Revolutionary Command Council Research Articles

Legal study on the project of the first amendment on Iraqi Nationality law No.26 in 2006

Nationality is a legal, political and spiritual bond that binds individuals to states. It is the means that distributes individuals between countries. Through nationality, the component of people is determined in every country; ie people who hold the nationality of a specific country are considered its citizens. By contrast, those who do not hold the nationality of the same country are foreigners, even if they have permission to stay on its ground. In general, there are three laws enacted to regulate nationality in Iraq: The first of which was the Nationality Law No. 42 in 1924, which was legislated after the establishment of the Iraqi state. However, this law was repealed and replaced by the Iraqi Nationality Law No. 43 in 1963. The latter sparked widespread controversy, especially after the change of the political system in Iraq, including the amendments made to it by the dissolved Revolutionary Command Council.
 Therefore, changing this law was a priority for the Iraqi parliament after the fall of the previous Iraqi regime in 2003. Indeed, this law and all decisions related to it were formally repealed by the Iraqi parliament in 2006 and replaced by the new Iraqi Nationality Law No. 26 in 2006. However, this law contains many legal and political criticism, especially regarding dual nationality. In addition, the law contains some other controversial cases regarding imposing original nationality and granting nationality through Iraqi mother and other legal disputes related to the recovery of a lost nationality and many other legal problems. Therefore, the Iraqi legislator has prepared a draft to amend the current Iraqi nationality law. In this study, we will highlight the most important points included in this project. We will also indicate the extent to which this project respond to the requirements of society. Finally, we will address the legal problems surrounding the current Iraqi Nationality Law.

THE POLICY OF CRIMINALIZATION IN THE IRAQI DOCTORS PROTECTION LAW

This research, tagged with (the policy of criminalization in the Iraqi Doctors Protection Law - an analytical study), deals with an important and vital topic of criminal law jurisprudence, and related to the legislator's criminal policy in the Doctors Protection Law, because the legislator's reliance on a successful criminalization policy in this law will inevitably lead to Securing a degree of appropriate protection for this important segment of society in order to give them a measure of freedom to practice their lofty work away from fears of attacks or illegal clan claims, as We divided the study into a prelude to clarifying the nature of the criminalization policy in general, in which the concept of criminalization policy was addressed and its criminal distinction on the policy of punishment, and then they complement each other, as there is no criminalization without punishment and no punishment without criminalization of a specific behavior, to follow it with two demands, the first of which came under the title of criminalizing illegal clan claims, which was divided into two branches. One of the innovations in the criminalization policy in this law is that the Iraqi legislator had previously criminalized this act and punished it with almost the same penalty, according to Revolutionary Command Council Resolution No. 24 of 1997, as for the second section, we discussed in its framework the pillars of this general and specific crime represented by the victim's status in this crime and his being a doctor. In it the legislator referred to the provisions of Articles (229-233) of the Iraqi Penal Code in terms of showing the forms of assault and its criminal penalties, in which the behavior expands to include several forms, the most important of which are insulting the doctor, assault, resistance and intentionally preventing him from performing his duties. The second section is devoted to examining the elements of the crime of assaulting doctors; let’s end our research after that with a conclusion that includes our conclusions and suggestions

الرقابة القضائية على السلطة المختصة بالتعليم العالي الاهلي في العراق - دراسة مقارنة

Private university education is one of the important pillars for building a knowledge society as a supporter of public university education at the present time. It keeps pace with the changes taking place, and employs the energies of society and all its capabilities in the process of development and growth in the field of knowledge, education and scientific research, leading to a private education characterized by a high degree of quality and performance. An increase in the number of private educational institutions was witnessed recently and in light of this, many legislations were issued to draw up their legal framework, duties, powers and functions. This, in turn, was reflected in the increase in the number of students enrolled in private university education, in line with the requirements of scientific development and the expansion of existing departments, and all its money related to specialized studies, whether theoretical or applied. As a result of this, the National Higher Education Law No. (25) of 2016 was issued in force, which was the result of legislative developments that carried positive and negative aspects starting with the decision of the (dissolved) Revolutionary Command Council No. (814) of 1987 and then Law No. (13) of 1996 (cancelled) and its amendments.

دراسة قانونية حول مشروع تعديل قانون الجنسية العراقية رقم(26) لسنة 2006

Nationality is a legal, political and spiritual bond that binds individuals to states. It is the means that distributes individuals between countries. Through nationality, the component of people is determined in every country; ie people who hold the nationality of a specific country are considered its citizens. By contrast, those who do not hold the nationality of the same country are foreigners, even if they have permission to stay on its ground. In general, there are three laws enacted to regulate nationality in Iraq: The first of which was the Nationality Law No. 42 in 1924, which was legislated after the establishment of the Iraqi state. However, this law was repealed and replaced by the Iraqi Nationality Law No. 43 in 1963. The latter sparked widespread controversy, especially after the change of the political system in Iraq, including the amendments made to it by the dissolved Revolutionary Command Council. Therefore, changing this law was a priority for the Iraqi parliament after the fall of the previous Iraqi regime in 2003. Indeed, this law and all decisions related to it were formally repealed by the Iraqi parliament in 2006 and replaced by the new Iraqi Nationality Law No. 26 in 2006. However, this law contains many legal and political criticism, especially regarding dual nationality. In addition, the law contains some other controversial cases regarding imposing original nationality and granting nationality through Iraqi mother and other legal disputes related to the recovery of a lost nationality and many other legal problems. Therefore, the Iraqi legislator has prepared a draft to amend the current Iraqi nationality law. In this study, we will highlight the most important points included in this project. We will also indicate the extent to which this project respond to the requirements ofsociety. Finally, we will address the legal problems surrounding the current Iraqi Nationality Law.

Conflictos armados y represión durante el primer gobierno del presidente Omar El Bashir en Sudán (1989-1999)

Este artículo analiza una primera etapa del Gobierno presidido por Omar Hassan Ahmed al Bashir (1989-1999), desde el punto de vista de la evolución de la guerra y del avance de la visión islamista. Desde un enfoque histórico y descriptivo, se examina el triunfo del Consejo del Mando Revolucionario y la política de represión llevada a cabo desde el Gobierno central, mediante la estrategia de la «llamada global». Asimismo, se estudia la evolución de las relaciones de poder en el seno del Gobierno y las discrepancias y disputas que culminan con la expulsión de su principal ideólogo civil islamista: Hassan al Turabi. Esto significaría, a la postre, el triunfo de los militares islamistas de Bashir frente a los civiles islamistas de Turabi.

Gays, Cross-Dressers, and Emos

Gays, Cross-Dressers, and Emos

SMART PARTNERSHIP IN ACTION: SUDAN'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS MALAYSIA 1989-1999

When the army came to power in 1989, many observers recognized it not only as a reaction to the critical situation in the country, like its predecessor coups, but also as a change from "old politics" to "new politics". The Revolutionary Command Council of National Salvation" RCC-NS" was signifying an alternative to civilian mismanagement, but with a definite ideology. Internally, under Omar al-Bashir, all the secular institutions were dissolved and the government started a Comprehensive Call program for Islamization that encompasses all aspects of life.

Mossadegh Madness: Oil and Sovereignty in the Anticolonial Community

This essay argues for the shared origins of the 1973–1974 energy crisis and the 1974 Declaration of a New International Economic Order in the United Nations. According to many contemporary actors, the energy crisis was part of a larger problem of international justice—that of unequal economic relationships between rich and poor nations. The article excavates that shared political and intellectual history from the failed Iranian oil nationalization in the early 1950s to the successful supply gambit of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council in the early 1970s. Central throughout was an anti-colonial reading of the recent past and the present, according to which a persistent imperial influence impeded an economic equivalent to political decolonization.

The Charismatic Persona of Colonel Qaddafi

In any list of dictators and antagonists of the West the name of Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi will always rank highly as one of the most memorable, colourful and mercurial. The roles he played to his fellow Libyans, to regional groupings, to revolutionaries and to the West were complex and nuanced. These various roles developed over time but were all grounded in his self-belief as a messianic revolutionary figure. More importantly, these roles and behaviours that stemmed from them were instrumental in preserving Qaddafi’s rule and thwarting challenges to it. These facets of Qaddafi’s public self accord with the model of “persona” described by Marshall. Whilst the nature of political persona and celebrity in the Western world has been explored by several scholars (for example Street; Wilson), little work has been conducted on the use of persona by non-democratic leaders. This paper examines the aspects of persona exhibited by Colonel Qaddafi and applied during his tenure. In constructing his role as a revolutionary leader, Qaddafi was engaging in a form of public performance aimed at delivering himself to a wider audience. Whether at home or abroad, this persona served the purpose of helping the Libyan leader consolidate his power, stymie political opposition and export his revolutionary ideals.

Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party: inside an authoritarian regime

The Ba'th Party came to power in 1968 and remained for thirty-five years, until the 2003 US invasion. Under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, who became president of Iraq in 1979, a powerful authoritarian regime was created based on a system of violence and an extraordinary surveillance network, as well as reward schemes and incentives for supporters of the party. The true horrors of this regime have been exposed for the first time through a massive archive of government documents captured by the United States after the fall of Saddam Hussein. It is these documents that form the basis of this extraordinarily revealing book and that have been translated and analyzed by Joseph Sassoon, an Iraqi-born scholar and seasoned commentator on the Middle East. They uncover the secrets of the innermost workings of Hussein's Revolutionary Command Council, how the party was structured, how it operated via its network of informers and how the system of rewards functioned.

Tactical Flexibility: Libyan Foreign Policy under Qadhafi, 1969–2004*

AbstractOn September 1, 1969, a group of junior Libyan Army officers took control of the Libyan government in a bloodless coup d'état. After the coup, the group formed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), chaired by Muammar al‐Qadhafi. In the four decades following, Libya faced numerous foreign policy challenges. The Qadhafi regime took on a distinctly anticolonial flavor that mirrored the revolutionary political trends of Egypt under of Gamal Abdul Nasser. This change in foreign policy posture shook Libya's relations with the United States and the United Kingdom and initiated the degradation of Libyan–Western ties.Under Qadhafi's leadership, Libya chose an ideological path for that focused on the strengthening of sovereignty while pursuing policies of unity and anti‐imperialism. This often put Libya at loggerheads with the West, and at times with its neighbors. Nevertheless, Qadhafi maintained popularity among his constituency.1 His domestic fame was the product of a carefully constructed persona that gave him the charismatic appeal necessary to maintain leadership during the latter quarter of the twentieth century and into the new millennium. Publicly, Qadhafi highlighted the similarities between himself and Libya's rural working class. He lived in a tent, and wore modest clothing. He fancied himself a devout Muslim, and praised the wisdom of the Libyan masses. He connected with his constituency through rhetoric that illustrated the stability of his policies over time, and their connection to the ideas that originally made him popular.This argues that the source of Qadhafi's charismatic power lay in his rhetoric, which connected Libya's foreign policy decisions to his foreign policy vision, the basis of his charismatic leadership. Qadhafi articulated his foreign policy vision during his first major speech to the Libyan people in September 1969, and he referred to it time and again when speaking about major Libyan foreign policy decisions. To demonstrate, this article describes the basis of Qadhafi's leadership authority and defines the parameters of his vision. Then Qadhafi's rhetoric surrounding major shifts in Libyan foreign policy is analyzed to show its congruence with his foreign policy vision. The rhetoric surrounding the Libya–Egypt war, the end of Libya's Chad intervention, Libya's surrendering of the two Lockerbie bombing suspects to be tried under Western authority, and Qadhafi's denunciation of the weapons of mass destruction programs—all major shifts in Libyan foreign policy—demonstrate how Qadhafi was able to maintain a single message, and thus his authority, over his first 35 years in power based on values established in the early days of his revolution. The flexibility of his vision enabled Qadhafi to maintain authority, while tactically adjusting Libyan foreign policy positions.

Preserving Non-Democracies: Leaders and State Institutions in the Middle East

Authoritarian elites often prolong their tenure in office by engaging in wholesale institutional change. Whether inherited or created from scratch, state institutions in non-democracies are meant to solidify elite cohesion and political control, pacify potential opponents, and create coalitions that support the state. Nevertheless, autocrats keep a watchful eye on these institutions, and if they change internally in directions that may seem threatening to state leaders, the institutions are changed or even disbanded. Change to the institutions of the non-democratic state is caused by a combination of deliberate decisions and institutional crafting by state leaders on the one hand, and by institutional layering and changes initiated from within the institutions rhemselves on the other. As the cases of the National Assembly in Kuwait, the Revolutionary Command Council in Egypt, and the Revolutionary Council in Iran demonstrate, when and if state institutions become inefficient or are seen as a threat by authoritarian leaders, then state leaders once again take control in determining their shape and configuration. Non-democracies are often preserved through purposive institutional change.

The Changing Libyan Economy: Causes and Consequences

Once the United Nations suspended its sanctions regime in April 1999, Libya began to introduce socioeconomic reforms aimed at liberalizing its economy. Greeted with some skepticism, the liberalization movement gained momentum as Libya first resolved the Lockerbie dispute and then renounced unconventional weapons. Considerable progress was made in the ensuing years; however it was notably uneven, with reform to the oil and gas industry outstripping initiatives in other economic sectors. Liberalization efforts continue but they are increasingly threatened by resistance to political reform. Following more than three decades of socialist experimentation and two earlier attempts at reform, Libya at the turn of the century began to implement sweeping changes to its stagnant command economy. The promise of economic liberalization generated considerable enthusiasm for the hydrocarbon sector where a new round of exploration and production sharing agreements, modified to provide bidders a more transparent and competitive milieu, generated substantial new investment. In other economic sectors, the checkered progress to date in implementing reforms suggests that progress will be slower and more difficult. Moreover, ongoing resistance to political reform appears to pose real limits to the broader implementation of the new economic strategy. POLICY REVOLUTION In 1959, American prospectors announced the discovery of petroleum deposits in commercially viable quantities in eastern Libya. The following decade witnessed dramatic increases in both production and revenues, but not in the posted price of oil, the basis of taxable income for producing countries. Like most oil-producing states, Libya considered the posted price to be undervalued and unjust. Nevertheless, it accepted a volume-oriented as opposed to a price-oriented policy because it feared that a confrontation with the oil companies over posted price levels might slow industry development. From the beginning, revenues from petroleum exports increased rapidly, growing more than fifteen-fold from $40 million in 1962 to $625 million in 1967. Within eight years of its first shipment, Libya was the world's fourth largest exporter of crude oil, a rate of expansion previously unknown anywhere in the industry's history. In the process, Libya moved from a stagnant to an exploding economy, from a capital-deficit state to a capital-surplus state, from an aid recipient to an aid extender. By the time King Idris I was overthrown in 1969, Libyan oil exports exceeded 3 million barrels per day (bpd); however, the revenue received per barrel of oil remained one of the lowest in the world.1 Immediately after the Free Unionist Officers seized power on September 1, 1969, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), headed by Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, began to implement a socioeconomic and political revolution in Libya. In early 1970, the RCC opened negotiations with the oil companies working in Libya, eventually gaining a majority control in all of them through modified participation agreements or outright nationalization. Thereafter, it pursued a two-pronged policy of controlled production to conserve reserves and price escalation to maximize revenues. The RCC was notably aggressive in its oil-pricing policy, even when higher prices were not necessarily in its best interests, because it viewed petroleum as its most effective political weapon.2 With the oil companies, the RCC pursued a strategy of confrontation to call the bluff of the international oil cartels and the Western consuming nations. In so doing, it was successful in wrestling from them additional taxes and revenues. Unfortunately, the RCC misinterpreted the political lessons to be drawn from its confrontation with the oil industry to the detriment of economic policy in other areas. Pleased with the results of its confrontational approach, it applied the same management style elsewhere only to find that none of the nation's other resources were amenable to such aggressive policies. …

Judicial punishments in Iraq

EDITOR,—Reports in the BMJ have drawn attention to a series of recent decrees of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council introducing amputation of the right hand as judicial punishment for theft, with amputation of the left foot for a second offence.1 2 Amputation of one ear is decreed as punishment for evasion of the draft, military desertion, or harbouring deserters. Amputation of the other pinna is the penalty for a second offence, and the death penalty is decreed for a third. In addition, an X is branded on to the forehead. It seems that these sentences …

Iraqi doctors face climate of fear

Doctors in Iraq say that one of their colleagues has been executed and several others have been imprisoned for refusing to cut off limbs or ears as a punishment for lawbreakers. The pressure on doctors to perform such operations comes against the background of growing difficulties in the day to day practice of medicine caused by shortages of drugs. The amputation of hands and legs was introduced in June for Iraqis caught stealing. In the last week of August Decree No 115 issued by Saddam Hussein's Revolutionary Command Council stated that army deserters and people evading military service …

The retreat to the barracks: Notes on the practice and the theory of military withdrawal from the seats of power

Most military regimes (a question-begging term, as will be seen) have very short lives.' Why? They are usurpations, inherently illegal, made, ex hypothesi by a minute section of the population. Though some are popular when they first take power, many are in fact greeted with a weary indifference, some with outright hostility, and none are linked organically with an organised mass following. In these respects the military government, at its inception, is wholly different from a revolutionary one. A revolutionary government is certainly illegal and has come to power by military means. But it has done so on the backs of a popular organised movement: as in China, Cuba, Mozambique, Angola, Nicaragua. In contrast, the initial condition of nearly all military regimes-at the point of their take-over-is a purely military one.2 Almost invariably this conforms to the Revolutionary Command Council/Junta format. Supreme power is exercised by a small group of officers, ranging from the traditional three of a Latin American junta to sometimes as many as twelve. This Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)-there are many alternative names for it of course-then appoints a civilian cabinet to work under its direction. (In three or four cases, in any year, all-military cabinets are found which serve the dual purpose of RCC and ministerial cabinet). The provinces or states of the country are put under the

The beginning of parliamentary democracy in Iraq — a case study

No form of representative institutions existed in Iraq since the 1958 revolution which liquidated the monarchy. The provisional constitution provided for the election of a new assembly at a date to be determined by the government. The Revolutionary Command Council announced on March 16, 1980, the promulgation ofthe National Assembly and the Legislative Council laws. Their drafts were published in mid-December 1979 and were said to be finalised after a comprehensive discussion for over two months by the workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals, women and the youth of the country. Highlighting the importance of the National Assembly law an explanatory note, to the following effect, was attached to it:

A Survey of Islamifying Trends in Libyan Law since 1969

The commitment to reinstatement of the sharī‘a, or traditional law of Islam, has been a striking feature of the programme of Libya's revolutionary government. Before 1969, legal development in Libya had conformed to the universally observable trend in Islamic societies of introducing secular laws on Western lines at the expense of the sharī‘a. True, the sharī‘a had not been superseded in Libya to as great an extent as in some countries, but its influence was largely restricted to matters of personal status and the regulation of certain traditional Islamic institutions. Civil and commercial codes on the French model had been introduced, and the Libyan Penal Code was inspired by the French and Italian versions. In 1971 the Revolutionary Command Council set up a commission to revise Libyan law in accordance with the sharī‘a, a task given renewed emphasis in 1975, when a law was passed reorganizing the commission. Since 1971 a number of laws modelled on the sharī‘a have been promulgated and, presumably, more are yet to come.An understanding of this remarkable development has been slow in coming. Information on Libyan law is regrettably difficult to obtain outside Libya, and many potentially illuminating sources remain unavailable to Western students. The impression one gleans from the incomplete materials presently available is that broad guidelines for the work of the commission revising the laws have been set. On a given legal issue the most lenient solution is to be selected from among the doctrines of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence, with consideration being given to the public welfare (maṣlaḥa) and Libya's traditional adherence to the Mālikī doctrine. However, one would like to know much more about the rationale underlying the specific enactments. Nonetheless, since this important trend has now been under way for several years, a tentative assessment, even if based on an inadequate range of sources, is long overdue.