Reward Biases Research Articles

A Trauma-Focused Screening Approach for Teen Dating Violence Prevention.

Developing accurate and equitable screening protocols can lead to more targeted, efficient, and effective, teen dating violence (TDV) prevention programming. Current TDV screening protocols perform poorly and are rarely implemented, but recent research and policy emphasizes the importance of leveraging more trauma-focused screening measures for improved prevention outcomes. In response, the present study examined which adversities (i.e., indices of family violence), trauma-focused risk factors (i.e., threat and reward biases) and strengths (i.e., social support and racial/ethnic identity) best classified concurrent and prospective risk for physical and psychological forms of TDV-perpetration. Participants included 584 adolescents aged 12-18years (MAge = 14.43; SD = 1.22), evenly distributed across gender (48.9% female), race (35% African American; 38.5% White) and ethnicity (40% Hispanic). Surveys completed at baseline and 1-year follow-up were analyzed using an evidence-based medicine (EBM) analytic protocol (i.e., logistic regression, area-under-the-curve; (AUC), diagnostic likelihood ratios (DLR), calibration curves) and compared to machine learning models. Results revealed hostility best classified risk for concurrent and prospective physical TDV-perpetration (AUCs > 0.70; DLRs > 2.0). Additionally, domestic violence (DV) exposure best forecasted prospective psychological TDV-perpetration (AUC > 0.70; DLR > 3.0). Both indices were well-calibrated (i.e., non-significant Spiegelhalter's Z statistics) and statistically fair. Machine learning models added minimal incremental validity. Results demonstrate the importance of prioritizing hostility and DV-exposure for accurate, equitable, and feasible screening for physical and psychological forms of TDV-perpetration, respectively. Integrating these findings into existing prevention protocols can lead to a more targeted approach to reducing TDV-perpetration.

An Expanded Conceptual Framework for Understanding Irritability in Childhood: The Role of Cognitive Control Processes

Children prone to irritability experience significant functional impairments and internalising and externalising problems. Contemporary models have sought to elucidate the underlying mechanisms in irritability, such as aberrant threat and reward biases to improve interventions. However, the cognitive control processes that underlie threat (e.g., attention towards threats) and reward (e.g., attention towards reward-related cues) biases and the factors which influence the differential activation of positive and negative valence systems and thus leading to maladaptive activation of cognitive control processes (i.e., proactive and reactive control) are unclear. Thus, we aim to integrate extant theoretical and empirical research to elucidate the cognitive control processes underlying threat and reward processing that contribute to irritability in middle childhood and provide a guiding framework for future research and treatment. We propose an expanded conceptual framework of irritability that includes broad intraindividual and environmental vulnerability factors and propose proximal ‘setting’ factors that activate the negative valence and positive valence systems and proactive and reactive cognitive control processes which underpin the expression and progression of irritability. We consider the implications of this expanded conceptualisation of irritability and provide suggestions for future research.

Attentional Biases and Their Association with Substance-Use-Related Problems and Addictive Behaviors: The Utility of a Gamified Value-Modulated Attentional Capture Task

BackgroundAttentional biases towards reward stimuli have been implicated in substance use-related problems. The value-modulated attentional capture (VMAC) task assesses such reward-related biases. The VMAC task widely used in lab studies tends to be monotonous and susceptible to low effort. We therefore tested a gamified online version of the VMAC that aimed to increase participant engagement. Our goal was to examine how VMAC is associated with substance use-related problems and addictive behaviors, and whether this association is moderated by cognitive control. MethodsWe recruited 285 participants from an online community, including heavy alcohol users. All participants completed a novel gamified version of the VMAC task, measures of substance use and addictive behaviors (addictive-like eating behavior, problematic smartphone use), the WebExec measure of problems with executive functions, and the Stroop Adaptive Deadline Task (SDL) as a measure of cognitive control. ResultsThe gamified VMAC task successfully identified value-modulated attentional capture effects towards high-reward stimuli. We found no significant associations between VMAC scores, problematic alcohol or cannabis use, addictive behaviors, or any moderation by a behavioral measure of cognitive control. Exploratory analyses revealed that self-reported cognitive problems were associated with more alcohol-, and cannabis-related problems, and addictive behaviors. Greater attentional capture (VMAC) was associated with more cannabis use-related problems among individuals with higher levels of self-reported cognitive problems. ConclusionsOur study is one of the first to demonstrate the utility of the gamified version of the VMAC task in capturing attentional reward biases. Self-reported problems with cognitive functions represent a key dimension associated with substance use-related problems and addictive behaviors.

Fluoxetine degrades luminance perceptual thresholds while enhancing motivation and reward sensitivity.

Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) increase serotonin activity in the brain. While they are mostly known for their antidepressant properties, they have been shown to improve visual functions in amblyopia and impact cognitive functions ranging from attention to motivation and sensitivity to reward. Yet, a clear understanding of the specific action of serotonin to each of bottom-up sensory and top-down cognitive control components and their interaction is still missing. To address this question, we characterize, in two adult male macaques, the behavioral effects of fluoxetine, a specific SSRI, on visual perception under varying bottom-up (luminosity, distractors) and top-down (uncertainty, reward biases) constraints while they are performing three different visual tasks. We first manipulate target luminosity in a visual detection task, and we show that fluoxetine degrades luminance perceptual thresholds. We then use a target detection task in the presence of spatial distractors, and we show that under fluoxetine, monkeys display both more liberal responses as well as a degraded perceptual spatial resolution. In a last target selection task, involving free choice in the presence of reward biases, we show that monkeys display an increased sensitivity to reward outcome under fluoxetine. In addition, we report that monkeys produce, under fluoxetine, more trials and less aborts, increased pupil size, shorter blink durations, as well as task-dependent changes in reaction times. Overall, while low level vision appears to be degraded by fluoxetine, performances in the visual tasks are maintained under fluoxetine due to enhanced top-down control based on task outcome and reward maximization.

The Acquired Preparedness Model of Cannabis Use in Emerging Adulthood: Comparing Within-Person and Between-Person Effects

The acquired preparedness model (APM) posits that high sensitivity to reward biases individuals to learn and maintain positive outcome expectancies, which in turn increase substance use, and that high sensitivity to punishment biases individuals to learn and maintain negative outcome expectancies, decreasing use. Little work has applied the APM to cannabis use, particularly with longitudinal data and methods that separate within- and between-person associations. The current study addressed these gaps. The sample comprised 314 emerging adults (age range: 19.13-21.39 years; 52% female; predominantly non-Hispanic White [76%] or African American [15%]) recruited using random-digit dialing. Data were taken from three annual assessments. Latent curve models with structure residuals were used to distinguish between- and within-person associations. We controlled for bidirectional associations and demographic covariates. At the between-person level, high sensitivity to reward was related to high positive expectancies and high cannabis use. High positive expectancies were associated with high cannabis use. High sensitivity to punishment was related to high negative expectancies and low cannabis use. No within-person associations were supported. These findings suggest a risk profile for emerging adult cannabis use involving high sensitivity to reward and positive expectancies and a protective profile involving high sensitivity to punishment and negative expectancies. However, our findings did not support the notion that the proposed learning processes unfold within individuals across annual assessments. Most notably, the findings emphasize the importance of disaggregating within- and between-person associations using a longitudinal design to better understand pathways to cannabis use in the developmental period of emerging adulthood.

Intertemporal preference reversals are associated with early activation of insula and sustained preferential processing of immediate rewards in visual cortex

Decision makers tend to give magnified significance to immediately available rewards which leads to intertemporal preference reversals, which is a form of self-control failure. The objective of the present study was to understand the cognitive and neural underpinnings of this phenomenon using event-related potentials (ERP) and their source localization using standardized low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography analysis (sLORETA). Twenty-four participants performed a money choice task, where they made choices between a smaller-sooner and a larger-later reward, which included trials with and without an immediately available option, while their electroencephalography (EEG) activity was recorded. Trials with and without immediacy were identical except that the latter involved a front-end delay added to both the rewards. Results showed that presence of immediacy made the choices significantly more impulsive. Presence of immediate reward elicited larger visual P2 and late positive potential (LPP), indicating enhanced capture of automatic and sustained attention respectively, and smaller N2, indicative of diminished engagement of cognitive control processes. Source localization revealed increased activity in the visual cortex in the presence of immediacy, signifying higher valuation. Higher activation of areas of insula during P2—suggesting increased awareness of visceral signals—predicted larger impulsive preference reversals. The results suggest that presence of immediate reward biases the choice very early during the decision making process by precipitating visceral states that triggers approach behaviour, and highlight the need to adopt strategies like precommitment to counter the effect.

Reward biases spontaneous neural reactivation during sleep

Sleep favors the reactivation and consolidation of newly acquired memories. Yet, how our brain selects the noteworthy information to be reprocessed during sleep remains largely unknown. From an evolutionary perspective, individuals must retain information that promotes survival, such as avoiding dangers, finding food, or obtaining praise or money. Here, we test whether neural representations of rewarded (compared to non-rewarded) events have priority for reactivation during sleep. Using functional MRI and a brain decoding approach, we show that patterns of brain activity observed during waking behavior spontaneously reemerge during slow-wave sleep. Critically, we report a privileged reactivation of neural patterns previously associated with a rewarded task (i.e., winning at a complex game). Moreover, during sleep, activity in task-related brain regions correlates with better subsequent memory performance. Our study uncovers a neural mechanism whereby rewarded life experiences are preferentially replayed and consolidated while we sleep.

Awareness is necessary for attentional biases by location–reward association

Many studies have reported attentional biases based on feature-reward associations. However, the effects of location-reward associations on attentional selection remain less well-understood. Unlike feature cases, a previous study that induced participants' awareness of the location-reward association by instructing them to look for a high-reward location has suggested the critical role of goal-driven manipulations in such associations. In this study, we investigated whether the reward effect occurred without goal-driven manipulations if participants were spontaneously aware of the location-reward association. We conducted three experiments using a visual search task that included four circles where participants received rewards; one possible target location was associated with a high reward, and another with a low reward. In Experiment 1, the target was presented among distractors, and participants had to search for the target. The results showed a faster reaction time in the high-reward rather than the low-reward locations only in participants aware of the location-reward association, even if they were not required to look for the association. Moreover, in Experiment 2, we replicated the main findings of Experiment 1, even when the target had an abrupt visual onset to restrict goal-driven manipulations. Furthermore, Experiment 3 confirmed that the effect observed in Experiment 2 could not be attributed to the initial eye position. These findings suggest that goal-driven manipulations are unnecessary for inducing reward biases to high-reward locations. We concluded that awareness of the association rather than goal-driven manipulations is crucial for the location-reward effect.

Multisensory Perceptual Biases for Social and Reward Associations.

Linking arbitrary shapes (e.g., circles, squares, and triangles) to personal labels (e.g., self, friend, or stranger) or reward values (e.g., £18, £6, or £2) results in immediate processing benefits for those stimuli that happen to be associated with the self or high rewards in perceptual matching tasks. Here we further explored how social and reward associations interact with multisensory stimuli by pairing labels and objects with tones (low, medium, and high tones). We also investigated whether self and reward biases persist for multisensory stimuli with the label removed after an association had been made. Both high reward stimuli and those associated with the self, resulted in faster responses and improved discriminability (i.e., higher d’), which persisted for multisensory stimuli even when the labels were removed. However, these self- and reward-biases partly depended on the specific alignment between the physical tones (low, medium, and high) and the conceptual (social or reward) order. Performance for reward associations improved when the endpoints of low or high rewards were paired with low or high tones; meanwhile, for personal associations, there was a benefit when the self was paired with either low or high tones, but there was no effect when the stranger was associated with either endpoint. These results indicate that, unlike reward, social personal associations are not represented along a continuum with two marked endpoints (i.e., self and stranger) but rather with a single reference point (the self vs. other).

Confluence of Timing and Reward Biases in Perceptual Decision-Making Dynamics.

Although the decisions of our daily lives often occur in the context of temporal and reward structures, the impact of such regularities on decision-making strategy is poorly understood. Here, to explore how temporal and reward context modulate strategy, we trained 2 male rhesus monkeys to perform a novel perceptual decision-making task with asymmetric rewards and time-varying evidence reliability. To model the choice and response time patterns, we developed a computational framework for fitting generalized drift-diffusion models, which flexibly accommodate diverse evidence accumulation strategies. We found that a dynamic urgency signal and leaky integration, in combination with two independent forms of reward biases, best capture behavior. We also tested how temporal structure influences urgency by systematically manipulating the temporal structure of sensory evidence, and found that the time course of urgency was affected by temporal context. Overall, our approach identified key components of cognitive mechanisms for incorporating temporal and reward structure into decisions.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT In everyday life, decisions are influenced by many factors, including reward structures and stimulus timing. While reward and timing have been characterized in isolation, ecologically valid decision-making involves a multiplicity of factors acting simultaneously. This raises questions about whether the same decision-making strategy is used when these two factors are concurrently manipulated. To address these questions, we trained rhesus monkeys to perform a novel decision-making task with both reward asymmetry and temporal uncertainty. In order to understand their strategy and hint at its neural mechanisms, we used the new generalized drift diffusion modeling framework to model both reward and timing mechanisms. We found two of each reward and timing mechanisms are necessary to explain our data.

Influence of Expected Reward on Temporal Order Judgment.

Perceptual decision-making has been shown to be influenced by reward expected from alternative options or actions, but the underlying neural mechanisms are currently unknown. More specifically, it is debated whether reward effects are mediated through changes in sensory processing, later stages of decision-making, or both. To address this question, we conducted two experiments in which human participants made saccades to what they perceived to be either the first or second of two visually identical but asynchronously presented targets while we manipulated expected reward from correct and incorrect responses on each trial. By comparing reward-induced bias in target selection (i.e., reward bias) during the two experiments, we determined whether reward caused changes in sensory or decision-making processes. We found similar reward biases in the two experiments indicating that reward information mainly influenced later stages of decision-making. Moreover, the observed reward biases were independent of the individual's sensitivity to sensory signals. This suggests that reward effects were determined heuristically via modulation of decision-making processes instead of sensory processing. To further explain our findings and uncover plausible neural mechanisms, we simulated our experiments with a cortical network model and tested alternative mechanisms for how reward could exert its influence. We found that our experimental observations are more compatible with reward-dependent input to the output layer of the decision circuit. Together, our results suggest that, during a temporal judgment task, reward exerts its influence via changing later stages of decision-making (i.e., response bias) rather than early sensory processing (i.e., perceptual bias).

Reward and aversion biases in projector populations of the amygdala and insular cortex

Reward and aversion biases in projector populations of the amygdala and insular cortex

Morphine Reward Promotes Cue-Sensitive Learning: Implication of Dorsal Striatal CREB Activity.

Different parallel neural circuits interact and may even compete to process and store information: whereas stimulus–response (S–R) learning critically depends on the dorsal striatum (DS), spatial memory relies on the hippocampus (HPC). Strikingly, despite its potential importance for our understanding of addictive behaviors, the impact of drug rewards on memory systems dynamics has not been extensively studied. Here, we assessed long-term effects of drug- vs food reinforcement on the subsequent use of S–R vs spatial learning strategies and their neural substrates. Mice were trained in a Y-maze cue-guided task, during which either food or morphine injections into the ventral tegmental area (VTA) were used as rewards. Although drug- and food-reinforced mice learned the Y-maze task equally well, drug-reinforced mice exhibited a preferential use of an S–R learning strategy when tested in a water-maze competition task designed to dissociate cue-based and spatial learning. This cognitive bias was associated with a persistent increase in the phosphorylated form of cAMP response element-binding protein phosphorylation (pCREB) within the DS, and a decrease of pCREB expression in the HPC. Pharmacological inhibition of striatal PKA pathway in drug-rewarded mice limited the morphine-induced increase in levels of pCREB in DS and restored a balanced use of spatial vs cue-based learning. Our findings suggest that drug (opiate) reward biases the engagement of separate memory systems toward a predominant use of the cue-dependent system via an increase in learning-related striatal pCREB activity. Persistent functional imbalance between striatal and hippocampal activity could contribute to the persistence of addictive behaviors, or counteract the efficiency of pharmacological or psychotherapeutic treatments.

Reward alters the perception of time

Recent findings indicate that monetary rewards have a powerful effect on cognitive performance. In order to maximize overall gain, the prospect of earning reward biases visual attention to specific locations or stimulus features improving perceptual sensitivity and processing. The question we addressed in this study is whether the prospect of reward also affects the subjective perception of time. Here, participants performed a prospective timing task using temporal oddballs. The results show that temporal oddballs, displayed for varying durations, presented in a sequence of standard stimuli were perceived to last longer when they signaled a relatively high reward compared to when they signaled no or low reward. When instead of the oddball the standards signaled reward, the perception of the temporal oddball remained unaffected. We argue that by signaling reward, a stimulus becomes subjectively more salient thereby modulating its attentional deployment and distorting how it is perceived in time.

Anhedonia is associated with blunted reward sensitivity in first-degree relatives of patients with major depression

BackgroundAnhedonia is a cardinal feature of major depression and is hypothesized to be driven by low motivation, in particular blunted reward sensitivity. It has been suggested to be a marker that represents a genetic predisposition to this disorder. However, little is known about the mechanisms underlying this heightened risk in unaffected first-degree relatives of patients with major depression. We previously demonstrated abnormal reward biases in acutely depressed patients. The present study aimed to examine the development of reward bias in first-degree relatives of patients with major depression. MethodsForty-seven first-degree relatives of patients with major depression (26 females, age 18–52) and 60 healthy controls with no family history of depression (34 females, age 21–48) were recruited. A probabilistically rewarded difficult visual discrimination task, in which participants were instructed about the contingencies, was used to assess blunted reward sensitivity. A response bias towards the more frequently rewarded stimulus (termed “reward bias”) was the primary outcome variable in this study. Participants also completed self-reported measures of anhedonia and depressive symptoms. ResultsCompared with the control group, relatives of patients with major depression with sub-clinical depressive symptoms displayed a blunted reward bias. Relatives without symptoms displayed largely intact motivational processing on both self-report and experimental measures. The degree of anhedonia was associated with attenuated reward bias in first-degree relatives of patients with major depression, especially in those with sub-clinical symptoms. LimitationsThe study did not include a depressed patient group, which restricted our ability to interpret the observed group differences. ConclusionsBlunted reward sensitivity may be largely manifested in a subgroup of relatives with high levels of depressive symptoms.

More of me! Distinguishing self and reward bias using redundancy gains.

Participants show a perceptual bias favoring stimuli associated with the participants themselves over stimuli associated with other people. A major account of this self-bias effect is that self-related information is intrinsically rewarding, and that high-reward stimuli have enhanced perceptual processing. Here we used redundancy gains to examine the relations between self bias and reward, and whether self and reward biases modulate common levels of stimulus integration. We demonstrated that the self-association bias increases when more than one exemplar of the stimulus is presented (i.e., when participants are exposed to redundant stimuli). The larger self-bias effects for redundant than for single stimuli arose at both perceptual and conceptual levels of representation (respectively, for identical and nonidentical stimuli associated with the same category). In contrast, high-reward stimuli did not affect perceptual redundancy gains with identical shapes, but they did affect redundancy gains with nonidentical stimuli associated with the same category. The strong redundancy effects with self-related stimuli are consistent with self associations modulating stimulus integration at both perceptual and conceptual levels, whereas reward only modulated higher-level conceptual processes (with nonidentical stimuli). The data provide two novel theoretical advances, by showing that (i) self association modulates both early perceptual coding and higher-level conceptual coding, whereas reward only affects the higher-level process, and (ii) self bias can not be reduced simply to differential effects of reward.

Reward-related attentional bias and adolescent substance use: a prognostic relationship?

Current cognitive-motivational addiction theories propose that prioritizing appetitive, reward-related information (attentional bias) plays a vital role in substance abuse behavior. Previous cross-sectional research has shown that adolescent substance use is related to reward-related attentional biases. The present study was designed to extend these findings by testing whether these reward biases have predictive value for adolescent substance use at three-year follow-up. Participants (N = 657, mean age = 16.2 yrs at baseline) were a sub-sample of Tracking Adolescents’ Individual Lives Survey (TRAILS), a large longitudinal community cohort study. We used a spatial orienting task as a behavioral index of appetitive-related attentional processes at baseline and a substance use questionnaire at both baseline and three years follow-up. Bivariate correlational analyses showed that enhanced attentional engagement with cues that predicted potential reward and nonpunishment was positively associated with substance use (alcohol, tobacco, and cannabis) three years later. However, reward bias was not predictive of changes in substance use. A post-hoc analysis in a selection of adolescents who started using illicit drugs (other than cannabis) in the follow-up period demonstrated that stronger baseline attentional engagement toward cues of nonpunishment was related to a higher level of illicit drug use three years later. The finding that reward bias was not predictive for the increase in substance use in adolescents who already started using substances at baseline, but did show prognostic value in adolescents who initiated drug use in between baseline and follow-up suggests that appetitive bias might be especially important in the initiation stages of adolescent substance use.

Reward associations impact both iconic and visual working memory

Reward plays a fundamental role in human behavior. A growing number of studies have shown that stimuli associated with reward become salient and attract attention. The aim of the present study was to extend these results into the investigation of iconic memory and visual working memory. In two experiments we asked participants to perform a visual-search task where different colors of the target stimuli were paired with high or low reward. We then tested whether the pre-established feature-reward association affected performance on a subsequent visual memory task, in which no reward was provided. In this test phase participants viewed arrays of 8 objects, one of which had unique color that could match the color associated with reward during the previous visual-search task. A probe appeared at varying intervals after stimulus offset to identify the to-be-reported item. Our results suggest that reward biases the encoding of visual information such that items characterized by a reward-associated feature interfere with mnemonic representations of other items in the test display. These results extend current knowledge regarding the influence of reward on early cognitive processes, suggesting that feature-reward associations automatically interact with the encoding and storage of visual information, both in iconic memory and visual working memory.

Super-size me: self biases increase to larger stimuli.

Prior work has shown that simple perceptual match responses to pairings of shapes and labels are more efficient if the pairing is associated with the participant (e.g., circle-you) than if it is associated with another familiar person (e.g., square-friend). There is a similar advantage for matching associations with high-value rewards (circle-£9) versus low-value rewards (square-£1) (Sui, He, & Humphreys Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 38, 1105-1117, 2012). Here we evaluated the relations between the self- and reward-bias effects by introducing occasional trials in which the size of a shape was varied unexpectedly (large or small vs. a standard medium). Participants favored stimuli that were larger than the standard when stimuli were associated with the self, and this enhancement of self bias was predicted by the degree of self bias that participants showed to standard (medium) sized stimuli. Although we observed a correlation between the magnitudes of the self and reward biases over participants, reward-bias effects were not increased to large stimuli. The data suggest both overlapping and independent components of the self and reward biases, and that self biases are uniquely enhanced when stimuli increase in size, consistent with previously reported motivational biases favoring large stimuli.

Hot and cold cognition in depression

We discuss the importance of cognitive abnormalities in unipolar depression, drawing the distinction between "hot" (emotion-laden) and "cold" (emotion-independent) cognition. "Cold" cognitive impairments are present reliably in unipolar depression, underscored by their presence in the diagnostic criteria for major depressive episodes. There is good evidence that some "cold" cognitive abnormalities do not disappear completely upon remission, and that they predict poor response to antidepressant drug treatment. However, in many studies the degree of impairment is moderately related to symptoms. We suggest that "cold" cognitive deficits in unipolar depression may in part be explicable in terms of alterations in "hot" processing, particularly on tasks that utilize feedback, on which depressed patients have been reported to exhibit a "catastrophic response to perceived failure." Other abnormalities in "hot" cognition are commonly observed on tasks utilizing emotionally valenced stimuli, with numerous studies reporting mood-congruent processing biases in depression across a range of cognitive domains. Additionally, an emerging literature indicates reliable reward and punishment processing abnormalities in depression, which are especially relevant for hard-to-treat symptoms such as anhedonia. Both emotional and reward biases are strongly influenced by manipulations of the neurochemical systems targeted by antidepressant drugs. Such a pattern of "hot" and "cold" cognitive abnormalities is consistent with our cognitive neuropsychological model of depression, which proposes central roles for cognitive abnormalities in the generation, maintenance, and treatment of depressive symptoms. Future work should examine in greater detail the role that "hot" and "cold" cognitive processes play in mediating symptomatic improvement following pharmacological, psychological, and novel brain circuit-level interventions.