Rights In Russia Research Articles

Aleksandr Dugin’s transformation from a lunatic fringe figure into a mainstream political publicist, 1980–1998: A case study in the rise of late and post-Soviet Russian fascism

The paper 1 1 The paper expands on my earlier survey : Toward an Uncivil Society? Contextualizing the Recent Decline of Parties of the Extreme Right Wing in Russia, 2002. On Dugin’s fascism, see Griffin, Loh, and Umland (2006); Umland (2006b, 2006c, 2006d), reprinted in: Verkhovskii (2006), and Laruelle (2007). was completed in 2008 and complements previous analyses of post-communist Russian right-wing extremism, in general, and studies of “neo-Eurasianism,” in particular, surveying some circumstances of the emergence of its major ideologist Aleksandr Dugin (b. 1962). It introduces some teachers and collaborators of Dugin who influenced him before he became a known journalist, writer and commentator in the late 1990s. It also sketches some of Dugin’s initiatives and activities until he rose to the position of an official advisor to Gennady Seleznev, the Speaker of the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, in 1998. The footnotes provide a comprehensive bibliography on Western and Russian sources on the Russian “New Right.” It concludes with some suggestion where further research into the Dugin phenomenon could go. Current position Assistant Professor of Contemporary Russian History at The Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Bavaria, and editor of the book series Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society ( http://www.ibidem-verlag.de/spps.html), Stuttgart and Hannover. Biographical sketch CertTransl (Leipzig), MA (Stanford), MPhil (Oxford), DipPolSci, DrPhil (FU Berlin), PhD (Cambridge). Visiting fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution in 1997–1999, and Harvard’s Weatherhead Center in 2001–2002. Bosch visiting lecturer at Yekaterinburg’s Urals State University in 1999–2001, and Kyiv’s Mohyla Academy in 2003/2005. In January-December 2004, temporary lecturer in Russian and East European studies at St. Antony’s College Oxford. In 2005–2008, German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) Lecturer Kyiv’s Shevchenko University. Papers in Problems of Post-Communism, East European Jewish Affairs, Osteuropa, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, Politicheskie issledovaniya, European Political Science, Political Studies Review, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Voprosy filosofii, Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost’, Forum für osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte, Ab Imperio and other journals. Editor of The Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights in Russia: Philosophical, Legal und Empirical Studies (Stuttgart: Ibidem 2004), Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Hochschullehre in Osteuropa. Vols. 1, 2, 3 & 4 (Frankfurt a.M. u.a.: Peter Lang 2005, 2006, 2007 & 2009), and, with Roger Griffin and Werner Loh, Fascism Past and Present, West and East: An International Debate on Concepts and Cases in the Comparative Study of the Extreme Right. With an afterword by Walter Laqueur (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag 2006).

Investor Protection and the Value of Shares: Evidence from Statutory Rules Governing Variations of Shareholders' Class Rights in Russia

This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred (non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their class rights. Based on a novel hand-collected dataset of dual class stock companies in Russia and using the difference-in-difference estimator, the study finds a statistically and economically significant effect of improved protection of preferred shareholders on the value of their shares. The result is robust to several changes in the empirical specification.

Regional'nye shkoly russkoi istonografii. Knigi po rusistike, 18 by Gyula Szv�k (review)

768 SEER, 87, 4, OCTOBER 2OO9 Szvák, Gyula (ed.) Regional'nye shkoly russkoi istoriografti. Knigi po rusistike,18. RussicaPannonica,Budapest,2007.207pp. Notes.Priceunknown. Thisvolume, theproceedings ofa conference heldinBudapestin2006,offers bothlessand morethanitstitlesuggests: less,becauseitcoversonlyfewof the centresstudying regionalhistory thatexistin Russia today,and more, becausewe learna good deal abouttheirpre-Soviet predecessors as wellas manyissuesinvarioussub-disciplines. Butjustwhatis a 'regionalschool'?M. P. Mokhnacheva(Moscow)distinguishes between'regionology' fortheerudite and local history, or kraevedenie, gearedto a non-specialist public(p. 58). This seemsdiscriminatory. Surelyit shouldembraceall historical scholarly studiesof areas (nationalrepublics, provinces) thatavoidantiquarianism and applythesophisticated methodologiesdevelopedbycolleaguesworking on a largercanvas- and do notshun international comparisons, either. Thankfully we havemovedon from theera whencthe prevailing viewwasofan ideologically monolithic space'(p.33)and localhistorians wereobligedtosubstantiate universally valid'regularities' prescribed bythecentre. Since1991research intoRussia'sregions hasburgeoned, as V. V. Alekseev (Ekaterinburg) showshere(pp.12-20)inregard totheUrals, whereecologicalconcernsand popularmentalities have replacedindustrializationandsocialprotest as favoured themes. However, hecensures colleagues who disparagesocialism, so 'vulgarizing historical science',and regrettably failsto mention thedoughty Memorialactivists in Perm',a majorcentreof Stalin'sGulag. Otherresearch centres, suchas Voronezh,NizhniiNovgorodand Tver', receive passing mentionhere, as do two northCaucasian universities, Krasnodarand Stavropol',wherethefocusis respectively on psychohistory and the growth of printculture.Vologda, as D. Kaiser (Iowa) pointsout, possesses a little-known ecclesiastical archive, puttogether bythededicatedI. N. Sudorov(1 860-1926),thatcontainsa massofinformation on dailylifein seventeenth-century Muscovy - whenthisregion, as A. Kleimola(Nebraska) demonstrates, fostered an independent and aesthetically rewarding school oficon-painting. Turningsouth,LO. Tiumenitsev (Volgograd) listsRussian - but not, alas, Ukrainian!- scholarscurrently writingon Cossack history, whileM. Font (Pecs) surveys the abundantli GaliciaVolhynia . Lterature on medieval tner articles in mis collection Dear only an indirect relation, 11 any, to regionalthemes.Thus L. N. Pushkareva(Moscow) claimsthatprovincial scholars are ahead oftheircolleaguesin thecapital,withtheir'sluggish and staticacademism',in the studyof gender,a fieldthathas now become academically recognized, withno less than350 coursescurrently on offer, pirpn if it» i-f^rfici- ic florrmnrr niip tr' fpnoriAiic T^of"r"ioT*r»ricil er'r*icil otriirtiirpo '^ V '_-A-l ÍX IHIV/I^OU XO iiCltl tlJL.L-l.tl V-ll^lV^ I.KJ LVxXAC4,'^JLV-» l-*O L^M-UL JLCU. '^1 JLC4.J. &'U'^±€A.± JU U^UUlV/kl (pp.49-52).Two Hungarianspecialists on Muscovy(S. Filippov, E. Shashalmi ) tackle the Boyar Duma and the churchschism,raisinginteresting questions abouttheextent ofsecularization, something earlier historians were prone to exaggerate.Moving on chronologically, P. Dukes (Aberdeen) explores briefly theinfluence oftheScottish Enlightenment in Russia,while G. Sisak(noaffiliation given) reviews historical writing ontheSlavophiles. The REVIEWS 769 Balkanwarof1877-78and thesovietization oftheBuriatsin easternSiberia also receiveattention. Altogether thisvolumecontains muchuseful information, butmoreattentionmight havebeenpaid torelevant Western work, especially sincetheaim oftheconference, as ofitsfourpredecessors, was 'bridge-building between [.. .] Russia and theWest',as P. Longworth explains(p. 9). He pleadsthat anylackofthematic coherence is offset bythemerits ofdiversity; thevolume shouldbe valuedas an 'expression ofacademicfreedom'. Manyreaderswill surely agree,butinanysequelthecontributors shouldbe allowedmorespace inwhichto displaytheir manifold talents. Bern JohnKeep Williams, StephenF. Liberal Reform inanIlliberal Regime: TheCreation ofPrivate Property inRussia, igo6-igi$.HooverInstitution Press,Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 2006.xiv+ 320pp.Maps.Figures. Tables.Notes.Statutory appendix.Bibliography. Index.$15.00(paperback). Sometimes long-term historical debates- in thiscase over the Stolypin reforms - can profit fromarbitration. I hesitateto describeStephenF. Williams as an 'outside'mediator, becauseheiswellversed inRussianhistoriographyand an activeparticipant in thelivelyfieldofRussianlegal studies. ButtheauthorofLiberal Reform inanIlliberal Regime: TheCreation ofPrivate Property inRussia,igo6-igij is a judge, not a historian, by profession, and his perspective diverges markedly, and helpfully, from thoseinternal totheacademy .Formanyreaders, thiscompactvolumewillclarify thesubstance ofthe controversial reform - thelawsthemselves. By focusing on statute law, Williamssteersaway fromofficials' intents, peasants'desires, and arguments 'for'or 'against'Stolypin and theautocracy he served.Instead,Williamsentersthefray withquestionsthatderivefrom thelaw and economicsfieldand from politicaltheories abouttheorigins of liberalism. Ratherthanworrying aboutwhether liberalism wouldhave been good forRussia,he askswhytheStolypin reform was enactedin autocratic Russiaand whatconsequences thenewregulations couldhavehad. Williams'introduction surveys purported relationships betweentheruleof law, democracy, privateproperty and civilsociety, and derivesa quandary from liberaltheory whydidthetsarist government devolveproperty rights to a largepartofthepopulation whenno one was forcing thisreform upon thestate'sleaders?In Chapter2 on peasantland rights in Russia,Williams arguesthatthe'transaction costs'ofimproving agriculture undercommunal tenure werehighand thatthestatehad notdoneenoughearliertogiveindividualpeasantscontrolovertheirland holding.The thirdchapterreviews debatesoverpeasantwelfare. Although Williams credits recent scholars (Hoch, Wilbur.Gorshkov and others') onneasants'mobilitv and commercial activism. he relieson conventional viewsofpeasantmentality - to developthecase forland reform. A functional - anti-law, anti-wealth istimperative underpins ...

Liberal Reform in an Illiberal Regime: The Creation of Prìvate Property in Russia, 1906-1915 by Stephen F. Williams (review)

REVIEWS 769 Balkanwarof1877-78and thesovietization oftheBuriatsin easternSiberia also receiveattention. Altogether thisvolumecontains muchuseful information, butmoreattentionmight havebeenpaid torelevant Western work, especially sincetheaim oftheconference, as ofitsfourpredecessors, was 'bridge-building between [.. .] Russia and theWest',as P. Longworth explains(p. 9). He pleadsthat anylackofthematic coherence is offset bythemerits ofdiversity; thevolume shouldbe valuedas an 'expression ofacademicfreedom'. Manyreaderswill surely agree,butinanysequelthecontributors shouldbe allowedmorespace inwhichto displaytheir manifold talents. Bern JohnKeep Williams, StephenF. Liberal Reform inanIlliberal Regime: TheCreation ofPrivate Property inRussia, igo6-igi$.HooverInstitution Press,Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 2006.xiv+ 320pp.Maps.Figures. Tables.Notes.Statutory appendix.Bibliography. Index.$15.00(paperback). Sometimes long-term historical debates- in thiscase over the Stolypin reforms - can profit fromarbitration. I hesitateto describeStephenF. Williams as an 'outside'mediator, becauseheiswellversed inRussianhistoriographyand an activeparticipant in thelivelyfieldofRussianlegal studies. ButtheauthorofLiberal Reform inanIlliberal Regime: TheCreation ofPrivate Property inRussia,igo6-igij is a judge, not a historian, by profession, and his perspective diverges markedly, and helpfully, from thoseinternal totheacademy .Formanyreaders, thiscompactvolumewillclarify thesubstance ofthe controversial reform - thelawsthemselves. By focusing on statute law, Williamssteersaway fromofficials' intents, peasants'desires, and arguments 'for'or 'against'Stolypin and theautocracy he served.Instead,Williamsentersthefray withquestionsthatderivefrom thelaw and economicsfieldand from politicaltheories abouttheorigins of liberalism. Ratherthanworrying aboutwhether liberalism wouldhave been good forRussia,he askswhytheStolypin reform was enactedin autocratic Russiaand whatconsequences thenewregulations couldhavehad. Williams'introduction surveys purported relationships betweentheruleof law, democracy, privateproperty and civilsociety, and derivesa quandary from liberaltheory whydidthetsarist government devolveproperty rights to a largepartofthepopulation whenno one was forcing thisreform upon thestate'sleaders?In Chapter2 on peasantland rights in Russia,Williams arguesthatthe'transaction costs'ofimproving agriculture undercommunal tenure werehighand thatthestatehad notdoneenoughearliertogiveindividualpeasantscontrolovertheirland holding.The thirdchapterreviews debatesoverpeasantwelfare. Although Williams credits recent scholars (Hoch, Wilbur.Gorshkov and others') onneasants'mobilitv and commercial activism. he relieson conventional viewsofpeasantmentality - to developthecase forland reform. A functional - anti-law, anti-wealth istimperative underpins 770 SEER, 87, 4, OCTOBER 2OO9 thisargument, as wellas a tension betweendescribing peasantsas heldback bytheir conditions or as holding themselves back. ouivcying puiiuucu cuiiuiuuiià di uic ume ui uic iciuiiii, vvimams cunuiuucs thatno substantial groupofpolitical activists (thenobility, liberalsorsocialist parties) supported thecreation ofindividual peasantlandholdings - thekind ofreform thatwouldmeettheefficiency imperative described above. Hence thefirst finding ofthebook.Contrary toDouglasNorth's theorization ofhow liberalreforms come about,theStolypin reforms werenotwrested from the statebypressure groups.Insteadthereforms werea 'case ofgenuineliberalizationfrom above'.The abolitions ofthepolltax,collective responsibility and redemption duesalso defy institutionalist theories aboutliberalization. The mostuseful partofthisstudy isChapter5, 'Overview oftheReforms'. The majorprovisions oftheukazof9 November1906,law of 14June1910, andlawof29May 191 1aresetoutclearly. (Translations ofmostpartsofthese 'Stolypin' laws are providedin an appendix.)This chapterdescribes clearly the distinctions betweenconversion of titleand land consolidation, along withthechangesin rulesfortheseprocessesand theirrelationship to each other.Relying on earlierstudies, Williams displays in clearcharts and maps, province byprovince, thepercentages ofhouseholds and peasantlandsthat wereconverted toindividual title orconsolidated between1907and into1915 whentheprocesswas stopped.He makestheimportant pointthatapplicationsoutstripped processing, and thepercentages ofconversions orconsolidations in 1915do notsignalan 'outcome'ofan ongoing processthatmight have becomelong-term. In thefinalchapters ofthebook,Williams cutsthrough earlierdebatesby asking aboutthedesignofthereform, rather thanhowmanypeopleusedits provisions. Did theStolypin reforms putinplace thekindsofproperty rights thought to be essential fora market-based economy, a vibrant civilsociety, andliberaldemocracy? The answer isno:thelawssetlimits onpeasants'right to selland to acquireland,and didnotgivepeasantselectoral rights equivalentto thoseofnoble and otherlandholders. Williamsaccusesthereforms themselves ofpreserving theold regime oftutelage. One conclusion to drawfromthisattentive analysisofstatute law is that thehigh-pitched debateover'private'vs communalproperty is off base: no privateproperty rightwas on offer. Williamsshowshow the cooperative movement andthestate's lending terms further stifled individual initiative and choice.Some evidence- offlimits in Soviettimes- suggests thatwhere strips wereconsolidated, agricultural outputincreaseddramatically by 191 3. But theseincreasesin efficiency did notchallengethepoliticsofprotection andpatrimonialism preserved in Stolypin's reform. Williams notessimilarities withpost-Soviet land laws:they,too,setlimits on purchasesand sales and retained stateofficials' authority overagricultural land. Based on liberaltheoriesof governance, Williams'book both answers itsquestions and posesnew ones.The autocracy - an 'illiberal'regimeproduceda reform thatwas notfoisted upon itand thatseemedto devolve powerand property to outsiders (peasants).But the reform was not really 'liberal';it preserved inequitiesin civilstatusand constrained individuals' REVIEWS 771 powersover'their' land.Theseconclusions do notresolve a century ofdebate overStolypin's reforms, but as a good mediatorshould,Williamsputsthe past intoa new and soberingperspective. At the same time,the poor fit betweenliberalpoliticaltheory and Stolypin's initiative meansthatwe need moreexpansivenotionsoflaw and politicsto understand whythisreform happenedat all. Department ofHistory Jane Burbank MewYorkUniversity Finkel, Stuart. On theIdeological Front:The RussianIntelligentsia of theSovietPublic Sphere. Yale UniversityPress, New H and theMaking [aven,CT and...

All Appeals Lead to Strasbourg?

(ProQuest: ... denotes non-US-ASCII text omitted.)The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), a judicial arm of the Council of Europe based in Strasbourg, France, is the most popular court in Russia today.1 In this article, I explore how ordinary people, government officials, and judges in Russia interact with this supranational human rights tribunal. Since March 30, 1998, Russia has recognized both the compulsory jurisdiction of this transnational court and the right of individuals to sue Russia in this court for violations of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.2 What violations did Russia commit in the past decade, as identified by the ECtHR? How does the process of transmitting the meaning of ECtHR judgments to Russian authorities work? How do Russia's courts respond to ECtHR interpretations of the 1950 convention and why? Do Russian judges read and draw on these decisions, or do they ignore or defy the decisions of the ECtHR? By addressing these questions, we can attempt to probe the dynamics of how law works or fails to work on the ground, as well as whether and how transnational legal institutions make a difference in societies in which officials and judges fail to uphold even the most basic principles of rule of law.3The observance of international human rights standards in nondemocracies like Russia is poor. However, this does not mean that we should not study what government officials and judges in nondemocratic regimes are actually doing when they face criticism coming from international legal institutions. What responses, if any, do key domestic actors have to the criticism of international institutions? Does this criticism makes a difference in their behavior? Human rights activists tend to portray Russia's responses as noncompliance, somewhere between outright defiance and quiet ignorance.4 Many Russian government officials reply that this defiance is justified. They argue that the European community uses the ECtHR as a baton to monitor the implementation of the European Convention of Human Rights in Russia.5 To them, every loss in the Strasbourg court is a political scandal, be it the embarrassment over nonpayment of the meager 500-ruble child-care subsidy to mothers in the Voronezh Region or the major cover-up of large-scale human rights violations in Chechnya. Most ECtHR judgments the key claim made by Vladimir Putin: that his regime brought law, order, and prosperity to Russia. The intensity of this political scandal will only escalate in the near future, largely because the ECtHR will hear more and more politically salient cases, including ones that involve torture and disappearances in Chechnya, YUKOSrelated cases, and the large-scale deportations of Georgian citizens, among others. Russia's human rights ombudsman, Vladimir Lukin, and his colleagues scolded Russian officials for developing a paranoia that the only wish of the rest of the world is to bite, destroy Russia.6 Not surprisingly, some of these officials began suggesting that only public enemies and whiners-plunderers of the federal budget go to the Strasbourg court, a tribunal that is seen either as plotting against Russia or as a biased, slow, ineffective court.7The Kremlin today has made it a priority to stem the flow of potential complaints to the ECtHR and to do something about the complaints that have already been received by the court. Indeed, this priority appears to be the key rationale for the Russian Parliament's failure during Vladimir Putin's presidency to ratify the fourteenth protocol to the 1950 convention, a reform that would speed up the handling of cases by the Strasbourg court and result in more judgments against Russia.8 Putin's successor, President Dmitry Medvedev, is worried about the impact of this transnational litigation. He appears to realize that never-ending losses in the Strasbourg court may undermine the legitimacy of the national position in the eyes of domestic constituents, something that he cannot afford in a time of deepening economic crisis. …

Investor Protection and Share Prices: Evidence from Statutory Rules Governing Variations of Shareholders' Class Rights in Russia

This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred (non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their class rights. Based on a novel hand-collected dataset of dual class stock companies in Russia and using the difference-in-difference estimator, the study finds a statistically and economically significant effect of improved protection of preferred shareholders on the value of their shares. The result is robust to several changes in the empirical specification.

Promoting Human Rights in Russia by Supporting NGOs: How to Improve EU Strategies

The EU advocates a policy that includes a great deal of human rights promotion and support for Russian NGOs. The question for EU policy-makers is no longer whether but how to manage NGO involvement in a way that induces necessary changes in Russia’s human rights behaviour. This paper argues that current EU policies often fall short of their potential to develop the non-state transfer of European ideas, norms, and practices to Russia or to assist the development of the Russian NGO community. If the EU is to become a serious actor in the field of human rights promotion, it will have to find new and creative ways to communicate with Russians about human rights matters. This paper offers policy recommendations to adapt EU strategies to the current context of the EURussia relationship and to redesign EU assistance programmes. CEPS Working Documents are intended to give an indication of work being conducted within CEPS research programmes and to stimulate reactions from other experts in the field. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which s/he is associated.

Defending Rights in Russia: Lawyers, the State, and Legal Reform in the Post-Soviet Era

Defending Rights in Russia: Lawyers, the State, and Legal Reform in the Post-Soviet Era

Le droit de propriété en Russie : l'évolution d'une catégorie juridique au gré des bouleversements politiques et économiques

Property rights in Russia: The evolution of a legal category in response to political and economic turbulence The system and function of property rights have been transformed in the switch from pre-Revolutionary to contemporary law. A historical view of this institution reveals how the law has served various purposes over time: for the marketplace or for economic planning and the distribution of goods. Remnants of the Communist past have gradually undergone an original sort of "sedimentation" in contemporary law, which is now trying to assimilate the legacy of European law. To understand this process, the category of property is analyzed as well as the reform of civil law and the definition of its scope. Changes in property rights are reviewed in the light of recent privatizations. Given the complexity of these trends, the difficulty of creating a real estate market makes thoroughgoing institutional reforms a necessity.

Original Sin, Good Works, and Property Rights in Russia

Are property rights obtained through dubious means forever tainted with original sin, or can right holders make their ill-gotten gains legitimate by doing good works? This is a critical question for developing and transition countries, where privatization is often opaque and businesspeople may receive property, but remain unwilling to use it productively due to concerns about the vulnerability of their rights to political challenge. Using a survey of 660 businesspeople conducted in Russia in 2005, the author finds that the original sin of an illegal privatization is difficult to expunge. Contrary to a “Coasian” view of privatization, property rights transferred through a legally questionable privatization are seen as illegitimate long after privatization. Busi-nesspeople, however, can improve the legitimacy of property rights by doing good works, such as providing public goods and using their assets well. Finally, managers who provide public goods for their region are more likely to invest in their firms than those who do not. This suggests a possible political rationale for the provision of public goods by privatefirms.Thesefindingshave implications for studies of privatization, property rights, and business-state relations in transitions and developing countries.

Defending rights in Russia: lawyers, the state, and legal reform in the post-Soviet era

Acknowledgments Abbreviations Introduction 1. The Russian and Soviet Bars: A Historical Perspective, 1864-1984 2. The Advokatura in the Gorbachev Period, 1985-91 3. Chaos in the Advokatura, 1992-2002 4. Autonomy and Dependence: State-Bar Relations in the 1990s 5. Restructuring the Advokatura from Above, 2002-3 6. Russian Criminal Defence Advocacy in the Post-Soviet Era 7. New Trends in Advocates' Practice in the Civil Sphere Conclusion Appendices 1 Surveys of Advocates' Opinions / 2 Stages of a Russian Criminal Case / Notes / Selected Bibliography / Index /

Human Rights in Russia

Human Rights in Russia

Human Rights in Russia: A Darker Side of Reform

Human Rights in Russia: A Darker Side of Reform

War against the Family: Domestic Violence and Human Rights in Russia - A View from the Bashkortostan Republic

Although the former Soviet totalitarian structures are being dismantled, new forms of political, economic and social organizations are not yet in place. In Communist Russia, the family as an ideological institution shaped official family policy. The contemporary transformation of Russian society has inevitably touched family life and women’s roles within it. This article presents an analysis of domestic violence in Russia, and makes recommendations for social action, legislation, social condemnation and the women’s movement.

Original Sin, Good Works, and Property Rights in Russia: Evidence From a Survey Experiment

Are property rights obtained through legally dubious means forever tainted with original sin or can rightholders make their ill-gotten gains legitimate by doing good works? 2 This is a critical question for developing countries (and Russia in particular) where privatization is often opaque and businesspeople may receive property, but remain unwilling to use it productively due to concerns about the vulnerability of their rights to political challenge. Using a survey of 660 businesspeople conducted in Russia in February 2005, I find that the original sin of an illegal privatization is difficult to expunge. Businesspeople, however, can improve the perceived legitimacy of property rights by doing good works, such as investing in the firm and by providing public goods for the region. Finally, managers that provide public goods for their region are more likely to invest in their firms than those who did not. The finding that public goods providers invest at higher rates is at odds with standard economic logic, but fits well with the more political view of property rights developed here. These findings have implications for political economy and contemporary Russia.

Human Rights in Russia: A Darker Side of Reform. By Jonathan Weiler. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004. x, 165 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Tables. $49.95, hard bound.

Human Rights in Russia: A Darker Side of Reform. By Jonathan Weiler. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004. x, 165 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Tables. $49.95, hard bound. - Volume 64 Issue 1

Defending Rights in Russia: Lawyers, the State, and Legal Reform in the Post-Soviet Era

Defending Rights in Russia: Lawyers, the State, and Legal Reform in the Post-Soviet Era

Property rights in context: Privatization’s legacy for corporate legality in Poland and Russia

In the first decade after the collapse of Communism, Russia became notorious for conflicts around corporate property and corporate governance. In Poland, such conflicts were far less frequent. This distinction, I argue, reflects the form of privatization in each country. In Poland, negotiation among potential shareholders and current enterprise stakeholders preceded privatization, whereas in Russia privatization procedures pitted these same groups against one another. The legacy of privatization in Russia expressed itself in long-running legal conflicts over the security of property rights. These developments highlight the importance of situational incentives to challenge or respect property rights, undermining various new-institutionalist arguments that link security of property rights primarily to the commitment and capacity of state bodies to enforce them, to the normative legitimacy of the law, or to coordination equilibria in a game-theoretic framework. The argument also enables a clarification of the political trajectory now leading to stronger corporate property rights in Russia. M ore than a decade after the collapse of state socialism in the East Bloc, the region displays many striking and intriguing contrasts in national trajectories. This article focuses on one such contrast: the remarkable distinctions between Poland and Russia in the area of corporate governance. In the 1990s, Russia’s corporate governance became notoriously conflictual. In any number of privatized firms, management refused to share power and profits with shareholders, sometimes via flouting the law, at other times by simply manipulating it. Legal experts asked “What went wrong?” and sought “corporate governance lessons from Russian enterprise fiascoes” (Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova 2000; Fox and Heller 2000). The state of corporate legality in Poland, by contrast, drew far more flatter

Human rights in Russia: a darker side of reform

Human rights in Russia: a darker side of reform

European Norms on the Protection of Human Rights: On the Development of Russian Human Rights Legislation

AbstractThis article examines the problems concerning the observance by the Russian Federation of European conventions, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture. In recent years, there has been a signifi cant breakthrough in the development of Russian legislation in light of human rights' principles and standards laid down by the Council of Europe. At the same time, the implementation of European standards in the law enforcement area has been carried out at a distinctly slow pace, particularly in relation to the criminal–executive system (where the first tentative steps towards the reform of penitentiary institutions have only been recently taken), the rights of migrants and refugees, the protection of the rights of armed forces personnel, and human rights in Chechnya. This article analyses the problems involved in the legal and judicial protection of human rights in Russia as well as issues concerning the restriction of citizens' rights in special circumstances (such as war or a state of emergency) and the protection of social rights. Lastly, the creation of a unifi ed legal space for human rights in the Russian Federation will also be discussed.