On Capability and the Good Life: Theoretical Debates and their Practical Implications

Abstract

The capability approach was first developed by Amartya Sen in his Tanner Lecture Equality of What? (Sen 1980). Canonical statements of the approach were published in the 1980s (for example, Sen 1985). Slightly modified statements were subsequently published in the early 1990s (for example, Sen 1993), with more mature versions published in Sen's Development as Freedom and The Idea of Justice (Sen 1999; 2009). Over the years, variations of the approach have emerged. In particular, Martha Nussbaum's version of the approach, which is distinguished by a different title--the capabilities approach--has emerged as a distinct view in moral and political theory. The capability approach is often seen as advancing a distinct view of human well-being. But at the same time it also supports Sen's claims that welfare is not the exclusive object of value in moral evaluation and that freedom has a value independent of welfare. The freedom to live a life we value and have reason to value--or the opportunity we have to lead a valuable or good life--is, very roughly, our capability. Those interested in alternative views of well-being or of the good life will ask: does this approach provide a distinctive account of what makes a life go well or better, or of human flourishing? If it does, does this view of the good life provide any new insights into public policies and about what governments and others should, or should not, promote? I argue in this paper that even if Sen does not advance a substantive view of the good life in developing his capability perspective, his theoretical commitments lead him to quite specific policy views. These strongly contrast with those adopted by one contemporary utilitarian: Richard Layard. Although Sen's views about policy typically overlap with those of others--like Nussbaum--who favor a version of the capability perspective, sometimes variations of the approach can diverge in their policy applications because of theoretical differences. The Capability Perspective The capability perspective emerged from an engagement with a variety of different theoretical approaches within philosophy and welfare economics. In both areas it started from a critical attitude to specific notions of welfare in utilitarian thinking, those that see welfare or utility in terms of the satisfaction of desires, pleasure, or happiness. In each case, the approach suggests that the metric of utility might be distorted in some way. The overworked indentured servant and the undernourished peasant may cut their desires, learn to find pleasure in mercies, or learn to be happy with their lot. Nonetheless, they suffer from significant deprivations and may be short on opportunities to live lives that are valuable. This adaptation (or small mercies) objection to utility-based analysis suggests that we should be concerned, in evaluating the quality of people's lives, with the opportunities they have and with what they are able to do or be. And it cautions us against focusing exclusively on people's level of utility understood in certain ways. Sen's capability approach asks us to include information on capability and functioning in the evaluation of the quality of life and social states more generally. Functioning here refers to states of the person, the various things a person can do and be. Indeed, on this approach lives can be understood as made up of functionings, and well-being is understood as an evaluation of functionings. The capability approach also asks us to consider the capability people have--where this is understood in terms of the collections or n-tuples of functionings from which a person can choose (see, for example, Sen 1993, 31). It asks us to consider the opportunities or range of lives that are open to each of us. If we return to the overworked indentured servant or the undernourished peasant, we need to evaluate their lives understood in terms of functionings and the range of lives open to them. …