the resulting rise of China’s industry. Second, in the 2000s, China promoted an upward stratification strategy from its position in the existing low-value-added and labor-intensive value chain. Thus, awareness of the crisis regarding technological hegemony in the U.S. has increased. The U.S. is currently pursuing a technology blockade strategy against China, starting with the trade dispute in 2018, to prevent the rise of China. Third, the U.S. SVC’s competitive strategy is to reorganize the Trans-Pacific SVC based on onshoring and friendshoring. In response to this, China is establishing a domestic Red Supply Chain as China’s “self-reliance and self-improvement” in the semiconductor industry and advanced technology. In the future, the Trans-Pacific SVC will be reorganized around the “Semicon Pivot to the U.S.” and China’s “Red Value Chain” establishment strategy. Under these conditions, the Trans-Pacific SVC is entering a new “Age of Transition.”