Whither the RMA?

Abstract

From Alfred Nobel's prediction that dynamite was such a radical change that it would lead to end of war, to similar claims about machine gun, naval torpedo, bomber, and nuclear bomb, predictions of revolutionary change in warfare have been commonplace--and wrong. --Mackubin Thomas Owens (1) The strategic importance of technological improvements in US military capability is a key but insufficiently examined issue in transformation of today's military. (2) Is present Department of Defense (DOD) attempt at transformation, which focuses on technological solutions to increase capabilities, being misguided by a vision of a high-tech Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)? This question is particularly relevant with regard to attempts to use information management and networked systems in lieu of increased firepower, better armor, and more manpower. The current effort may well be leading America's military in wrong direction. This article suggests that DOD's endeavors to pursue technical improvements in warfighting functions where US forces already display dominance have been excessive to point of being counterproductive. Organizational changes based upon assumptions of an ongoing RMA have already placed at-risk ability to achieve a rapid victory in Iraq. The minimal size of ground forces deployed and available for Operation Iraqi Freedom was result of planning to fight war we envisioned, with RMA-capabilities we hoped for, instead of enemy and conditions we would actually face. The relatively small force employed for initial ground war was stupendously successful, but rapidly lost its effectiveness during subsequent stability and security operations. Failing to adequately think past first move, senior decisionmakers ignored old adage that the enemy gets a vote. America's undisputed dominance of conventional maneuver warfare means that intelligent, adaptive enemies will engage us with asymmetric strategies and tactics. The current transformation efforts are not yet capable of meeting this challenge. If wars of twenty-first century will primarily involve rogue regimes and failed states, even exponential increases in traditional combat capabilities are likely to produce only marginal improvement in our ability to achieve larger political objectives. While trying to get even better at tasks in which America's military already excels is prudent, this goal should not be pursued at expense of fixing vulnerabilities that current and future enemies are likely to exploit using asymmetric strategies and tactics. In particular, DOD would be better served by improving its ability to coordinate and execute interagency operations that support employment of entire range of national power--a critical improvement that is likely to require more personnel instead of less and greater emphasis on human resources rather than technology. A Historical Perspective Arguably, earliest well-documented RMA occurred during First Punic War between Carthage and Rome. One of leading city-states, Carthage was greatest maritime power of age and possessed major trade routes throughout known world when war began in 264 B.C. Its armies had also been widely victorious. Consisting mostly of mercenaries and allied troops led by Carthaginian officers, they had been successful in expanding Carthage's footprint and establishing colonies in Spain, Sardinia, Balearic Islands east of Spain, Malta, and Sicily while controlling most of North African coast along Mediterranean Sea. (3) Rome, in contrast, was an emerging regional power still fighting to complete its domination of Italian Peninsula. While its legions were nearly invincible land formations, Rome had no navy. When Rome and Carthage came into conflict over spheres of influence in Sicily, Carthaginian strategy was to defend from heavily fortified cities and control seas. …