Abstract
Voting-based certificate revocation is an interesting revocation method which tries to isolate the compromised nodes and attackers by cooperation of the network nodes. In this paper, we present a complete evaluation of the localized certificate revocation scheme proposed by Arboit et al. and indicate its limitations and weaknesses in revoking the malicious certificates. In these simulations we focus on the issues such as cooperative or non-cooperative malicious false accusers, false alarms and simultaneous accusations. Then we indicate that these problems can have negative impact on the voting-based certificate revocation and as a result the cooperation of more non-malicious nodes will be needed to revoke the malicious certificates. Moreover, we exhibit that when an intelligent attacker does not reveal its malicious behaviors to only a subset of the MANET nodes, the Arboit's scheme will not be able to revoke its certificate. The results of these evaluations highlight the future research directions in the localized certificate revocation context.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
