Medical Dispute Resolution Research Articles

Development of Medical Dispute Resolution System

Development of Medical Dispute Resolution System

Evidence-based Medical Dispute Resolution

Evidence-based Medical Dispute Resolution

Development of an Early Identification and Response Model of Malpractice Prevention

The dramatic rise in the incidence of malpractice claims over the past thirty years has revealed several problems with the U.S. system of medical dispute resolution. First, the sudden and unexpected increase in claims has created an insurance crisis wherein various medical specialists have had difficulty obtaining affordable insurance coverage.1 One such crisis occurred in Florida in the mid-1980's, when an inability of many physicians to procure medical malpractice coverage caused some to limit or curtail their practice. This resulted in access problems for the public. This phenomenon has disproportionately befallen physicians practicing obstetric medicine.2 Second, besides contributing to periodic crises of access, the current medical dispute resolution system is often responsible for long delays in resolving claims and in compensating victims.3

Uncertainty, information and resolution of medical malpractice disputes

This study assesses the role of defendant liability in determining whether the plaintiff receives payment, relationship of compensation to economic loss, and stage of dispute resolution. An options pricing model explains how information acquired affects both decisions to drop or continue and settlement values, as well as the role of pecuniary motives for claiming. Cases in which a panel of physician evaluators thought defendant(s) to be innocent were much more likely to be dropped, as were cases in which innocence became more apparent as the case developed. Compensation was much less than economic loss on average. Questionable defendant liability meant reduced compensation.

The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach

Previous articleNext article No AccessThe Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing ApproachBradford CornellBradford Cornell Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 19, Number 1Jan., 1990 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467846 Views: 8Total views on this site Citations: 19Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1990 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Julia Shamir, Noam Shamir Third-party funding in a sequential litigation process, European Journal of Law and Economics 52, no.11 (Aug 2021): 169–202.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-021-09707-4Samuel Antill, Steven R. Grenadier Financing the Litigation Arms Race, SSRN Electronic Journal 15 (Jan 2020).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3719238Michael I. C. Nwogugu Intangibles Accounting Regulations and the “Global Intangibles Economy”: Belief-Revision, Enforcement Theory and Financial Stability, (Sep 2019): 341–420.https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-44704-3_5 References, (Nov 2016): 239–280.https://doi.org/10.1201/9781315383149-16William H.J. Hubbard Sinking Costs to Force or Deter Settlement, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 32, no.33 (Dec 2015): 545–585.https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewv029Bruce H. Kobayashi The Law and Economics of Litigation, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2015).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2613145Martin Mendelski, Alexander Libman Demand for litigation in the absence of traditions of rule of law: an example of Ottoman and Habsburg legacies in Romania, Constitutional Political Economy 25, no.22 (Feb 2014): 177–206.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-014-9158-yMartin Mendelski, Alexander Libman Demand for Litigation in the Absence of Traditions of Rule of Law: An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies in Romania, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2014).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2429309James Fallows Tierney Economic Theory of Bellwether Trials, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1754231Avery W. Katz, Chris William Sanchirico Fee Shifting in Litigation: Survey and Assessment, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2010).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1714089Ansley Chua, Bruce Haslem PSLRA and Litigation Backed Investor Speculation, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2008).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1099050BRUCE HASLEM Managerial Opportunism during Corporate Litigation, The Journal of Finance 60, no.44 (Aug 2005): 2013–2041.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00786.xBarry E. Cushing, David L. Gilbertson Strategic Analysis of Securities Litigation against Independent Auditors, AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 21, no.22 (Sep 2002): 57–80.https://doi.org/10.2308/aud.2002.21.2.57Lucian Arye Bebchuk Suits with Negative Expected Value, (Jan 2002): 1951–1954.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_368Moshe Bar Niv (Burnovski), David Feldman Forum Selection in International Business Contracts: Home Bias Portfolio Puzzle and Managerial Moral Hazard, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2001).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.291339Peter Newman S, (Jan 1998): 395–559.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14286-6_4Avery Wiener Katz Indemnity of Legal Fees, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 1998).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.57958 William M. Landes Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis, The Journal of Legal Studies 22, no.11 (Oct 2015): 99–134.https://doi.org/10.1086/468159Frank A. Sloan, Thomas J. Hoerger Uncertainty, information and resolution of medical malpractice disputes, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 4, no.44 (Dec 1991): 403–423.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00056164

Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion

Previous articleNext article No AccessProduct Liability Litigation with Risk AversionW. Kip ViscusiW. Kip Viscusi Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 17, Number 1Jan., 1988 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/468123 Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 31Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1988 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Barbara Luppi Behavioral Biases and the Law, Review of Law & Economics 17, no.22 (Dec 2021): 453–464.https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2021-0065J.B. Heaton Risk aversion as risk-neutral pessimism: A simple proof, International Review of Law and Economics 56 (Dec 2018): 70–72.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2018.07.002J.B. Heaton Risk Neutral Justice, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2018).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3179835Enrique Guerra-Pujol Litigation as a Dollar Auction, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2016).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802290Danial Asmat, Sharon L. Tennyson Tort Liability and Settlement Failure: Evidence on Litigated Auto Insurance Claims, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2016).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2816697J.J. Prescott, Kathryn E. Spier, and Albert Yoon Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements, The Journal of Law and Economics 57, no.33 (Jun 2015): 699–746.https://doi.org/10.1086/677297P. Fenn, N. Rickman Information and the Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims: A Competing Risks Analysis, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 30, no.22 (May 2013): 244–274.https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewt002Gonzalo Martin Ruiz Understanding the Pro-plaintiff Bias in Consumer Protection Legal Processes, Journal of Consumer Policy 37, no.11 (Feb 2014): 113–141.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10603-014-9253-5Andrew I. Friedson, Thomas J. Kniesner Losers and losers: Some demographics of medical malpractice tort reforms, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 45, no.22 (Sep 2012): 115–133.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-012-9152-6Kuo-Chang Huang, Kong-Pin Chen, Chang-Ching Lin An Empirical Investigation of Settlement and Litigation-The Case of Taiwanese Labor Disputes, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 7, no.44 (Nov 2010): 786–810.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2010.01195.xJ.J. Prescott, Kathryn E. Spier, Albert Yoon Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2010).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1676404Seth A. A. Seabury Case Selection after the Trial: A Study of Post-Trial Settlement and Appeal, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2009).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1397702Kuo-Chang Huang, Kong-Pin Chen, Chang-Ching Lin An Empirical Investigation of Settlement & Litigation - The Case of Taiwan Labor Disputes, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2009).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1433683Mark J. Browne, Joan T. Schmit Litigation Patterns in Automobile Bodily Injury Claims 1977–1997: Effects of Time and Tort Reforms, Journal of Risk & Insurance 75, no.11 (Mar 2008): 83–100.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2007.00249.x Joni Hersch , Jeffrey O’Connell , and W. Kip Viscusi An Empirical Assessment of Early Offer Reform for Medical Malpractice Hersch/O'Connell/Viscusi, The Journal of Legal Studies 36, no.S2S2 (Jul 2015): S231–S259.https://doi.org/10.1086/519464Adam Burgess Mobile Phones and Service Stations: Rumour, Risk and Precaution, Diogenes 54, no.11 (Jul 2016): 125–139.https://doi.org/10.1177/0392192107073435Daniel P. Kessler, Daniel L. Rubinfeld Chapter 5 Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System, (Jan 2007): 343–402.https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0730(07)01005-5Adam Burgess Téléphones portables et stations-service, Diogène n° 213, no.11 (Mar 2006): 153–173.https://doi.org/10.3917/dio.213.0153 Joni Hersch Demand for a Jury Trial and the Selection of Cases for Trial Hersch, The Journal of Legal Studies 35, no.11 (Jul 2015): 119–142.https://doi.org/10.1086/498831Joni Hersch Jury Demands and Trials, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2004).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.487781Mark J. Browne, Joan T. Schmit Patterns in Personal Automobile Third-Party Bodily Injury Litigation: 1977 - 1997, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2004).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.588481F. P. Tulder, B. C. J. Velthoven Econom(etr)ics of crime and litigation, Statistica Neerlandica 57, no.33 (Aug 2003): 321–346.https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9574.00234Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell Economic Analysis of Law, (Jan 2002): 1661–1784.https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80029-5 Terry Thomason , and John F. Burton, Jr. Economic Effects of Workers' Compensation in the United States: Private Insurance and the Administration of Compensation Claims, Journal of Labor Economics 11, no.1, Part 21, Part 2 (Oct 2015): S1–S37.https://doi.org/10.1086/298327Frank A. Sloan, Thomas J. Hoerger Uncertainty, information and resolution of medical malpractice disputes, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 4, no.44 (Dec 1991): 403–423.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00056164W. Kip Viscusi Product and Occupational Liability, Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no.33 (Aug 1991): 71–91.https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.3.71Peter J. van Koppen Risk taking in civil law negotiations., Law and Human Behavior 14, no.22 (Jan 1990): 151–165.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01062970James W. Hughes, Edward A. Snyder Policy Analysis of Medical Malpractice Reforms: What Can We Learn From Claims Data?, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 7, no.44 (Oct 1989): 423–431.https://doi.org/10.1080/07350015.1989.10509754 J. Mark Ramseyer , and Minoru Nakazato The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, The Journal of Legal Studies 18, no.22 (Oct 2015): 263–290.https://doi.org/10.1086/468148W.Kip Viscusi Pain and suffering in product liability cases: Systematic compensation or capricious awards?, International Review of Law and Economics 8, no.22 (Dec 1988): 203–220.https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(88)90006-3J. Keith Murnighan, Alvin E. Roth, Francoise Schoumaker Risk aversion in bargaining: An experimental study, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1, no.11 (Mar 1988): 101–124.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00055566

The Determinants of the Disposition of Product Liability Claims and Compensation for Bodily Injury

Previous articleNext article No AccessThe Determinants of the Disposition of Product Liability Claims and Compensation for Bodily InjuryW. Kip ViscusiW. Kip Viscusi Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 15, Number 2Jun., 1986 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467815 Views: 8Total views on this site Citations: 31Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1986 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Lubna Zia, Shujahat Haider Hashmi Disposition Effect and Overconfidence in Pakistani Stock Market, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2016).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2745749Herbert M. Kritzer Litigation, (Jan 2015): 265–275.https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.86082-1P. Fenn, N. Rickman Information and the Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims: A Competing Risks Analysis, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 30, no.22 (May 2013): 244–274.https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewt002Sasha Romanosky, David Hoffman, Alessandro Acquisti Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 11, no.11 (Jan 2014): 74–104.https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12035Jean-François Sattin Procédures d’audit et gestion des licences de brevet : une analyse transactionnelle, Revue d'économie industrielle , no.139139 (Sep 2012): 77–99.https://doi.org/10.4000/rei.5447Sasha Romanosky, David A. Hoffman, Alessandro Acquisti Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2012).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1986461Marc Poitras, Ralph Frasca A unified model of settlement and trial expenditures: The Priest–Klein model extended, International Review of Law and Economics 31, no.33 (Sep 2011): 188–195.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2011.07.006Miguel Santolino Determinants of the decision to appeal against motor bodily injury judgements made by Spanish trial courts, International Review of Law and Economics 30, no.11 (Mar 2010): 37–45.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2009.09.002Mark J. Browne, Joan T. Schmit Litigation Patterns in Automobile Bodily Injury Claims 1977–1997: Effects of Time and Tort Reforms, Journal of Risk & Insurance 75, no.11 (Mar 2008): 83–100.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2007.00249.xMark J. Browne, Joan T. Schmit Patterns in Personal Automobile Third-Party Bodily Injury Litigation: 1977 - 1997, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2004).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.588481F. P. Tulder, B. C. J. Velthoven Econom(etr)ics of crime and litigation, Statistica Neerlandica 57, no.33 (Aug 2003): 321–346.https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9574.00234Steven Shavell Economic Analysis of Litigation and the Legal Process, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2003).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.382060Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell Economic Analysis of Law, (Jan 2002): 1661–1784.https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80029-5B. Zorina Khan Commerce and Cooperation: Litigation and Settlement of Civil Disputes on the Australian Frontier, 1860–1990, The Journal of Economic History 60, no.44 (Jul 2012): 1088–1119.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700026383 By Howard F. Chang and Hilary Sigman Incentives to Settle under Joint and Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis of Superfund Litigation Chang & Sigman, The Journal of Legal Studies 29, no.11 (Jul 2015): 205–236.https://doi.org/10.1086/468068Donald Wittman Lay Juries Versus Professional Arbitrators and the Arbitrator Selection Hypothesis, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2000).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.243760Robert Puelz, Mark J. Browne The Effect of Legal Rules on the Value of Economic and Non-Economic Damages and the Decision to File, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 1998).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.120608Andrew S. Rajkumar, Michael T. French Drug abuse, crime costs, and the economic benefits of treatment, Journal of Quantitative Criminology 13, no.33 (Sep 1997): 291–323.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02221094Jeffery Mullis Medical malpractice, social structure, and social control, Sociological Forum 10, no.11 (Mar 1995): 135–163.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02098567Peter Zweifel, Jean-Robert Tyran Environmental impairment liability as an instrument of environmental policy, Ecological Economics 11, no.11 (Sep 1994): 43–56.https://doi.org/10.1016/0921-8009(94)90049-3 Combined Bibliography, Justice System Journal 16, no.22 (Sep 2014): 155–172.https://doi.org/10.1080/23277556.1993.10871176BRIAN OSTROM, DAVID ROTTMAN, ROGER HANSON What are Tort Awards Really Like? The Untold Story from the State Courts, Law & Policy 14, no.11 (Jan 1992): 77–106.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9930.1992.tb00076.xFrank A. Sloan, Thomas J. Hoerger Uncertainty, information and resolution of medical malpractice disputes, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 4, no.44 (Dec 1991): 403–423.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00056164Ivy E. Broder, Thomas A. Husted The effect of post-trial activity on large jury awards, International Review of Law and Economics 11, no.33 (Dec 1991): 251–260.https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(91)90002-UW. Kip Viscusi, Joni Hersch The market response to product safety litigation, Journal of Regulatory Economics 2, no.33 (Sep 1990): 215–230.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134061James W. Hughes, Edward A. Snyder Policy Analysis of Medical Malpractice Reforms: What Can We Learn From Claims Data?, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 7, no.44 (Oct 1989): 423–431.https://doi.org/10.1080/07350015.1989.10509754William L. F. Felstiner, Tom Durkin, Peter Siegelman Consumers as workers: The problems of complacent theory, Journal of Consumer Policy 12, no.33 (Sep 1989): 381–396.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00412143W. L. F. FELSTINER, PETER SIEGELMAN Neoclassical Difficulties: Tort Deterrence for Latent Injuries*, Law & Policy 11, no.33 (Jun 2008): 309–329.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9930.1989.tb00031.xHoward K. Gruenspecht, Lester B. Lave Chapter 26 The economics of health, safety, and environmental regulation, (Jan 1989): 1507–1550.https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02014-5W.Kip Viscusi Pain and suffering in product liability cases: Systematic compensation or capricious awards?, International Review of Law and Economics 8, no.22 (Dec 1988): 203–220.https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(88)90006-3 W. Kip Viscusi Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion, The Journal of Legal Studies 17, no.11 (Oct 2015): 101–121.https://doi.org/10.1086/468123

Settlement out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims

THE main purpose of this paper is to present empirical estimates of a model of the disposition of claims through the courts. Landes, Gould, Posner, and others have developed a theoretical model of the disposition process, in which the decision to settle and the size of settlement depend on the defendant's maximum offer (expected award at verdict plus litigation costs) relative to the plaintiff's minimum ask (expected award at verdict minus litigation costs).' Variants of this model have been applied in several contexts, but so far it has not been tested empirically with data on individual claims.2 The obstacles to estimation by standard econometric techniques are twofold. First, the hypothesized determinants of the outcome-the potential verdict, ask, offer, and litigation costs-are all unobserved in the data available. Second, if the theory is correct, claims closed at each stage of disposition are not random samples but are "selfselected" on the basis of those case characteristics whose effect we wish to measure. Therefore, analysis of the observed outcome-size and probability of payment to the plaintiff, at verdict and in out-of-court settlement-cannot be generalized to the universe of claims as a whole. Param-