Richard Layard Research Articles

Обзор книги «Источники счастья: наука о благополучии на протяжении всей жизни»

Рецензия знакомит читателей с ключевыми идеями и выводами книги «Источники счастья: наука о благополучии на протяжении всей жизни» авторов Эндрю Кларка, Сары Флеш, Ричарда Лейарда, Наттавудха Повдтхави, Джорджа Уорда.

Income growth is unlikely to help, but we can learn from international comparisons

AbstractThe paper by Paul Frijters, Andrew E. Clark, Christian Krekel and Richard Layard is a timely attempt to move subjective wellbeing (SWB) to the center of policy attention. I am essentially making three points. First of all, for this enterprise to be successful, one needs to have very solid evidence on what improves SWB and what does not. If policies are proposed that turn out not to improve SWB (or do so far less than expected), then the enterprise of making SWB the centerpiece of policy may be discredited before it has begun in earnest. As an example of this concern, my second point is that raising the incomes of all may have very disappointing effects on measured SWB. My third point is that at the current state of knowledge, the most fertile ground for learning about what works is to exploit international comparisons of policies and how these affect a nation's SWB.

Self-Reported Wellbeing Indicators Are a Valuable Complement to Traditional Economic Indicators but Aren’t Yet Ready to Compete with Them. A Comment on a Happy Choice: Wellbeing As the Goal of Government by Paul Frijters, Andrew E. Clark, Christian Krekel and Richard Layard

We join the call for governments to routinely collect survey-based measures of self-reported wellbeing and for researchers to study them. We list a number of challenges that have to be overcome in order for these measures to eventually achieve a status competitive with traditional economic indicators. We discuss in more detail one of the challenges, comprehensiveness: single-question wellbeing measures do not seem to fully capture what people care about. We briefly review the existing evidence, suggesting that survey respondents, when asked to make real or hypothetical tradeoffs, would not always choose to maximize their predicted response to single-question wellbeing measures. The deviations appear systematic, and persist under conditions where alternative explanations are less plausible. We also review an approach for combining single-question measures into a more comprehensive wellbeing index—an approach that itself is not free of ongoing theoretical and implementational challenges, but that we view as a promising direction.

Your fathers’ mistakes: Critiques of GDP and the search for an alternative

Your fathers’ mistakes: Critiques of GDP and the search for an alternative

Reflections on happiness

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to assess the twenty-first century reach and impact of “happiness” work by one individual (Professor Lord Richard Layard).Design/methodology/approachThe author approaches his work as a public health case study, with the caveat that the author knew this “Case” personally, which could influence the author’s assessment.FindingsDuring 2005-2018, Richard Layard stimulated discussion of “happiness” as a field of study. This field now has global relevance to mental health, although its relationship to practice for population health is still debated.Originality/valueLayard’s ideas are behind many initiatives, such as Improving Access to Psychological Therapies.

WHAT ECONOMICS CAN AND CANNOT SAY ABOUT EGALITARIAN REDISTRIBUTION

Abstract:I critically consider four purported economic-efficiency arguments for egalitarian redistribution of income or wealth. (1) Jeremy Bentham’s “greatest aggregate happiness” criterion has been used (by Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, A. C. Pigou, Abba Lerner, and more recently Richard Layard) to argue for wealth transfers toward the poor based on the supposition that they register higher happiness from a marginal dollar. Drawing from Vilfredo Pareto and Lionel Robbins, however, I argue that modern economic theory is not about individual happiness, let alone aggregate happiness, and therefore does not support (nor refute) any happiness-based case for wealth redistribution. (2) Theories based on a “social welfare function” misapply the economic way of thinking in a different way. (3) Other writers have framed redistribution as a public good, and public goods provision by the state as a voluntary collective means of satisfying individual preferences, thereby using modern economic theory to formulate a rationale for redistributive policies based on Pareto-efficiency. I criticize this rationale for resting on suppositions about actual preferences that are self-immunized against falsification. (4) James Buchanan made a related case for taxing inheritances based on the supposition that in constitutional deliberation behind a veil of ignorance we would agree to such a policy based on our preference for a certain kind of fairness. I find this argument non-economic, equally unfalsifiable, and no more plausible than alternative suppositions about our common preferences. The economic way of thinking does speak clearly, however, about how taxes on income or wealth discourage its production, the more so the higher the marginal tax rate.

What Economics Can and Cannot Say About Egalitarian Redistribution

I critically consider four purported economic-efficiency arguments for egalitarian redistribution of income or wealth. (1) Jeremy Bentham’s “greatest aggregate happiness” criterion has been used (by Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, A. C. Pigou, Abba Lerner, and more recently Richard Layard) to argue for wealth transfers toward the poor based on the supposition that they register higher happiness from a marginal dollar. Drawing from Vilfredo Pareto and Lionel Robbins, however, I argue that modern economic theory is not about individual happiness, let alone aggregate happiness, and therefore does not support (nor refute) any happiness-based case for wealth redistribution. (2) Theories based on a “social welfare function” misapply the economic way of thinking in a different way. (3) Other writers have framed redistribution as a public good, and public goods provision by the state as a voluntary collective means of satisfying individual preferences, thereby using modern economic theory to formulate a rationale for redistributive policies based on Pareto-efficiency. I criticize this rationale for resting on suppositions about actual preferences that are self-immunized against falsification. (4) James Buchanan made a related case for taxing inheritances based on the supposition that in constitutional deliberation behind a veil of ignorance we would agree to such a policy based on our preference for a certain kind of fairness. I find this argument non-economic, equally non-falsifiable, and no more plausible than alternative suppositions about our common preferences. The economic way of thinking does speak clearly, however, about how taxes on income or wealth discourage its production, the more so the higher the marginal tax rate.

Thrive: The Power of Evidence-Based Psychological Therapies by Richard Layard and David M. Clark. Published by Allen Lane, Penguin Group, London, 2014; 373 pp; £20.00 hardback

Thrive: The Power of Evidence-Based Psychological Therapies by Richard Layard and David M. Clark. Published by Allen Lane, Penguin Group, London, 2014; 373 pp; £20.00 hardback

The elephant tied up with string: a clinical case study showing the importance of NHS provision of intensive, time-limited psychoanalytic psychotherapy treatments

Prof. Richard Layard's influential advocacy for greater provision of ‘evidence-based’ psychological therapies, based in part on an economic rationale, has lead to greatly increased provision of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and short-term therapies for depression, through the Increasing Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) initiative, whilst longer-term psychodynamic treatments are under threat, criticised as lacking an evidence base. This paper argues for the continuing provision of intensive thrice-weekly psychoanalytic psychotherapy treatments, time-limited to two years. It does so by describing such a treatment within an NHS psychotherapy department with a patient with a long history of severe personality pathology, including significant levels of perversity. The paper describes the patient's difficulties and his movement through the treatment, focussing on his difficulties making genuine emotional contact, his destructiveness of such contact, his acting out in the treatment, his perversity and the vital working through of the ending. The shifts the patient made are described, and follow-up information on the patient is given. The paper discusses the unique benefits of time-limited treatment and intensive psychoanalytic treatments for this ‘hard-to-help’ group of patients, and the economic rationale that can be made for such treatments.

The CBT Panacea

Thrive: The Power of Evidence-Based Psychological Therapies Richard Layard and David M Clark Allen Lane, 2014 HB, 384pp, £20.00, 978-1846146053 Richard Layard is a Labour peer and a distinguished economist and David Clark is Professor of Psychology at Oxford. They are both key figures in the NHS IAPT (Improving Access to Psychological Therapies) programme. Their book was published not long after another of the same name, by Arianna Huffington, the high-profile founder of the Huffington Post . Both deal in different ways with the pursuit of happiness. Huffington’s road to personal wellbeing involves the ‘Third Metric’, which comprises getting a lot of sleep, mindfulness, relaxation, unplugging, watching your sugar intake, and …

On Capability and the Good Life: Theoretical Debates and their Practical Implications

The capability approach was first developed by Amartya Sen in his Tanner Lecture Equality of What? (Sen 1980). Canonical statements of the approach were published in the 1980s (for example, Sen 1985). Slightly modified statements were subsequently published in the early 1990s (for example, Sen 1993), with more mature versions published in Sen's Development as Freedom and The Idea of Justice (Sen 1999; 2009). Over the years, variations of the approach have emerged. In particular, Martha Nussbaum's version of the approach, which is distinguished by a different title--the capabilities approach--has emerged as a distinct view in moral and political theory. The capability approach is often seen as advancing a distinct view of human well-being. But at the same time it also supports Sen's claims that welfare is not the exclusive object of value in moral evaluation and that freedom has a value independent of welfare. The freedom to live a life we value and have reason to value--or the opportunity we have to lead a valuable or good life--is, very roughly, our capability. Those interested in alternative views of well-being or of the good life will ask: does this approach provide a distinctive account of what makes a life go well or better, or of human flourishing? If it does, does this view of the good life provide any new insights into public policies and about what governments and others should, or should not, promote? I argue in this paper that even if Sen does not advance a substantive view of the good life in developing his capability perspective, his theoretical commitments lead him to quite specific policy views. These strongly contrast with those adopted by one contemporary utilitarian: Richard Layard. Although Sen's views about policy typically overlap with those of others--like Nussbaum--who favor a version of the capability perspective, sometimes variations of the approach can diverge in their policy applications because of theoretical differences. The Capability Perspective The capability perspective emerged from an engagement with a variety of different theoretical approaches within philosophy and welfare economics. In both areas it started from a critical attitude to specific notions of welfare in utilitarian thinking, those that see welfare or utility in terms of the satisfaction of desires, pleasure, or happiness. In each case, the approach suggests that the metric of utility might be distorted in some way. The overworked indentured servant and the undernourished peasant may cut their desires, learn to find pleasure in mercies, or learn to be happy with their lot. Nonetheless, they suffer from significant deprivations and may be short on opportunities to live lives that are valuable. This adaptation (or small mercies) objection to utility-based analysis suggests that we should be concerned, in evaluating the quality of people's lives, with the opportunities they have and with what they are able to do or be. And it cautions us against focusing exclusively on people's level of utility understood in certain ways. Sen's capability approach asks us to include information on capability and functioning in the evaluation of the quality of life and social states more generally. Functioning here refers to states of the person, the various things a person can do and be. Indeed, on this approach lives can be understood as made up of functionings, and well-being is understood as an evaluation of functionings. The capability approach also asks us to consider the capability people have--where this is understood in terms of the collections or n-tuples of functionings from which a person can choose (see, for example, Sen 1993, 31). It asks us to consider the opportunities or range of lives that are open to each of us. If we return to the overworked indentured servant or the undernourished peasant, we need to evaluate their lives understood in terms of functionings and the range of lives open to them. …

Subjective Social Indicators: Benefits and Limitations for Policy Making—An Introduction to this Special Issue

Although the field of empirical ‘‘happiness research’’ or the ‘‘new science of happiness’’— as it was overzealously named by Richard Layard—has been prospering in recent years and attracting considerable interest by policy makers, the usefulness of happiness indicators—or more generally subjective social indicators—for policy making purposes continues to be controversial: There are numerous advocates of the notion that subjective indicators can and should be used to better inform policy makers, but also many critical voices pointing to the ambivalent nature of this sort of information and indicators as well as to the risks of making use of them in everyday political decision making. The currently flourishing debate is all but new however. Particularly Scandinavian researchers representing a resources based notion of welfare or well-being have in their majority always been critical toward the use of subjective indicators for policy making purposes. According to Robert Erikson—one of the most eminent proponents of the Swedish ‘‘level of living approach’’—‘‘people’s opinions and preferences should go into the democratic political process through their activities as citizens, but not through survey questions and opinion polls’’ (Erikson 1993: 78). Contrary to this position, happiness researchers have consistently underlined that policy makers need to take subjective indicators into account, at least in addition to objective indicators: ‘‘...subjective indicators are indispensable in social policy, both for assessing policy success and for selecting policy goals’’ (Veenhoven 2002: 40). Currently, those advocating the use of ‘‘happiness research’’—results and measures of subjective well-being in the policy making process seem to outbalance those raising doubts whether ‘‘the scientific basis of happiness research (is) sufficiently strong to base important public policy considerations on it’’ (Whittington 2007). In recent years, it has not only been proposed to make use of this sort of research and information in specific policy making fields, e.g. health, or the labour market, but even to establish national accounts of (subjective) well-being (Diener et al. 2009; Michaelson et al. 2009). On the other hand, policy

Voice - Julia Quickfall highlights an upcoming series of workshops on technology

A recent report from a mental health policy group at the London School of Economics, led by Richard Layard, states that ‘mental illness’ accounts for nearly half of all ill health experienced by people under the age of 65 in the UK. Although the group’s report highlights the problem of what it terms ‘mental illness’, the underlying assumption is that a standardised treatment protocol – controlled by the providing authority and delivered according to a specifi c process – will meet everyone’s needs. Psychological distress is not a medical illness and cannot be treated effectively by a traditional medical model. It has its roots in social, structural and environmental processes beyond the control of the individual. The number of individuals with psychological diffi culties has risen steadily since the second world war. The fi nancial cost of treatment is huge, but the real cost is reduced quality of life for many. To treat psychological distress effectively, the root of the problem needs to be exposed. The solution suggested by the report addresses the problem after the epidemic has begun, rather than trying to immunise against it. re-thinking distress

Richard Layard and Stephen Nickell (2011), Combating Unemployment. New York: Oxford University Press. £35, pp. 272, hbk.

Richard Layard and Stephen Nickell (2011), Combating Unemployment. New York: Oxford University Press. £35, pp. 272, hbk.

Naukowy hedonizm jako podstawa krytycznej oceny przemian społecznych – ekonomia szczęścia Richarda Layarda, Marka Anielskiego i Richarda Easterlina

Since about 1970 there is a growing scientific interest in the concept of happiness (or its measurable equivalent – subjective well-being SWB). It is assumed that if augmenting happiness is assumed as the aim of social development, it can be assessed if real progress is being made. It should replace traditional concept of GDP. Researchers like Richard Layard, Mark Anielski and Richard Easterlin use the concept of happiness to mount a critique of contemporary free-market capitalism. They suggest that instead of consumption and competition, governments should promote happiness, tightening interpersonal relationship, building social trust, timing strive for prestige. However other researchers (Ruut Veenhoven, Betsey Sevenson and Justin Wolfers among others) defend economical growth as a foundation of every social development. The discussion has a philosophical paradox in it – those how attack capitalism from a humanistic angle use a hedonistic and selfish concept of subjective happiness while those who defend capitalism appeal to values that goes beyond it.

The happiness of people with a mental disorder in modern society

Richard Layard (2005) holds modern society responsible for an 'epidemic of mental disorder', which he sees as a major source of contemporary unhappiness. Yet average happiness is high in modern society and most people with a mental disorder feel happy most of the time. This appears in an analysis of a representative sample (N = 7,076) of the general population in The Netherlands that was screened for mental disorders. Happiness was measured using a single question on how often respondents had felt happy during the last four weeks. Of the respondents with a mental disorder 68% reported they often felt happy during the last four weeks. People with a mental disorder may be victims of modern society, but they also benefit from modern society. Happiness is highest for people with substance abuse and anxiety disorders and uncommon for people with mood disorders.

On the Philosophical Implications of Empirical Research on Happiness

The claim that Empirical Research has Philosophical Implications (or ERPI) is the thesis that empirical happiness research in psychology, economics, sociology, neuroscience, or some other similar field has direct implications for the truth of some philosophical theory about happiness. ERPI appears to be an unquestioned presupposition of some philosophers who write about happiness. Several psychologists seem to have endorsed ERPI. Other empirical researchers (not in psychology) have made similar claims. After explaining the meaning and importance of ERPI, I discuss a series of specific instances that have been cited in support of ERPI. I discuss work by Martin Seligman, Daniel Kahneman, Richard Layard, Donald Bruckner, Ed Diener, and Pelin Kesebir. In each case, I try to show that the instance cited does nothing to support ERPI. I am inclined to think (thought I don't try to establish it in this paper) that there is no instance in which clearly empirical research clearly supports a clearly philosophical conclusion.

The fallacy of Van Helmont's tree

A campaign sponsored by the ‘happiness tsar’ Richard Layard and backed by the entire medical, psychiatric, and social policy establishment is recommending ‘evidence-based’ psychological therapies for up to one-third of the population.1 But is their evidence sound? According to Professor Layard, the scale of Britain's mental health problem is ‘massive’: one in three families are affected.2 He believes that ‘one in ten’ children and ‘one in six’ adults are suffering from a ‘diagnosable problem requiring professional help’. It is immediately apparent that these rates of diagnosis can only be achieved by the dramatic inflation of familiar diagnostic categories and the expansion of the scope of psychiatric labelling from a small …

Staatliche Glücksförderung? Karl Popper, Richard Layard und das Rauchen / Should public policy pursue happiness? Karl Popper, Richard Layard and smoking

Zusammenfassung Die empirische Glücksforschung hat dazu geführt, dass nunmehr auch manche Ökonomen fordern, dass der Staat des Glückes Schmied der Bürger sein soll. In einer liberalen Gesellschaft wirkt diese Forderung zunächst befremdlich. Um zu klären, ob und gegebenenfalls wie der Staat Politik glücksdienlich gestalten könnte, werden die Positionen von Karl Popper und Richard Layard einander gegenüber gestellt. Daran schließt sich eine tiefer gehende Analyse paternalistischer Staatseingriffe an, wobei die Frage im Mittelpunkt steht, welche Präferenzen der Bürger von Staatswegen gefördert bzw. unterdrückt werden sollten. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auf die Internalitäten-Theorie eingegangen, die zu zeigen versucht. wie Individuen gegen ihre eigenen längerfristigen Interessen verstoßen. Am Beispiel des potentiell gesundheits- und glücksschädlichen Rauchens wird geprüft, ob und gegebenenfalls welche Staatseingriffe nach Karl Popper einerseits und der Internalitäten-Theorie andererseits gerechtfertigt werden können.

Richard Layard and Stephen Nickell receive IZA Prize in Labor Economics

Richard Layard and Stephen Nickell receive IZA Prize in Labor Economics