Revolution In Military Affairs Research Articles

The coming revolution in foreign affairs: rethinking American national security

For the last two decades the US has pursued what some analysts have called the ‘fantastical idea’ of military transformation that would enable the US to change the very nature of war. Known as the ‘revolution in military affairs’, this process would use technology to provide the US with battlefield dominance that no opponent could overcome. Motivated by the politics of the Cold War, however, this exit from reality has proved less than effective in what has become known as the ‘war on terror’. The US has been pulled into nasty, ‘small’ wars, against enemies utilizing asymmetric tactics. The Bush administration has tried to destroy these groups through the use of military force, failing, or even worse refusing, to recognize that these enemies feed off the economical, political and social rot of weak and failing states. For the last eight years the US government has addressed the symptoms of a problem rather than the actual disease. If America wants to make serious progress with the most pressing national security risks, the next American president must enact a revolution in foreign affairs that sees a massive overhaul and substantial investment in the State Department and USAID. A critical mass of research exists to illustrate the links between development and security—it is time Washington gets serious and embraces a conception of security that is more holistic, and ultimately, more effective.

The revolution in military affairs: Its driving forces, elements, and complexity

AbstractThe current concept of a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) mainly characterizes the transformation of the US military to smaller, more lethal forces. It is driven by structural changes in the international system, the high investment in R&D and military expenditures by the US government, the dramatic advancements in information and communication technologies, and the integration of these military, doctrinal, and technological factors into new military structures and tactics. This current revolution in American affairs has been a capital‐intensive evolution, and while these innovations have lead to tactical victories over opposing forces on the battlefield, it is not yet clear that they have contributed to stability in the larger strategic context. Indeed, even the tactical advantages are eroding as potential and existing opponents retool their own military doctrines. The strategic response runs the length of technological spectrum, from the development of countermeasures such as in the proliferation of WMD to the development of effective low‐tech warfare strategies and tactics like IEDs detonated by cell phone. The proliferation of conventional weapons combines with the adaptation of new asymmetric tactics to offer a particularly grim forecast of the future. The Iraqi war demonstrates that the fog of war is not overcome, nor are wars fought with precision‐guided munitions necessarily “clean.” In short, the sophisticated weapons and communications platforms of RMA are no panacea for the ills of the modern world. The key task for the globalized world is first and foremost to develop strategies to win the “hearts and minds” of people in zones of violent conflict. The inclusion of civil society is a basic element, and armed forces should seek the dialogue with the civil society before it comes to war. Moreover, efforts must be redoubled to develop new methods for effective arms control. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity, 2008

Military transformation past and present: historical lessons for the 21st century

Transformation has become a buzz word in today's military, but what are its historical precursors-those large scale changes that were once called Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA)? Who has gotten it right, and who has not? The Department of Defense must learn from history. Most studies of innovation focus on the actions, choices, and problems faced by individuals in a particular organization. Few place these individuals and organizations within the complex context where they operate. Yet, it is this very context that is a powerful determinant of how actions are conceived, examined, and implemented, and of how errors are identified and corrected. The historical cases that Mandeles examines reveal how different military services organized to learn, accumulate, and retrieve knowledge; and how their particular organization affected everything from the equipment they acquired to the quality of doctrine and concepts used in combat. In cases where more than one community of experts was responsible for weighing in on decisionmaking, the service benefited from enhanced application of evidence, sound inference, and logic. These cases demonstrate that, for senior leadership, participating in such a system should be a strategic and deliberate choice. In each of the cases featured in this book, no such deliberate choice was made. The interwar U.S. Navy (USN) aviation community and the U.S. Marine Corps amphibious operation community were lucky that, in a time of rapid technological advance and strategic risk, their decisions in framing and solving technological and operational problems were made within a functioning multi-organizational system. The Army Air Corps and the Royal Marines were unfortunate, with corresponding results. It is characteristic of 20th-century military history that no senior civilian or military leader suggested a policy to handle overlapping responsibilities by multiple departments. Today's policymakers have not learned this lesson. In the present time, while a great deal of thought is devoted to proper organizational design and the numbers of persons required to perform necessary functions, there is still no overarching framework guiding these designs.

What is Military History? (review)

Reviewed by: What is Military History? Ronald L. Spiller What is Military History?. By Stephen Morillo with Michael F. Pavkovic . Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2006. ISBN 0-7456-3391-9. Notes. Index. Pp. vi, 150. $19.95. The simple title and the plastic action figure on the cover of this small book belie its contents. This is more than a student reader; it is an exceptional introduction to the study and craft of military history for any reader. In little more than one hundred pages of text Morillo and Pavkovic provide a set of definitions for "Military History," and discuss historiography, conceptual frameworks, current controversies, "doing" military history, and the future of this aspect of the broader study of History. The authors define military history broadly as "any historical study in which military personnel of all sorts, warfare, . . . military institutions, and their various intersections with politics, economics, society, nature, and culture form the focus or topic of the work" (p. 4). They also discuss the military historian's multiple audiences: popular, academic, and professional military. This holistic definition is particularly refreshing and useful. As the authors write, "military history, like all history, is a dialogue between past and present" (p. 7). Stitch-counting buffs and History Channel aficionados, professors and students looking for the next book or dissertation topic, and service personnel looking for new lessons and models do not fragment the craft. The synergy produced by the interaction of these multiple interests strengthens the craft. Not only are these different interests and interpretations not mutually exclusive, "most, in fact, are complementary and the more we have the more nuanced is our understanding of the past" (p. 9). The discussion of historiography is as refreshing as the discussion of subject and audience. Combined with their twelve pages of suggestions for further reading, the authors provide an excellent, broad, and basic historiographical foundation for both students and general readers. They also provide the academic professional an opportunity to surface and reconnect with a broader military history perspective. The authors conclude that the lines separating popular, professional, and academic military history are, in fact, fading, "recreating in some ways the dynamics of the less specialized military literature of ancient and medieval [End Page 543] times, but reconstructed around the standards and methods of professional academic historians" (p. 43). Subsequent discussions of conceptual frameworks, controversies, "doing" military history, and the future of military history live up to the high standard of the first two chapters. Although the authors acknowledge that military historians have often been resistant to new concepts and methodologies, "The influence of social and cultural history and the expansion of the field . . . through war and society studies have added significantly to the military historian's methodological toolkit" (p. 61). On-going controversies—from the debate on revolutions in military affairs to the question of Western exceptionalism—strengthen the study of military history, and "show military history to be a vital and changing piece of the larger historical profession" (p. 96). Although aimed at a student audience, this is not just a book for undergraduate or graduate students. Well-written and clear without being simplistic, it is a worthwhile book for any person with an interest in the study and craft of military history. Ronald L. Spiller Edinboro University of Pennsylvania Edinboro, Pennsylvania Copyright © 2008 Society for Military History

Through the Looking Glass: The Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the American Revolution in Military Affairs

The roots of the information technology Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) can be traced to the mid-1970s, when the West capitalized on scientific-technological developments to neutralize the threat posed by Soviet second echelons. However, the cultivation of the technological seeds of the American RMA preceded the maturation of the conceptual ones. Although it was the US that was laying the technological groundwork for the RMA, Soviet, rather than the American military theorists, were the first to argue that the new range of technological innovations constituted a fundamental discontinuity in the nature of war, which they dubbed the ‘Military-Technical Revolution’ (MTR). About a decade later, this fundamental Soviet approach to the transformations in military affairs was analyzed, adapted and adopted by the US, and designated the RMA. This article deals with the intellectual history of the Soviet MTR and the American RMA.

Transforming European Militaries: Coalition Operations and the Technology Gap (review)

Reviewed by: Transforming European Militaries: Coalition Operations and the Technology Gap Theo Farrell Transforming European Militaries: Coalition Operations and the Technology Gap. By Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari . New York: Routledge, 2006. ISBN 0-415-39264-0. Tables. Glossary. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xiv, 176. $120.00. The United States military is currently embarked on a hugely ambitious effort to transform itself for the twenty-first century. This self-styled military transformation has grown out of the much touted U.S.-led revolution in military affairs (RMA) of the 1990s. Hence, at the heart of it is a techno-centric vision of the future U.S. force: a move from large platform-centric formations [End Page 300] (armoured divisions, bomber fleets, and carrier battle groups) to agile, mission orientated groupings and networks of sensors, information processors, and shooters. Crucial also is the shaping influence of new doctrinal ideas about network-centric warfare. Where are the Europeans in all this? The RMA already promised to leave them trailing behind. Hence, the title of a well known U.S. National Defense University (NDU) monograph, Mind the Gap (1999), pointed to the risks for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of American military development steaming ahead of its European allies. Transforming European Militaries is also the fruit of a NDU project. In this important book, the authors take stock of where the Europeans are at in all this. The book focuses on one (albeit the central) aspect of transformation, namely, the networking of military forces. Chapters two and three of this book assess European strategies and European capabilities for network-based operations. Chapters three and four then examine the roles, respectively, of NATO and the European Union in this area of European military transformation. European collaboration on space assets and the European technology industrial base are then considered in chapters five and six. This is an admirably thorough work. The chapters on European strategies and capabilities go into very useful detail on developments in France, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Some readers may be struck by the paucity of references for such an empirically rich work. It so happens that this is because the authors have drawn on many confidential and classified sources that could not be cited. And as somebody who works on British and French military transformation in recent years, I can vouch for the accuracy of their accounts of these cases. The book makes a number of findings. In general, it reveals a major difference between U.S. and European approaches to networking of military forces. Thus, in contrast to the U.S. vision of network-centric warfare, the Europeans are pursuing the far more modest goal of network-enabled capability (NEC). The more limited scope of European military transformation is not due to an inferior technological industrial base. Rather it is the result of less investment combined with the absence of a long-term strategy. In this respect, it is worth noting the minor role of the EU in guiding European military transformation. The authors also draw out fascinating comparisons between the national case studies. For instance, the British NEC program is focused on improving inter-operability (between the services and with U.S. forces) whereas the French NEC effort is focused on improving self-sufficiency. Also whereas the British are European leaders in developing doctrine on NEC, the French are leaders when it comes to NEC equipment capabilities. This is a very important book. There are hardly any comparative studies of European military transformation. It is true that the subject is technical by nature. So this book often gets down into the weeds (necessarily so) and, in places, is a dry read. But the authors do pull out big points. For instance, in the United States, military transformation is all about the synergy [End Page 301] of new doctrine and new technology. In Europe, however, doctrine leaders are not the same as technology leaders. In sum, this book may not be an exciting read, but it is an essential one. Theo Farrell King’s College London London, United Kingdom Copyright © 2007 Society for Military History

Beyond the RMA: Survival Strategies for Small Defense Economies

Life was straightforward during the Cold War. There were the big guys in the bi-polar strategic stand-off—the United States and the Soviet Union—and there were the little guys: the Eastern European countries, such as Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia; Chile in Latin America; Spain in Southern Europe; Sweden in Scandinavia; Israel in the Middle East; and Singapore in the Far East. All these countries, big or small, capitalist or communist, possessed comprehensive and diversified defense industrial bases. However, times have changed, and in some senses they have changed dramatically. More than anything else, economics does not favor small countries. Previously, Cold War doctrine was premised on mass formations of artillery, main battle groups of tanks and combat aircraft located on the Central European front. In the twenty-first century, these formations have disappeared. Militaries have been transformed by the need to respond to new, emerging, asymmetrical threats arising anywhere across the globe, a shift that is captured under the umbrella term of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). Contemporary doctrine focuses on high-intensity warfare, characterized by sophisticated defense systems, such as telemetry and cruise missiles, fiber optic technologies, sensors, modern telecommunication systems, “stealth” coatings of modern weapon platforms, light-weight composite materials, and the miniaturization of technologies in, for instance, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Under this new RMA-driven doctrine, there is an emphasis on heavy-lift aircraft, such as Europe’s A400M and the US’s C-17, to rapidly respond to “hot” wars across the world. UAVs have been deployed on reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence duties, often acting as “shooters.” Just as important, laser-guided precision munitions delivered by computer-programmed cruise missiles have proved highly effective in minimizing collateral damage, removing entirely the danger of losing aircraft crews. This “Revolution in Military Affairs,” then, has transformed the architecture of battlefield weapon systems, representing a networked systems-of-systems model, linking simultaneously a networked family of space-based satellites, land-based weapons systems, and global communications systems. The RMA—or transformational warfare, as it is now often called—is a contentious subject, because it intellectualizes whether these dramatic changes in doctrine and technology represent discontinuous developments in military technology or whether

War and the West

The outline of human history over the last two thousand years is framed by armed conflict. Many would like to overlook this simple historical reality, and the perilous consequences of ignoring military affairs. The advantage the West now enjoys is the product of several developments in political and social domains culminating in what can be called a Military Revolution. The creation of powerful states as the overarching social organization is an example of one such revolution, which supported a series of smaller innovations and changes in the way the West fought its wars. These smaller changes are “revolutions in military affairs.” These revolutions do not have to be tied to technology. Britain generated an advantage over France by creating a financial system which substantially altered its ability to sustain the conduct of war in the eighteenth century. History reveals the degree of political, social, economic and technological adaptation needed to maximize security and minimize the consequences of failure. The study of history is necessary to insure that we do not have to fight wars more often, or at far higher cost in human terms.

Sociology and New Wars in the Era of Globalisation

AbstractThe sociology of war has used a number of analytical perspectives to explain why the end of the Cold War saw outbreaks of violence around the world in the form of ‘new wars’, rather than universal peace. Factors often considered are globalisation, nationalist ideology, political elites, the Revolution in Military Affairs, international crime and migration. Sociological analysis of these new wars often makes use of comparative historical sociology, but these are wars of state disintegration rather than of state formation. This summary undertakes a critical evaluation of different approaches, arguing that they mostly follow a model of war inherited from Clausewitz which conceives of war only as an encounter between two states and so cannot successfully explain new war, where armed forces no longer primarily fight each other but target civilians.

The Army after next: the first postindustrial army

Sure to be found controversial by some, compelling by all, this is the only available book-length examination of the way the U.S. Army and Department of Defense have tried to create the capabilities promised by the high-tech Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Of more immediate concern, it is also the only in-depth account of the effect RMA and transformation concepts had on the American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of the problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Adams argues, arose from the DoD's implacable desire to implement RMA-driven transformation concepts-whether they were appropriate or not. What we need to do, he maintains, is to fight the war we have, not the war we want. Over the last several decades, military theorists and others began to believe that new technologies were generating a revolution in military affairs (RMA), capabilities so revolutionary that they would redefine warfare. Spurred by these beliefs, and led by President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the Department of Defense (DoD) set out to transform the U.S. armed forces by adopting RMA concepts-and spending billions to make the hypothetical capabilities real. The entire structure of the armed forces changed as a result. This vision, however, was totally dependent on a set of unproven suppositions and often nonexistent capabilities, especially a network of information technologies. Moreover, the services, the media, Congress, and industry each had its own agenda, all of which continue to come into play in the development of RMA strategies. The interplay of politics, technology and military reality offers a fascinating narrative.

New Challenges for Defense, Security and the Public Finances

This paper provides an introductory background to the symposium on defense, security and the public finances. It outlines the recent dramatic transformation of both the global defense industry and the geo-political environment within which it has to operate. Within this, changing political, strategic and military strategies are reviewed and the principal factors driving change in the defense sector are explored. the paper reviews the consequences of the end of the Cold War and explores the impact of recent ethic conflict, the Iraq and Afghanistan developments and the terrorist threat. Additional forces driving change in defense are also considered; in particular, the so-called ‘revolution in military affairs’ and the widespread restructuring of the defense industrial base over the last decade and a half. Finally, budgetary response is discussed briefly before an overview of the papers contained in this symposium is presented.

Whither the RMA?

From Alfred Nobel's prediction that dynamite was such a radical change that it would lead to end of war, to similar claims about machine gun, naval torpedo, bomber, and nuclear bomb, predictions of revolutionary change in warfare have been commonplace--and wrong. --Mackubin Thomas Owens (1) The strategic importance of technological improvements in US military capability is a key but insufficiently examined issue in transformation of today's military. (2) Is present Department of Defense (DOD) attempt at transformation, which focuses on technological solutions to increase capabilities, being misguided by a vision of a high-tech Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)? This question is particularly relevant with regard to attempts to use information management and networked systems in lieu of increased firepower, better armor, and more manpower. The current effort may well be leading America's military in wrong direction. This article suggests that DOD's endeavors to pursue technical improvements in warfighting functions where US forces already display dominance have been excessive to point of being counterproductive. Organizational changes based upon assumptions of an ongoing RMA have already placed at-risk ability to achieve a rapid victory in Iraq. The minimal size of ground forces deployed and available for Operation Iraqi Freedom was result of planning to fight war we envisioned, with RMA-capabilities we hoped for, instead of enemy and conditions we would actually face. The relatively small force employed for initial ground war was stupendously successful, but rapidly lost its effectiveness during subsequent stability and security operations. Failing to adequately think past first move, senior decisionmakers ignored old adage that the enemy gets a vote. America's undisputed dominance of conventional maneuver warfare means that intelligent, adaptive enemies will engage us with asymmetric strategies and tactics. The current transformation efforts are not yet capable of meeting this challenge. If wars of twenty-first century will primarily involve rogue regimes and failed states, even exponential increases in traditional combat capabilities are likely to produce only marginal improvement in our ability to achieve larger political objectives. While trying to get even better at tasks in which America's military already excels is prudent, this goal should not be pursued at expense of fixing vulnerabilities that current and future enemies are likely to exploit using asymmetric strategies and tactics. In particular, DOD would be better served by improving its ability to coordinate and execute interagency operations that support employment of entire range of national power--a critical improvement that is likely to require more personnel instead of less and greater emphasis on human resources rather than technology. A Historical Perspective Arguably, earliest well-documented RMA occurred during First Punic War between Carthage and Rome. One of leading city-states, Carthage was greatest maritime power of age and possessed major trade routes throughout known world when war began in 264 B.C. Its armies had also been widely victorious. Consisting mostly of mercenaries and allied troops led by Carthaginian officers, they had been successful in expanding Carthage's footprint and establishing colonies in Spain, Sardinia, Balearic Islands east of Spain, Malta, and Sicily while controlling most of North African coast along Mediterranean Sea. (3) Rome, in contrast, was an emerging regional power still fighting to complete its domination of Italian Peninsula. While its legions were nearly invincible land formations, Rome had no navy. When Rome and Carthage came into conflict over spheres of influence in Sicily, Carthaginian strategy was to defend from heavily fortified cities and control seas. …

Russia and postmodern deterrence: military power and its challenges for security

Russia is a post-communist country struggling to adapt to the modern world economically and politically. In the twenty-first century, Russia faces postmodern social, cultural, and political problems with its old policy of deterrence. For Russia's political leaders and military planners, three scenarios define their postmodern setting: 1) the world's leading military and economic powers, with the exception of China, are market-based economies and political democracies; 2) the revolution in military affairs, based on advances in information, electronics, and communications, is driving both civil and military technology innovation; and 3) the Cold War's fundamental war-fighting premises, such as deterrence based on nuclear weapons and on conventional armed forces organized and trained for massive wars of attrition, have changed radically. These points'implications for future Russian strategy are profound, Stephen J. Cimbala and Peter Rainow argue. Russia faces an increased presence of its former adversary, the United States, in adjacent territories; an increasingly assertive NATO, which includes many of Moscow's former allies; and continued fighting in Chechnya. Ominously, China aspires to overtake Russia as the world's second-ranked military power and establish its hegemony over the Pacific basin. In short, Russia confronts a radically new political and military world order that demands adapting to postmodern thinking about deterrence and defense. The danger is that Russia, realizing that it lags behind in leveraging modern technology for military purposes and that it must scrap its dependence on conscription, now relies on nuclear weapons as its first line of deterrence against either nuclear or conventional attack.

China's Defense Policy and Military Modernization

Abstract Without transparency, China's defense policy attracts global attention, even though China proclaims its peaceful development policy. China plays its dual strategy widely and successfully in a variety of fields. To precisely analyze China's defense policy and military modernization it is necessary to look into its dual strategy, especially from the point of view of its strategic culture. China always adopts “revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics” as an excuse to deny the request of military transparency from international society, but China never explicitly interprets “revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics.” With an overview of the history of Chinese military development, “Communist Party controls” and “asymmetric development strategy” can be appraised as the two primary characteristics of the revolution in Chinese military affairs. These characteristics are the cornerstone of China's defense policy. Under the guidance of China's defense policy, the Peop...

The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy

"Revolutions in Military Affairs" (RMAs) currently interest both historians and strategic analysts, but how exactly do they occur, why do they prove so decisive, and what (if any) are their limits? This essay seeks answers through the detailed study of one critical element of an earlier "Revolution in Military Affairs"—infantry volley fire—tracing its invention, first in Japan in the 1560s and then in the Dutch Republic in the 1590s, and its first use in combat at the battle of Nieuwpoort in 1600 by a Dutch army commanded by Maurice of Nassau. It then examines the current RMA in the light of that case study.

Books Received

Books Received Blair P. Turner Virginia Military Institute General The Army After Next: The First Post-Industrial Army. By Thomas K. Adams. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006. ISBN 0-275-98107-X. Glossary. Appendix. Notes. Selected bibliography. Index. Pp. 327. $49.95. The author analyzes the Revolution in Military Affairs and its impact on current military events and concludes that many problems with the campaigns in the Middle East stem from a dogmatic application of RMA concepts to inappropriate circumstances. Battlefield: Decisive Conflicts in History . Edited by Richard Holmes and Martin Marix Evans. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-19-280653-X. Maps. Photographs. Index. Pp. 376. $30.00. The editors have collected battle entries from The Oxford Companion to Military History and present them here in a chronological and regional organization; included are significant battles from wars in the West from ancient times through World War II as well as conflicts, almost exclusively from the 18th century on, in the Americas, Asia and the Middle East, and Africa. Dictionary of Battles and Sieges: A Guide to 8,500 Battles from Antiquity Through the Twenty-first Century. Vols. 1–3. By Tony Jacques. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2007. Set ISBN 0-313-33536-2. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Pp. lvi, 1354. $299.95. The entries are necessarily and frustratingly brief, and they are in strict alphabetical order without regard for geography or chronology; but the coverage is vast and global and, fortunately, the entries are cross referenced and placed in historical context in a Chronological Reference Guide in the first volume. The Endurance of Nationalism . By Aviel Roshwald. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-521-60364-1. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xii, 349. Paper. $29.99. Nationalism is not new; its roots and expression are ancient and endemic. The world is ill-served by international policies which fail to recognize this fact and attempt to rise above a supposedly transient phenomenon. God's Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad . By Charles Allen. Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2006. ISBN 0-306-81522-2. Maps. Illustrations. Glossary. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xiv, 349. $26.95. The author traces the history of the extremist and puritanical Wahhabi cult from its creation in Saudi Arabia by Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the 18th century to its pervasive influence in the Islamic world of today. Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence . By Robert W. Pringle. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2006. ISBN 0-8108-4942-9. Appendixes. Bibliography. Pp. xxxv, 364. $85.00. [End Page 611] Number 5 in Scarecrow's series of Historical Dictionaries offers a reference guide to civilian and military intelligence organizations and operations of the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1991. Infantry Tactics . By Erwin Rommel. St. Paul, Minn.: MBI Publishing, 2006. ISBN 1-85367-707-8. Illustrations. Pp. xv, 265. Paper. $19.95. A reissue of the German general's famous 1935 manual based on his experiences in World War I and his analysis of three phases of that conflict: "war of movement" through Belgium, "trench warfare" in the West and "open warfare" in the East. Risk and Exploration: Earth, Sea, and the Stars . Edited by Steven J. Dick and Keith L. Cowing. Washington: NASA Administrator's Symposium Proceedings, September 26–29, 2004. NASA SP-2005-4701. Photographs. Illustrations. Pp. ix, 294. Several participants offer discussions of issues related to exploration, both terrestrial and in space, but with little military application. Soldier's Lives Through History: The Ancient World . By Richard A. Gabriel. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2007. ISBN 0-313-33348-3. Maps. Photographs. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xviii, 305. $65.00. This fifth volume in the Soldiers' Lives through History series offers short analyses of various aspects of military life, organization, and activity in the ancient world with 18 additional descriptive essays of particular army organizations and campaigns, from Sumer and Akkad to Imperial Rome. Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U...

(Out of) Control Demons: Software Agents, Complexity Theory and the Revolution in Military Affairs

(Out of) Control Demons: Software Agents, Complexity Theory and the Revolution in Military Affairs

Security is Coming Home: Rethinking Scale and Constructing Resilience in the Global Urban Response to Terrorist Risk

This article argues that contemporary security as a concept, practice and commodity is undergoing a rescaling, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, with previously international security concerns penetrating all levels of governance. Security is becoming more civic, urban, domestic and personal: security is coming home. In the context of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), asymmetric confl ict, the ‘war on terror’ and the ‘splintering’ of cosmopolitan urban centres, policy is increasingly centred around military derived constructions of risk. This securitisation is bound up in neoliberal economic competition between cities and regions for ‘global’ status, with security emerging as a key part of the offer for potential inward investment. The result is increasing temporary and permanent fortifi cation and surveillance, often symbolic or theatrical, in which privileged transnational elites gain feelings of safety at the expense of the liberty and mobility of ordinary citizens.

The Empire of the Spectacle

The Empire of the Spectacle

American Military Technology: The Life Story of a Technology (review)

Reviewed by: American Military Technology: The Life Story of a Technology William J. Astore American Military Technology: The Life Story of a Technology. By Barton C. Hacker with the assistance of Margaret Vining. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2006. ISBN 0-313-33308-4. Photographs. Illustrations. Appendix. Select bibliography. Index. Pp. xxiii, 205. $45.00. This volume looks at the American military's engagement with warfare and technology from the Revolutionary War to the 1991 Gulf War. Enlivened by photographs and potted biographies of influential technocrats and military leaders, it is an attractive primer that should prove useful to readers looking for a straightforward and jargon-free introduction to the complex relationship existing between the American military and its tools (and toolmakers) of war. Along with military technologies and their social contexts, [End Page 1193] the authors also address medical contributions, including Walter Reed's efforts to suppress typhoid and yellow fever, and scientific contributions, notably J. Robert Oppenheimer's work on the atomic bomb. For the most part the authors avoid controversy. In a statement of breathtaking simplicity, they note that a uranium bomb "destroyed Hiroshima, a plutonium bomb Nagasaki, and Japan surrendered" (p. 104). No mention is made of opposition to or criticism of the use of atomic bombs, whether by scientists before August 1945 or by postwar critics citing Cold War imperatives. Perhaps the authors believe enough ink has been spilled on this controversy, but some reference to the intense debate surrounding the Fiftieth Anniversary exhibit at the Smithsonian would have highlighted the ironies, tragedies, and emotions generated by modern weaponry and war. Sidebars that highlighted salient issues in the historiography of technology and the U.S. military would have enhanced the value of this book. Notably absent is any critical discussion of biological and chemical weaponry. Meanwhile, the select bibliography fails to list works by Lewis Mumford (perhaps the most incisive critic of the U.S. military's "megamachine") or relevant articles from the Journal of Military History, Technology and Culture, and similar scholarly journals. While a book that takes time to define terms like "bullet" and "bayonet" is obviously intended for the uninitiated, one might also expect guidance with respect to more advanced themes. Controversial themes and issues such as interservice rivalries, political and economic pressures, and President Eisenhower's warning about the military-industrial complex are not developed fully. Curiously, although published in 2006, the timeline of this book ends in 1999 with air attacks in Kosovo. Similarly, the last chapter ends with a rushed account of the Gulf War of 1991 and the concept of a "Revolution in Military Affairs." One might imagine a different (and timelier), post 9-11 conclusion, perhaps stressing the difficulties of asymmetrical warfare and the unpredictable and often surprisingly labile nature of technology (e.g., "civilian" cell phones used as triggers for roadside bombs). The American military's enormous investment in high-tech weaponry in the 1980s and 1990s was geared primarily to conventional conflicts against like-minded opponents; the wisdom of this investment is now being tested in low-intensity conflicts and messy urban settings like Iraq. Here the authors could have built on their discussion of the Vietnam War, where they note that American technical virtuosity did not produce victory, forcing the military to reconsider its emphasis on superior technology as uniquely efficacious. Nevertheless, the strength of this volume is that it provides solid historical underpinnings for more advanced discussions about, and research into, these and similar subjects. William J. Astore Pennsylvania College of Technology Williamsport, Pennsylvania Copyright © 2006 Society for Military History