Certificate-based signature (CBS) is an attractive paradigm since it simultaneously solves the certificate revocation problem in conventional signatures and the key escrow problem in ID-based signatures. In particular, short certificate-based signatures are useful in bandwidth reduction for communication due to their short signature lengths. However, it is still a challenging and open problem to design a secure short certificate-based signature (SCBS) scheme. Recently, to solve this problem, Li et al . proposed an efficient SCBS scheme. However, in this article, we will show that Li et al .’s scheme is insecure against Type I adversary (i.e. uncertified entity) under an accredited security model. Moreover, we propose a new SCBS scheme with provable security. Based on the computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) assumption, we demonstrate that our SCBS scheme possesses existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks under the same accredited security model. When compared with previous SCBS schemes, our scheme is the first provably secure SCBS scheme while retaining efficiency. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.itc.45.3.12814
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